Evaluating late detection capability against diverse insider adversaries

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This paper describes a model for evaluating the late (after-the-fact) detection capability of material control and accountability (MCandA) systems against insider theft or diversion of special nuclear material. Potential insider cover-up strategies to defeat activities providing detection (e.g., inventories) are addressed by the model in a tractable manner. For each potential adversary and detection activity, two probabilities are assessed and used to fit the model. The model then computes the probability of detection for activities occurring periodically over time. The model provides insight into MCandA effectiveness and helps identify areas for safeguards improvement. 4 refs., 4 tabs.

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7 pages

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Sicherman, A. December 3, 1987.

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Description

This paper describes a model for evaluating the late (after-the-fact) detection capability of material control and accountability (MCandA) systems against insider theft or diversion of special nuclear material. Potential insider cover-up strategies to defeat activities providing detection (e.g., inventories) are addressed by the model in a tractable manner. For each potential adversary and detection activity, two probabilities are assessed and used to fit the model. The model then computes the probability of detection for activities occurring periodically over time. The model provides insight into MCandA effectiveness and helps identify areas for safeguards improvement. 4 refs., 4 tabs.

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7 pages

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NTIS, PC A02/MF A01; 1.

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  • American Nuclear Society topical conference, San Diego, CA, USA, 29 Nov 1987

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  • Other: DE88008678
  • Report No.: UCRL-97740
  • Report No.: CONF-8711108-3
  • Grant Number: W-7405-ENG-48
  • Office of Scientific & Technical Information Report Number: 5028064
  • Archival Resource Key: ark:/67531/metadc1057223

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Office of Scientific & Technical Information Technical Reports

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Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI) is the Department of Energy (DOE) office that collects, preserves, and disseminates DOE-sponsored research and development (R&D) results that are the outcomes of R&D projects or other funded activities at DOE labs and facilities nationwide and grantees at universities and other institutions.

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  • December 3, 1987

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  • Jan. 22, 2018, 7:23 a.m.

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  • May 3, 2019, 4:45 p.m.

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Sicherman, A. Evaluating late detection capability against diverse insider adversaries, article, December 3, 1987; California. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1057223/: accessed July 16, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.

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