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Warfighter Support: Improved Cost Analysis and Better Oversight Needed over Army Nonstandard Equipment

Description: A publication issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "As of March 2011, the Army had over $4 billion worth of nonstandard equipment in Iraq--that is equipment not included on units' standard list of authorized equipment. Concurrently, the Department of Defense (DOD) has acquired over $44 billion worth of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAP), most of which have been allocated to the Army. This equipment must be withdrawn from Iraq by December 31, 2011. GAO examined the extent to which the Army has plans and processes for the disposition of (1) nontactical nonstandard equipment; (2) tactical nonstandard equipment; and (3) MRAPs that are no longer needed in Iraq. In performing this review, GAO analyzed relevant documents, interviewed Army officials, and visited Sierra Army Depot, where most nontactical nonstandard equipment is shipped once it leaves Iraq."
Date: September 29, 2011
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Warfighter Support: Information on Army and Marine Corps Ground Combat Helmet Pads

Description: Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Combat soldiers operate in diverse environments and face injury threats that place demands on the protective equipment systems they use to provide consistent protection throughout a range of temperatures and threat magnitudes. Protective helmets are one of those systems. In addition to protecting against ballistic threats, Army and Marine Corps ground combat helmets are now designed to absorb energy in order to reduce head injury risk from blunt impacts; previous combat helmets, such as the Personnel Armor System for Ground Troops helmet in use until 2002, were not designed to provide any tested levels of blunt impact protection. The currently used Army Advanced Combat Helmet and Marine Corps Light Weight Helmet are outfitted with a pad suspension system to protect against these threats. These pad suspension systems have been found to offer superior blunt impact protection over the older sling suspension systems. The Explanatory Statement accompanying the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act of 2009 directed GAO to review ground combat helmet pads. In response, this report focuses on two objectives: (1) Who currently provides the pads used in Army and Marine Corps ground combat helmets, and how were they chosen? and (2) What efforts and research have been undertaken by the Army and Marine Corps to improve helmet pad performance and helmet technology? In addition, we have included information on servicemembers' use of helmet pads that are not approved."
Date: July 28, 2009
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Warfighter Support: DOD Needs Additional Steps to Fully Integrate Operational Contract Support into Contingency Planning

Description: A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and the services have taken steps to integrate operational contract support into planning for contingency operations. For example, in April 2011, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, working with the Joint Staff, revised the Guidance for the Employment of the Force to require planning for operational contract support in all phases of military operations. Further, in December 2011, the Department of Defense (DOD) revised an instruction and issued corresponding regulations establishing policies and procedures for operational contract support. The Army issued service-specific guidance that describes roles, responsibilities, and requirements to help integrate operational contract support into its planning efforts for contingency operations. However, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have not issued similar comprehensive guidance for integrating operational contract support throughout each service. Instead, these services have taken actions such as developing training and other individual efforts to familiarize servicemembers with operational contract support. According to service officials, one reason that they have not issued comprehensive guidance similar to the Army's guidance is because the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have not been the lead service for contracting in recent operations. However, these services combined spent over a billion dollars for contracted services in Afghanistan in fiscal year 2011. Without specific, service-wide guidance, the other services' future planning efforts may not reflect the full extent of the use of contract support and the attendant cost and need for oversight."
Date: February 8, 2013
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Warfighter Support: Independent Expert Assessment of Army Body Armor Test Results and Procedures Needed Before Fielding

Description: A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Army has issued soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan personal body armor, comprising an outer protective vest and ceramic plate inserts. GAO observed Preliminary Design Model testing of new plate designs, which resulted in the Army's awarding contracts in September 2008 valued at a total of over $8 billion to vendors of the designs that passed that testing. Between November and December 2008, the Army conducted further testing, called First Article Testing, on these designs. GAO is reporting on the degree to which the Army followed its established testing protocols during these two tests. GAO did not provide an expert ballistics evaluation of the results of testing. GAO, using a structured, GAO-developed data collection instrument, observed both tests at the Army's Aberdeen Test Center, analyzed data, and interviewed agency and industry officials to evaluate observed deviations from testing protocols. However, independent ballistics testing expertise is needed to determine the full effect of these deviations."
Date: October 16, 2009
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Warfighter Support: Improvements to DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Would Enhance Oversight and Expedite Efforts to Meet Critical Warfighter Needs

Description: A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have faced rapidly changing threats to mission failure or loss of life, highlighting the Department of Defense's (DOD) need to develop and field new capabilities more quickly than its usual acquisition procedures allow. Since 2006, Congress has provided nearly $16 billion to counter improvised explosive devices alone. GAO and others have reported funding, organizational, acquisition, and oversight issues involving DOD's processes for meeting warfighters' urgent needs. The Senate Armed Services Committee asked GAO to determine 1) the extent to which DOD has a means to assess the effectiveness of its urgent needs processes, and 2) what challenges, if any, have affected the overall responsiveness of DOD's urgent needs processes. To conduct this review GAO looked at three urgent needs processes--joint, Army, and the Marine Corps processes--visited forces overseas that submit urgent needs requests and receive solutions, and conducted 23 case studies."
Date: April 30, 2010
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to Improve Visibility and Coordination of DOD's Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Efforts

Description: A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Prior to the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization's (JIEDDO) establishment in 2006, no single entity was responsible for coordinating the Department of Defense's (DOD) counter improvised explosive device (IED) efforts. JIEDDO was established to coordinate and focus all counter-IED efforts, including ongoing research and development, throughout DOD. This report, which is one in a series of congressionally mandated GAO reports related to JIEDDO's management and operations, assesses the extent to which 1) capability gaps were initially identified in DOD's effort to defeat IEDs and how these gaps and other factors led to the development of JIEDDO, 2) JIEDDO has maintained visibility over all counter-IED efforts, 3) JIEDDO has coordinated the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives to the military services, and 4) JIEDDO has developed criteria for the counter-IED training initiatives it will fund. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed and analyzed relevant documents and met with DOD and service officials."
Date: October 29, 2009
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Warfighter Support: Army Has Taken Steps to Improve Reset Process, but More Complete Reporting of Equipment and Future Costs Is Needed

Description: A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Since GAO’s 2007 review, the Army has taken steps to improve its use of reset in targeting equipment shortages. In 2007, GAO noted that the Army’s reset implementation strategy did not specifically target shortages of equipment on hand among units preparing for deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan in order to mitigate operational risk. GAO recommended that the Army act to ensure that its reset priorities address equipment shortages in the near term to ensure that the needs of deploying units could be met. The Department of Defense (DOD) did not concur, and stated that there was no need to reassess its approaches to equipment reset. However, in 2008, the Army issued its Depot Maintenance Enterprise Strategic Plan, noted that filling materiel shortages within warfighting units is a key challenge facing the depot maintenance enterprise, and called for changes in programs and policies to address materiel shortages within warfighting units. Further, recognizing that retrograde operations—the return of equipment from theater to the United States—are essential to facilitating depot level reset and redistribution of equipment, the Army in 2010 developed the retrograde, reset, and redistribution (R3) initiative to synchronize retrograde, national depot-level reset efforts, and redistribution efforts. In March 2011, the Army issued an R3 equipment priority list, and revised and reissued an updated list at the end of fiscal year 2011 with full endorsement from all Army commands. The R3 initiative has only begun to be fully implemented this year, and thus it is too early to tell whether it will provide a consistent and transparent process for addressing the Army’s current or future equipping needs."
Date: May 15, 2012
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Warfighter Support: DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Need a More Comprehensive Approach and Evaluation for Potential Consolidation

Description: A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have faced significant risks of mission failure and loss of life due to rapidly changing enemy threats. In response, the Department of Defense (DOD) established urgent operational needs processes to rapidly develop, modify, and field new capabilities, such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) technology, and counter-improvised explosive devices (IED) systems. However, GAO, the Defense Science Board, and others have raised concerns about the effectiveness, efficiency, and oversight of DOD's various urgent needs processes. GAO conducted this review to determine (1) what various entities exist within DOD for responding to urgent operational needs, and the extent to which there is fragmentation, overlap, or duplication; (2) the extent to which DOD has a comprehensive approach for managing and overseeing its urgent needs activities; and (3) the extent to which DOD has evaluated the potential for consolidations. To conduct this review, GAO examined DOD's urgent needs processes and collected and analyzed data from urgent needs entities."
Date: March 1, 2011
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Warfighter Support: DOD Should Improve Development of Camouflage Uniforms and Enhance Collaboration Among the Services

Description: A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The military services have a degree of discretion regarding whether and how to apply Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition guidance for their uniform development and they varied in their usage of that guidance. As a result, the services had fragmented procedures for managing their uniform development programs, and did not consistently develop effective camouflage uniforms. GAO identified two key elements that are essential for producing successful outcomes in acquisitions: 1) using clear policies and procedures that are implemented consistently, and 2) obtaining effective information to make decisions, such as credible, reliable, and timely data. The Marine Corps followed these two key elements to produce a successful outcome, and developed a uniform that met its requirements. By contrast, two other services, the Army and Air Force, did not follow the two key elements; both services developed uniforms that did not meet mission requirements and had to replace them. Without additional guidance from DOD on the use of clear policies and procedures and a knowledge-based approach, the services may lack assurance that they have a disciplined approach to set requirements and develop new uniforms that meet operational needs."
Date: September 28, 2012
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Warfighter Support: Observations on DOD's Ground Combat Uniforms

Description: Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This report is in response to section 352 of Public Law 111-84, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. The statute requires the Comptroller General to conduct an assessment of the ground combat uniforms and camouflage utility uniforms currently in use in the Department of Defense and provide the results to the congressional defense committees not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of the act."
Date: May 28, 2010
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Warfighter Support: DOD Has Made Progress, but Supply and Distribution Challenges Remain in Afghanistan

Description: A publication issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In fiscal year 2010, the Department of Defense (DOD) spent billions of dollars to move troops and materiel into Afghanistan, a mountainous, land-locked country with poorly developed infrastructure. The increase of 30,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan as of August 2010, along with thousands of civilians and contractors supporting U.S. efforts, have required further development of DOD's already-complex distribution network to support and sustain U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. GAO conducted this review to assess distribution issues in Afghanistan, including (1) DOD's oversight of distribution operations; (2) DOD's performance in providing supplies and equipment; and (3) challenges that have affected DOD's ability to provide supplies and equipment. GAO reviewed joint doctrine and DOD policies on distribution, analyzed DOD delivery data, and interviewed DOD officials in the United States and in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain."
Date: October 7, 2011
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to Improve the Joint Improvised Exposive Device Defeat Organization's System of Internal Control

Description: A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In 2006, the Department of Defense (DOD) established the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to lead, advocate, and coordinate all DOD actions to defeat improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Since 2007, GAO has reported on several issues related to JIEDDO's management and transparency of operations. In response to the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act conference report, mandating that GAO review JIEDDO's efforts, this report addresses the extent to which JIEDDO has (1) measured the effectiveness of its efforts and investments, (2) adhered to its review and approval process for developing counter-IED initiatives, and (3) taken action to address overall internal control weaknesses previously reported by GAO. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed relevant documents and discussed with relevant officials their guidance, oversight, and internal control processes to carry out JIEDDO operations. GAO also conducted case studies of 56 of 497 initiatives JIEDDO's initiative management system."
Date: July 1, 2010
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Warfighter Support: Improved Joint Oversight and Reporting on DOD's Prepositioning Programs May Increase Efficiencies

Description: A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Defense (DOD) prepositions equipment to help ensure combat-ready forces receive equipment in days rather than the weeks it would take if it had to be moved from the United States to their location. Prepositioned stocks may also support activities including disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. As GAO's third report in response to Congress's annual reporting requirement, GAO assessed the extent to which DOD has (1) met the six reporting requirements in the annual report to Congress on its prepositioned stocks, and whether additional information may be needed related to those requirements; (2) developed effective departmentwide guidance on prepositioned stocks to achieve national military objectives; and (3) organized effectively to provide joint oversight over its prepositioning programs and achieve efficiencies. To meet these objectives, GAO reviewed relevant DOD reports, strategies, and policies, and met with DOD and service officials in the U.S., Kuwait, and Qatar."
Date: May 16, 2011
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Warfighter Support: DOD Needs to Improve Its Planning for Using Contractors to Support Future Military Operations

Description: A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Contractors provide a broad range of support to U.S. forces deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq, with the number of contractors at times exceeding the number of military personnel in each country. The Department of Defense (DOD) has acknowledged shortcomings in how the role of contractors was addressed in its planning for Iraq and Afghanistan. In its report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, the Senate Armed Services Committee directed GAO to assess DOD's development of contract support plans. This report examines (1) what progress DOD has made in developing operational contract support annexes for its operation plans, (2) the extent to which contract requirements are included in other sections of operation plans, and (3) DOD's progress in establishing a long-term capability to include operational contract support requirements in operation plans. GAO reviewed DOD policies, selected operation plans and annexes, and interviewed officials at the combatant commands, the Joint Staff, and Office of the Secretary of Defense."
Date: March 30, 2010
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Warfighter Support: Continued Actions Needed by DOD to Improve and Institutionalize Contractor Support in Contingency Operations

Description: Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Defense (DOD) relies greatly on contractors to support its current operations and is likely to continue to depend on contractors in support of future operations. As of December 2009, DOD estimated that over 207,000 contractor personnel were supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD expects to increase the number of contractors as more troops deploy to Afghanistan. The use of contractors in contingencies has challenged DOD in overseeing and managing contractors. This testimony addresses (1) the challenges DOD faces when trying to provide management and oversight of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, and (2) the extent to which DOD has made progress in institutionalizing a department- wide approach to managing and overseeing operational contract support. Today's testimony is based on GAO's ongoing audit work in Iraq and Afghanistan, looking at planning for operational contract support and at DOD's efforts to manage and oversee contractors, as well as on recently published related GAO reports and testimonies."
Date: March 17, 2010
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Warfighter Support: DOD Needs Strategic Outcome-Related Goals and Visibility over Its Counter-IED Efforts

Description: A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "As the responsible DOD agency for leading, advocating, and coordinating all DOD efforts to defeat improvised explosive devices (IED) the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) was directed to develop DOD’s counter-IED strategic plan in February 2006 under DOD Directive 2000.19E. As previously recommended by GAO, JIEDDO has made several attempts to develop such a plan, but its strategic-planning actions have not followed leading strategic-management practices or have since been discontinued. For example, JIEDDO’s 2007 strategic plan did not contain a means of measuring its performance outcomes—a leading strategic-management practice. In addition, JIEDDO’s 2009–2010 strategic plan contained performance measures, but JIEDDO discontinued using these measures because it later determined that the measures were not relevant to the organization’s goals. Although DOD tasked JIEDDO to develop its counter-IED strategic plan, DOD has not translated DOD’s counter-IED general mission objective of eliminating IEDs as a weapon of strategic influence into actionable goals and objectives. JIEDDO issued a new counter-IED strategic plan in January 2012; however, the new plan does not apply to all other counter-IED efforts departmentwide, only to those managed by JIEDDO. Consequently, JIEDDO’s new strategic plan alone will not provide the means necessary for determining the effectiveness of all counter-IED efforts across DOD. Further, as JIEDDO implements its plan, it will continue to face difficulty measuring effectiveness until DOD establishes and provides results-oriented goals to accompany its general mission objective. Without actionable goals and objectives established by DOD, JIEDDO and other DOD components cannot tie individual performance measures to DOD’s desired outcomes. As a result, DOD and external stakeholders will be left without a comprehensive, data-driven assessment as to whether their counter-IED efforts are achieving DOD’s mission and will not be informed about the overall effectiveness of ...
Date: February 22, 2012
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Warfighter Support: DOD Should Have a More Comprehensive Approach for Addressing Urgent Warfighter Needs

Description: Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This testimony discusses the challenges that the Department of Defense (DOD) faces in fulfilling urgent operational needs identified by our warfighters. Over the course of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces have encountered changing adversarial tactics, techniques, and procedures, which challenged DOD to quickly develop and provide new equipment and new capabilities to address evolving threats. Further, U.S. troops faced shortages of critical items, including body armor, tires, and batteries. DOD's goal is to provide solutions as quickly as possible to meet urgent warfighter needs to prevent mission failure or loss of life. To meet its urgent needs, DOD had to look beyond traditional acquisition procedures, expand the use of existing processes, and develop new processes and entities designed to be as responsive as possible to urgent warfighter requests. In addition to requests for equipment from DOD's existing stocks, warfighters have requested new capabilities, such as: technology to counter improvised explosive devices (IED); technology related to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to provide increased situational awareness; and equipment related to command and control to enhance operations on the battlefield. In meeting urgent needs, it is important for DOD to efficiently use the department's financial resources. DOD has spent billions of dollars over the past several years to address urgent warfighter needs. Our past work on weapons acquisition has shown that the department has often pursued more programs than its resources can support. Additionally, our past work also has shown that DOD has had difficulty translating needs into programs, which often has led to cost growth and delayed delivery of needed capabilities to the warfighter. Today, we are publicly releasing a report that addresses (1) what entities exist within DOD for responding to urgent operational needs, and ...
Date: March 1, 2011
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Warfighter Support: Challenges Confronting DOD's Ability to Coordinate and Oversee Its Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices Efforts

Description: Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Improvised explosive devices (IED) are the number-one threat to troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, accounting for almost 40 percent of the attacks on coalition forces in Iraq. Although insurgents' use of IEDs in Iraq has begun to decline, in Afghanistan the number of IED incidents has significantly increased. The Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) was created to lead, advocate, and coordinate all DOD efforts to defeat IEDs. Its primary role is to provide funding to the military services and DOD agencies to rapidly develop and field counter-IED solutions. Through fiscal year 2009, Congress has appropriated over $16 billion to JIEDDO. In addition, other DOD components, including the military services, have devoted at least $1.5 billion to the counter-IED effort--which does not include $22.7 billion for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. This testimony is based on a report that GAO is issuing today as well as preliminary observations from ongoing work that GAO plans to report in early 2010. In the report being issued today, GAO is recommending that JIEDDO (1) improve its visibility of counter-IED efforts across DOD, (2) develop a complete plan to guide the transition of initiatives, and (3) define criteria for its training initiatives to help guide its funding decisions. DOD generally concurred with GAO's recommendations and noted actions to be taken."
Date: October 29, 2009
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Warfighter Support: Preliminary Observations on DOD's Progress and Challenges in Distributing Supplies and Equipment to Afghanistan

Description: Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In fiscal year 2009, the Department of Defense (DOD) reported that it spent $4 billion to move troops and materiel into Afghanistan, a mountainous, arid, land-locked country with few roads, no railway, and only four airports with paved runways over 3,000 meters. The terrain and weather in Afghanistan and surrounding countries pose further challenges to transporting supplies and equipment. In December 2009, the President announced that an additional 30,000 U.S. troops will be sent to Afghanistan by August 2010. Today's testimony discusses GAO's preliminary observations drawn from ongoing work reviewing DOD's logistics efforts supporting operations in Afghanistan, including (1) the organizations involved and routes and methods used to transport supplies and equipment into and around Afghanistan; (2) steps DOD has taken to improve its distribution process, based on lessons learned from prior operations; and (3) challenges affecting DOD's ability to distribute supplies and equipment within Afghanistan, and its efforts to mitigate them. In conducting its audit work, GAO examined DOD guidance and other documentation relating to the processes of transporting supplies and equipment to Afghanistan and met with various cognizant officials and commanders in the United States, Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Qatar."
Date: June 25, 2010
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Warfighter Support: Cultural Change Needed to Improve How DOD Plans for and Manages Operational Contract Support

Description: Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This testimony discusses the challenges the Department of Defense (DOD) faces in institutionalizing operational contract support throughout the department. The institutionalization of operational contract support includes planning for the use of contractors, training of military personnel on the use of contractor support, accurately tracking contractor use, and establishing measures to ensure that contractors are accountable. For decades, DOD has relied on contractors to support contingency operations and has long considered them a part of the total force. For example, in its 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review the department reiterated that contractors were part of a total force that includes active and reserve military components, civilians and contractors. Additionally, in 2008 the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness testified that the structure of the U.S. military had been adapted to an environment in which contractors were an important part of the force. Further, an Army commission chaired by Dr. Jacques Gansler acknowledged that contractors were a significant part of the military's total force. While DOD joint guidance recognizes contractors as part of its total workforce, we have previously reported that DOD has not yet developed a strategy for determining the appropriate mix of contractor and government personnel. In addition, we recently testified that several long-standing challenges have hindered DOD's ability to manage and oversee contractors at deployed locations. For example, DOD has not followed long-standing planning guidance, ensured that there is an adequate number of contract oversight and management personnel, and comprehensively trained non-acquisition personnel, such as military commanders. Since 1992, we have designated DOD contract management as a high-risk area, in part due to concerns over the adequacy of the department's acquisition and contract oversight workforce. As we have previously testified, many of the long-standing ...
Date: June 29, 2010
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Warfighter Support: A Cost Comparison of Using State Department Employees versus Contractors for Security Services in Iraq

Description: Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The U.S. government's reliance on contractors, including the State Department's and Department of Defense's (DOD) use of private security contractors in Iraq, has been well documented. We and others have examined many of the challenges the government faces using contractors in Iraq, including issues related to the scope of private security contractors' activities, the challenges in providing sufficient oversight, the appropriate accountability processes, and difficulties in conducting background screenings of foreign national contractor employees. What has not been so well examined is the comparative cost of using civilian employees or military members versus the cost of using contractors, particularly private security contractors, during contingency operations such as Operation Iraqi Freedom. Generally, when costs have been discussed, the focus has been on the daily rate paid to contractor employees, rather than on the total costs of using State Department or DOD personnel. However, in October 2005, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) issued a study that compared the cost of using military personnel, federal civilians, or contractors to provide logistic support for overseas operations. The study concluded that over a 20-year period, using Army military units would cost roughly 90 percent more than using the contractor. Also, in an August 2008 report on contractor support in Iraq, the Congressional Budget Office conducted a comparison of one contractor's costs to provide private security services in Iraq versus estimated military costs. The report concluded that for the 1-year period beginning June 11, 2004, the costs of the private contractor did not differ greatly from the costs of having a comparable military unit performing similar functions. Because of the broad level of interest by Congress in issues dealing with Iraq, the Comptroller General performed this review under his authority to conduct evaluations on ...
Date: March 4, 2010
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Warfighter Support: Army's and Defense Logistics Agency's Approach for Awarding Contracts for the Army Combat Shirt

Description: Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "During the fiscal year 2007-12 timeframe, the Army applied statutory and regulatory requirements related to procurement for supplies to award contracts for the Army Combat Shirt. The Army applied these requirements, including those in the Federal Acquisition Regulation and Small Business Regulations, to award the following groups of contracts and to respond to demand for the combat shirt and the supply of manufacturers that could produce it:"
Date: February 14, 2013
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department