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Computational Age Dating of Special Nuclear Materials

Description: This slide-show presented an overview of the Constrained Progressive Reversal (CPR) method for computing decays, age dating, and spoof detecting. The CPR method is: Capable of temporal profiling a SNM sample; Precise (compared with known decay code, such a ORIGEN); Easy (for computer implementation and analysis).  We have illustrated with real SNM data using CPR for age dating and spoof detection. If SNM is pure, may use CPR to derive its age. If SNM is mixed, CPR will indicate that it is mixed or spoofed.
Date: June 30, 2012
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

The Effects of Heterogeneities on Seismic Wave Propagation in the Climax Stock

Description: The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty requires the ability to detect low-yield (less than 150kton) nuclear events. This kind of monitoring can only be done seismically on a regional scale (within 2000km). At this level, it is difficult to distinguish between low-yield nuclear events and non-nuclear events of similar magnitude. In order to confidently identify a nuclear event, a more detailed understanding of nuclear seismic sources is needed. In particular, it is important to know the effects of local geology on the seismic signal. This study focuses on P-wave velocity in heterogeneous granitoid. The Source Physics Experiment (SPE) is currently performing low-yield tests with chemical explosives at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The exact test site was chosen to be in the Climax Stock, a cretaceous granodiorite and quartz-monzonite pluton located in Area 15 of the NNSS. It has been used in the past for the Hard Hat and Pile Driver nuclear tests, which provided legacy data that can be used to simulate wave propagation. The Climax Stock was originally chosen as the site of the SPE partly because of its assumed homogeneity. It has since been discovered that the area of the stock where the SPE tests are being performed contains a perched water table. In addition, the stock is known to contain an extensive network of faults, joints, and fractures, but the exact effect of these structural features on seismic wave velocity is not fully understood. The SPE tests are designed to seismically capture the explosion phenomena from the near- to the far-field transition of the seismic waveform. In the first SPE experiment, 100kg of chemical explosives were set off at a depth of 55m. The blast was recorded with an array of sensors and diagnostics, including accelerometers, geophones, rotational sensors, short-period and broadband seismic sensors, Continuous Reflectometry ...
Date: December 1, 2011
Creator: Hagan Webb, C., Snelson, C. M., White, R., Emmitt, R., Barker, D., Abbott, R., Bonal, N.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Evaluation of Simultaneous Testing Procedures for Nuclear Materials Control and Accounting

Description: This report presents the results of a comparative evaluation of four statistical testing procedures for use in the control and accounting of special nuclear materials. Of primary interest is a bivariate procedure that simultaneously tests ID and CID. Descriptions of the four testing procedures are presented with the necessary formulas and special considerations for their implementation. Results of a simulation study indicate the conditions under which each of the tests would provide superior protection against "trickle" diversions.
Date: March 1, 1982
Creator: Bowen, W. M.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Integrated Performance Testing for Nonproliferation Support Project

Description: The objective of this workshop is to provide participants with training in testing techniques and methodologies for assessment of the performance of: Physical Protection system elements; Material Control and Accounting (MC&A) system elements.
Date: August 20, 2013
Creator: Johns, Russell; Bultz, Garl Alan; Byers, Kenneth R. & Yaegle, William
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Integrated Performance Testing Workshop - Supplemental Materials (Scripts and Procedures)

Description: A variety of performance tests are described relating to: Material Transfers; Emergency Evacuation; Alarm Response Assessment; and an Enhanced Limited Scope Performance Test (ELSPT). Procedures are given for: nuclear material physical inventory and discrepancy; material transfers; and emergency evacuation.
Date: February 1, 2014
Creator: Baum, Gregory A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department


Description: Early in the Fuels Refabrication and Development (FRAD) program, it was recognized that safeguards and nonproliferation design criteria were needed to provide guidance to equipment, process, and facility designers. This need was highlighted by the recent attention given safeguards and proliferation. Because of this heightened concern, it was found that design criteria that adequately address safeguards and nonproliferation do not now exist. For this reason, a three-day workshop was convened to attempt to collect and organize existing information regarding design criteria. This document is a result of that undertaking and the subsequent efforts required to structure the information. In summary, it was found that domestic and international goals and objectives are reasonably well established. Goals and objectives for evaluating the proliferation resistance of a facility are less firmly defined. A listing of design criteria for domestic and international safeguards has not been compiled. This document presents a summary of considerations that must be incorporated into design criteria but stops short of developing a comprehensive list of design criteria. One is certainly needed and should be funded as a follow-on effort. Following the development of the design criteria, the next logical steps are the development of evaluation methodologies and acceptance criteria. These also were proposed as logical follow-on activities which would be needed before a major FRAD design activity could be initiated.
Date: September 1, 1979
Creator: McSweeney, T. I.; Powers, J. A.; Forscher, F.; Morris, F.; De Montmollin, J. M.; Higinbotham, W. A. et al.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Tables for Trials and Failures with PD for Designated Confidence Level

Description: Two attachments are provided for performance testing of sensors and other Physical Protection System (PPS) components.#2; The first attachment is a table of Trials and Failures, giving Probability of Detection (PD) for a designated confidence level and sorted by trials.#2; The second attachment contains the same data, sorted by failures.
Date: February 1, 2014
Creator: Leach, Janice
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department


Description: This paper briefly summarizes the series in which we consider the possibilities for losing, or compromising, key capabilities of the U.S. nuclear force in the face of modernization and reductions. The first of the three papers takes an historical perspective, considering capabilities that were eliminated in past force reductions. The second paper is our attempt to define the needed capabilities looking forward in the context of the current framework for force modernization and the current picture of the evolving challenges of deterrence and assurance. The third paper then provides an example for each of our undesirable outcomes: the creation of roach motels, box canyons, and wrong turns.
Date: September 16, 2013
Creator: Swegle, J. & Tincher, D.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department


Description: Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) are collaborating on development of a Ceramic Seal, also sometimes designated the Intrinsically Tamper Indicating Ceramic Seal (ITICS), which is a tamper indicating seal for international safeguards applications. The Ceramic Seal is designed to be a replacement for metal loop seals that are currently used by the IAEA and other safeguards organizations. The Ceramic Seal has numerous features that enhance the security of the seal, including a frangible ceramic body, protective and tamper indicating coatings, an intrinsic unique identifier using Laser Surface Authentication, electronics incorporated into the seal that provide cryptographic seal authentication, and user-friendly seal wire capture. A second generation prototype of the seal is currently under development whose seal body is of Low Temperature Co-fired Ceramic (LTCC) construction. SRNL has developed the mechanical design of the seal in an iterative process incorporating comments from the SNL vulnerability review team. SRNL is developing fluorescent tamper indicating coatings, with recent development focusing on optimizing the durability of the coatings and working with a vendor to develop a method to apply coatings on a 3-D surface. SRNL performed a study on the effects of radiation on the electronics of the seal and possible radiation shielding techniques to minimize the effects. SRNL is also investigating implementation of Laser Surface Authentication (LSA) as a means of unique identification of each seal and the effects of the surface coatings on the LSA signature.
Date: June 3, 2013
Creator: Krementz, D.; Brinkman, K.; Martinez-Rodriguez, M.; Mendez-Torres, A. & Weeks, G.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department


Description: This is the third of three papers (in addition to an introductory summary) aimed at providing a framework for evaluating future reductions or modifications of the U.S. nuclear force, first by considering previous instances in which nuclear-force capabilities were eliminated; second by looking forward into at least the foreseeable future at the features of global and regional deterrence (recognizing that new weapon systems currently projected will have expected lifetimes stretching beyond our ability to predict the future); and third by providing examples of past or possible undesirable outcomes in the shaping of the future nuclear force, as well as some closing thoughts for the future. In this paper, we provide one example each of our judgments on what constitutes a box canyon, a roach motel, and a wrong turn: � Wrong Turn: The Reliable Replacement Warhead � Roach Motel: SRAM T vs the B61 � A Possible Box Canyon: A Low-Yield Version of the W76 SLBM Warhead Recognizing that new nuclear missions or weapons are not demanded by current circumstances � a development path that yields future capabilities similar to those of today, which are adequate if not always ideal, and a broader national-security strategy that supports nonproliferation and arms control by reducing the role for, and numbers, of nuclear weapons � we briefly consider alternate, less desirable futures, and their possible effect on the complex problem of regional deterrence. In this regard, we discuss the issues posed by, and possible responses to, three example regional deterrence challenges: in-country defensive use of nuclear weapons by an adversary; reassurance of U.S. allies with limited strategic depth threatened by an emergent nuclear power; and extraterritorial, non-strategic offensive use of nuclear weapons by an adversary in support of limited military objectives against a U.S. ally.
Date: September 11, 2013
Creator: Swegle, J. & Tincher, D.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department