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Precision Information Environment (PIE) for International Safeguards: Pre-Demonstration Development Use Cases

Description: In FY2013, the PIE International Safeguards team demonstrated our development progress to U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) staff from the Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24, our client) and the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (NA-22). Following the demonstration, the team was asked by our client to complete additional development prior to a planned demonstration at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), scheduled tentatively for January or spring of 2014. The team discussed four potential areas for development (in priority order), and will develop them as time and funding permit prior to an IAEA demonstration. The four capability areas are: 1. Addition of equipment manuals to PIE-accessible files 2. Optical character recognition (OCR) of photographed text 3. Barcode reader with information look-up from a database 4. Add Facilities to Data Model 5. Geospatial capabilities with information integration Each area will be described below in a use case.
Date: November 13, 2013
Creator: Gastelum, Zoe N. & Henry, Michael J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Report on the September 2011 Meeting of the Next Generation Safegaurds Professional Network

Description: The Next Generation Safeguards Professional Network (NGSPN) was established in 2009 by Oak Ridge National Laboratory targeted towards the engagement of young professionals employed in safeguards across the many national laboratories. NGSPN focuses on providing a mechanism for young safeguards professionals to connect and foster professional relationships, facilitating knowledge transfer between current safeguards experts and the next generation of experts, and acting as an entity to represent the interests of the international community of young and mid-career safeguards professionals. This is accomplished in part with a yearly meeting held at a national laboratory site. In 2011, this meeting was held at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. This report documents the events and results of that meeting.
Date: December 19, 2011
Creator: Gitau, Ernest TN & Benz, Jacob M.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department


Description: The collection of programs broadly termed Transparency Initiatives frequently involves physics measurements that are applied to items with sensitive or classified properties. The inability or reluctance to perform quantitative measurements, in the safeguards tradition, to such items, and then to expose the results to international examination, has impelled development of an attributes approach to measurements, following the philosophy if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, call it a duck, This approach avoids certain of the classification issues that would otherwise be associated with such measurements. Use of the attributes approach, however, continues to pose problems of interpretation, in light of the need to establish numerical thresholds whereby data obtained from the measurements can be evaluated to determine whether the attribute is present. In this paper we examine the foundations of the attributes approach and the steps used to determine appropriate attributes and thresholds, using examples from contemporary threat-reduction initiatives where possible. Implications for the detector technologies used in the measurements will be discussed, as will the characteristics of so-called information barriers intended to prevent inadvertent release of sensitive information during attributes measurements.
Date: September 1, 2000
Creator: JOHNSON, M. W.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

The International Safeguards Technology Base: How is the Patient Doing? An Exploration of Effective Metrics

Description: The term “Technology Base” is commonly used but what does it mean? Is there a common understanding of the components that comprise a technology base? Does a formal process exist to assess the health of a given technology base? These are important questions the relevance of which is even more pressing given the USDOE/NNSA initiatives to strengthen the safeguards technology base through investments in research & development and human capital development. Accordingly, the authors will establish a high-level framework to define and understand what comprises a technology base. Potential goal-driven metrics to assess the health of a technology base will also be explored, such as linear demographics and resource availability, in the hope that they can be used to better understand and improve the health of the U.S. safeguards technology base. Finally, through the identification of such metrics, the authors will offer suggestions and highlight choices for addressing potential shortfalls.
Date: July 1, 2010
Creator: Schanfein, Mark J. & Gouveia, Fernando S.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Evaluation of a Business Case for Safeguards by Design in Nuclear Power Reactors

Description: Safeguards by Design (SbD) is a well-known paradigm for consideration and incorporation of safeguards approaches and associated design features early in the nuclear facility development process. This paradigm has been developed as part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), and has been accepted as beneficial in many discussions and papers on NGSI or specific technologies under development within NGSI. The Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security funded the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to examine the business case justification of SbD for nuclear power reactors. Ultimately, the implementation of SbD will rely on the designers of nuclear facilities. Therefore, it is important to assess the incentives which will lead designers to adopt SbD as a standard practice for nuclear facility design. This report details the extent to which designers will have compelling economic incentives to adopt SbD.
Date: December 1, 2012
Creator: Wood, Thomas W.; Seward, Amy M.; Lewis, Valerie A.; Gitau, Ernest TN & Zentner, Michael D.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Opportunities for Process Monitoring Techniques at Delayed Access Facilities

Description: Except for specific cases where the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) maintains a continuous presence at a facility (such as the Japanese Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant), there is always a period of time or delay between the moment a State is notified or aware of an upcoming inspection, and the time the inspector actually enters the material balance area or facility. Termed by the authors as “delayed access,” this period of time between inspection notice and inspector entrance to a facility poses a concern. Delayed access also has the potential to reduce the effectiveness of measures applied as part of the Safeguards Approach for a facility (such as short-notice inspections). This report investigates the feasibility of using process monitoring to address safeguards challenges posed by delayed access at a subset of facility types.
Date: September 20, 2013
Creator: Curtis, Michael M.; Gitau, Ernest TN; Johnson, Shirley J.; Schanfein, Mark & Toomey, Christopher
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Safeguards Approaches for Black Box Processes or Facilities

Description: The objective of this study is to determine whether a safeguards approach can be developed for “black box” processes or facilities. These are facilities where a State or operator may limit IAEA access to specific processes or portions of a facility; in other cases, the IAEA may be prohibited access to the entire facility. The determination of whether a black box process or facility is safeguardable is dependent upon the details of the process type, design, and layout; the specific limitations on inspector access; and the restrictions placed upon the design information that can be provided to the IAEA. This analysis identified the necessary conditions for safeguardability of black box processes and facilities.
Date: September 25, 2013
Creator: Diaz-Marcano, Helly; Gitau, Ernest TN; Hockert, John; Miller, Erin & Wylie, Joann
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Source Recertification, Refurbishment, and Transfer Logistics

Description: The 2012 Gap Analysis of Department of Energy Radiological Sealed Sources, Standards, and Materials for Safeguards Technology Development [1] report, and the subsequent Reconciliation of Source Needs and Surpluses across the U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratory Complex [2] report, resulted in the identification of 33 requests for nuclear or radiological sealed sources for which there was potentially available, suitable material from within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex to fill the source need. Available, suitable material was defined by DOE laboratories as material slated for excess, or that required recertification or refurbishment before being used for safeguards technology development. This report begins by outlining the logistical considerations required for the shipment of nuclear and radiological materials between DOE laboratories. Then, because of the limited need for transfer of matching sources, the report also offers considerations for an alternative approach – the shipment of safeguards equipment between DOE laboratories or technology testing centers. Finally, this report addresses repackaging needs for the two source requests for which there was available, suitable material within the DOE complex.
Date: September 1, 2013
Creator: Gastelum, Zoe N.; Duckworth, Leesa L.; Greenfield, Bryce A. & Doll, Stephanie R.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department


Description: With new safeguards measures (under old and new authority) now available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there will be fundamental changes in the manner IAEA safeguards are implemented, raising questions about their effectiveness in meeting expanded Agency safeguards objectives. In order to characterize the capability of various safeguards approaches in meeting their objectives, it will be necessary to fully understand what is involved in the new safeguards equation. Both old and new measures will be required to construct a comprehensive picture of a State's nuclear activities and capabilities, and they both have strengths and weaknesses. There are (for political and cost reasons) likely to be tradeoffs between the two types of measures. Significant differences among measures with respect to the probability of their detecting an anomaly, along with other characteristics, need be considered in this context. Given the important role of both types of measures in future approaches, their inherent differences with regard to their capabilities and limitations, and their potential impact on the credibility of safeguards, it will be essential to consider these measures systematically, independently, and in combination in any effectiveness evaluation. This paper will consider concepts and issues in addressing this need.
Date: September 1, 2000
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

The Case for the Application of Worldwide Marine Radioactivity Studies In the Search for Undeclared Facilities and Activities

Description: Undeclared nuclear facilities unequivocally remain the most difficult safeguards challenge facing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Recent cases of undeclared facilities revealed in Iran and Syria, which are NPT signatory States, show both the difficulty and the seriousness of this threat to nonproliferation. In the case of undeclared nuclear facilities, the most effective deterrent against proliferation is the application of Wide-Area Environmental Sampling (WAES); however, WAES is currently cost-prohibitive. As with any threat, the most effective countering strategy is a multifaceted approach. Some of the approaches applied by the IAEA include: open source analysis, satellite imagery, on-site environmental sampling, complementary access under the Additional Protocol (where in force), traditional safeguards inspections, and information provided by member States. These approaches, naturally, are focused on specific States. Are there other opportunities not currently within the IAEA purview to assess States that may provide another opportunity to detect clandestine facilities? In this paper, the author will make the case that the IAEA Department of Safeguards should explore the area of worldwide marine radioactivity studies as one possible opportunity. One such study was released by the IAEA Marine Environment Laboratory in January 2005. This technical document focused on 90Sr, 137Cs, and 239/240Pu. It is clearly a challenging area because of the many sources of anthropogenic radionuclides in the world’s oceans and seas including: nuclear weapons testing, reprocessing, accidents, waste dumping, and industrial and medical radioisotopes, whose distributions change based on oceanographic, geochemical, and biological processes, and their sources. It is additionally challenging where multiple States share oceans, seas, and rivers. But with the application of modern science, historical sampling to establish baselines, and a focus on the most relevant radionuclides, the potential is there to support this challenging IAEA safeguards mission.
Date: June 1, 2013
Creator: Schanfein, Mark
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

The US Support program to IAEA Safeguards - 2008

Description: The U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards (USSP) was established in 1977 to provide technical assistance to the IAEA Department of Safeguards. Since that time the U.S. Department of State has provided funding of over $200 million and over 900 tasks have been completed by USSP contractors on behalf of the KEA. The USSP is directed by a U.S. interagency subcommittee known as the Subgroup on Safeguards Technical Support (SSTS) and is managed by the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory. In recent years, the SSTS and ISPO have identified priorities to guide the process of determining which IAEA requests are aligned with US. policy and will be funded. The USSP priorities are reviewed and updated prior to the USSP Annual Review Meeting which is hosted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) each spring in Vienna, Austria. This paper will report on the 2008 USSP priorities and be an introduction for a session which will consist of four papers on USSP priorities and four other papers related to USSP activities.
Date: June 9, 2008
Creator: Pepper,S.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

The US Support Program to IAEA Safeguards Priority of Training and Human Resources

Description: The U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards (USSP) priority of training and human resources is aimed at providing the Department of Safeguards with an appropriate mixture of regular staff and extrabudgetary experts who are qualified to meet the IAEA's technical needs and to provide personnel with appropriate instruction to improve the technical basis and specific skills needed to perform their job functions. The equipment and methods used in inspection activities are unique, complex, and evolving. New and experienced safeguards inspectors need timely and effective training to perform required tasks and to learn new skills prescribed by new safeguards policies or agreements. The role of the inspector has changed from that of strictly an accountant to include that of a detective. New safeguards procedures are being instituted, and therefore, experienced inspectors must be educated on these new procedures. The USSP also recognizes the need for training safeguards support staff, particularly those who maintain and service safeguards equipment (SGTS), and those who perform information collection and analysis (SGIM). The USSP is committed to supporting the IAEA with training to ensure the effectiveness of all staff members and will continue to offer its assistance in the development and delivery of basic, refresher, and advanced training courses. This paper will discuss the USSP ongoing support in the area of training and IAEA staffing.
Date: June 13, 2008
Creator: Queirolo,A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

The U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards - How It Works

Description: The U.S. Support Program to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards (USSP) was established in 1977 to transfer US technology and expertise to assist the IAEA Department of Safeguards because its limited budget and scope would not allow for R&D activities and the procurement of specialized or customized equipment. Over the years, the USSP and the Department of Safeguards have worked together continuously to develop and improve processes for requesting, selecting, and managing projects that support the Safeguards verification mission. This paper will discuss the main USSP processes for accepting and processing Safeguards requests, and managing and reporting task progress.
Date: July 13, 2008
Creator: Nock,C. & Hoffheins,B.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Considerations for Possible Light Impact of Spent Nuclear Fuel for Safeguards Measurements

Description: This effort is designed to be a preliminary study to determine the appropriateness of lightly contacting SNF with zirconium-based cladding, in wet storage, for the purpose of taking safeguards measurements. Contact will likely consist of an initial impact followed by a light tensile load on the exterior surface of the SNF cladding. In the past, concerns have been raised that contacting SNF cladding could result in a loss of long-term mechanical integrity due to crack initiation, uncontrolled crack propagation, and a mechanical exfoliation of the protective oxide layer. The mechanical integrity concerns are addressed with an analytic model that evaluates the threshold impact limits for degraded, but undamaged SNF cladding. Aqueous corrosion concerns, associated with exfoliation of the protective oxide layer, are addressed with a qualitative argument, focusing on the possible corrosion mechanisms of zirconium-based cladding.
Date: September 1, 2012
Creator: Castle, Brian K. & Ellis, Kelly D.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Personal views on integrated safeguards and the status of safeguards R&D in the united states.

Description: Nearly one year ago, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) completed the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards .' This important document, which was the product of extensive efforts by the Secretariat, the Director General's Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI), and outside experts over a number of years, provides a basis for discussions of proposed approaches to integrated safeguards . I will refer to this framework paper to share with you my personal views of integrated safeguards .
Date: January 1, 2003
Creator: Tape, J. W. (James W.)
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

An American Academy for Training Safeguards Inspectors - An Idea Revisited

Description: In 2009, we presented the idea of an American academy for training safeguards inspectors for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), due to the declining percentage of Americans in that international organization. In this paper we assert that there is still a compelling need for this academy. While the American Safeguards Academy would be useful in preparing and pre-training American inspectors for the IAEA, it would also be useful for preparing Americans for domestic safeguards duties in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. DOE National Laboratories, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It is envisioned that such an academy would train graduate and post-graduate university students, DOE National Laboratory interns, and nuclear safeguards professionals in the modern equipment, safeguards measures, and approaches currently used by the IAEA. It is also envisioned that the Academy would involve the domestic nuclear industry, which could provide use of commercial nuclear facilities for tours and demonstrations of the safeguards tools and methods in actual nuclear facilities. This would be in support of the U.S. DOE National Nuclear Security Administration’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). This training would also help American nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation professionals better understand the potential limitations of the current tools used by the IAEA and give them a foundation from which to consider even more effective and efficient safeguards measures and approaches.
Date: July 1, 2010
Creator: Durst, Philip Casey & Bean, Robert
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Safeguards-By-Design: Guidance and Tools for Stakeholders

Description: Effective implementation of the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach can help meet the challenges of global nuclear energy growth, by designing facilities that have improved safeguardability and reduced safeguards-related life cycle costs. The ultimate goal of SBD is to implement effective and efficient safeguards that reduce the burden to both the facility operator and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Since 2008, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative's Safeguards By Design Project has initiated multiple studies and workshops with industry and regulatory stakeholders, including the IAEA, to develop relevant documents to support the implementation of SBD. These 'Good Practices Guides' describe facility and process design features that will facilitate implementation of effective nuclear material safeguards starting in the earliest phases of design through to final design. These guides, which are in their final editorial stages, start at a high level and then narrow down to specific nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as Light Water Reactors, Generation III/IV Reactors, High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors, and Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants. Most recently, NGSI has begun development of a facility safeguardability assessment toolkit to assist the designer. This paper will review the current status of these efforts, provide some examples of these documents, and show some standard IAEA Unattended Instrumentation that is permanently installed in nuclear facilities for monitoring.
Date: February 1, 2012
Creator: Schanfein, Mark & Johnson, Shirley
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department


Description: For safety reasons, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is preparing to stabilize and package plutonium oxide currently subject to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS) beginning in the year 2001. The Hanford Site will also stabilize and package plutonium materials under IAEA safeguards. The U.S. and the IAEA began consultations in late 1996 to develop an approach to the application of safeguards during stabilization and packaging. With the plans to ship RFETS plutonium to Savannah River for interim storage prior to final disposition, this work has been extended to include safeguards during shipment. This paper will discuss the elements of a joint U.S./IAEA proposal for this task.
Date: February 1, 2001
Creator: KWEI, L.; SMITH, B. & AL, ET
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department