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Investigation of CTBT OSI Radionuclide Techniques at the DILUTED WATERS Nuclear Test Site

Description: Under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), a verification regime that includes the ability to conduct an On-Site Inspection (OSI) will be established. The Treaty allows for an OSI to include many techniques, including the radionuclide techniques of gamma radiation surveying and spectrometry and environmental sampling and analysis. Such radioactivity detection techniques can provide the “smoking gun” evidence that a nuclear test has occurred through the detection and quantification of indicative recent fission products. An OSI faces restrictions in time and manpower, as dictated by the Treaty; not to mention possible logistics difficulties due to the location and climate of the suspected explosion site. It is thus necessary to have a good understanding of the possible source term an OSI will encounter and the proper techniques that will be necessary for an effective OSI regime. One of the challenges during an OSI is to locate radioactive debris that has escaped an underground nuclear explosion (UNE) and settled on the surface near and downwind of ground zero. To support the understanding and selection of sampling and survey techniques for use in an OSI, we are currently designing an experiment, the Particulate Release Experiment (PRex), to simulate a small-scale vent from an underground nuclear explosion. PRex will occur at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The project is conducted under the National Center for Nuclear Security (NCNS) funded by the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA). Prior to the release experiment, scheduled for Spring of 2013, the project scheduled a number of activities at the NNSS to prepare for the release experiment as well as to utilize the nuclear testing past of the NNSS for the development of OSI techniques for CTBT. One such activity—the focus of this report—was a survey and sampling campaign at the site of an old UNE that vented: DILUTED ...
Date: November 1, 2012
Creator: Baciak, James E.; Milbrath, Brian D.; Detwiler, Rebecca S.; Kirkham, Randy R.; Keillor, Martin E.; Lepel, Elwood A. et al.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

A Continuous Automated Vault Inventory System (CAVIS) for accountability monitoring of stored nuclear materials

Description: Nearly all facilities that store hazardous (radioactive or non-radioactive) materials must comply with prevailing federal, state, and local laws. These laws usually have components that require periodic physical inspections to insure that all materials remain safely and securely stored. The inspections are generally labor intensive, slow, put personnel at risk, and only find anomalies after they have occurred. The system described in this paper was developed for monitoring stored nuclear materials resulting from weapons dismantlement, but its applications extend to any storage facility that meets the above criteria. The traditional special nuclear material (SNM) accountability programs, that are currently used within most of the Department of Energy (DOE) complex, require the physical entry of highly trained personnel into SNM storage vaults. This imposes the need for additional security measures, which typically mandate that extra security personnel be present while SNM inventories are performed. These requirements increase labor costs and put additional personnel at risk to radiation exposure. In some cases, individuals have received radiation exposure equivalent to the annual maximum during just one inventory verification. With increasing overhead costs, the current system is rapidly becoming too expensive to operate, the need for an automated method of inventory verification is evident. The Continuous Automated Vault Inventory System (CAVIS) described in this paper was designed and prototyped as a low cost, highly reliable, and user friendly system that is capable of providing, real-time weight, gamma. and neutron energy confirmation from each item stored in a SNM vault. This paper describes the sensor technologies, the CAVIS prototype system (built at Y- 12 for highly enriched uranium storage), the technical requirements that must be achieved to assure successful implementation, and descriptions of sensor technologies needed for a plutonium facility.
Date: December 8, 1994
Creator: Pickett, C. A.; Barham, M. A.; Gafford, T. A.; Hutchinson, D. P.; Jordan, J. K.; Maxey, L. C. et al.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Initial recommendations for restricting gamma-ray spectrometry measurements of radionuclides for on-site inspections

Description: The US paper �Radionuclide Sampling, Sample Handling and Analytical Laboratory Equipment for Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty On-Site Inspections,� CTBT/PC/V/OSI/WSII/PR/29 identified the radionuclides of interest to an OS1 as <sup>144</sup>Ce, <sup>147</sup>Nd, <sup>141</sup>Ce, <sup>149</sup>Ba<sup>140</sup>La), <sup>95</sup> Zr(<sup>95</sup>Nb), <sup>131m</sup>Xe, <sup>133m</sup>Xe, <sup>133g</sup>Xe, <sup>135g</sup>Xe, and <sup>37</sup>Ar. All of these nuclides (except <sup>37</sup>Ar) can be measured via some form of conventional or coincidence-based gamma-ray spectrometry. The non-gaseous radionuclides [<sup>144</sup>Ce, <sup>147</sup>Nd, <sup>141</sup>Ce, <sup>140</sup>Ba(<sup>140</sup>La), and <sup>95</sup>Zr(<sup>95</sup>Nb)] can be measured via conventional high-resolution gamma-ray spectrometry using a shielded, high-purity germanium (HPGe) detector. The gaseous radionuclides <sup>131m</sup>Xe, <sup>133m</sup>Xe, <sup>133g</sup>Xe, and <sup>135g</sup>Xe are best measured (after separation from their homologous elements) via a gamma & beta/electron coincidence technique such as that described in CTBT/WGB/TL-11/5 which could utilize either a HPGe or low-resolution (NaI(TI)) gamma-ray spectrometer to detect the gamma-ray/x-ray and a plastic scintillator to detect the beta particle/electron from the decay of the various Xe isotopes. The US paper CTBT/PC/V/IOSI/WSII/PR/29 (and other papers) identified a need to limit the information that can be extracted from high-resolution gamma-ray spectra to ensure that only information relevant to an OSI is accessible. The term �blinding� has been used to describe the need to limit the information available to the Inspection Team from the high-resolution gamma-ray measurement. A better term is �measurement restriction�; the need for restricting the information is particularly relevant to conventional high-resolution gamma-ray spectrometry measurements, but not to the gamma & beta/electron coincidence-type measurements envisioned for Xe isotopes because the separation process for these radionuclides will likely eliminate any other observables. The purpose of this paper is to define functional requirements for restricting measurements via conventional high- resolution gamma-ray spectrometry systems to ensure that only the nuclides of interest to an OSI can be identified and quantified. Options discussed below include 1) acquisition and analysis of the entire high-resolution gamma-ray spectrum combined with ...
Date: November 6, 1998
Creator: Buckley, W. F.; Kreek, S. A. & Wild, J. F.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

A review of existing model of no-notice randomized inspection and their potential application to model Pu handling facilities

Description: Literature regarding two alternative safeguards concepts--randomization and zones--is reviewed. The concepts were introduced in the early 1980`s to address the need to make safeguards more efficient in the light of the increasing number of facilities under safeguards and a fixed IAEA inspection budget. The paper discusses literature broadly relating these approaches to IAEA needs and objectives, reports from IAEA consultants meetings, reports of field trials, and other technical papers. The review suggests that the approaches have been extensively considered on a theoretical and practical level, and that the safeguards community endorses them on a conceptual level as potentially valid ways of achieving safeguards objectives. Actual utilization of the ideas in safeguards practice has to proceed on a case-by-case basis, but progress is being made.
Date: December 31, 1997
Creator: Sanborn, J. & Lu, M.S.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Implementing the chemical weapons convention: The nuts and bolts of compliance

Description: This paper is a presentation prepared for the American Bar Association in which the author discusses the issue of rights to privacy in the United States in the face of implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention inspections. The author points out that there are no clear precedents in law which deal with all the issues which will result from international inspections for verification which are required by the treaty. In particular as inspections tread on the issue of personal rights or private property there is a fairly ill defined legal area which needs to be developed to allow such inspections in the face of constitutional guarantees.
Date: March 1, 1995
Creator: Tanzman, E.A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Pipe Crawler{reg_sign} internal piping characterization system - deactivation and decommissioning focus area. Innovative Technology Summary Report

Description: Pipe Crawler{reg_sign} is a pipe surveying system for performing radiological characterization and/or free release surveys of piping systems. The technology employs a family of manually advanced, wheeled platforms, or crawlers, fitted with one or more arrays of thin Geiger Mueller (GM) detectors operated from an external power supply and data processing unit. Survey readings are taken in a step-wise fashion. A video camera and tape recording system are used for video surveys of pipe interiors prior to and during radiological surveys. Pipe Crawler{reg_sign} has potential advantages over the baseline and other technologies in areas of cost, durability, waste minimization, and intrusiveness. Advantages include potentially reduced cost, potential reuse of the pipe system, reduced waste volume, and the ability to manage pipes in place with minimal disturbance to facility operations. Advantages over competing technologies include potentially reduced costs and the ability to perform beta-gamma surveys that are capable of passing regulatory scrutiny for free release of piping systems.
Date: February 1, 1998
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Some field observations on OSI aerial photography scales

Description: The US, UK and USSR are attempting to negotiate a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in Geneva. One of the verification procedures presently proposed provides for the possibility of conducting an On-Site Inspection (OSI) if a violation is suspected. According to the terms of the draft treaty, the OSI team would be provided with either (1) stereoscopic aerial photographs with a scale of 1:2,500, or equivalent topographic maps (US version) or (2) a large scale aerial photograph (USSR version). In order to gain a better understanding of the aerial photograph issue, EG and G was asked to take stereoscopic aerial photographs of two areas at the NTS at four different scales, 1:2,500, 1:5,000, 1:10,000 and 1:25,000. The purpose of this paper is to present some field observations on the use for OSI type purposes of these different scale photos.
Date: March 16, 1981
Creator: Geil, R.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Aerial and ground-based inspections of mine sites in the Western U.S.-implications for on-site inspection overflights, under the CTBT

Description: The verification regime of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) provides for the possibility of On-Site Inspections (OSI`s) to resolve questions concerning suspicious events which may have been clandestine nuclear tests. Overflights by fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft, as part of an OSI, are permitted by the Treaty. These flights are intended to facilitate the narrowing of the inspection area, from an initial permissible 1000 km{sup 2}, and to help select the locations to deploy observers and ground-based sensors (seismic, radionuclides, . . .) Because of the substantial amount of seismicity generated by mining operations worldwide, it is expected that mine sites and mine districts would be prime candidates for OSI`S. To gain experience in this context, a number of aerial and ground-based mine site inspections have been performed in the Western U.S. by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory since 1994. These inspections are part of a broad range of CTBT mining-related projects conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy and its National Laboratories. The various sites are described next, and inferences are made concerning CTBT OSI`S. All the mines are legitimate operations, with no implication whatsoever of any clandestine tests.
Date: July 1, 1997
Creator: Heuze, F.E.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Information sources for transparency measures at sensitive facilities

Description: The concept of transparency stems from a desire to assure other parties that some action such as the dismantlement of a weapons system is taking place while avoiding the intrusiveness, complexity, and lengthy negotiations associated with formal verification measures. By their nature, transparency measures may fall short of providing the degree of confidence associated with arms control treaties, such as INF or START, but can be more quickly and easily implemented. This paper discusses information sources that could form the basis of transparency measures at sensitive facilities.
Date: August 1, 1993
Creator: Stanbro, W. D.; Olinger, C. T.; Close, D. A. & Kniss, B.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Routine inspection effort required for verification of a nuclear material production cutoff convention

Description: On 27 September 1993, President Clinton proposed {open_quotes}... a multilateral convention prohibiting the production of highly enriched uranium or plutonium for nuclear explosives purposes or outside of international safeguards.{close_quotes} The UN General Assembly subsequently adopted a resolution recommending negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty (hereinafter referred to as {open_quotes}the Cutoff Convention{close_quotes}) banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The matter is now on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, although not yet under negotiation. This accord would, in effect, place all fissile material (defined as highly enriched uranium and plutonium) produced after entry into force (EIF) of the accord under international safeguards. {open_quotes}Production{close_quotes} would mean separation of the material in question from radioactive fission products, as in spent fuel reprocessing, or enrichment of uranium above the 20% level, which defines highly enriched uranium (HEU). Facilities where such production could occur would be safeguarded to verify that either such production is not occurring or that all material produced at these facilities is maintained under safeguards.
Date: November 1, 1996
Creator: Dougherty, D.; Fainberg, A.; Sanborn, J.; Allentuck, J. & Sun, C.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Implementation of neutron counting techniques at US facilities for IAEA verification of excess materials from nuclear weapons production

Description: The U.S. Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy, announced by President Clinton before the United Nations General Assembly on September 27, 1993, commits the U.S. to placing under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards excess nuclear materials no longer needed for the U.S. nuclear deterrent. As of July 1, 1995, the IAEA had completed Initial Physical Inventory Verification (IPIV) at two facilities: a storage vault in the Oak Ridge Y-12 plant containing highly enriched uranium (HOW) metal and another storage vault in the Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) containing plutonium oxide and plutonium-bearing residues. Another plutonium- storage vault, located at Rocky Flats, is scheduled for the IPIV in the fall of 1995. Conventional neutron coincidence counting is one of the routinely applied IAEA nondestructive assay (ND) methods for verification of uranium and plutonium. However, at all three facilities mentioned above, neutron ND equipment had to be modified or developed for specific facility needs such as the type and configuration of material placed under safeguards. This document describes those modifications and developments.
Date: August 1, 1995
Creator: Stewart, J.E.; Krick, M.S.; Langner, D.G.; Reilly, T.D.; Theis, W.; Lemaire, R.J. et al.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

The applicability of sample collection and analysis in support of nuclear arms control agreements

Description: Agreements are being negotiated to halt the spread of nuclear arms both within the declared nuclear weapons states and to states not heretofore declaring their possession. With the verification regime of the recently negotiated Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) as a model, negotiators are considering variations of on-site inspection as formulas to enhance the assurance of compliance with future agreements. These on-site inspections may be part of a treaty dictated verification regime or one of a set of voluntary {open_quotes}confidence building{close_quotes} measures. In either case, the collection of material samples for analysis could be an integral component of the inspection as it is in the CWC. The following is an assessment of the applicability of sampling and analysis for compliance monitoring nuclear arms control agreements currently envisioned. There are two essentially orthogonal ways of approaching this question of applicability: the consideration of the analytical questions and the consideration of the specifics of the individual agreements. This study is meant to utilize both approaches in examining the possible impact of sampling and analysis on compliance assessment. First attention must be given to technical questions relating to the efficacy of sampling and analysis.
Date: August 1, 1995
Creator: McGuire, R.R.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

LLNL on-site inspection research project: A progress report

Description: We have been developing four specific technology areas that could be used during on-site inspections under a comprehensive test ban treaty: aftershock monitoring, noble gas monitoring, electromagnetic pulse monitoring, and overhead imagery detection of disturbed ground. Our investigation of aftershocks has shown that the low-frequency aftershocks that have been observed after nuclear tests at the Nevada Test Site are also associated with certain kinds of mining operations such as block caving. Our noble gas detection effort has successfully predicted the travel time of two tracer gases emplaced in the Non-Proliferation Experiment. Our EMP effort has developed a stand-off relationship for EMP sensors from the source and to date, has found that mining explosions do not generate significant low-frequency EMP. Our overhead imagery effort suggests that plant stress from shocked ground above an underground explosion may be detected using a ratio of 690 to 420 microns of visible light.
Date: July 1, 1995
Creator: Zucca, J.J.; Carrigan, C.; Schultz, C.; Smith, A.; Sweeney, J. & Pickles, W.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Visual Sample Plan (VSP) Statistical Software as Related to the CTBTO’s On-Site Inspection Procedure

Description: In the event of a potential nuclear weapons test the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is commissioned to conduct an on-site investigation (OSI) of the suspected test site in an effort to find confirmatory evidence of the nuclear test. The OSI activities include collecting air, surface soil, and underground samples to search for indications of a nuclear weapons test - these indicators include radionuclides and radioactive isotopes Ar and Xe. This report investigates the capability of the Visual Sample Plan (VSP) software to contribute to the sampling activities of the CTBTO during an OSI. VSP is a statistical sampling design software, constructed under data quality objectives, which has been adapted for environmental remediation and contamination detection problems for the EPA, US Army, DoD and DHS among others. This report provides discussion of a number of VSP sample designs, which may be pertinent to the work undertaken during an OSI. Examples and descriptions of such designs include hot spot sampling, combined random and judgment sampling, multiple increment sampling, radiological transect surveying, and a brief description of other potentially applicable sampling methods. Further, this work highlights a potential need for the use of statistically based sample designs in OSI activities. The use of such designs may enable canvassing a sample area without full sampling, provide a measure of confidence that radionuclides are not present, and allow investigators to refocus resources in other areas of concern.
Date: September 1, 2010
Creator: Pulsipher, Trenton C.; Walsh, Stephen J.; Pulsipher, Brent A. & Milbrath, Brian D.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

A Discussion of Procedures and Equipment for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty On-Site Inspection Environmental Sampling and Analysis

Description: This paper is intended to serve as a scientific basis to start discussions of the available environmental sampling techniques and equipment that have been used in the past that could be considered for use within the context of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) on-site inspections (OSI). This work contains information on the techniques, equipment, costs, and some operational procedures associated with environmental sampling that have actually been used in the past by the United States for the detection of nuclear explosions. This paper also includes a discussion of issues, recommendations, and questions needing further study within the context of the sampling and analysis of aquatic materials, atmospheric gases, atmospheric particulates, vegetation, sediments and soils, fauna, and drill-back materials.
Date: February 1, 2011
Creator: Wogman, Ned A.; Milbrath, Brian D.; Payne, Rosara F.; Seifert, Carolyn E.; Friese, Judah I.; Miley, Harry S. et al.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Evaluation of Cavity Collapse and Surface Crater Formation at the Norbo Underground Nuclear Test in U8c, Nevada Nuclear Security Site, and the Impact on Stability of the Ground Surface

Description: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Containment Program performed a review of nuclear test-related data for the Norbo underground nuclear test in U8c to assist in evaluating this legacy site as a test bed for application technologies for use in On-Site Inspections (OSI) under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. This request is similar to one made for the Salut site in U8c (Pawloski, 2012b). Review of the Norbo site is complicated because the test first exhibited subsurface collapse, which was not unusual, but it then collapsed to the surface over one year later, which was unusual. Of particular interest is the stability of the ground surface above the Norbo detonation point. Proposed methods for on-site verification include radiological signatures, artifacts from nuclear testing activities, and imaging to identify alteration to the subsurface hydrogeology due to the nuclear detonation. Aviva Sussman from the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has also proposed work at this site. Both proposals require physical access at or near the ground surface of specific underground nuclear test locations at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site (NNSS), formerly the Nevada Test Site (NTS), and focus on possible activities such as visual observation, multispectral measurements, and shallow and deep geophysical surveys.
Date: June 18, 2012
Creator: Pawloski, G. A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Seismic reflection imaging of underground cavities using open-source software

Description: The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) includes provisions for an on-site inspection (OSI), which allows the use of specific techniques to detect underground anomalies including cavities and rubble zones. One permitted technique is active seismic surveys such as seismic refraction or reflection. The purpose of this report is to conduct some simple modeling to evaluate the potential use of seismic reflection in detecting cavities and to test the use of open-source software in modeling possible scenarios. It should be noted that OSI inspections are conducted under specific constraints regarding duration and logistics. These constraints are likely to significantly impact active seismic surveying, as a seismic survey typically requires considerable equipment, effort, and expertise. For the purposes of this study, which is a first-order feasibility study, these issues will not be considered. This report provides a brief description of the seismic reflection method along with some commonly used software packages. This is followed by an outline of a simple processing stream based on a synthetic model, along with results from a set of models representing underground cavities. A set of scripts used to generate the models are presented in an appendix. We do not consider detection of underground facilities in this work and the geologic setting used in these tests is an extremely simple one.
Date: December 20, 2011
Creator: Mellors, R J
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Verifying Missile Non-Proliferation in Northeast Asia

Description: Missiles are attractive weapon systems because of their flexibility, survivability, and relatively low cost. Consequently, many nations are seeking to build missile forces resulting in regional arms races. Missile forces can be both stabilizing (e.g., providing a survivable force for deterrence) and destabilizing (e.g., creating strategic asymmetries). Efforts to control missile proliferation must account for these effects. A number of strategies to control the destabilizing effects of missiles were developed during the Cold War. Some of these strategies are applicable to regional missile control but new approaches, tailored to regional geographic and security conditions, are needed. Regional missile nonproliferation can be pursued in a variety of ways: Reducing the demand for missiles by decreasing the perception of national threats; Restricting the export of missiles and associated equipment by supplier countries; Restricting information describing missile technology; Limiting missile development activities such as flight or engine tests; Restricting the operational deployment of existing missile forces; and Reducing existing missile forces by number and/or type. Even when development is complete, limits on deployment within range of potential targets or limits on operational readiness can help stabilize potential missile confrontations. Implementing these strategies often involves the collection and exchange of information about activities related to missile development or deployment. Monitoring is the process of collecting information used to for subsequent verification of commitments. A systematic approach to implementing verification is presented that identifies areas where monitoring could support missile nonproliferation agreements. The paper presents both non-technical and technical techniques for monitoring. Examples of non-technical techniques are declarations about planned test launches or on-site inspections. Examples of technical monitoring include remote monitoring (i.e., a sensor that is physically present at a facility) and remote sensing (i.e., a sensor that records activity without being physically present at a facility).
Date: April 1, 2003
Creator: Vannoni, Michael G.; Biringer, Kent L. & Trost, Lawrence C.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

A systems perspective of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty monitoring and verification

Description: On September 24, 1996, after decades of discussion and more than two years of intensive international negotiations, President Clinton, followed by representatives of (to date) more than 125 other countries, including the other four declared nuclear weapons states, signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Each signatory now faces a complex set of technical and political considerations regarding the advisability of joining the treaty. Those considerations vary from country to country, but for many countries one of the key issues is the extent to which the treaty can be verified. In the case of the US, it is anticipated that treaty verifiability will be an important issue in the US Senate Advice and Consent Hearings. This paper will address treaty verifiability, with an emphasis on the interplay between the various elements of the International monitoring regime, as prescribed in the CTBT Treaty Text and its associated Protocol. These elements, coupled with the National regimes, will serve as an integrated set of overlapping, interlocking measures to support treaty verification. Taken as a whole, they present a formidable challenge to potential testers who wish not to be caught.
Date: November 1, 1996
Creator: Walker, L.S.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Long-term surveillance plan for the Mexican Hat disposal site Mexican Hat, Utah

Description: This long-term surveillance plan (LTSP) describes the U.S. Department of Energy`s (DOE) long-term care program for the Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action (UMTRA) Project Mexican Hat, Utah, disposal site. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has developed regulations for the issuance of a general license for the custody and long-term care of UMTRA Project disposal sites in 10 CFR Part 40. The purpose of this general license is to ensure that the UMTRA Project disposal sites will be cared for in a manner that protects the public health and safety and the environment. Before each disposal site is licensed, the NRC requires the DOE to submit a site-specific LTSP. The DOE prepared this LTSP to meet this requirement for the Mexican Hat disposal site. The general license becomes effective when the NRC concurs with the DOE`s determination of completion of remedial action for the disposal site and the NRC formally accepts this LTSP. This LTSP describes the long-term surveillance program the DOE will implement to ensure that the Mexican Hat disposal site performs as designed. The program is based on two distinct types of activities: (1) site inspections to identify potential threats to disposal cell integrity, and (2) monitoring of selected seeps to observe changes in flow rates and water quality. The LTSP is based on the UMTRA Project long-term surveillance program guidance and meets the requirements of 10 CFR {section}40.27(b) and 40 CFR {section}192.03. 18 refs., 6 figs., 1 tab.
Date: May 1, 1997
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Visual inspection for CTBT verification

Description: On-site visual inspection will play an essential role in future Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) verification. Although seismic and remote sensing techniques are the best understood and most developed methods for detection of evasive testing of nuclear weapons, visual inspection can greatly augment the certainty and detail of understanding provided by these more traditional methods. Not only can visual inspection offer ``ground truth`` in cases of suspected nuclear testing, but it also can provide accurate source location and testing media properties necessary for detailed analysis of seismic records. For testing in violation of the CTBT, an offending party may attempt to conceal the test, which most likely will be achieved by underground burial. While such concealment may not prevent seismic detection, evidence of test deployment, location, and yield can be disguised. In this light, if a suspicious event is detected by seismic or other remote methods, visual inspection of the event area is necessary to document any evidence that might support a claim of nuclear testing and provide data needed to further interpret seismic records and guide further investigations. However, the methods for visual inspection are not widely known nor appreciated, and experience is presently limited. Visual inspection can be achieved by simple, non-intrusive means, primarily geological in nature, and it is the purpose of this report to describe the considerations, procedures, and equipment required to field such an inspection.
Date: March 1, 1997
Creator: Hawkins, W. & Wohletz, K.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

The interactive on-site inspection system: An information management system to support arms control inspections

Description: The increasing use of on-site inspection (OSI) to meet the nation`s obligations with recently signed treaties requires the nation to manage a variety of inspection requirements. This document describes a prototype automated system to assist in the preparation and management of these inspections.
Date: December 1, 1996
Creator: DeLand, S.M.; Widney, T.W.; Horak, K.E.; Caudell, R.B. & Grose, E.M.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

The Chemical Weapons Convention -- Legal issues

Description: The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) offers a unique challenge to the US system of constitutional law. Its promise of eliminating what is the most purely genocidal type of weapon from the world`s arsenals as well as of destroying the facilities for producing these weapons, brings with it a set of novel legal issues. The reservations about the CWC expressed by US business people are rooted in concern about safeguarding confidential business information and protecting the constitutional right to privacy. The chief worry is that international verification inspectors will misuse their power to enter commercial property and that trade secrets or other private information will be compromised as a result. It has been charged that the Convention is probably unconstitutional. The author categorically disagrees with that view and is aware of no scholarly writing that supports it. The purpose of this presentation is to show that CWC verification activities can be implemented in the US consistently with the traditional constitutional regard for commercial and individual privacy. First, he very briefly reviews the types of verification inspections that the CWC permits, as well as some of its specific privacy protections. Second, he explains how the Fourth Amendment right to privacy works in the context of CWC verification inspections. Finally, he reviews how verification inspections can be integrated into these constitutional requirements in the SU through a federal implementing statute.
Date: August 1, 1997
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department