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Capital Ships, Commerce, and Coalition: British Strategy in the Mediterranean Theater, 1793

Description: In 1793, Great Britain embarked on a war against Revolutionary France to reestablish a balance of power in Europe. Traditional assessments among historians consider British war planning at the ministerial level during the First Coalition to be incompetent and haphazard. This work reassesses decision making of the leading strategists in the British Cabinet in the development of a theater in the Mediterranean by examining political, diplomatic, and military influences. William Pitt the Younger and his controlling ministers pursued a conservative strategy in the Mediterranean, reliant on Allies in the region to contain French armies and ideas inside the Alps and the Pyrenees. Dependent on British naval power, the Cabinet sought to weaken the French war effort by targeting trade in the region. Throughout the first half of 1793, the British government remained fixed on this conservative, traditional approach to France. However, with the fall of Toulon in August of 1793, decisions made by Admiral Samuel Hood in command of forces in the Mediterranean radicalized British policy towards the Revolution while undermining the construct of the Coalition. The inconsistencies in strategic thought political decisions created stagnation, wasting the opportunities gained by the Counter-revolutionary movements in southern France. As a result, reinvigorated French forces defeated Allied forces in detail in the fall of 1793.
Date: August 2014
Creator: Baker, William C.
Partner: UNT Libraries

OOTW Force Design Tools

Description: This report documents refined requirements for tools to aid the process of force design in Operations Other Than War (OOTWs). It recommends actions for the creation of one tool and work on other tools relating to mission planning. It also identifies the governmental agencies and commands with interests in each tool, from whom should come the user advisory groups overseeing the respective tool development activities. The understanding of OOTWs and their analytical support requirements has matured to the point where action can be taken in three areas: force design, collaborative analysis, and impact analysis. While the nature of the action and the length of time before complete results can be expected depends on the area, in each case the action should begin immediately. Force design for OOTWs is not a technically difficult process. Like force design for combat operations, it is a process of matching the capabilities of forces against the specified and implied tasks of the operation, considering the constraints of logistics, transport and force availabilities. However, there is a critical difference that restricts the usefulness of combat force design tools for OOTWs: the combat tools are built to infer non-combat capability requirements from combat capability requirements and cannot reverse the direction of the inference, as is required for OOTWs. Recently, OOTWs have played a larger role in force assessment, system effectiveness and tradeoff analysis, and concept and doctrine development and analysis. In the first Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), each of the Services created its own OOTW force design tool. Unfortunately, the tools address different parts of the problem and do not coordinate the use of competing capabilities. These tools satisfied the immediate requirements of the QDR, but do not provide a long-term cost-effective solution.
Date: May 1, 1999
Creator: Bell, R.E.; Hartley, D.S.III & Packard, S.L.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress

Description: The character of the war in Afghanistan evolved from a violent struggle against al Qaeda and its Taliban supporters to a multi-faceted counterinsurgency (COIN) effort. This report provides an examination of the war's background, context, and early execution; an analytical discussion of the COIN war to date, including strategy, organization, participation, and key facets of the effort including population security, advising the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), counter-narcotics, reconciliation, community outreach, and civil-military coordination; and an analysis of major strategic and operational issues and options that the 111th Congress may opt to consider.
Date: December 3, 2009
Creator: Bowman, Steve & Dale, Catherine
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress

Description: This report discusses the ongoing U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, begun in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The report, which will be updated as events warrant, describe and analyzes several issues, including the key players in the war in Afghanistan; the strategic outlooks of the Afghan government, the U.S. government, and NATO; and the threats to the security and stability of the Afghan state and its people.
Date: June 8, 2010
Creator: Bowman, Steve & Dale, Catherine
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress

Description: The character of the war in Afghanistan evolved from a violent struggle against al Qaeda and its Taliban supporters to a multi-faceted counterinsurgency (COIN) effort. This report provides an examination of the war's background, context, and early execution; an analytical discussion of the COIN war to date, including strategy, organization, participation, and key facets of the effort including population security, advising the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), counter-narcotics, reconciliation, community outreach, and civil-military coordination; and an analysis of major strategic and operational issues and options that the 111th Congress may opt to consider.
Date: February 25, 2010
Creator: Bowman, Steve & Dale, Catherine
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress

Description: The character of the war in Afghanistan evolved from a violent struggle against al Qaeda and its Taliban supporters to a multi-faceted counterinsurgency (COIN) effort. This report provides an examination of the war's background, context, and early execution; an analytical discussion of the COIN war to date, including strategy, organization, participation, and key facets of the effort including population security, advising the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), counter-narcotics, reconciliation, community outreach, and civil-military coordination; and an analysis of major strategic and operational issues and options that the 111th Congress may opt to consider.
Date: May 6, 2010
Creator: Bowman, Steve & Dale, Catherine
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Economic impacts study

Description: This is a progress report on the first phase of a project to measure the economic impacts of a rapidly changing U.S. target base. The purpose of the first phase is to designate and test the macroeconomic impact analysis model. Criteria were established for a decision-support model. Additional criteria were defined for an interactive macroeconomic impact analysis model. After a review of several models, the Economic Impact Forecast System model of the U.S. Army Construction Research Laboratory was selected as the appropriate input-output tool that can address local and regional economic analysis. The model was applied to five test cases to demonstrate its utility and define possible revisions to meet project criteria. A plan for EIFS access was defined at three levels. Objectives and tasks for scenario refinement are proposed.
Date: September 30, 1988
Creator: Brunsen, W.; Worley, W. & Frost, E.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

SPACE BASED INTERCEPTOR SCALING

Description: Space Based Interceptor (SBI) have ranges that are adequate to address rogue ICBMs. They are not overly sensitive to 30-60 s delay times. Current technologies would support boost phase intercept with about 150 interceptors. Higher acceleration and velocity could reduce than number by about a factor of 3 at the cost of heavier and more expensive Kinetic Kill Vehicles (KKVs). 6g SBI would reduce optimal constellation costs by about 35%; 8g SBI would reduce them another 20%. Interceptor ranges fall rapidly with theater missile range. Constellations increase significantly for ranges under 3,000 km, even with advanced interceptor technology. For distributed launches, these estimates recover earlier strategic scalings, which demonstrate the improved absentee ratio for larger or multiple launch areas. Constellations increase with the number of missiles and the number of interceptors launched at each. The economic estimates above suggest that two SBI per missile with a modest midcourse underlay is appropriate. The SBI KKV technology would appear to be common for space- and surface-based boost phase systems, and could have synergisms with improved midcourse intercept and discrimination systems. While advanced technology could be helpful in reducing costs, particularly for short range theater missiles, current technology appears adequate for pressing rogue ICBM, accidental, and unauthorized launches.
Date: February 1, 2001
Creator: CANAVAN, G.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

VARIATION OF STRIKE INCENTIVES IN DEEP REDUCTIONS

Description: This note studies the sensitivity of strike incentives to deep offensive force reductions using exchange, cost, and game theoretic decision models derived and discussed in companion reports. As forces fall, weapon allocations shift from military to high value targets, with the shift being half complete at about 1,000 weapons. By 500 weapons, the first and second strikes are almost totally on high value. The dominant cost for striking first is that of damage to one's high value, which is near total absent other constraints, and hence proportional to preferences for survival of high value. Changes in military costs are largely offsetting, so total first strike costs change little. The resulting costs at decision nodes are well above the costs of inaction, so the preferred course is inaction for all offensive reductions studied. As the dominant cost for striking first is proportional to the preference for survival of high value. There is a wide gap between the first strike cost and that of inaction for the parameters studied here. These conclusions should be insensitive to significant reductions in the preference for survival of high value, which is the most sensitive parameter.
Date: August 1, 2001
Creator: CANAVAN, G.H.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

VARIATION OF STRIKE INCENTIVES WITH DAMAGE PREFERENCES

Description: For START III level forces, strike allocations and magnitudes vary little with L, but first strike costs vary directly with L, which means that for K reflecting a preference for the survival of high value targets over their destruction and a preference for high value over military targets, the costs of action are far greater than those of inaction for a wide range of values of damage preference L. Thus, if both sides have much greater preferences for the survival of their high value targets than for military targets or destruction, they do not see a net incentive to strike, and crises are terminated by inaction. Recent decades suggest strong preferences for the survival of high value and that this has contributed to the lack of direct conflict during that period.
Date: August 1, 2001
Creator: Canavan, G.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Advanced techniques for the analysis of crisis stability, deterrence, and latency

Description: Studies on crisis stability, deterrence, and latency are presented in chronological order, which also reflects their logical order of development, captures the main features of stability analysis; relates first strike, crisis, and arms control stability as seen from US and Russian perspective; and addresses questions such as whether uncertainty in damage preference or defense deployment can be destabilizing. It illustrates the problems with alternative metrics, latency and reconstitution, and deep unilateral and proportional force reductions.
Date: December 1, 1997
Creator: Canavan, G. H.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Analysis of sequential exchanges between vulnerable forces

Description: A multi-stage and -step analysis of sequences of crises or exchanges shows that aggressiveness on one side can induce rapid counter-value strikes by the other as well and knowledge that opponents will later become less aggressive does not mitigate the tendency to strike early in crises.
Date: September 4, 1998
Creator: Canavan, G. H.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Attack optimization at moderate force levels

Description: Optimal offensive missile allocations for moderate offensive and defensive forces are derived and used to study their sensitivity to force structure parameters levels. It is shown that the first strike cost is a product of the number of missiles and a function of the optimum allocation. Thus, the conditions under which the number of missiles should increase or decrease in time is also determined by this allocation.
Date: April 1, 1997
Creator: Canavan, G. H.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Considerations in missile reductions and de-alerting

Description: Earlier analyses assumed that all survivable forces could withstand first strikes and retaliate. Only those on alert, at sea, or capable of launching under attack meet that assumption. The sensitivity of those results to non-alert forces is discussed. Reduced alert rates decrease stability indices, primarily by reducing second strikes. Survivable, mobile Russian ICBMs could increase both sides stability. Dealerting hastens expected reductions and raises the possibility of abuse. And the low-force goal of arms reductions has some poorly understood and awkward attributes.
Date: April 1, 1998
Creator: Canavan, G. H.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Freedom to mix vulnerable offensive and defensive forces

Description: The freedom to mix offense and defense to expand without diminishing either side`s second strike capability is shown to be counterproductive at large numbers of missiles; effective at intermediate numbers; and progressively less effective at modest numbers. Solutions are less stable for large second strikes.
Date: September 1, 1998
Creator: Canavan, G. H.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Limits on linearity of missile allocation optimization

Description: Optimizations of missile allocation based on linearized exchange equations produce accurate allocations, but the limits of validity of the linearization are not known. These limits are explored in the context of the upload of weapons by one side to initially small, equal forces of vulnerable and survivable weapons. The analysis compares analytic and numerical optimizations and stability induces based on aggregated interactions of the two missile forces, the first and second strikes they could deliver, and they resulting costs. This note discusses the costs and stability indices induced by unilateral uploading of weapons to an initially symmetrical low force configuration. These limits are quantified for forces with a few hundred missiles by comparing analytic and numerical optimizations of first strike costs. For forces of 100 vulnerable and 100 survivable missiles on each side, the analytic optimization agrees closely with the numerical solution. For 200 vulnerable and 200 survivable missiles on each side, the analytic optimization agrees with the induces to within about 10%, but disagrees with the allocation of the side with more weapons by about 50%. The disagreement comes from the interaction of the possession of more weapons with the shift of allocation from missiles to value that they induce.
Date: December 1, 1997
Creator: Canavan, G. H.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Optimization of stability index versus first strike cost

Description: This note studies the impact of maximizing the stability index rather than minimizing the first strike cost in choosing offensive missile allocations. It does so in the context of a model in which exchanges between vulnerable missile forces are modeled probabilistically, converted into first and second strike costs through approximations to the value target sets at risk, and the stability index is taken to be their ratio. The value of the allocation that minimizes the first strike cost for both attack preferences are derived analytically. The former recovers results derived earlier. The latter leads to an optimum at unity allocation for which the stability index is determined analytically. For values of the attack preference greater than about unity, maximizing the stability index increases the cost of striking first 10--15%. For smaller values of the attack preference, maximizing the index increases the second strike cost a similar amount. Both are stabilizing, so if both sides could be trusted to target on missiles in order to minimize damage to value and maximize stability, the stability index for vulnerable missiles could be increased by about 15%. However, that would increase the cost to the first striker by about 15%. It is unclear why--having decided to strike--he would do so in a way that would increase damage to himself.
Date: May 1, 1997
Creator: Canavan, G. H.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Sensitivity of stability indices to dealerting

Description: It is reported that more than 100 former or current heads of state and civilian leaders from around the world, including ex-presidents Jimmy Carter and Mikhail Gorbachev, have signed a statement that calls for removing nuclear weapons from alert status and other measures aimed at the eventual elimination of atomic arsenals--reflecting mounting support for the cause of nuclear bolition. This note uses stability analysis derived from current US and Russian analyses to study the impact of such dealerting on stability, indicating that it could be negative. Dealerting forces removes them from first and second strikes for as long as they are dealerted. If they are dealerted for periods long compared to those involved in the evaluation of first strike stability, dealerting has the same effect as permanent arms reductions, it subtracts them from first and second strikes. Thus, it is conceptually a way of implementing such reductions on an accelerated scale. Dealerting strategic forces has been posited as a stabilizing step towards their abolition. Previous reports have shown that planned START reductions will reduce stability indices by about a factor of two. Dealerting would hasten those reductions. They would also raise the possibility that one side could realert faster than the other. If so, the remobilized forces could be used to damage limit, which would reduce his first strike cost and stability index. The impact of complete demobilization of SSBNs would be an order of magnitude reduction in the overall stability index, to a level set by alert ICBMs. Generally, it would be preferable to maintain any existing strategic forces at the highest level of alert to minimize this effect and to concentrate instead on decreasing their total number.
Date: March 1, 1998
Creator: Canavan, G. H.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Sensitivity to alert rates at moderate force levels

Description: This analysis extends previous studies of sensitivity to survivability and alert rates to low force levels. Stability and first strike considerations favor reduction of both survivable and vulnerable forces for a range of conditions. Reductions in the number of weapons per vulnerable missile always increases first strike costs, and would have to be offset by non-stability considerations.
Date: July 1, 1998
Creator: Canavan, G. H.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Stability issues in reconstitution by weapon addition

Description: Reconstitution of strategic forces by the unilateral uploading of additional weapons from initially symmetric modest force levels reduces first strike stability. These changes are quantified and traced to changes in first and second strike costs in a model of missile exchanges in which both strikes are optimized analytically.
Date: August 1, 1997
Creator: Canavan, G. H.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department