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The Stuxnet Computer Worm: Harbinger of an Emerging Warfare Capability

Description: In September 2010, media reports emerged about a new form of cyber attack that appeared to target Iran, although the actual target, if any, is unknown. This report discusses this cyber attack, a malicious software program known as Stuxnet, which infected computer systems that were used to control the functioning of a nuclear power plant. Once inside the system, Stuxnet had the ability to degrade or destroy the software on which it operated. Although early reports focused on the impact on facilities in Iran, researchers discovered that the program had spread throughout multiple countries worldwide.
Date: December 9, 2010
Creator: Kerr, Paul K.; Rollins, John & Theohary, Catherine A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

The March 2016 Nuclear Security Summit

Description: This report discusses the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS), a biennial summit which aims to focus global attention at the highest level of government on the threat of nuclear terrorism.
Date: March 14, 2016
Creator: Nikitin, Mary Beth D.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Summary Report for the Radiation Detection for Nuclear Security Summer School 2012

Description: The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) hosted students from across the United States at the inaugural Radiation Detection for Nuclear Security Summer School from June 11 – 22, 2012. The summer school provided students with a unique understanding of nuclear security challenges faced in the field and exposed them to the technical foundations, analyses, and insight that will be required by future leaders in technology development and implementation. The course heavily emphasized laboratory and field demonstrations including direct measurements of special nuclear material. The first week of the summer school focused on the foundational knowledge required by technology practitioners; the second week focused on contemporary applications. Student evaluations and feedback from student advisors indicates that the summer school achieved its objectives of 1) exposing students to the range of nuclear security applications for which radiation detection is necessary, 2) articulating the relevance of student research into the broader context, and 3) exciting students about the possibility of future careers in nuclear security.
Date: August 22, 2012
Creator: Runkle, Robert C.; Baciak, James E. & Stave, Jean A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

The Convention on Nuclear Safety - A Fact Sheet

Description: Until the catastrophic accident with the former Soviet Union's Chernobyl nuclear power plant showed that radioactivity from a major nuclear accident could reach neighboring nations, nuclear safety was held to be an exclusively sovereign responsibility of each nation. Now it is recognized that a nuclear accident in one state can release radioactivity dangerous to another. As a result, many now view international cooperation as one way to help to assure safe operation of each nation's civil nuclear power stations.
Date: May 16, 1996
Creator: Behrens, Carl E. & Donnelly, Warren H.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Resolve Significant Issues Before It Fully Meets the New Design Basis Threat

Description: A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "A successful terrorist attack on Department of Energy (DOE) sites containing nuclear weapons or the material used in nuclear weapons could have devastating consequences for the site and its surrounding communities. Because of these risks, DOE needs an effective safeguards and security program. A key component of an effective program is the design basis threat (DBT), a classified document that identifies the potential size and capabilities of terrorist forces. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, rendered the then-current DBT obsolete. GAO examined DOE's response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, identified why DOE took almost 2 years to develop a new DBT, analyzed the higher threat in the new DBT, and identified the remaining issues that need to be resolved in order for DOE to meet the threat contained in the new DBT."
Date: April 27, 2004
Creator: United States. General Accounting Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

National Nuclear Security Administration: Observations on NNSA's Management and Oversight of the Nuclear Security Enterprise

Description: Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "NNSA has successfully ensured that the nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe and reliable in the absence of underground nuclear testing, accomplishing this complicated task by using state-of-the-art facilities as well as the skills of top scientists. Nevertheless, NNSA does not have reliable enterprise-wide management information on program budgets and costs, which potentially increases risk to NNSA’s programs. For example, in June 2010, GAO reported that NNSA could not identify the total costs to operate and maintain essential weapons activities facilities and infrastructure. In addition, in February 2011, GAO reported that NNSA lacks complete data on, among other things, the condition and value of its existing infrastructure, cost estimates and completion dates for planned capital improvement projects, and critical human capital skills in its contractor workforce that are needed for its programs. As a result, NNSA does not have a sound basis for making decisions on how to most effectively manage its portfolio of projects and other programs and lacks information that could help justify future budget requests or target cost savings opportunities. NNSA recognizes that its ability to make informed decisions is hampered and is taking steps to improve its budget and cost data."
Date: February 16, 2012
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

National Nuclear Security Administration: Security and Management Improvements Can Enhance Implementation of the NNSA Act

Description: Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "During the late 1990s, the Department of Energy (DOE) experienced difficulties with a lack of clear management authority and responsibility that contributed to security problems at the nation's nuclear weapons laboratories and management problems with major projects. In response, Congress created the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) as a separately organized agency within DOE under Title 32 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000--the NNSA Act. Since its creation, NNSA has continued to experience security problems, such as unauthorized access to NNSA computer systems, and cost and schedule overruns on major projects, such as the National Ignition Facility. GAO was asked to review the extent to which NNSA has taken steps to (1) improve security at its laboratories and plants and (2) improve its management practices and revise its organizational structure. In January 2007, GAO issued a report--National Nuclear Security Administration: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Management of the Nation's Nuclear Programs, (GAO-07-36)--that addressed these matters. To carry out its work, GAO reviewed legislation; NNSA policies, plans and budgets; collected and analyzed security performance ratings and interviewed current and former DOE and NNSA officials."
Date: January 31, 2007
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Nuclear Security: Actions Needed by DOE to Improve Security of Weapons-Grade Nuclear Material at Its Energy, Science and Environment Sites

Description: Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "A successful terrorist attack on a Department of Energy (DOE) site containing nuclear weapons material could have devastating effects for the site and nearby communities. DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment (ESE), which is responsible for DOE operations in areas such as energy research, manages five sites that contain weapons-grade nuclear material. A heavily armed security force equipped with such items as automatic weapons protects ESE sites. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which ESE protective forces are meeting DOE's existing readiness requirements and (2) the actions DOE and ESE will need to take to successfully defend against the larger, revised terrorist threat identified in the October 2004 design basis threat (DBT) by DOE's implementation deadline of October 2008."
Date: July 26, 2005
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Improve Control Over Classified Information

Description: A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Energy (DOE) maintains millions of classified documents containing highly sensitive nuclear weapons design and production information. Allegations that the Peoples Republic of China obtained nuclear warhead designs from an employee of DOE's Los Alamos National Laboratory, as well as the disappearance of two computer hard drives containing highly sensitive weapons information from that same laboratory, have raised concerns about how effectively DOE protects classified information, particularly the most sensitive classified information that is contained in vaults and computer systems. DOE's security program consists of many strategies for protecting and controlling classified information, such as controlling access to classified information through physical and administrative barriers and determining whether a person's work requires a "need to know" the information. DOE has recently increased protection for top-secret documents by revising its Classified Matter Protection and Control Manual, which provides detailed requirements for the protection and control of classified matter. This report reviews the (1) extent to which DOE's Sandia and Los Alamos National Laboratories have implemented DOE's established access controls and need-to-know requirements for classified vaults and computer systems containing the most sensitive classified information as well as the adequacy of these requirements and (2) steps DOE is taking to upgrade the protection of its classified information. GAO found that the Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories have implemented DOE's access controls and need-to-know requirements for both vaults and classified computer systems containing the most sensitive classified information. However, DOE's requirements for documenting need to know lack specificity, allowing laboratory managers wide variations in interpretation and implementation and. DOE has recently taken, and continues to take, steps to upgrade protection and control over its classified information, but additional steps are needed."
Date: August 24, 2001
Creator: United States. General Accounting Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Nuclear Security: Improvements Needed in DOE's Safeguards and Security Oversight

Description: A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) oversight activities for nuclear laboratories' safety and security programs, focusing on: (1) the monitoring and tracking of findings resulting from DOE's oversight activities; (2) the correction, validation, and closing of findings resulting from such activities; and (3) the consistency of various DOE assessments of the laboratories' safeguard and security programs."
Date: February 24, 2000
Creator: United States. General Accounting Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Nuclear Security: Information on DOE's Requirements for Protecting and Controlling Classified Documents

Description: Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Department of Energy's (DOE) requirements for protecting and controlling classified documents."
Date: July 11, 2000
Creator: United States. General Accounting Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Nuclear Security: Security Issues At DOE and Its Newly Created National Nuclear Security Administration

Description: Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed its recent reports concerning the Department of Energy's (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) security programs to protect against theft, sabotage, espionage, terrorism, and other risks to national security at its facilities, focusing on: (1) oversight of safeguards and security programs at DOE; and (2) security issues with NNSA."
Date: March 14, 2000
Creator: United States. General Accounting Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Self-Reliability and Motivation in a Nuclear Security Culture Enhancement Program

Description: The threat of nuclear terrorism has become a global concern. Many countries continue to make efforts to strengthen nuclear security by enhancing systems of nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A). Though MPC&A systems can significantly upgrade nuclear security, they do not eliminate the "human factor." This paper will describe some of the key elements of a comprehensive, sustainable nuclear security culture enhancement program and how implementation can mitigate the insider threat.
Date: October 19, 2009
Creator: Crawford, C.; de Boer, G.; De Castro, K.; Landers, J. & Rogers, E.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

National Center for Nuclear Security: The Nuclear Forensics Project (F2012)

Description: These presentation visuals introduce the National Center for Nuclear Security. Its chartered mission is to enhance the Nation’s verification and detection capabilities in support of nuclear arms control and nonproliferation through R&D activities at the NNSS. It has three focus areas: Treaty Verification Technologies, Nonproliferation Technologies, and Technical Nuclear Forensics. The objectives of nuclear forensics are to reduce uncertainty in the nuclear forensics process & improve the scientific defensibility of nuclear forensics conclusions when applied to nearsurface nuclear detonations. Research is in four key areas: Nuclear Physics, Debris collection and analysis, Prompt diagnostics, and Radiochemistry.
Date: March 21, 2012
Creator: Klingensmith, A. L.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Future BNL plans for a polarized electron-ion collider (eRHIC)

Description: To provide polarized electron-proton collisions of {radical}s = 100 GeV; addition of a 10 GeV electron accelerator to the existing RHIC facility is currently under study. Two design lines are under consideration: a self-polarizing electron ring, and an energy recovery linac. While the latter provides significantly higher luminosities, it is technologically very challenging. We present both design approaches and discuss their advantages and limitations.
Date: July 26, 2009
Creator: Montag,C.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Securing Nuclear Materials: The 2010 Summit and Issues for Congress

Description: This report discusses domestic and global nuclear security measures. It talks about the challenges to achieve the four year goal, the multilateral efforts to improve nuclear security, and the role of nongovernmental organization and the nuclear industry. The report concludes that Congress will continue to decide on funding for the U.S. domestic and international programs focused on nuclear material security and nuclear terrorism prevention.
Date: April 13, 2010
Creator: Nikitin, Mary Beth
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Securing Nuclear Materials: The 2010 Summit and Issues for Congress

Description: This report discusses domestic and global nuclear security measures. It talks about the challenges to achieve the four-year goal, the multilateral efforts to improve nuclear security, and the role of nongovernmental organization and the nuclear industry. The report concludes that Congress will continue to decide on funding for the U.S. domestic and international programs focused on nuclear material security and nuclear terrorism prevention. Congress is also likely to assess implementation of the Administration's goal to secure nuclear materials by the end of 2013.
Date: April 16, 2010
Creator: Nikitin, Mary Beth
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Nuclear Security: Action May Be Needed to Reassess the Security of NRC-Licensed Research Reactors

Description: A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "There are 37 research reactors in the United States, mostly located on college campuses. Of these, 33 reactors are licensed and regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Four are operated by the Department of Energy (DOE) and are located at three national laboratories. Although less powerful than commercial nuclear power reactors, research reactors may still be attractive targets for terrorists. As requested, GAO examined the (1) basis on which DOE and NRC established the security and emergency response requirements for DOE and NRC-licensed research reactors and (2) progress that the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has made in converting U.S. research reactors that use highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. This report summarizes the findings of GAO's classified report on the security of research reactors (GAO-08-156C)."
Date: January 31, 2008
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: Observations on the National Nuclear Security Administration's Oversight of Safety, Security, and Project Management

Description: Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), has successfully ensured that the nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe and reliable by using state-of-the-art facilities as well as the skills of top scientists. Nevertheless, DOE’s and NNSA’s ineffective oversight of its contractors has contributed to many safety and security problems. As work carried out at NNSA’s sites involves dangerous nuclear materials such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium, stringent safety procedures and security requirements must be observed. In response to numerous serious safety incidents over several decades, DOE has taken steps to improve safety oversight. Recently, laboratory and other officials have raised concerns, however, that federal oversight has become excessive and overly burdensome. To address these concerns, DOE completed a safety and security reform effort to streamline or eliminate many DOE directives. However, GAO reported in April 2012 that the benefits of this reform effort are unclear because DOE did not determine if the original directives were, in fact, burdensome. In addition, the reform effort did not fully address safety concerns GAO and others identified in the areas of quality assurance, safety culture, and federal oversight. For example, the reform effort gives the NNSA site offices, rather than DOE’s Office of Independent Oversight staff, responsibility for correcting problems identified in independent assessments. Site office determinations of what issues require more formal contractor responses may be influenced by their responsibility for keeping costs under control and work on schedule. NNSA has also experienced security deficiencies, including numerous incidents involving the compromise or potential compromise of classified information that pose the most serious threat to U.S. national security. NNSA has made progress addressing these deficiencies—including the establishment of an effective headquarters security organization—but ...
Date: September 12, 2012
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: The National Nuclear Security Administration's Proposed Acquisition Strategy Needs Further Clarification and Assessment

Description: A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)--a semiautonomous agency within the Department of Energy (DOE)-- proposed in March 2010 a new acquisition strategy that includes consolidating the management and operating (M&O) contracts for two of its eight sites--the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) in Tennessee and the Pantex Plant in Texas--and consolidating all construction projects for all of its sites under a single, enterprise-wide contract. NNSA anticipates that this strategy will reduce costs, enhance mission performance, and improve construction management. NNSA's sites are overseen by colocated federal site offices. GAO was asked to assess NNSA's preliminary proposals for (1) a consolidated M&O contract for Y-12 and Pantex and (2) an enterprise-wide construction contract. GAO reviewed analyses supporting NNSA's acquisition strategy; examined agency directives and guidance; and interviewed DOE, NNSA, and contractor officials."
Date: September 20, 2011
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Nuclear Security: Better Oversight Needed to Ensure That Security Improvements at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Are Fully Implemented and Sustained

Description: A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In April 2008, the Department of Energy's (DOE) security inspection at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) found significant weaknesses, particularly in LLNL's protective force's ability to assure the protection of weapons-grade (special) nuclear material. LLNL is overseen by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within DOE, and managed by a contractor. NNSA is planning to remove most of the special nuclear material from LLNL. GAO was asked to (1) characterize security deficiencies identified in the 2008 inspection; (2) determine the factors that contributed to these deficiencies; (3) identify LLNL's corrective actions to address security deficiencies; and (4) assess LLNL's plan to permanently remove the riskiest special nuclear material from its site. To conduct this work, GAO visited LLNL, reviewed numerous documents and plans, and interviewed LLNL and NNSA security officials."
Date: March 16, 2009
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Nuclear Security: DOE and NRC Have Different Security Requirements for Protecting Weapons-Grade Material from Terrorist Attacks

Description: Correspondence issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In terrorists' hands, weapons-grade nuclear material--known as Category I special nuclear material when in specified forms and quantities--can be used to construct an improvised nuclear device capable of producing a nuclear explosion. Responsibility for the security of Category I special nuclear material is divided between the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Specifically, DOE and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within DOE, are responsible for overseeing physical security at government-owned and contractor-operated sites with Category I special nuclear material. NRC, which is responsible for licensing and overseeing commercially owned facilities with nuclear materials, such as nuclear power plants, is responsible for regulating physical security at those licensees that store and process Category I special nuclear material under contract, primarily for DOE. Because of the risks associated with Category I special nuclear material, both DOE and NRC recognize that effective security programs are essential. The key component in both DOE's and NRC's security programs is each agency's design basis threat (DBT)--classified documents that identify the potential size and capabilities of terrorist threats to special nuclear material. To counter the threat contained in their respective DBTs, both DOE sites and NRC licensees use physical security systems, such as alarms, fences, and other barriers; trained and armed security forces; and operational security procedures, such as a "two-person" rule that prevents unobserved access to special nuclear material. In addition, to ensure DBT requirements are being met and to detect potential security vulnerabilities, DOE and NRC employ a variety of other measures, including inspection programs; reviews; and force-on-force performance tests, in which the site's security forces undergo simulated attacks by a group of mock terrorists. Over the past several years, we have raised concerns ...
Date: September 11, 2007
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

National Nuclear Security Administration: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Management of the Nation's Nuclear Programs

Description: A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In response to security and management weaknesses, in 1999 the Congress created the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy (DOE). NNSA is responsible for the nation's nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and naval reactors programs. Since its creation, NNSA has continued to experience security problems, such as unauthorized access to a NNSA unclassified computer system, and cost and schedule overruns on its major projects, such as the National Ignition Facility. GAO reviewed the extent to which NNSA has taken steps to (1) improve security at its laboratories and plants and (2) improve its management practices and revise its organizational structure. To carry out its work, GAO reviewed legislation; NNSA policies, plans and budgets; and interviewed current and former NNSA and DOE officials."
Date: January 19, 2007
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: Observations on DOE's and NNSA's Efforts to Enhance Oversight of Security, Safety, and Project and Contract Management

Description: Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within DOE, continue to face challenges in ensuring that oversight of security activities is effective. For example, in July 2012, after three trespassers gained access to the protected security area directly adjacent to one of the nation's most critically important nuclear weapon-related facilities, the Y-12 National Security Complex, DOE and NNSA took a number of immediate actions. These actions included repairing security equipment, reassigning key security personnel, and firing the Y-12 protective force contractor. As GAO and others have reported, DOE has a long history of security breakdowns and an equally long history of instituting remedies to fix these problems. For example, 10 years ago, GAO reported on inconsistencies among NNSA sites on how they assess contractors' security activities and, since that time, DOE has undertaken security initiatives to address these issues. GAO is currently evaluating these security reform initiatives."
Date: March 13, 2013
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department