What Can the Collective Action Problem Tell Us about the Recurrence of Civil War and the Long-term Stability of a Country? Page: 39
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Without assistance from the outside this further diminishes the average citizen's opportunities.
Countries that have relatively low economic development and experience a civil war would be
much more likely to experience another and another. Countries with high per capita income limit
the ability of the rebels to solve the collective action problem because few individuals view the
select incentives offered by a rebel group as worth the risk of dying. However, countries with
low per capita income will have the opposite effect on the collective action problem.
Hypothesis 3.: Countries with low economic development are expected to have a higher
probability of the recurrence of another civil war.
Fearon (2004) finds that the availability of drugs and/or gemstones (contraband) in a
conflict zone tends to lengthen civil wars. Stedman (2001) reports similar findings that lootable
goods decrease the duration of a negotiated settlement. "Loot is not usually the root motivation
for conflict, but it may become critical to its perpetuation, giving rise to the conflict trap"
(Collier et al. 2003). Collier, Elliot, Hoeffler, Reynal-Querol and Sambanis (2003) argue that
while the production of drugs rise sharply during conflicts, it is not completely eliminated in post
conflict situations and that the production of drugs prevails long after the civil war ends.
The argument parallels those of Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom (2004) regarding
rebellion as a business. Countries that have experienced one civil war and have gem mining
and/or drug production have already developed the necessary underground economy, technical
expertise and trafficking routes outside the country for the financing of rebel groups. Rebel
groups will find it much easier to recruit and reward individuals when they have a steady income
stream funded by these lootable goods. Thus, we can expect the likelihood of another civil war
in countries that have a marketable lootable good to be high. This source of income increases the
ability of rebels to solve the collective action problem.39
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Kohler, Matthew. What Can the Collective Action Problem Tell Us about the Recurrence of Civil War and the Long-term Stability of a Country?, thesis, December 2005; Denton, Texas. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc4955/m1/43/: accessed July 17, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; .