What Can the Collective Action Problem Tell Us about the Recurrence of Civil War and the Long-term Stability of a Country? Page: 50
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collective action problem using rewards as an inducement for service to the rebellion. This
suggests that the material reward of rebellion is reserved for the elites of the rebellion and not the
soldiers who do the actual fighting. These findings contrast the predictions of Collier, Hoeffler,
and Soderbom (2004).
Second, the ability of rebel leaders to solve the collective action problem is a direct result
of the political environment following the first war. Factors that measured the political
environment resulting from the previous civil war, including partition and level of democracy,
were significant. Interestingly, partition affected the recurrence of civil war in the opposite
direction predicted by hypothesis 7. Partition actually decreases the likelihood of another civil
war and thus has a positive effect on long-term stability of a country.
Democracy was highly significant in both of the models. Democracies are less likely to
experience another civil war. Intuitively this makes sense for democracies allow the malcontents
to have an influence on the government and effect change through voting instead of revolution.
Therefore, democracies limit the ability of the rebel leaders to solve the collective action
problem. Consequently, democracies decrease the likelihood of recurrence of a civil war.
Lastly, forces outside of the state involved in the war can alter the solution to the
collective action problem of the Rebel's Dilemma. Third-party enforcement of the peace was
significant. This suggests that third parties can influence the long-term stability of a country
following a civil war.
Due to the difficulty of interpreting the magnitude of the effect from the logit regression
discussed above, Table 3 transforms all the significant coefficients from Model 1 into marginal
effects presenting them at incremental levels so that we can determine their effects on the
dependent variable through a wide range of outcomes for each of the significant independent50
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Kohler, Matthew. What Can the Collective Action Problem Tell Us about the Recurrence of Civil War and the Long-term Stability of a Country?, thesis, December 2005; Denton, Texas. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc4955/m1/54/?rotate=270: accessed July 17, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; .