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Technical Basis for Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for WTD Emergency Response Plan: West Point Treatment Plant

Description: Staff of the King County Wastewater Treatment Division (WTD) have concern about the aftermath of a radiological dispersion event (RDE) leading to the introduction of significant quantities of radioactive material into the combined sanitary and storm sewer system in King County, Washington. Radioactive material could come from the use of a radiological dispersion device (RDD). RDDs include "dirty bombs" that are not nuclear detonations but are explosives designed to spread radioactive material (National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) 2001). Radioactive material also could come from deliberate introduction or dispersion of radioactive material into the environment, including waterways and water supply systems. This document, Volume 3 of PNNL-15163 is the technical basis for the Annex to the West Point Treatment Plant (WPTP) Emergency Response Plan related to responding to a radiological emergency at the WPTP. The plan primarily considers response to radioactive material that has been introduced in the other combined sanitary and storm sewer system from a radiological dispersion device, but is applicable to any accidental or deliberate introduction of materials into the system.
Date: August 1, 2005
Creator: Hickey, Eva E. & Strom, Daniel J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Radiological Risk Assessment for King County Wastewater Treatment Division

Description: Staff of the King County Wastewater Treatment Division (WTD) have concern about the aftermath of a radiological dispersion event (RDE) leading to the introduction of significant quantities of radioactive material into the combined sanitary and storm sewer system in King County, Washington. Radioactive material could come from the use of a radiological dispersion device (RDD). RDDs include "dirty bombs" that are not nuclear detonations but are explosives designed to spread radioactive material (National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) 2001). Radioactive material also could come from deliberate introduction or dispersion of radioactive material into the environment, including waterways and water supply systems. This document develops plausible and/or likely scenarios, including the identification of likely radioactive materials and quantities of those radioactive materials to be involved. These include 60Co, 90Sr, 137Cs, 192Ir, 226Ra, plutonium, and 241Am. Two broad categories of scenarios are considered. The first category includes events that may be suspected from the outset, such as an explosion of a "dirty bomb" in downtown Seattle. The explosion would most likely be heard, but the type of explosion (e.g., sewer methane gas or RDD) may not be immediately known. Emergency first responders must be able to quickly detect the radioisotopes previously listed, assess the situation, and deploy a response to contain and mitigate (if possible) detrimental effects resulting from the incident. In such scenarios, advance notice of about an hour or two might be available before any contaminated wastewater reaches a treatment plant. The second category includes events that could go initially undetected by emergency personnel. Examples of such a scenario would be the inadvertent or surreptitious introduction of radioactive material into the sewer system. Intact rogue radioactive sources from industrial radiography devices, well-logging apparatus, or moisture density gages may get into wastewater and be carried to a treatment plant. ...
Date: August 5, 2005
Creator: Strom, Daniel J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Radiological Instrumentation Assessment for King County Wastewater Treatment Division

Description: The King County Wastewater Treatment Division (WTD) have concern about the aftermath of a radiological dispersion event (RDE) leading to the introduction of significant quantities of radioactive material into its combined sanitary and storm sewer system. Radioactive material could come from the use of a radiological dispersion device (RDD). RDDs include "dirty bombs" that are not nuclear detonations but are explosives designed to spread radioactive material. Radioactive material also could come from deliberate introduction or dispersion of radioactive material into the environment, including waterways and water supply systems. Volume 2 of PNNL-15163 assesses the radiological instrumentation needs for detection of radiological or nuclear terrorism, in support of decisions to treat contaminated wastewater or to bypass the West Point Treatment Plant (WPTP), and in support of radiation protection of the workforce, the public, and the infrastructure of the WPTP. Fixed radiation detection instrumentation should be deployed in a defense-in-depth system that provides 1) early warning of significant radioactive material on the way to the WPTP, including identification of the radionuclide(s) and estimates of the soluble concentrations, with a floating detector located in the wet well at the Interbay Pump Station and telemetered via the internet to all authorized locations; 2) monitoring at strategic locations within the plant, including 2a) the pipe beyond the hydraulic ram in the bar screen room; 2b) above the collection funnels in the fine grit facility; 2c) in the sampling tank in the raw sewage pump room; and 2d) downstream of the concentration facilities that produce 6% blended and concentrated biosolids. Engineering challenges exist for these applications. It is necessary to deploy both ultra-sensitive detectors to provide early warning and identification and detectors capable of functioning in high-dose rate environments that are likely under some scenarios, capable of functioning from 10 microrems per hour (background) up to ...
Date: May 19, 2005
Creator: Strom, Daniel J.; McConn, Ronald J. & Brodzinski, Ronald L.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department