Design and Analysis of Novel Verifiable Voting Schemes Page: 28
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candidates but leaves position number and verification code unaltered. Voter's audit
wouldn't reveal it because election officials will publish only positions and verification
codes. But recount of the paper ballots will detect it. The same will happen if adversary
would change only paper ballots, leaving the optical scan machine data unaltered.
Therefore, the adversary should modify both paper ballots and data on optical scan
machines to succeed. This attack is possible, but requires to have an access to op-scan
machine internals and ability to change ballot boxes or ballots themselves. It would be
practically impossible to realize this attack without the help from corrupted election
officials, which contradicts to our assumption that they act honest.
Ballots stuffing. Let assume that the adversary was able to stuff either paper
ballots or votes on op-scan machines. This attack would be easily detected because the
number of paper ballots and ballots tabulated by op-scan machine wouldn't match.
Even if the adversary was able to add additional votes to both op-scan machines and
ballot boxes, the total number of votes should match the number of voters who actually
casted their ballots. Both numbers are publicly announced on the bulletin board. To
achieve success, the adversary should add more voters on the list. Otherwise fraud will
be detected.
Now let's assume that the adversary was able to add some voters' names to the
list of actually voted citizens. If the adversary adds legitimate voters, who didn't vote
then there is a probability that someone will detect that person who didn't participate in
election, appeared on the list of voters. It is detectable with high probability, but
unfortunately, not guaranteed [24].28
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Yestekov, Yernat. Design and Analysis of Novel Verifiable Voting Schemes, thesis, December 2013; Denton, Texas. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc407785/m1/33/: accessed July 17, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; .