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Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 423: Building 03-60 Underground Discharge Point, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada

Description: This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 423, Building 03-60 Underground Discharge Point (UDP) in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) of 1996 that was agreed to by the US Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV); the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP); and the U.S Department of Defense (FFACO, 1996). The CADD provides or references the specific information necessary to recommend a preferred corrective action for the single Corrective Action Site (CAS), 03-02-002-0308, within CAU 423. Corrective Action Unit 423 is located at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada. The TTR is approximately 255 kilometers (km) (140 miles[mi]) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. The UDP is approximately 73 meters (m) (240 feet [ft]) northwest of the northwest corner of Building 03-60, the Auto Maintenance Shop. Corrective Action Unit 423 is comprised of the UDP and an associated discharge line extending from Building 03-60. The UDP received waste oil products from the Auto Maintenance Shop, a light-duty fleet maintenance shop in the Area 3 compound, from 1965 to 1989 or 1990 (DOE/NV, 1997).
Date: June 19, 1999
Creator: /NV, DOE
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

CORRECTIVE ACTION DECISION DOCUMENT FOR THE AREA 3 LANDFILL COMPLEX, TONOPAH TEST RANGE, CAU 424, REVISION 0, MARCH 1998

Description: This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) has been prepared for the Area 3 Landfill Complex (Corrective Action Unit [CAU] 424) in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) of 1996. Corrective Action Unit 424 is located at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) and is comprised of the following Corrective Action Sites (CASs), each an individual landfill located around and within the perimeter of the Area 3 Compound (DOE/NV, 1996a): (1) Landfill A3-1 is CAS No. 03-08-001-A301. (2) Landfill A3-2 is CAS No. 03-08-002-A302. (3) Landfill A3-3 is CAS No. 03-08-002-A303. (4) Landfill A3-4 is CAS No. 03-08-002-A304. (5) Landfill A3-5 is CAS No. 03-08-002-A305. (6) Landfill A3-6 is CAS No. 03-08-002-A306. (7) Landfill A3-7 is CAS No. 03-08-002-A307. (8) Landfill A3-8 is CAS No. 03-08-002-A308. The purpose of this CADD is to identify and provide a rationale for the selection of a recommended corrective action alternative for each CAS. The scope of this CADD consists of the following: (1) Develop corrective action objectives. (2) Identify corrective action alternative screening criteria. (3) Develop corrective action alternatives. (4) Perform detailed and comparative evaluations of the corrective action alternatives in relation to the corrective action objectives and screening criteria. (6) Recommend and justify a preferred corrective action alternative for each CAS. In June and July 1997, a corrective action investigation was performed as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) for CAU No. 424: Area 3 Landfill Complex, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada (DOE/NV, 1997). Details can be found in Appendix A of this document. The results indicated four groupings of site characteristics as shown in Table ES-1. Based on the potential exposure pathways, the following corrective action objectives have been identified for CAU No. 424: (1) Prevent or mitigate human exposure to subsurface soils containing waste. (2) Remediate ...
Date: March 3, 1998
Creator: /NV, DOE
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 405: Area 3 Septic Systems, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada(April 2001, Rev. 0) with Record of Technical Change No. 1

Description: This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office's (DOE/NV's) approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 405, Area 3 Septic Systems, Tonopah Test Range (TTR), under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 405 consists of Corrective Action Sites 03-05-002-SW03, 03-05-002-SW04, and 03-05-002-SW07 (also collectively known as: Septic Waste Systems [SWSs] 3, 4, and 7). Located in Area 3 in the northwest section of the TTR, approximately 140 miles northwest of Las Vegas, this location was historically (between 1960 and 1990) used as a research facility with the mission to perform defense-related projects, and whose operations generated sanitary and industrial wastewaters potentially contaminated with COPCs and disposed of in septic tanks and leachfields. Though Septic Waste Systems 3, 4, and 7 were origin ally constructed to receive sanitary sewage, they may have inadvertently received effluent containing potentially hazardous and radiological constituents containing acetone, benzene, ethylbenzene, 4-methyl-2-pentanone, toluene, xylenes, volatile organic compound constituents, phenols, arsenic, barium, lead, mercury, hydrocarbons of oil and grease, and uranium-234, -235, and -238. The Area 3 septic systems were documented in a DOE/NV 1996 report as being included in the septic tank abandonment program conducted by Sandia National Laboratories in 1993; however, this program was not completed and the possibility exists that some of the Area 3 septic tanks may not have been abandoned. Even though all of the SWSs addressed in this CAIP are inactive, geophysical surveys conducted in 1993 were generally inconclusive and did not provide useful data for the purposes of this investigation. The scope of this current investigation, therefore, will be to determine the existence of the identified CO PCs and excavation will be the primary investigation method employed for ...
Date: April 26, 2001
Creator: /NV, DOE
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 406: Area 3 Building 03-74 and Building 03-58 Under ground Discharge Points and Corrective Action Unit 429: Area 3 Building 03-55 and Area 9 Building 09-52 Underground Discharge Points, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada

Description: This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) has been developed in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the US Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV); the State of Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP); and the US Department of Defense (FFACO, 1996). The CAIP is a document that provides or references all of the specific information for investigation activities associated with Corrective Action Units (CAUs) or Corrective Action Sites (CASs). According to the FFACO (1996), CASs are sites potentially requiring corrective action(s) and may include solid waste management units or individual disposal or release sites. Corrective Action Units consist of one or more CASs grouped together based on geography, technical similarity, or agency responsibility for the purpose of determining corrective actions. This CAIP contains the environmental sample collection objectives and the criteria for conducting site investigation activities at the Underground Discharge Points (UDPs) included in both CAU 406 and CAU 429. The CAUs are located in Area 3 and Area 9 of the Tonopah Test Range (TTR). The TTR, included in the Nellis Air Force Range, is approximately 255 kilometers (km) (140 miles [mi]) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada.
Date: May 20, 1999
Creator: /NV, DOE
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 428: Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 1 and 5, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, REVISION 0, march 1999

Description: The Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 428, Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 1 and 5, has been developed in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order that was agreed to by the U. S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office; the State of Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; and the U. S. Department of Defense. Corrective Action Unit 428 consists of Corrective Action Sites 03- 05- 002- SW01 and 03- 05- 002- SW05, respectively known as Area 3 Septic Waste System 1 and Septic Waste System 5. This Corrective Action Investigation Plan is used in combination with the Work Plan for Leachfield Corrective Action Units: Nevada Test Site and Tonopah Test Range, Nevada , Rev. 1 (DOE/ NV, 1998c). The Leachfield Work Plan was developed to streamline investigations at leachfield Corrective Action Units by incorporating management, technical, quality assurance, health and safety, public involvement, field sampling, and waste management information common to a set of Corrective Action Units with similar site histories and characteristics into a single document that can be referenced. This Corrective Action Investigation Plan provides investigative details specific to Corrective Action Unit 428. A system of leachfields and associated collection systems was used for wastewater disposal at Area 3 of the Tonopah Test Range until a consolidated sewer system was installed in 1990 to replace the discrete septic waste systems. Operations within various buildings at Area 3 generated sanitary and industrial wastewaters potentially contaminated with contaminants of potential concern and disposed of in septic tanks and leachfields. Corrective Action Unit 428 is composed of two leachfield systems in the northern portion of Area 3. Based on site history collected to support the Data Quality Objectives process, contaminants of potential concern for the site include oil/ diesel range total petroleum hydrocarbons, and Resource ...
Date: March 26, 1999
Creator: /NV, DOE
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit No. 423: Building 03-60 Underground Discharge Point, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada

Description: This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) has been developed in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the US Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV), the State of Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP), and the US Department of Defense. The CAIP is a document that provides or references all of the specific information for investigation activities associated with Corrective Action Units (CAUS) or Corrective Action Sites (CASs) (FFACO, 1996). As per the FFACO (1996), CASs are sites potentially requiring corrective action(s) and may include solid waste management units or individual disposal or release sites. Corrective Action Units consist of one or more CASs grouped together based on geography, technical similarity, or agency responsibility for the purpose of determining corrective actions. This CAIP contains the environmental sample collection objectives and the criteria for conducting site investigation activities at CAU No. 423, the Building 03-60 Underground Discharge Point (UDP), which is located in Area 3 at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR). The TTR, part of the Nellis Air Force Range, is approximately 225 kilometers (km) (140 miles [mi]) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figures 1-1 and 1-2). Corrective Action Unit No. 423 is comprised of only one CAS (No. 03-02-002-0308), which includes the Building 03-60 UDP and an associated discharge line extending from Building 03-60 to a point approximately 73 meters (m) (240 feet [ft]) northwest as shown on Figure 1-3.
Date: October 1, 1997
Creator: /NV, DOE
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

CORRRECTIVE ACTION DECISION DOCUMENT FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION UNIT 427: AREA 3 SEPTIC WASTE SYSTEMS 2 AND 6, TONOPAH TEST RANGE, NEVADA, REVISION 0, JUNE 1998

Description: This Corrective Action Decision Document has been prepared for the Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 2 and 6 (Corrective Action Unit 427) in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order of 1996 (FFACO, 1996). Corrective Action Unit 427 is located at the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, and is comprised of the following Corrective Action Sites, each an individual septic waste system (DOE/NV, 1996a): (1) Septic Waste System 2 is Corrective Action Site Number 03-05-002-SW02. (2) Septic Waste System 6 is Corrective Action Site Number 03-05-002-SW06. The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document is to identify and provide a rationale for the selection of a recommended corrective action alternative for each Corrective Action Site. The scope of this Correction Action Decision Document consists of the following tasks: (1) Develop corrective action objectives. (2) Identify corrective action alternative screening criteria. (3) Develop corrective action alternatives. (4) Perform detailed and comparative evaluations of the corrective action alternatives in relation to the corrective action objectives and screening criteria. (5) Recommend and justify a preferred corrective action alternative for each CAS. From November 1997 through January 1998, a corrective action investigation was performed as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit No. 427: Area 3 Septic Waste System Numbers 2 and 6, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada (DOE/NV, 1997b). Details can be found in Appendix A of this document. The results indicated that contamination is present in some portions of the CAU and not in others as described in Table ES-1 and shown in Figure A.2-2 of Appendix A. Based on the potential exposure pathways, the following corrective action objectives have been identified for Corrective Action Unit 427: (1) Prevent or mitigate human exposure to subsurface soils containing TPH at concentrations greater than 100 milligrams per kilogram (NAC, ...
Date: June 23, 1998
Creator: /NV, DOE
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Housekeeping Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 36: Areas 8, 10, 16, 18, and 26, Housekeeping Waste Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

Description: The Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order was entered into by the State of Nevada, U.S. Department of Energy, and U.S. Department of Defense to identify sites of potential historical contamination and implement corrective actions based on public health and environmental considerations. The facilities subject to this agreement include the Nevada Test Site (NTS), parts of the Tonopah Test Range, parts to the Nellis Air Force Range, the Central Nevada Test Area, and the Project Shoal Area. Corrective Action Sites (CASs) are areas potentially requiring corrective actions and may include solid waste management units, individual disposal, or release sites. Based on geography, technical similarity, agency responsibility, or other appropriate reasons, CASs are grouped together into Corrective Action Units (CAUs) for the purposes of determining corrective actions. This report contains the Closure Verification Forms for cleanup activities performed at the 12 CASs within CAU 36 on the NTS. The Housekeeping Closure Verification Form for each CAS provides the location, directions to the site, general description, and photographs of the site before and after cleanup activities. Housekeeping activities at these sites included removal of batteries, buckets, cans, drums, gas cylinders, and smoke pots. Based on these activities, no further action is required at these CASs.
Date: April 26, 2000
Creator: /NV, DOE
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Industrial Sites Work Plan for Leachfield Corrective Action Units: Nevada Test Site and Tonopah Test Range, Nevada (including Record of Technical Change Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4)

Description: This Leachfield Corrective Action Units (CAUs) Work Plan has been developed in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV); the State of Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP); and the U.S. Department of Defense (FFACO, 1996). Under the FFACO, a work plan is an optional planning document that provides information for a CAU or group of CAUs where significant commonality exists. A work plan may be developed that can be referenced by leachfield Corrective Action Investigation Plans (CAIPs) to eliminate redundant CAU documentation. This Work Plan includes FFACO-required management, technical, quality assurance (QA), health and safety, public involvement, field sampling, and waste management documentation common to several CAUs with similar site histories and characteristics, namely the leachfield systems at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and the Tonopah Test Range (TT R). For each CAU, a CAIP will be prepared to present detailed, site-specific information regarding contaminants of potential concern (COPCs), sampling locations, and investigation methods.
Date: December 18, 1998
Creator: /NV, DOE
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 140: Waste Dumps, Burn Pits, and Storage Area, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, July 2002, Rev. No. 0

Description: This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 140 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 140 consists of nine Corrective Action Sites (CASs): 05-08-01, Detonation Pits; 05-08-02, Debris Pits; 05-17-01, Hazardous Waste Accumulation Site (Buried); 05-19-01, Waste Disposal Site; 05-23-01, Gravel Gertie; 05-35-01, Burn Pit; 05-99-04, Burn Pit; 22-99-04, Radioactive Waste Dump; 23-17-01, Hazardous Waste Storage Area. All nine of these CASs are located within Areas 5, 22, and 23 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) in Nevada, approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas. This CAU is being investigated because disposed waste may be present without appropriate controls (i.e., use restrictions, adequate cover) and hazardous and/or radioactive constituents may be present or migrating at concentrations and locations that could potentially pose a threat to human health and the environment. The NTS has been used for various research and development projects including nuclear weapons testing. The CASs in CAU 140 were used for testing, material storage, waste storage, and waste disposal. A two-phase approach has been selected to collect information and generate data to satisfy needed resolution criteria and resolve the decision statements. Phase I will determine if contaminants of potential concern (COPCs) are present in concentrations exceeding preliminary action levels. This data will be evaluated at all CASs. Phase II will determine the extent of the contaminant(s) of concern (COCs). This data will only be evaluated for CASs with a COC identified during Phase I. Based on process knowledge, the COPCs for CAU 140 include volatile organics, semivolatile organics, petroleum hydrocarbons, explosive residues, herbicides, pesticides, polychlorinated biphenyls, metals, and radionuclides. The results of this ...
Date: July 18, 2002
Creator: /NV, NNSA
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 410: Waste Disposal Trenches, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Revision 0 (includes ROTCs 1, 2, and 3)

Description: This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 410 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 410 is located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), which is included in the Nevada Test and Training Range (formerly the Nellis Air Force Range) approximately 140 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. This CAU is comprised of five Corrective Action Sites (CASs): TA-19-002-TAB2, Debris Mound; TA-21-003-TANL, Disposal Trench; TA-21-002-TAAL, Disposal Trench; 09-21-001-TA09, Disposal Trenches; 03-19-001, Waste Disposal Site. This CAU is being investigated because contaminants may be present in concentrations that could potentially pose a threat to human health and/or the environment, and waste may have been disposed of with out appropriate controls. Four out of five of these CASs are the result of weapons testing and disposal activities at the TTR, and they are grouped together for site closure based on the similarity of the sites (waste disposal sites and trenches). The fifth CAS, CAS 03-19-001, is a hydrocarbon spill related to activities in the area. This site is grouped with this CAU because of the location (TTR). Based on historical documentation and process know-ledge, vertical and lateral migration routes are possible for all CASs. Migration of contaminants may have occurred through transport by infiltration of precipitation through surface soil which serves as a driving force for downward migration of contaminants. Land-use scenarios limit future use of these CASs to industrial activities. The suspected contaminants of potential concern which have been identified are volatile organic compounds; semivolatile organic compounds; high explosives; radiological constituents including depleted uranium, beryllium, total petroleum hydrocarbons; and total Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals. ...
Date: July 16, 2002
Creator: /NV, NNSA
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Deployment of a Continuously Operated {mu}ChemLab

Description: A continuously operating prototype chemical weapons sensor system based on the {mu}ChemLab{trademark} technology was installed in the San Francisco International Airport in late June 2002. This prototype was assembled in a National Electric Manufacturers Association (NEMA) enclosure and controlled by a personal computer collocated with it. Data from the prototype was downloaded regularly and periodic calibration tests were performed through modem-operated control. The instrument was installed just downstream of the return air fans in the return air plenum of a high-use area of a boarding area. A CW Sentry, manufactured by Microsensor Systems, was installed alongside the {mu}ChemLab unit and results from its operation are reported elsewhere. Tests began on June 26, 2002 and concluded on October 16, 2002. This report will discuss the performance of the prototype during the continuous testing period. Over 70,000 test cycles were performed during this period. Data from this first field emplacement have indicated several areas where engineering improvements can be made for future field emplacement.
Date: May 1, 2003
Creator: ADKINS, DOUGLAS R.; KOTTENSTETTE, RICHARD; LEWIS, PATRICK R.; DULLECK JR., GEORGE R.; OBORNY, MICHAEL C.; GORDON, SUSANNA P. et al.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Editing Tips for Technical Publications in the Joint Nuclear Weapons Publication System (JNWPS)

Description: These editing tips contain helpful suggestions to assist writers who are writing, editing, and publishing technical publications in the JNWPS. The suggestions clarify some of the most common writing problems and requirements of two publications used in the JNWPS: ''DOE-DTRA TP 1-1, Joint Nuclear Weapons Publications System Operating Procedures, Specifications, and Standards, and United States Government Printing Office Style Manual''. Topics include requirements for abbreviations, formats for drafts, layouts of illustrations and tables, appropriate wording for interim changes, guidance for creating a list of effective pages, how to insert and delete pages and paragraphs, referencing other technical publications, use of revision bars, requirements for safety precautions, use of hyphens, and how to place warnings, cautions, and notes. Also included are a writer's checklist, samples of draft title pages, and a section of helpful tips for the writers who use the department's desktop publishing software program, Adobe{reg_sign} FrameMaker{reg_sign}.
Date: December 1, 2002
Creator: ALLEN, TARA S.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

PHASE II CHARACTERIZATION SURVEY OF THE USNS BRIDGE (T AOE 10), MILITARY SEALIFT FLEET SUPPORT COMMAND, NAVAL STATION, NORFOLK, VIRGINIA DCN 5180-SR-01-0

Description: In March 2011, the USNS Bridge was deployed off northeastern Honshu, Japan with the carrier USS Ronald Reagan to assist with relief efforts after the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami. During that time, the Bridge was exposed to air-borne radioactive materials leaking from the damaged Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant. The proximity of the Bridge to the air-borne impacted area resulted in the contamination of the ship’s air-handling systems and the associated components, as well as potential contamination of other ship surfaces due to either direct intake/deposition or inadvertent spread from crew/operational activities. Preliminary surveys in the weeks after the event confirmed low-level contamination within the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) ductwork and systems, and engine and other auxiliary air intake systems. Some partial decontamination was performed at that time. In response to the airborne contamination event, Military Sealift Fleet Support Command (MSFSC) contracted Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU), under provisions of the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE) contract, to assess the radiological condition of the Bridge. Phase I identified contamination within the CPS filters, ventilation systems, miscellaneous equipment, and other suspect locations that could not accessed at that time (ORAU 2011b). Because the Bridge was underway during the characterization, all the potentially impacted systems/spaces could not be investigated. As a result, MSFSC contracted with ORAU to perform Phase II of the characterization, specifically to survey systems/spaces previously inaccessible. During Phase II of the characterization, the ship was in port to perform routine maintenance operations, allowing access to the previously inaccessible systems/spaces.
Date: August 30, 2012
Creator: ALTIC, NICK A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Innovative Measurement Diagnostics for Analysis of Jet Interactions in Rotating Flowfields

Description: The present document summarizes the experimental efforts of a three-year study funded under the Laboratory Directed Research and Development program of Sandia National Laboratories. The Innovative Diagnostics LDRD project was designed to develop new measurement capabilities to examine the interaction of a propulsive spin jet in a transonic freestream for a model in a wind tunnel. The project motivation was the type of jet/fin interactions commonly occurring during deployment of weapon systems. In particular, the two phenomena of interest were the interaction of the propulsive spin jet with the freestream in the vicinity of the nozzle and the impact of the spin rocket plume and its vortices on the downstream fins. The main thrust of the technical developments was to incorporate small-size, Lagrangian sensors for pressure and roll-rate on a scale model and include data acquisition, transmission, and power circuitry onboard. FY01 was the final year of the three-year LDRD project and the team accomplished much of the project goals including use of micron-scale pressure sensors, an onboard telemetry system for data acquisition and transfer, onboard jet exhaust, and roll-rate measurements. A new wind tunnel model was designed, fabricated, and tested for the program which incorporated the ability to house multiple MEMS-based pressure sensors, interchangeable vehicle fins with pressure instrumentation, an onboard multiple-channel telemetry data package, and a high-pressure jet exhaust simulating a spin rocket motor plume. Experiments were conducted for a variety of MEMS-based pressure sensors to determine performance and sensitivity in order to select pressure transducers for use. The data acquisition and analysis path was most successful by using multiple, 16-channel data processors with telemetry capability to a receiver outside the wind tunnel. The development of the various instrumentation paths led to the fabrication and installation of a new wind tunnel model for baseline non-rotating experiments to validate ...
Date: January 1, 2002
Creator: AMATUCCI, VINCENT A.; BERESH, STEVEN J.; HENFLING, JOHN F.; ERVEN, ROCKY J. & BOURDON, CHRIS J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Corrosion of Uranium in Desert Soil, with Application to GCD Source Term M

Description: Uranium fragments from the Sandia Sled Track were studied as analogues for weapons components and depleted uranium buried at the Greater Confinement Disposal (GCD) site in Nevada. The Sled Track uranium fragments originated as weapons mockups and counterweights impacted on concrete and soil barriers, and experienced heating and fragmentation similar to processes thought to affect the Nuclear Weapons Accident Residues (NWAR) at GCD. Furthermore, the Sandia uranium was buried in unsaturated desert soils for 10 to 40 years, and has undergone weathering processes expected to affect the GCD wastes. Scanning electron microscopy, X-ray diffraction and microprobe analyses of the fragments show rapid alteration from metals to dominantly VI-valent oxy-hydroxides. Leaching studies of the samples give results consistent with published U-oxide dissolution rates, and suggest longer experimental periods (ca. 1 year) would be required to reach equilibrium solution concentrations. Thermochemical modeling with the EQ3/6 code indicates that the uranium concentrations in solutions saturated with becquerelite could increase as the pore waters evaporate, due to changes in carbonate equilibria and increased ionic strength.
Date: September 1, 1999
Creator: ANDERSON, HOWARD L.; BACA, JULIANNE; KRUMHANSL, JAMES L.; STOCKMAN, HARLAN W. & THOMPSON, MOLLIE E.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Reconfigurable mobile manipulation for accident response

Description: The need for a telerobotic vehicle with hazard sensing and integral manipulation capabilities has been identified for use in transportation accidents where nuclear weapons are involved. The Accident Response Mobile Manipulation System (ARMMS) platform has been developed to provide remote dexterous manipulation and hazard sensing for the Accident Response Group (ARG) at Sandia National Laboratories. The ARMMS' mobility platform is a military HMMWV [High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle] that is teleoperated over RF or Fiber Optic communication channels. ARMMS is equipped with two high strength Schilling Titan II manipulators and a suite of hazardous gas and radiation sensors. Recently, a modular telerobotic control architecture call SMART (Sandia Modular Architecture for Robotic and Teleoperation) has been applied to ARMMS. SMART enables input devices and many system behaviors to be rapidly configured in the field for specific mission needs. This paper summarizes current SMART developments applied to ARMMS.
Date: June 6, 2000
Creator: ANDERSON,ROBERT J.; MORSE,WILLIAM D.; SHIREY,DAVID L.; CDEBACA,DANIEL M.; HOFFMAN JR.,JOHN P. & LUCY,WILLIAM E.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

HANFORD REGULATORY EXPERIENCE REGULATION AT HANFORD A CASE STUDY

Description: Hanford has played a pivotal role in the United States' defense for more than 60 years, beginning with the Manhattan Project in the 1940s. During its history, the Hanford Site has had nine reactors producing plutonium for the United States' nuclear weapons program. All the reactors were located next to the Columbia River and all had associated low-level radioactive and hazardous waste releases. Site cleanup, which formally began in 1989 with the signing of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order, also known as the Tri-Party Agreement, involves more than 1,600 waste sites and burial grounds, and the demolition of more than 1,500buildings and structures, Cleanup is scheduled to be complete by 2035. Regulatory oversight of the cleanup is being performed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Washington State Department of Ecology(Ecology) under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the Revised Code of Washington, 'Hazardous Waste Management.' Cleanup of the waste sites and demolition of the many buildings and structures generates large volumes of contaminated soil, equipment, demolition debris, and other wastes that must be disposed of in a secure manner to prevent further environmental degradation. From a risk perspective, it is essential the cleanup waste be moved to a disposal facility located well away from the Columbia River. The solution was to construct very large engineered landfill that meets all technical regulatory requirements, on the Hanford Site Central Plateau approximately 10kilometers from the river and 100metersabovegroundwater. This landfill, called the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility or ERDF is a series of cells, each 150x 300 meters wide at the bottom and 20 meters deep. This paper looks at the substantive environmental regulations applied to ERDF, and how the facility is designed to protect the environment and meet regulatory requirements. The paper describes ...
Date: September 24, 2007
Creator: AR, HAWKINS
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Rapid Ultrasensitive Chemical-Fingerprint Detection of Chemical and Biochemical Warfare Agents

Description: Vibrational spectra can serve as chemical fingerprints for positive identification of chemical and biological warfare molecules. The required speed and sensitivity might be achieved with surface-enhanced Raman spectroscopy (SERS) using nanotextured metal surfaces. Systematic and reproducible methods for preparing metallic surfaces that maximize sensitivity have not been previously developed. This work sought to develop methods for forming high-efficiency metallic nanostructures that can be integrated with either gas or liquid-phase chem-lab-on-a-chip separation columns to provide a highly sensitive, highly selective microanalytical system for detecting current and future chem/bio agents. In addition, improved protein microchromatographic systems have been made by the creation of acrylate-based porous polymer monoliths that can serve as protein preconcentrators to reduce the optical system sensitivity required to detect and identify a particular protein, such as a bacterial toxin.
Date: December 1, 2002
Creator: ASHBY, CAROL I.; SHEPODD, TIMOTHY J.; YELTON, WILLIAM G. & MURON, DAVID J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Laser Safety Evaluation of the MILES and Mini MILES Laser Emitting Components

Description: Laser safety evaluation and output emission measurements were performed (during October and November 2001) on SNL MILES and Mini MILES laser emitting components. The purpose, to verify that these components, not only meet the Class 1 (eye safe) laser hazard criteria of the CDRH Compliance Guide for Laser Products and 21 CFR 1040 Laser Product Performance Standard; but also meet the more stringent ANSI Std. z136.1-2000 Safe Use of Lasers conditions for Class 1 lasers that govern SNL laser operations. The results of these measurements confirmed that all of the Small Arms Laser Transmitters, as currently set (''as is''), meet the Class 1 criteria. Several of the Mini MILES Small Arms Transmitters did not. These were modified and re-tested and now meet the Class 1 laser hazard criteria. All but one System Controllers (hand held and rifle stock) met class 1 criteria for single trigger pulls and all presented Class 3a laser hazard levels if the trigger is held (continuous emission) for more than 5 seconds on a single point target. All units were Class 3a for ''aided'' viewing. These units were modified and re-tested and now meet the Class 1 hazard criteria for both ''aided'' as well as ''unaided'' viewing. All the Claymore Mine laser emitters tested are laser hazard Class 1 for both ''aided'' as well as ''unaided'' viewing.
Date: February 2, 2002
Creator: AUGUSTONI, ARNOLD L.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

THE FISSILE MATERIAL TRANSPARENCY TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION (FMTTD)

Description: The United States Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency Cooperative Threat Reduction program is supporting the construction of a fissile material storage facility at Mayak in the Russian Federation. Up to 34 tons of weapon-grade plutonium will be stored in the facility to await disposition. In order to meet arms control and nonproliferation objectives, the U.S. Congress has requested assurances that the nuclear material stored at the Mayak facility is derived from dismantled nuclear weapons. The usual approach to identify the origin or state of radioactive materials is to measure the intensity and energy of neutron and gamma radiation emitted. However, the Russian Federation considers such details as isotopic composition and mass to be classified. The solution arrived at by a DOE multilaboratory team is to place the radioactive specimen, the gamma and neutron counters, and all the computational equipment behind an information barrier. In the Fissile Materials Transparency Technology Demonstration (FMTD), this equipment was configured and programmed to measure the following six attributes: isotopic ratio, threshold mass, absence of oxide, presence of plutonium, age, and symmetry. On August 16, 2000, at Los Alamos National Laboratory, a delegation of Russian officials observed the successful demonstration of this new technology (called an Attribute Measurement System with Information Barrier, or AMS/IB). The scientists were able to demonstrate without releasing classified information that the nuclear material sample being tested (a nuclear weapon pit) had the declared weapon-grade plutonium characteristics. Once fully developed, AMS/IB technology will protect sensitive information while providing the United States increased confidence that the mandated Russian fissile materials have been stored. Attribute measurement systems can play a role in a number of U.S.-Russian nuclear security regimes such as the Trilateral Initiative, the Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement, and future strategic arms agreements. This paper discusses the details of this new ...
Date: June 1, 2001
Creator: AVENS, L. R.; DOYLE, J. E. & MULLEN, M. F.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Temperature tests of high frequency SLIFER oscillator, LEA73-2176. [For monitoring underground nuclear detonations at Nevada Test Site]

Description: SLIFER (Short Location Indication by Frequency of Electrical Resonance) systems measure stress wave velocity in solid or liquid materials. They monitor underground nuclear detonations at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). A shorted length of coaxial cable is a component in an oscillator's tank circuit. This sensor cable is inductive when less than one-fourth wavelength long at the oscillator's resonant frequency. The stress wave from a detonation crushes and shorts this sensor cable. As the short proceeds, inductance decreases and oscillator frequency increases. Later we convert frequency vs time to shock-front position vs time. Some doubt existed about the reliable operation of the oscillators in cold weather. Therefore these tests were conducted to check their reliability under several conditions: (1) at temperatures from -40/sup 0/ to 60/sup 0/C; (2) with three sensor cable lengths; (3) with sensor cables shorted or open at the far end; and (4) at two input power voltages. Results are presented.
Date: June 7, 1976
Creator: Aaron, Carl C., Jr.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Effects of gamma-ray irradiation on M1 propellant

Description: Samples of M1 single-base propellant were exposed to 10{sup 5}, 10{sup 6}, and 10{sup 7}r of Co{sup 60} gamma rays. Burning rates were determined over a pressure range of 600 to 2600 psi at -40{degrees}, 21{degrees}, and 71{degrees}C. A statistical study indicated no significant change in the burning rate and a small but statistically significant increase (6%) in the exponential factor n after the 10{sup 7}r dose. Visible deterioration resulted, as the color changed from yellow to dark brown and the surface became uneven. In view of these marked visible effects, the slight change in burning rate is surprising. One sample exposed to 5 {times} 10{sup 8}r showed severe blistering, swelling, and contraction, and embrittlement causing fracture. Nitrogen Taliani tests conducted at 110{degrees}C indicated that the decomposition rate is decreased by exposure to 10{sup 5}r, is decreased less by 10{sup 6}r, and remains unchanged after 10{sup 7}r exposure. Chemical analysis showed that the percentage of 2-nitrodiphenylamine increases with dose by a factor of 7 at 10{sup 7}r, while, at the same time, the nitrogen content of the nitrocellulose decreases with increasing dose. This indicates that a substantial part of the nitrocellulose decomposition product had reacted with the diphenylamine stabilizer. It is remarkable that propellant strands obviously modified by exposure to 10{sup 7}r showed little or no change in burning rate.
Date: April 1, 1964
Creator: Abel, J.E.; Mapes, J.E. & Levy, P.W.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department