5 Matching Results

Search Results

Advanced search parameters have been applied.

Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress

Description: On January 26, 2012, senior DOD leadership unveiled a new defense strategy based on a review of potential future security challenges, current defense strategy, and budgetary constraints. This new strategy envisions a smaller, leaner Army that is agile, flexible, rapidly deployable, and technologically advanced. This strategy will rebalance the Army's global posture and presence, emphasizing where potential problems are likely to arise, such as the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East. Potential issues for Congress include the strategic risk posed by a smaller and restructured Army; the "health" of the Army given the impending downsizing; where the force will be based; the role of the National Guard and Reserves; and should the enrollment at the service academies (West Point) be reduced to pre-9/11 levels. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant.
Date: April 20, 2012
Creator: Feickert, Andrew & Henning, Charles A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Impact of a reduced nuclear weapons stockpile on strategic stability

Description: This presentation is to discuss the impact of a reduced nuclear weapons stockpile on the strategic stability. Methodologies used to study strategic stability issues include what are basically strategic-force exchange models. These models are used to simulate a massive nuclear exchange in which one side attacks and the other side retaliates. These models have been of interest to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program. Researchers have been looking at issues concerning the stability of the transition period, during which some defenses have been deployed and during which deterrence and war-fighting capability reply partly on defense and partly on offense. Also, more recently, with interest in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and force reductions beyond START, the same calculation engines have been used to examine the impact of reduced forces on strategic stability. For both the SDI and the START reduction cases, exchange models are able to address only a rather narrow class of strategic stability issues. Other broader stability questions that are unrelated to nuclear weapons or that relate to nuclear weapons but are not addressed by the calculational tools which are not included in this discussion. 6 refs., 1 fig., 1 tab. (BN)
Date: March 20, 1991
Creator: Chrzanowski, P.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

A theory of deterrence

Description: The purpose of this monograph is to start a theory of deterrence which has the capability of quantitatively answering the question of what is required to deter a nation or alliance from certain acts. Despite the existence of voluminous writing on deterrence, from the beginning of the nuclear age and even before, none of it attempts a theoretical discussion of how to calculate what it takes to deter a country from committing some acts which are objectionable to another country. Many theories of deterrence have already been created. They have exclusively been of two separate forms -- those of the social scientists, which deal with political questions, and how the concept of mass destruction psychological deters the initiation of war; and those of the mathematicians, who model the quantities of one country`s arsenal of strategic systems needed to destroy a certain portion of another country`s. Only the latter is quantitative, but they lack an essential element added to answer the question ``How much is enough?`` In order to use the techniques of operations research on the questions of what type and amount of weapons are adequate for deterrence, the definitions of quantities occurring in the calculations need to be made in quantifiable way. Numbers of weapons have been the only quantified parameter in previous deterrence calculations. Yet weapons alone do not deter. The threat of destruction and damage does. How is that threatenable damage to be measured, and as through defensive system construction, counterforce capability improvement, arms control, or other means, it becomes less when is the threshold for deterrence met and crossed? The calculation of this damage, and the implication of that damage to decision-makers capable of making a war initiation decision, is a complicated process, and it is what constitutes a theory of deterrence. 36 refs.
Date: March 20, 1991
Creator: Erickson, S. A. Jr.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Nuclear weapons, nuclear effects, nuclear war

Description: This paper provides a brief and mostly non-technical description of the militarily important features of nuclear weapons, of the physical phenomena associated with individual explosions, and of the expected or possible results of the use of many weapons in a nuclear war. Most emphasis is on the effects of so-called ``strategic exchanges.``
Date: August 20, 1991
Creator: Bing, G. F.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department