Los Alamos National Laboratory: Information on Security of Classified Data, Nuclear Material Controls, Nuclear and Worker Safety, and Project Management Weaknesses Page: 4 of 61
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* reducing the number of accountable electronic classified items from 87,000 to
4,472,
* reducing the number of vaults and vault-type rooms holding classified data
from 142 to 114, and
* consolidating classified material and classified processing operations into a
"Super Vault Type Room."
There were no reported incidents involving the loss or diversion of special nuclear or
radiological material from LANL from October 1, 2002, through June 30, 2007.
However, a number of security concerns with the inventory and accounting of these
materials have been documented, most recently in a DOE Inspector General report
issued in September 2007.5 Although the Inspector General concluded that, in general,
LANL provides timely and accurate information on its inventory of accountable
nuclear material," it highlighted several areas of concern, including the following:
* Several inventories of nuclear materials were not completed in a timely
manner.
* A storage vault containing over 11,000 individual containers of accountable
nuclear material had not undergone a 100 percent inventory in over a decade.
* The creation of a new container of accountable nuclear material was not
documented within the required time frame. This nuclear material could have
been diverted without any record showing that it had ever existed.
Concerns about nuclear safety at LANL are long-standing. Problems include the
following:
* Criticality concerns. 7 For example, since 2003, the laboratory reported 19
incidents raising nuclear criticality concerns, such as storage or
transportation of dangerous material in quantities that exceeded or potentially
exceeded criticality limits. In the plutonium facility (TA-55) in July 2007, for
example, an area of the facility containing spent trichloroethylene exceeded
the criticality safety limit for such material by 40 percent. As recently as
September 2007, operations were suspended in the plutonium facility over
nuclear safety concerns.
5DOE Inspector General, Material Control and Accountability at Los Alamos National Laboratory,
DOE/IG-0774, Sept. 2007.
'This refers to nuclear material that LANL is required to account for and control according to its
strategic and monetary importance and the consequences of its loss.
7Criticality involves an inadvertent nuclear chain reaction. To prevent such an occurrence from
happening, DOE's regulations and directive require contractors to evaluate potential accident
conditions and put in place appropriate controls and safety measures.GAO-08-173R: Los Alamos Laboratory
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United States. Government Accountability Office. Los Alamos National Laboratory: Information on Security of Classified Data, Nuclear Material Controls, Nuclear and Worker Safety, and Project Management Weaknesses, text, January 10, 2008; Washington D.C.. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc298630/m1/4/: accessed April 27, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.