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National Nuclear Security Administration: Observations on NNSA's Management and Oversight of the Nuclear Security Enterprise

Description: Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "NNSA has successfully ensured that the nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe and reliable in the absence of underground nuclear testing, accomplishing this complicated task by using state-of-the-art facilities as well as the skills of top scientists. Nevertheless, NNSA does not have reliable enterprise-wide management information on program budgets and costs, which potentially increases risk to NNSA’s programs. For example, in June 2010, GAO reported that NNSA could not identify the total costs to operate and maintain essential weapons activities facilities and infrastructure. In addition, in February 2011, GAO reported that NNSA lacks complete data on, among other things, the condition and value of its existing infrastructure, cost estimates and completion dates for planned capital improvement projects, and critical human capital skills in its contractor workforce that are needed for its programs. As a result, NNSA does not have a sound basis for making decisions on how to most effectively manage its portfolio of projects and other programs and lacks information that could help justify future budget requests or target cost savings opportunities. NNSA recognizes that its ability to make informed decisions is hampered and is taking steps to improve its budget and cost data."
Date: February 16, 2012
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

National Nuclear Security Administration: Security and Management Improvements Can Enhance Implementation of the NNSA Act

Description: Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "During the late 1990s, the Department of Energy (DOE) experienced difficulties with a lack of clear management authority and responsibility that contributed to security problems at the nation's nuclear weapons laboratories and management problems with major projects. In response, Congress created the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) as a separately organized agency within DOE under Title 32 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000--the NNSA Act. Since its creation, NNSA has continued to experience security problems, such as unauthorized access to NNSA computer systems, and cost and schedule overruns on major projects, such as the National Ignition Facility. GAO was asked to review the extent to which NNSA has taken steps to (1) improve security at its laboratories and plants and (2) improve its management practices and revise its organizational structure. In January 2007, GAO issued a report--National Nuclear Security Administration: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Management of the Nation's Nuclear Programs, (GAO-07-36)--that addressed these matters. To carry out its work, GAO reviewed legislation; NNSA policies, plans and budgets; collected and analyzed security performance ratings and interviewed current and former DOE and NNSA officials."
Date: January 31, 2007
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

National Nuclear Security Administration: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Management of the Nation's Nuclear Programs

Description: A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "In response to security and management weaknesses, in 1999 the Congress created the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy (DOE). NNSA is responsible for the nation's nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and naval reactors programs. Since its creation, NNSA has continued to experience security problems, such as unauthorized access to a NNSA unclassified computer system, and cost and schedule overruns on its major projects, such as the National Ignition Facility. GAO reviewed the extent to which NNSA has taken steps to (1) improve security at its laboratories and plants and (2) improve its management practices and revise its organizational structure. To carry out its work, GAO reviewed legislation; NNSA policies, plans and budgets; and interviewed current and former NNSA and DOE officials."
Date: January 19, 2007
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

National Nuclear Security Administration: Key Management Structure and Workforce Planning Issues Remain As NNSA Conducts Downsizing

Description: A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), is responsible for the management and security of the nation's nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and naval reactor programs. NNSA oversees contractors that operate its facilities to ensure that activities are effective and in line with departmental policy. In December 2002, NNSA began implementing a major reorganization aimed at solving important long-standing organizational issues. GAO reviewed NNSA's overall reorganization efforts to assess (1) the extent to which it is addressing in practice the past problems concerning the unclear delineation of authority and responsibility, (2) workforce planning, and (3) its impact on federal oversight of contractor activities."
Date: June 25, 2004
Creator: United States. General Accounting Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

National Nuclear Security Administration: Contractors' Strategies to Recruit and Retain a Critically Skilled Workforce Are Generally Effective

Description: A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Responsibility for ensuring the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile rests upon a cadre of workers at eight contractor-operated National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) weapons facilities. Many of these workers--including scientists, engineers, and technicians--have "critical" skills needed to maintain the stockpile. About 37 percent of these workers are at or near retirement age, raising concern about whether these specialists will have time to pass on their knowledge and expertise to new recruits. In this context, Congress asked us to (1) describe the approaches that NNSA, its contractors, and organizations with similar workforces are using to recruit and retain critically skilled workers; (2) assess the extent to which these approaches have been effective; and (3) describe any remaining challenges, strategies to mitigate these challenges, and the similarity of these challenges and strategies to those of organizations with comparable workforces."
Date: February 2, 2005
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

National Nuclear Security Administration: Laboratories' Indirect Cost Management Has Improved, but Additional Opportunities Exist

Description: A letter report issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) management and operating (M&O) contractors differ in how they classify and allocate indirect costs at NNSA laboratories. Although different approaches are allowed by Cost Accounting Standards, these differences limit the ability to compare program costs across the laboratories. Recognizing the limitations of its current cost data, the Department of Energy (DOE) and NNSA are implementing the Institutional Cost Reporting initiative intended to create a standardized report of certain costs, including many indirect costs. However, DOE is uncertain how it will use the data gathered by this initiative, and these efforts may provide only limited improvements because the data will continue to only be reported at an aggregate level."
Date: June 28, 2013
Creator: United States. Government Accountability Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Project Execution Plan, Rev. 3

Description: This plan addresses project activities encompassed by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office, Environmental Restoration Division and conforms to the requirements contained in the Life-Cycle Asset Management, DOE Order 430.1A; The Joint Program Office Policy on Project Management in Support of DOE Order 430.1; Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets, DOE Order 413.3; the Project Execution and Engineering Management Planning Guide, GPG-FM-010; and other applicable Good Practice Guides; and the FY 2001 Integrated Planning, Accountability, and Budgeting System Policy Guidance. The plan also reflects the milestone philosophies of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order, as agreed to by the State of Nevada, the DOE, and the U.S. Department of Defense; and traditional project management philosophies such as the development of life-cycle costs, schedules, and work scope; identification o f roles and responsibilities; and baseline management and controls.
Date: August 1, 2002
Creator: IT Corporation, Las Vegas
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 140: Waste Dumps, Burn Pits, and Storage Area, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, July 2002, Rev. No. 0

Description: This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 140 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 140 consists of nine Corrective Action Sites (CASs): 05-08-01, Detonation Pits; 05-08-02, Debris Pits; 05-17-01, Hazardous Waste Accumulation Site (Buried); 05-19-01, Waste Disposal Site; 05-23-01, Gravel Gertie; 05-35-01, Burn Pit; 05-99-04, Burn Pit; 22-99-04, Radioactive Waste Dump; 23-17-01, Hazardous Waste Storage Area. All nine of these CASs are located within Areas 5, 22, and 23 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) in Nevada, approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas. This CAU is being investigated because disposed waste may be present without appropriate controls (i.e., use restrictions, adequate cover) and hazardous and/or radioactive constituents may be present or migrating at concentrations and locations that could potentially pose a threat to human health and the environment. The NTS has been used for various research and development projects including nuclear weapons testing. The CASs in CAU 140 were used for testing, material storage, waste storage, and waste disposal. A two-phase approach has been selected to collect information and generate data to satisfy needed resolution criteria and resolve the decision statements. Phase I will determine if contaminants of potential concern (COPCs) are present in concentrations exceeding preliminary action levels. This data will be evaluated at all CASs. Phase II will determine the extent of the contaminant(s) of concern (COCs). This data will only be evaluated for CASs with a COC identified during Phase I. Based on process knowledge, the COPCs for CAU 140 include volatile organics, semivolatile organics, petroleum hydrocarbons, explosive residues, herbicides, pesticides, polychlorinated biphenyls, metals, and radionuclides. The results of this ...
Date: July 18, 2002
Creator: /NV, NNSA
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 127: Areas 25 and 26 Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (Rev. No.: 0, August 2002)

Description: This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Offices's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 127 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 127 is located on the Nevada Test Site approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. This CAU is comprised of 12 Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located at Test Cell C; the Engine Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (E-MAD) Facility; the X-Tunnel in Area 25; the Pluto Disassembly Facility; the Pluto Check Station; and the Port Gaston Training Facility in Area 26. These CASs include: CAS 25-01-05, Aboveground Storage Tank (AST); CAS 25-02-02, Underground Storage Tank (UST); CAS 25-23-11, Contaminated Materials; CAS 25-12-01, Boiler; CAS 25-01-06, AST; CAS 25-01-07, AST; CAS 25-02-13, UST; CAS 26- 01-01, Filter Tank (Rad) and Piping; CAS 26-01-02, Filter Tank (Rad); CAS 26-99-01, Radioactively Contaminated Filters; CAS 26-02-01, UST; CAS 26-23-01, Contaminated Liquids Spreader. Based on site history, process knowledge, and previous field efforts, contaminants of potential concern for CAU 127 include radionuclides, metals, total petroleum hydrocarbons, volatile organic compounds, asbestos, and polychlorinated biphenyls. Additionally, beryllium may be present at some locations. The sources of potential releases are varied, but releases of contaminated liquids may have occurred and may have migrated into and impacted soil below and surrounding storage vessels at some of the CASs. Also, at several CASs, asbestos-containing materials may be present on the aboveground structures and may be friable. Exposure pathways are limited to ingestion, inhalation, and dermal contact (adsorption) of soils/sediments or liquids, or inhalation of contaminants by site workers due to disturbance of contaminated materials. Future land-use scenarios limit subsequent uses of the CASs to various nonresidential (i.e., industrial) activities. ...
Date: August 27, 2002
Creator: /NV, NNSA
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 410: Waste Disposal Trenches, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Revision 0 (includes ROTCs 1, 2, and 3)

Description: This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 410 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 410 is located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), which is included in the Nevada Test and Training Range (formerly the Nellis Air Force Range) approximately 140 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. This CAU is comprised of five Corrective Action Sites (CASs): TA-19-002-TAB2, Debris Mound; TA-21-003-TANL, Disposal Trench; TA-21-002-TAAL, Disposal Trench; 09-21-001-TA09, Disposal Trenches; 03-19-001, Waste Disposal Site. This CAU is being investigated because contaminants may be present in concentrations that could potentially pose a threat to human health and/or the environment, and waste may have been disposed of with out appropriate controls. Four out of five of these CASs are the result of weapons testing and disposal activities at the TTR, and they are grouped together for site closure based on the similarity of the sites (waste disposal sites and trenches). The fifth CAS, CAS 03-19-001, is a hydrocarbon spill related to activities in the area. This site is grouped with this CAU because of the location (TTR). Based on historical documentation and process know-ledge, vertical and lateral migration routes are possible for all CASs. Migration of contaminants may have occurred through transport by infiltration of precipitation through surface soil which serves as a driving force for downward migration of contaminants. Land-use scenarios limit future use of these CASs to industrial activities. The suspected contaminants of potential concern which have been identified are volatile organic compounds; semivolatile organic compounds; high explosives; radiological constituents including depleted uranium, beryllium, total petroleum hydrocarbons; and total Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals. ...
Date: July 16, 2002
Creator: /NV, NNSA
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department