Description: One year into the Hanford contract, Fluor had learned a number of hard lessons very quickly. Although the Hanford remediation contract was in many ways a new endeavor for Fluor and a different kind of contract, the organization moved quickly to increase communication with all employees, attack head-on what it considered unsafe and inappropriate safety practices, and strongly inject its own corporate cultural beliefs into the Hanford organization. It wasn't easy, and it didn't happen overnight. From the beginning, Fluor established processes and programs to drive down injury rates. For example, whereas the previous contractor's approach to injuries had been passive, Fluor took a much more aggressive approach to worker injuries. The previous contractor had established a practice of sending injured workers home with the basic directive 'to come back when you are well'. Instead of using outsourced medical assessment, Fluor internalized it and evaluated all claims aggressively. Legitimate claims were quickly settled, and management moved to identify 'repeat offenders' when it came to reportable safety incidents. In the first year of Fluor's management, reportable injuries dropped from 5.37 to 2.99 per 200,000 man-hours. Despite the drop in injury rates, the safety record at Fluor Hanford was not at a level that met either Fluor or the Department of Energy's expectations. Earlier in 1997, Fluor Hanford's proposed safety program was rejected by the DOE. The DOE was not satisfied with Fluor Hanford's proposal for various reasons, including insufficient worker involvement and a lack of accountability. With the need for change clearly established, Fluor Hanford management embarked on a decade-long mission to change the safety culture and improve safety performance. This case describes the key changes and their impact on Fluor Hanford.
Date: September 25, 2009
Creator: LD, ARNOLD
Item Type: Refine your search to only Article
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