'The Marshall System' in World War II, Myth and Reality: Six American Commanders Who Failed Page: I
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Carlson, Cody King. 'The Marshall System' in World War II, Myth and Reality: Six
American Commanders Who Failed. Doctor of Philosophy (History), August 2020, 354 pp.,
bibliography, 126 primary sources, 182 secondary sources.
This is an analysis of the U.S. Army's personnel decisions in the Second World War.
Specifically, it considers the U.S. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall's appointment of
generals to combat command, and his reasons for relieving some generals while leaving others in
place after underperformance. Many historians and contemporaries of Marshall, including
General Omar N. Bradley, have commented on Marshall's ability to select brilliant, capable
general officers for combat command in the war. However, in addition to solid performers like
J. Lawton Collins, Lucian Truscott, and George S. Patton, Marshall, together with Dwight D.
Eisenhower and Lesley J. McNair, often selected sub-par commanders who significantly
underperformed on the battlefield. These generals' tactical and operational decisions frequently
led to unnecessary casualties, and ultimately prolonged the war. The work considers six case
studies: Lloyd Fredendall at Kasserine Pass, Mark Clark during the Italian campaign, John Lucas
at Anzio, Omar Bradley at the Falaise Gap, Courtney Hodges at the Htrtgen Forest, and Simon
Bolivar Buckner, Jr. at Okinawa. Personal connections and patronage played strong roles in
these generals' command appointments, and often trumped practical considerations like
command experience. While their superiors ultimately relieved corps commanders Fredendall
and Lucas, field army and army group commanders Clark, Hodges, and Bradley retained
command of their units, (Buckner died from combat wounds on Okinawa). Personal connections
also strongly influenced the decision to retain the field army and army group commanders in
their commands.
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Carlson, Cody King. 'The Marshall System' in World War II, Myth and Reality: Six American Commanders Who Failed, dissertation, August 2020; Denton, Texas. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1707257/m1/2/: accessed July 17, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; .