What Can the Collective Action Problem Tell Us about the Recurrence of Civil War and the Long-term Stability of a Country? Page: 3
This thesis is part of the collection entitled: UNT Theses and Dissertations and was provided to UNT Digital Library by the UNT Libraries.
Extracted Text
The following text was automatically extracted from the image on this page using optical character recognition software:
peace following a negotiated settlement. Hartzell and Hoddie (2003a) examine the context of the
settlement and its design on the effects of the duration of peace. In particular, Hartzell and
Hoddie (2003a) focus their attention on the power sharing mechanisms in the negotiated
settlement, which are intended to distribute power among the competing groups in the post-civil
war environment.
Civil wars end in one of three ways: government victory, rebel victory, or a negotiated
settlement (Mason, Weingarten and Fett 1999). The bulk of the research on negotiated
settlements focuses on their short-term effects on the durability of peace. Little of the current
research addresses the long-term stability of the country following the conclusion of a civil war
and the recurrence of another civil war. Several scholars have developed some interesting
variables which have been found to lengthen the duration of a civil war; however, one must ask:
how well do these variables perform in the larger context of all wars and what effect do they
have on the recurrence of a civil war? I argue that studying the long-term stability of peace is at
least as important as studying the short-term effects on durability of peace. This should be
interesting to scholars of both interstate and intrastate conflicts because all or almost all actors in
the system prefer to operate in a stable system. This research question also provides insight into
the larger set of civil wars with peace being the goal all forms of intrastate conflict should be
examined. I believe that this study will shed some light on the differing goals and outcomes of
long-term stability versus the goals of short-term stability. This research may suggest that the
means used to attain long-stability versus short-term stability are closely related but somewhat
different.
Upcoming Pages
Here’s what’s next.
Search Inside
This thesis can be searched. Note: Results may vary based on the legibility of text within the document.
Tools / Downloads
Get a copy of this page or view the extracted text.
Citing and Sharing
Basic information for referencing this web page. We also provide extended guidance on usage rights, references, copying or embedding.
Reference the current page of this Thesis.
Kohler, Matthew. What Can the Collective Action Problem Tell Us about the Recurrence of Civil War and the Long-term Stability of a Country?, thesis, December 2005; Denton, Texas. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc4955/m1/7/?rotate=90: accessed July 17, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; .