Boko Haram and the Islamic State's West Africa Province Page: 1 of 2
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;* Congressional Research Service
Informing the legislative debate since 1914June 28, 2018
Boko Haram and the Islamic State's West Africa ProvinceBoko Haram emerged in the early 2000s as a small Sunni
Islamic sect in Nigeria advocating a strict interpretation and
implementation of Islamic law, and has evolved since 2009
to become one of the world's deadliest terrorist groups. The
nickname Boko Haram was given by local communities to
describe the group's narrative that Western education and
culture are corrupting influences and haram ("forbidden").
The group called itself Jama'a Ahi as-Sunna Li-da'wa Wa-
al Jihad (roughly translated from Arabic as "People
Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings
and Jihad"). In 2015, its leadership pledged allegiance to
the Islamic State (IS, aka ISIS/ISIL), and renamed itself as
the Islamic State's West Africa Province (aka ISWAP,
ISIS-WA, hereafter IS-WA). The group, still widely
referred to as Boko Haram, subsequently split into two
factions. Both pose an ongoing security threat in Nigeria
and the surrounding Lake Chad Basin region.
Civilians in Nigeria's impoverished, predominately Muslim
northeast have borne the brunt of Boko Haram's violence,
which also impacts the border areas of Cameroon, Chad,
and Niger. By some estimates Boko Haram has killed more
than 15,200 people since 2011, including over 950 in 2017.
The conflict has sparked a major humanitarian emergency,
with more than 2.4 million people in the region displaced.
Boko Haram has attracted international headlines with its
brutal tactics and targeting of civilians, including the
abduction of over 270 schoolgirls from the town of Chibok
in 2014. Amnesty International estimated a year later that
Boko Haram had abducted more than 2,000 women and
girls in total, forcing some to participate in attacks.
UNICEF estimates that in 2014-2016 nearly 20% of Boko
Haram suicide bombers were children, 75% of them girls.
Boko Haram conducted its first lethal attack against an
international institution in August 2011, with the bombing
of the United Nations building in Nigeria's capital, Abuja.
That has been its most prominent assault on an international
(non-regional) target. Boko Haram has issued threats to
attack the United States, but to date no U.S. citizens are
known to have been kidnapped or killed by the group.
In mid-2014, Boko Haram launched a territorial offensive
that Nigerian forces struggled to reverse until regional
forces, primarily from Chad, launched a counteroffensive in
early 2015. Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari, elected
later that year, has taken a more aggressive approach
toward countering the group, which has since reverted to
asymmetric attacks, operating from remote border areas in
the Lake Chad Basin region.
Leadership and Group Divisions
Abubakar Shekau assumed leadership of Boko Haram after
its founding leader Mohammed Yusuf was killed in police
custody in 2009. Analysts suggest that Shekau fostered
divisions in the group with his brutal and indiscriminatetactics against Muslim civilians, including his use of child
suicide bombers. In 2016, a new faction emerged, led by
Yusuf's son, Abu Musab al Barnawi, a former Boko Haram
spokesman. Barnawi renounced attacks against Muslim
civilians; he claims to focus on government and security
force targets. In August 2016, IS leadership recognized
Barnawi as IS-WA's new wali ("governor"), notionally
replacing Shekau, who denounced Barnawi as an apostate.
He has not renounced his allegiance to Islamic State.
The name "Boko Haram" is still often used to refer to both
factions, reflecting their common history. There is also
ongoing debate over the extent to which the groups are
distinct. Many, including the U.S. government, now refer to
Shekau's faction as Boko Haram and Barnawi's as IS-WA.
In February 2018, a U.S. Africa Command official
described IS-WA as being a "longer term strategic threat"
than the Shekau faction.
The United States has designated both groups as Foreign
Terrorist Organizations (FTOs): Boko Haram in 2013 and
IS-WA in 2018. In 2012, the State Department designated
three individuals linked to Boko Haram, including Shekau,
as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs), and in
2013 it offered $7 million for information on his location
through its Rewards for Justice program. The two other
individuals were cited as having close links to a regional
terrorist network, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM), and have since been reportedly killed or arrested.
In 2015, two others linked to Boko Haram were designated
as SDGTs: Mustapha Chad, a Chadian commander, and
Mohammed (Mamman) Nur, who is rumored to be aligned
with Barnawi. He was designated as an SDGT in 2018.
Objectives and Areas of Operation
Boko Haram has called for an uprising against secular
authority and for the establishment of an Islamic state in
Nigeria. It draws on a narrative of resentment and
vengeance against state abuses to elicit sympathizers and
recruits. Some attacks have targeted Christian communities
in the north, fueling sectarian tensions in the country.
According to the group's narrative, the state and Christians
have collaborated against Nigerian Muslims. Most of
Shekau's victims have nonetheless been Muslim, consistent
with his exclusivist interpretation of Islam, which justifies
brutality against moderates. Barnawi has pledged to shift
the group's focus to Western, Christian, and secular targets.
Key factors that have given rise to the insurgency include a
legacy of overlapping intercommunal, Muslim-Christian,
and north-south tensions within Nigeria and frustration with
elite corruption and other state abuses. The Nigerian
security forces' heavy-handed response in the northeast
may have driven recruitment in some areas. Financial
incentives, social pressures, and coercion have also been
cited in studies on the group's recruitment. Defectors andwww.crs.gov 17-5700
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Blanchard, Lauren Ploch & Cavigelli, Katia T. Boko Haram and the Islamic State's West Africa Province, report, June 28, 2018; Washington D.C.. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1213136/m1/1/: accessed April 26, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.