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CRS-5
with its safeguards obligations."" There is considerable room for interpretation, both by
IAEA inspectors and the DG. In one respect, this may be considered necessary, because,
for example, failures to report material can be significant or trivial, depending on the
circumstances. Discrepancies involving large quantities of weapons-grade plutonium or
highly enriched uranium are clearly more significant for a nuclear weapons program than
those involving smaller quantities or non-weapons grade materials like natural uranium.
However, many hold that discrepancies establish a pattern of deception that is significant.
Board of Governors Actions. The first step the Board took was in September
2003, calling on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment and reprocessing
activities, resolve all outstanding issues, be transparent and cooperative with the IAEA,
and sign, ratify and implement the Additional Protocol. Iran responded by agreeing to sign
the Additional Protocol and voluntarily suspend all uranium enrichment and "processing
activities." The suspension covered: operation and/or testing of centrifuges at the pilot
plant, further introduction of any nuclear material into any centrifuges, and installation of
new centrifuges at the pilot plant and at Natanz. Iran also said it would withdraw nuclear
material from any centrifuge facility to the extent practicable.'5 During the period of
suspension, Iran said it did not "intend to make new contracts for the manufacture of
centrifuge machines and their components;" that the Agency could supervise the storage
of machines assembled during that period; that it had dismantled its laser enrichment
projects and that it was not constructing or operating any plutonium separation facility.
Yet, Iran reportedly continued to assemble centrifuges.
The Board resolved in November 2003 (GOV/2003/81) that "should any further
serious Iranian failures come to light, the Board of Governors would meet immediately to
consider...all options at its disposal, in accordance with the IAEA Statute and Iran's
Safeguards Agreement." Between February and June 2004, the IAEA attempted to verify
fran's pledges to suspend activities. The DG reported in March 2004 that Iran had been
actively cooperating with the Agency, including providing access to workshops at military
sites, but that Iran failed to mention advanced centrifuge designs (P-2) in its October 2003
declaration and the Agency was not able to resolve the major outstanding issue of LEU
and HEU contamination at Kalaye and Natanz. The June 2004 report (GOV/2004/34)
assessed that Iran had delayed inspections at the Natanz pilot scale enrichment plant; Iran
had not suspended UF6 production or domestic production of centrifuge components; and
Iran had not previously declared the procurement of 4000 magnets (and orders for more)
for P-2 centrifuges. While the Board noted (GOV/2004/49) with concern continuing
discrepancies about HEU contamination and the nature of the P-2 centrifuge program andcalled upon Iran to halt UF6 production and planned construction of the research reactor
designed to use heavy water, the resolution noted only the Board would remain seized of
the matter. In March 2005, Iran was reported to continue the production of UF4, as well
as quality control testing on centrifuge components. The March 2005 Board, however, did
not issue a resolution on Iran.
EU-3 Negotiations. Since October 2003, the foreign ministers of Germany,
France, and the UK (EU-3) have been negotiating with Iran on restricting its nuclear" Statement of Ambassador Kenneth Brill at September 2003 IAEA Board of Governors
Meeting.
" GOV/2004/11, February DG's report on Iran, p. 10.
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Squassoni, Sharon. Iran's Nuclear Program: Recent Developments, report, August 2, 2005; Washington D.C.. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs6961/m1/5/: accessed July 18, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.