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Reflector and Shield Material Properties for Project Prometheus

Description: This letter provides updated reflector and shield preliminary material property information to support reactor design efforts. The information provided herein supersedes the applicable portions of Revision 1 to the Space Power Program Preliminary Reactor Design Basis (Reference (a)). This letter partially answers the request in Reference (b) to provide unirradiated and irradiated material properties for beryllium, beryllium oxide, isotopically enriched boron carbide ({sup 11}B{sub 4}C) and lithium hydride. With the exception of {sup 11}B{sub 4}C, the information is provided in Attachments 1 and 2. At the time of issuance of this document, {sup 11}B{sub 4}C had not been studied.
Date: November 2, 2005
Creator: Nash, J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Reentry response of the lightweight radioisotope heater unit resulting from a Cassini Venus-Venus-Earth-Jupiter gravity assist maneuver accident

Description: Reentry analyses consisting of ablation response, thermal response and thermal stress response have been conducted on the Lightweight Radioisotope Heater Unit (LWRHU) for Cassini/Venus-Venus-Earth-Jupiter-Gravity-Assist (VVEJGA) reentry conditions. Sequential ablation analyses of the LWRHU aeroshell, and the fuel pellet have been conducted in reentry regimes where the aeroshell has been deemed to fail. The failure criterion for ablation is generally assumed to be recession corresponding to 75% and 100% of the wall thickness. The 75% recession failure criteria allows for uncertainties that result mainly because of the high energies involved in the VVEJGA reentries compared to orbital decay reentries. Risk evaluations should consider the fact that for shallow flight paths the unit may disassemble at high-altitude as a result of ablation or may remain intact with a clad that had been molten. Within the limitations of the methodologies and assumptions of the analyses, the results indicate that: (1) For a side-on stable LWRHU reentry, aeroshell ablation failures occur for all reentry angles. (2)For a side-on spinning LWRHU reentry, aeroshell ablation failures are minimal. (3) For the tumbling LWRHU reentry, the aeroshell survives for most angles. (4) For the thermostructural analyses, using both a 1% and 5% allowable strain, all reentry angles and orientations examined resulted in small localized failures, but aeroshell breach is not predicted for any case. The analyses included in this report concentrate on VVEJGA reentry scenarios. Analyses reported previously have demonstrated that the LWRHU has adequate design margin to survive reentry from orbital decay scenarios and most injection scenarios at speeds up to escape speeds. The exception is a narrow range of flight path angles that produce multiple skip trajectories which may have excessive ablation.
Date: December 1, 1996
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Nuclear Rocket Test Facility Decommissioning Including Controlled Explosive Demolition of a Neutron-Activated Shield Wall

Description: Located in Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site, the Test Cell A Facility was used in the 1960s for the testing of nuclear rocket engines, as part of the Nuclear Rocket Development Program. The facility was decontaminated and decommissioned (D&D) in 2005 using the Streamlined Approach For Environmental Restoration (SAFER) process, under the Federal Facilities Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). Utilities and process piping were verified void of contents, hazardous materials were removed, concrete with removable contamination decontaminated, large sections mechanically demolished, and the remaining five-foot, five-inch thick radiologically-activated reinforced concrete shield wall demolished using open-air controlled explosive demolition (CED). CED of the shield wall was closely monitored and resulted in no radiological exposure or atmospheric release.
Date: September 1, 2007
Creator: Kruzic, Michael
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Nuclear Rocket Facility Decommissioning Project: Controlled Explosive Demolition of Neutron-Activated Shield Wall

Description: Located in Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), the Test Cell A (TCA) Facility (Figure 1) was used in the early to mid-1960s for testing of nuclear rocket engines, as part of the Nuclear Rocket Development Program, to further space travel. Nuclear rocket testing resulted in the activation of materials around the reactors and the release of fission products and fuel particles. The TCA facility, known as Corrective Action Unit 115, was decontaminated and decommissioned (D&D) from December 2004 to July 2005 using the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) process, under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. The SAFER process allows environmental remediation and facility closure activities (i.e., decommissioning) to occur simultaneously, provided technical decisions are made by an experienced decision maker within the site conceptual site model. Facility closure involved a seven-step decommissioning strategy. First, preliminary investigation activities were performed, including review of process knowledge documentation, targeted facility radiological and hazardous material surveys, concrete core drilling and analysis, shield wall radiological characterization, and discrete sampling, which proved to be very useful and cost-effective in subsequent decommissioning planning and execution and worker safety. Second, site setup and mobilization of equipment and personnel were completed. Third, early removal of hazardous materials, including asbestos, lead, cadmium, and oil, was performed ensuring worker safety during more invasive demolition activities. Process piping was to be verified void of contents. Electrical systems were de-energized and other systems were rendered free of residual energy. Fourth, areas of high radiological contamination were decontaminated using multiple methods. Contamination levels varied across the facility. Fixed beta/gamma contamination levels ranged up to 2 million disintegrations per minute (dpm)/100 centimeters squared (cm2) beta/gamma. Removable beta/gamma contamination levels seldom exceeded 1,000 dpm/100 cm2, but, in railroad trenches on the reactor pad containing soil on the concrete pad in ...
Date: June 1, 2008
Creator: Kruzic, Michael R.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department