1,445 Matching Results

Search Results

Advanced search parameters have been applied.

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Working Reference Material Production Pla

Description: This Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Working Reference Material Production Plan was written for LLNL by the Los Alamos National Laboratory to address key elements of producing seven Pu-diatomaceous earth NDA Working Reference Materials (WRMS). These WRMS contain low burnup Pu ranging in mass from 0.1 grams to 68 grams. The composite Pu mass of the seven WRMS was designed to approximate the maximum TRU allowable loading of 200 grams Pu. This document serves two purposes: first, it defines all the operations required to meet the LLNL Statement of Work quality objectives, and second, it provides a record of the production and certification of the WRMS. Guidance provided in ASTM Standard Guide C1128-89 was used to ensure that this Plan addressed all the required elements for producing and certifying Working Reference Materials. The Production Plan was written to provide a general description of the processes, steps, files, quality control, and certification measures that were taken to produce the WRMS. The Plan identifies the files where detailed procedures, data, quality control, and certification documentation and forms are retained. The Production Plan is organized into three parts: a) an initial section describing the preparation and characterization of the Pu02 and diatomaceous earth materials, b) middle sections describing the loading, encapsulation, and measurement on the encapsulated WRMS, and c) final sections describing the calculations of the Pu, Am, and alpha activity for the WRMS and the uncertainties associated with these quantities.
Date: November 4, 1998
Creator: Wong, Amy; Thronas, Denise & Marshall, Robert
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Dissolution studies of plutonium oxide in LaBS glass

Description: As part of international agreement between the United States and Russia, a significant amount of plutonium requires disposition. One of the disposition paths is to immobilize it and dispose of it in a geological repository. The two favored immobilization forms are glass and ceramic. The plutonium, as an oxide, would be reacted with the glass or ceramic to form a homogeneousmaterial. The resulting solid product would then be encased in High-Level Waste (1-ILW)glass for the can-in-canister option. The HLW glass gives a radiation barrier to increase proliferation resistance. The glass canister would then be disposed of by geological emplacement. This paper discusses how glass meets two criteria: the condition of significant actinide volubility, and That the PuO{sub 2} feed should be incorporated into the matrix without significant amount of unreacted material.
Date: May 5, 1997
Creator: Riley, D.; Bourcier, W.; Vienna, J.; Meaker, T.; Peeler, D. & Maffa, J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Fabrication of 12% {sup 240}Pu calorimetry standards

Description: Throughout the DOE complex, laboratories are performing calorimetric assays on items containing high burnup plutonium. These materials contain higher isotopic range and higher wattages than materials previously encountered in vault holdings. Currently, measurement control standards have been limited to utilizing 6% {sup 240}Pu standards. The lower isotopic and wattage value standards do not complement the measurement of the higher burnup material. Participants of the Calorimetry Exchange (CALEX) Program have identified the need for new calorimetric assay standards with a higher wattage and isotopic range. This paper describes the fabrication and verification measurements of the new CALEX standard containing 12% {sup 240}Pu oxide with a wattage of about 6 to 8 watts.
Date: August 1, 1995
Creator: Long, S.M.; Hildner, S.; Gutierrez, D.; Mills, C.; Garcia, W. & Gurule, C.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

CSER-025: PFP storage of 9.25 inch tall, 4.4 kg Pu cans on existing vault four pedestals

Description: A nuclear criticality safety analysis has been performed to increase the approved plutonium mass limit for cans stored in Vault {number_sign}4 cubicles at PFP. The cubicles were approved to hold up to 2.5 kg of plutonium on each pedestal. The purpose of this CSER is to accommodate the storage of 4.4 kg of plutonium in PuO, (5.0 kg PuO,) in Vault {number_sign}4 cubicles. The highest k{sub eff} calculated for all possible scenarios is 0.868 + 0.003 when every other cubicle is left vacant, which is well below the criticality safety limit of k{sub eff}=0.935. Consequently, an increase of plutonium mass to 4.4 kg per can is within acceptable safety limits for this configuration.
Date: February 6, 1997
Creator: Hillesland, K.E., Fluor Daniel Hanford
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

A Simplified Methodology for Estimating the Pressure Buildup and Hydrogen Concentration Within a 2R/6M Container

Description: A simplified and bounding methodology for analyzing the pressure buildup and hydrogen concentration within an unvented 2R container was developed (the 2R is a sealed container within a 6M package). The specific case studied was the gas buildup due to alpha radiolysis of water moisture sorbed on small quantities (less than 20 Ci per package) of plutonium oxide. Analytical solutions for gas pressure buildup and hydrogen concentration within the unvented 2R container were developed. Key results indicated that internal pressure buildup would not be significant for a wide range of conditions. Hydrogen concentrations should also be minimal but are difficult to quantify due to a large variation/uncertainty in model parameters. Additional assurance of non-flammability can be obtained by the use of an inert backfill gas in the 2R container.
Date: August 1, 2001
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Shielding Analysis of the 5320 Shipping Cask

Description: The purpose of this work is to demonstrate that the 5320 shipping cask meets Federal regulations for maximum radiation dose rates when loaded with the intended plutonium oxide cargo. It should be emphasized that the 5320 is an existing cask, and therefore this work represents confirmatory analysis rather than design analysis.
Date: May 1, 1998
Creator: Blanchard, A. & Nathan, S.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Nuclear fuels technologies Fiscal year 1997 research and development test plan

Description: This document details the research and development (R&D) activities that will be conducted in fiscal year 1997 (FY97) by the Nuclear Fuels Technologies project team for the Department of Energy Office of Fissile Materials Disposition. This work is a continuation and extension of experimental activities that have been conducted in support of the disposition program with regard to using weapons-plutonium in the fabrication of mixed-oxide (MOX) nuclear fuel for reactor-based disposition. The purpose of this work is to identify and if possible, resolve, technical issues associated with applying the large experience base (existing mainly in Europe) of making MOX fuel with recycled reactor-grade plutonium to the fabrication of MOX using weapons-grade plutonium. Therefore, the projects are designed to fill one or more of three needs: (1) To provide potential fabricators a technical basis upon which to evaluate the uncertainties and technical risks associated with MOX fabrication using weapons-plutonium; (2) To provide the fabricator ultimately selected for the disposition mission with a technical basis upon which to build, thereby reducing the amount of development and time required for implementation of the MOX disposition option; and (3) To identify to DOE technical issues that it is unlikely the fabricator will address (e.g., gallium removal), and to resolve these issues or provide a clear path forward for doing so. Because of the volatile nature of the disposition program, all work described within this plan is intended to be completed this fiscal year with its culmination being one of two goals: (1) a summary of the technical results sufficient to hand over to commercial MOX fabricators for their use in planning activities; or (2) an estimate with regard to cost and schedule for follow-on activities to completely resolve the issue as well as sufficient technical supporting information in order for DOE to make well-informed ...
Date: January 30, 1997
Creator: Beard, C.A.; Blair, H.T.; Buksa, J.J. & Butt, D.P.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Technical basis for storage of elastomer-sealed produce cans in the DOE-STD-3013-94 package

Description: Department of Energy standard DOE-STD-3013-94 establishes criteria for the long-term packaging of plutonium metal and oxide. The inclusion of organic materials in sealed packages of plutonium may produce gases that contribute to container pressurization. To expedite processing, it would be desirable to permit, within the DOE-outlined criteria, limited amounts of organic materials to be used as a sealing gasket in some packaging containers. This paper presents a technical basis for allowing elastomer-sealed cans to be packaged inside the sealed inner container of a double weld-sealed DOE-STD-3013-94 container system.
Date: November 1, 1996
Creator: Horrell, D.R.; Stakebake, J.L. & Szempruch, R.W.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Bulging of cans containing plutonium residues. Summary report

Description: In 1994, two cans in the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Plutonium Facility were found to be bulging as a result of the generation of gases form the plutonium ash residues contained in the cans. This report describes the chronology of this discovery, the response actions that revealed other pressurized cans, the analysis of the causes, the short-term remedial action, a followup inspection of the short-term storage packages, and a review of proposed long-term remedial options.
Date: March 1, 1996
Creator: Van Konynenburg, R.A.; Wood, D.H.; Condit, R.H. & Shikany, S.D.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

CSER 96-023: CSER for PFP glovebox HC-21A with 4.4 kilogram plutonium cans

Description: This criticality safety evaluation report addresses the criticality impact of increasing plutonium oxide content from 2.5 kg oxide storage cans to 5.0 kg oxide Pu storage cans. Glovebox HC-21A is used to move plutonium metal buttons from cans into furnace boats prior to transferring them to the muffle furnace gloveboxes. Glovebox HC-21A supports muffle furnace operations where plutonium buttons are burned to form paw, (H/Pu < 2). The paw, is returned to glovebox HC-21A and sieved and packed into the 4.,f kg Pu cans. The plutonium mass limit is set at 7.5 kg plutonium when plutonium metal is present. The plutonium mass limit is set at 15. kg plutonium when no plutonium metal is present. Additionally, there are other requirements to assure criticality safety during this operation.
Date: December 17, 1996
Creator: Wittekind, W.D., Westinghouse Hanford
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Materials identification and surveillance project item evaluation: Items, impure plutonium oxide (ATL27960) and pure plutonium oxide (PEOR3258)

Description: In this report, Los Alamos scientists characterize properties relevant to storage of an impure plutonium oxide (74 mass % plutonium) in accordance with the Department of Energy (DOE) standard DOE-STD-3013-96. This oxide is of interest because it is the first impure plutonium oxide sample to be evaluated and it is similar to other materials that must be stored. Methods used to characterize the oxide at certain points during calcination include surface-area analyses, mass loss-on-ignition (LOI) measurements, elemental analysis, moisture-adsorption measurements, and quantitative supercritical-CO{sub 2} extraction of adsorbed water. Significant decreases in the LOI and surface area occurred as the oxide was calcined at progressively increasing temperatures. Studies indicate that supercritical-CO{sub 2} extraction is an effective method for removing adsorbed water from oxides. We extracted the water from powdered oxides (high-purity ZrO{sub 2}, pure PuO{sub 2}, and impure plutonium oxide) using CO{sub 2} at 3000 psi pressure and 75{degrees}C, and we quantitatively determined it by using gravimetric and dew-point procedures. The effectiveness of the extraction method is demonstrated by good agreement between the amounts of water extracted from pure zirconium and plutonium dioxides and the mass changes obtained from LOI analyses. However, the amount of moisture (0.025 mass %) extracted from the impure plutonium oxide after it had been calcined at 950{degrees}C and stored for a period of months is much less than the LOI value (0.97 mass %). These results imply that the impure plutonium oxide is free of adsorbed water after calcination at 950{degrees}C, even though the sample does not satisfy the LOI requirement of <0.50 mass % for storage.
Date: March 1, 1997
Creator: Allen, T.; Appert, Q. & Davis, C.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Test report for the Hanford convenience can

Description: This report provides the test results for the Hanford Convenience Can System. This system consists of four nested sealed steel cans which will be used for the interim storage of plutonium oxide on the Hanford Site. Several of the Convenience Can Systems were loaded with a plutonium oxide simulant and then drop and load tested to ensure that this system would provide adequate containment. The Convenience Can System passed all tests.
Date: January 14, 1997
Creator: Crow, S.R.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Skeletons in the closet: Implementation of the packaging program at Los Alamos

Description: In May 1994, The Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB) issued recommendation 94-1 to the Secretary of Energy indicating the need for improved remediation efforts within the defense nuclear facilities complex. The primary concern was for the safety of the workers, the public, and the environment as a result of improperly stabilized and packaged fissile materials. The DNFSB recommended that an integrated plan be formulated to convert the identified materials to forms or conditions suitable for safe interim storage. In addition, the DNFSB recommended that plutonium metal and oxides (> 50 weight-percent plutonium) be stabilized and packaged in accordance with the criteria stated in the DOE storage standard (DOE-STD-3013). In response to the recommendations, DOE requested input from all the defense-related sites and as a result, individual Site Integrated Stabilization and Management Plans (SISMP) were established. The following 2 milestones are identified in the Los Alamos SISMP: (1) stabilize high-risk vault items and recover the plutonium as oxide for packaging to meet the long-term storage standard by September 1997; (2) stabilize the remaining residue inventory and recover the plutonium as oxide. Repackage the existing plutonium metal and oxide (> 50% plutonium assay) for long-term storage by May 2002.
Date: November 1997
Creator: Ricketts, T. E.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Material protection, control, and accounting enhancements through the Russian/US cooperative MPC & A program

Description: The cooperative Russian/US Mining and Chemical Combine (Gorno-Khimichesky Kombinat, GKhK, also referred to as Krasnoyarsk-26) Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC & A) project was initiated in June 1996. Since then, the GKhK has collaborated with Brookhaven, Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, Pacific Northwest, and Sandia National Laboratories to test, evaluate, and implement MPC & A elements including bar codes, computerized nuclear material accounting software, nondestructive assay technologies, bulk measurement systems, seals, video surveillance systems, radio communication systems, metal detectors, vulnerability assessment tools, personnel access control systems, and pedestrian nuclear material portal monitors. This paper describes the strategy for implementation of these elements at the GKhK and the status of the collaborative efforts. 8 refs., 7 figs., 1 tab.
Date: November 1, 1997
Creator: Scott, S.C.; Sude, S. & Buckley, W.M.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Reaction kinetics relevant to the recycle hydride-dehydride process for plutonium recovery

Description: Objectives of this one-year, Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project were the expansion of fundamental knowledge of plutonium chemistry and the development of information for enhancing plutonium recovery methods and weapons safety. Results of kinetic studies demonstrate that the monoxide monohydride, PuO(H), formed during corrosion of plutonium by water in pyrophoric when dry and acts as an initiator for hydride-catalyzed reaction of the metal with air. The catalyzed corrosion rate of Pu is 10{sup 8} times faster than that in dry air and transforms plutonium into a readily aerosolized material. A potential application for the catalytic reaction is in the direct recovery of plutonium as oxide. Wet PuO(H) is non-pyrophoric and the safety hazard posed by its formation is reduced if the material is not allowed to dry.
Date: October 1, 1997
Creator: Haschke, J.M. & Allen, T.H.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Production test 234-4, production of plutonium (IV) fluoride by direct hydrofluorination of plutonium (III) oxalate. Final report

Description: A new method for the production of plutonium (IV) fluoride, which is used for the production of metallic plutonium, is described. The method bypasses the oxidation of plutonium(III) oxalate to plutonium(IV) oxide. A production test was executed with favorable yields; the decision to replace the prior method was recommended. This report is from the Hanford Works 234-5 building, March 30, 1951.
Date: March 30, 1951
Creator: Quinn, F.J. Jr.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Radioactive air emissions notice of construction for vertical calciner operation at the plutonium finishing plant

Description: This document serves as a notice of construction (NOC) for construction, installation, and operation of a vertical calciner to stabilize plutonium at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP)Complex, pursuant to the requirements of Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 246-247-060. The PFP Complex activities are focused on the cleanout and stabilization of plutonium residue left from plutonium weapons material processing activities. The prime purpose of the vertical calciner is to convert plutonium acid solutions to a more stable plutonium oxide. A test calciner has been developed and put in place in the 234-5Z Building. Development testing of this vertical calciner is ongoing. A new vertical calciner will be assembled for actual stabilization operation in Room 230C of the 234-5Z Building. The test calciner may be upgraded or replaced as an alternative to building a new calciner in Room 230C.
Date: July 17, 1996
Creator: Hays, C.B., Westinghouse Hanford
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Measuring the fill height of sealed cans with a compound pendulum

Description: A compound pendulum has been designed, fabricated, tested, and used to determine the fill height of material in sealed cans. The specific cans that stimulated this work are partially filled with uranium and plutonium oxide. Fill height affects nondestructive assays using fission neutrons, but corrections for various fill heights can be made once the height is known. Heights vary with use as the powder compacts or loosens, so it is necessary to determine the height at the time of the neutron measurement. The pendulum is small and readily portable so it can be taken to the location of the neutron measurement. Tests with open cans filled with sand to various known heights had accuracies generally within 3%. Factors that can affect the accuracy are examined and discussed. Experience in using the pendulum on sealed cans is related.
Date: June 1, 1995
Creator: Rinard, P.M.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Implementation of IAEA safeguards at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site

Description: When President Clinton spoke to the United Nations General Assembly in September 1993, he offered to place US excess defense nuclear material under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, before the next Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Extension Conference. This set in motion a flurry of activities at three DOE facilities, including Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (Site). With general guidance from DOE Headquarters, the facility selected a suitable storage area, identified appropriate materials, and acquired the necessary instrumentation to implement full-scale IAEA safeguards on excess plutonium oxide.
Date: July 1, 1995
Creator: Giacomini, J.J.; Finleon, C.A.; Larsen, R.K.; Lucas, M. & Langner, D.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department