What Can the Collective Action Problem Tell Us about the Recurrence of Civil War and the Long-term Stability of a Country? Page: 13
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Political power-sharing measurement details the distribution of political power among the
parties to the settlement. Hartzell and Hoddie (2003a) limit the political forms of power sharing
to electoral proportional representation and executive proportional representation. The territorial
measurement of power-sharing is defined as autonomy between levels of government on the
basis of federalism or regional autonomy arrangements. Military power-sharing is the rules
regarding the distribution of the state's coercive power among the warring factions in the civil
war. The economic power-sharing defines the distribution among groups of economic resources
controlled or mandated by the state3 (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003a).
3According to the coding rules each part of the four part typology is defined as:
"Political power-sharing (politicalps): Score as "1" if the civil war settlement includes any of the following
provisions: (a) electoral proportional representation (settlement or discussion of settlement must specify its use, it is
not a revision to previous use of proportional representation); (b) administrative proportional representation (i.e.,
appointment of representatives of warring groups to courts, civil service, foreign service, and commissions); (c)
executive proportional representation (i.e., appointment of representatives of warring groups to ministerial, sub-
ministerial, and cabinet positions)."
"Territorial power-sharing (terrps): Score as "1" if the civil war settlement includes any of the following provisions:
(a) divisions of political power between levels of government on the basis of federalism (either centralized
federalism or decentralized federalism) or confederalism; (b) division of political power between levels of
government on the basis of regional autonomy."
"Military power-sharing (militaryps): Score as "1" if the civil war settlement includes any of the following
provisions: (a) creation of state's security forces (i.e., army, navy, air force, state militia) through the integration of
former antagonists' armed forces on the basis of a formula representative of the size of the armed groups; (b)
creation of state's security forces (i.e., army, navy, air force, state militia) on the basis of equal numbers of troops
drawn from the antagonists' armed forces, (c) appointment of members of armed faction(s) who do not dominate the
state, or of weaker armed factions, to key leadership positions (i.e., general, commander, director, defense minister)
in the state's security forces; (d) allow antagonists to remain armed (i.e., settlement does not specify any
disarmament measures); (e) allow antagonists to retain their own armed forces."
"Economic power-sharing (econps): Score as "1" if the civil war settlement includes any of the following
provisions: (a) specification of pattern of resource distribution by the state to disadvantaged groups, either on the
basis of a percentage of resources to be allocated to those groups or on a financial amount to be directed to those
groups; (b) specification of policies to be used to direct economic assets toward groups on the basis of their group
membership or geographic location (i.e., policies associated with provision of land; control or administration of
natural resources; scholarships and admissions to schools, training centers, colleges; creation and/or set-asides of
jobs, promotions; transfer of factories, capital, and credit; provision or creation of licenses to operate commercial
enterprises and to practice professions or trades)."
It is important to note that the coding is based on the notion that if any portion of each one of these is included in the
negotiated settlement. This does not in any way imply that any or all of these are actually implemented following
the settlement.
Coding rules and variable labels are available at
www.polisci.tamu.edu/uploadimages/18/AJPS%20Final%20Coding%20Rules%20and%20Variable%20Labls.htm13
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Kohler, Matthew. What Can the Collective Action Problem Tell Us about the Recurrence of Civil War and the Long-term Stability of a Country?, thesis, December 2005; Denton, Texas. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc4955/m1/17/: accessed July 17, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; .