Intergovernmental responsibilities for water supply and sewage disposal in metropolitan areas. Page: 36
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Many of these alleged advantages are scored as weaknesses
by critics of the contract system. In essence, contracting is a
relationship between customer and monopoly supplier. Although
the "dictator" often is benevolent, the arrangement is not
representative government. The suburbs have no representation
on the central city agency which provides the service. When
clashes arise over rates and service, or supply during periods
of shortage, and such conflicts are endemic to the contract
system, the central city, because of its disproportionate
bargaining position, usually prevails. Complaints, such as those
in Cleveland's suburbs, that nearly half the users of Cleveland
water have no political control over the water supply, are common.
The unequal relationship produces antagonisms that often result
in the central city being blamed for all service shortcomings,
although the trouble usually results from inadequate local distribution
and collection systems. Since the central city voters must
approve bond issues for improvement or additions of benefit to
both residents and contracting communities, the suburbs' water and
sewer service levels are determined by political processes over
which they have no control. In the Los Angeles area, improvements
and additions to the city's sewage collection and treatment system
vital to a number of suburbs have been delayed or shelved because
of the failure of voters in Los Angeles to approve the necessary
bond issues.
A few States seek to prevent monopolistic exploitation of
suburbs by central cities through regulation by a State utility
commission. Wisconsin's Public Service Commission regulates the
rates charged by a wholesale utility. In most States, however, the
suburbs only recourse if negotiation fails is the courts or the State
legislature, with neither alternative likely to improve intergovernmental
relations in the metropolitan area.
Profits under the contract system do not always accrue to the
central city. State law prohibits Chicago from selling water to
municipalities within the Chicago Sanitary District at prices higher
than those charged in the city. Over 50 suburbs obtain water wholesale
from Chicago. They sell the water to their residents and in some
cases other communities for rates which average three times those in
Chicago. Some municipalities increase the price as much as 600 percent,
finance a good part of their local expenses with water revenues, and
maintain a much more attractive tax rate than Chicago.
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United States. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. Intergovernmental responsibilities for water supply and sewage disposal in metropolitan areas., book, October 1962; Washington, D.C.. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1424/m1/48/: accessed July 18, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.