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Nuclear Materials Management for the Nevada Test Site (NTS) PREPRINT

Description: The Nevada Test Site (NTS) has transitioned from its historical role of weapons testing to a broader role that is focused on being a solution to multiple National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) challenges and opportunities with nuclear materials for the nation. NTS is supporting other NNSA sites challenged with safe nuclear materials storage and disposition. NNSA, with site involvement, is currently transforming the nuclear stockpile and supporting infrastructure to meet the 2030 vision. Efforts are under way to make the production complex smaller, more consolidated, and more modern. With respect to the nuclear material stockpile, the NNSA sites are currently reducing the complex nuclear material inventory through dispositioning and consolidating nuclear material. This includes moving material from other sites to NTS. State-of-the-art nuclear material management and control practices at NTS are essential for NTS to ensure that these new activities are accomplished in a safe, secure, efficient, and environmentally responsible manner. NTS is aggressively addressing this challenge.
Date: January 1, 2007
Creator: Schreiber, Jesse C.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Local Area Network Material Accounting System (LANMAS) Functions and Features Overview

Description: The Local Area Network Material Accounting System (LANMAS) application is a standardized approach to comply with the DOE Order 5633.3B, control and Accountability of Nuclear Material, material accounting requirements. This paper provides a general overview of the functions and features included in the LANMAS application.
Date: July 1, 1998
Creator: Robichaux, J.J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Global nuclear material monitoring with NDA and C/S data through integrated facility monitoring

Description: This paper focuses on a flexible, integrated demonstration of a monitoring approach for nuclear material monitoring. This includes aspects of item signature identification, perimeter portal monitoring, advanced data analysis, and communication as a part of an unattended continuous monitoring system in an operating nuclear facility. Advanced analysis is applied to the integrated nondestructive assay and containment and surveillance data that are synchronized in time. End result will be the foundation for a cost-effective monitoring system that could provide the necessary transparency even in areas that are denied to foreign nationals of both US and Russia should these processes and materials come under full-scope safeguards or bilateral agreements. Monitoring systems of this kind have the potential to provide additional benefits including improved nuclear facility security and safeguards and lower personnel radiation exposures. Demonstration facilities in this paper include VTRAP-prototype, Los Alamos Critical Assemblies Facility, Kazakhstan BM-350 Reactor monitor, DUPIC radiation monitoring, and JOYO and MONJU radiation monitoring.
Date: September 1, 1996
Creator: Howell, J.A.; Menlove, H.O.; Argo, P.; Goulding, C.; Klosterbuer, S. & Halbig, J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Material protection, control and accounting cooperation at the Urals Electrochemical Integrated Plant (UEIP), Novouralsk, Russia

Description: The Urals Electrochemical Integrated Plant is one of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy`s nuclear material production sites participating in the US Department of Energy`s Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Program. The Urals Electrochemical Integrated Plant is Russia`s largest uranium enrichment facility and blends tons of high-enriched uranium into low enriched uranium each year as part of the US high-enriched uranium purchase. The Electrochemical Integrated Plant and six participating national laboratories are cooperating to implement a series of enhancements to the nuclear material protection, control, and accountability systems at the site This paper outlines the overall objectives of the MPC&A program at Urals Electrochemical Integrated Plant and the work completed as of the date of the presentation.
Date: July 15, 1998
Creator: McAllister, S., LLNL
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Automated Systems for Safeguarding and Accountancy of Stored Nuclear Material (for proceedings of ESARDA 21st Annual Meeting, Sevilla, Spain May 4-6, 1999

Description: Oak Ridge has developed several sensor systems that are capable of providing unattended monitoring of the physical and/or assigned attributes associated with stored nuclear materials. These systems include the Continuous Automated Vault Inventory System (CAVISTM), SmartShelfTM, and the ReflectoActive Seal System TM. Each of these systems can be implemented independently or may be integrated with existing systems through the Graphical Facility Information Center or GraFICTM software package. GraFICTM is a versatile software package designed to operate in a distributed computing environment. GraFICTM can monitor and report all item and facility activity from the various sensors and systems to an unlimited number of authorized remote clients through a common interface. The software also contains an Intelligent Facility Management (lFM) package that helps storage facility managers with space planning, records management, item location, and variety of other facility specific needs. Results and details from several system deployments will be described, along with the specific features and possible uses of each system.
Date: May 1, 1999
Creator: Baldwin, K. M.; Bell, Z. W.; Dunigan, J. J.; Gaby, J. E.; Hickerson, T. W.; Lawson, R. L. et al.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

An alternative test for verifying electronic balance linearity

Description: This paper presents an alternative method for verifying electronic balance linearity and accuracy. This method is being developed for safeguards weighings (weighings for the control and accountability of nuclear material) at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL). With regard to balance linearity and accuracy, DOE Order 5633.3B, Control and Accountability of Nuclear Materials, Paragraph 2, 4, e, (1), (a) Scales and Balances Program, states: ``All scales and balances used for accountability purposes shall be maintained in good working condition, recalibrated according to an established schedule, and checked for accuracy and linearity on each day that the scale or balance is used for accountability purposes.`` Various tests have been proposed for testing accuracy and linearity. In the 1991 Measurement Science Conference, Dr. Walter E. Kupper presented a paper entitled: ``Validation of High Accuracy Weighing Equipment.`` Dr. Kupper emphasized that tolerance checks for calibrated, state-of-the-art electronic equipment need not be complicated, and he presented four easy steps for verifying that a calibrated balance is operating correctly. These tests evaluate the standard deviation of successive weighings (of the same load), the off-center error, the calibration error, and the error due to nonlinearity. This method of balance validation is undoubtedly an authoritative means of ensuring balance operability, yet it could have two drawbacks: one, the test for linearity is not intuitively obvious, especially from a statistical viewpoint; and two, there is an absence of definitively defined testing limits. Hence, this paper describes an alternative means of verifying electronic balance linearity and accuracy that is being developed for safeguards measurements at the INEEL.
Date: February 1, 1998
Creator: Thomas, I.R.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Security Transition Program Office (STPO), technology transfer of the STPO process, tools, and techniques

Description: In 1990, with the transition from a defense mission to environmental restoration, the U.S. Department of Energy`s (DOE`s) Hanford Site began a significant effort to diagnose, redesign, and implement new safeguards and security (SAS) processes. In 1992 the Security Transition Program Office (STPO) was formed to address the sweeping changes that were being identified. Comprised of SAS and other contractor staff with extensive experience and supported by staff experienced in organizational analysis and work process redesign, STPO undertook a series of tasks designed to make fundamental changes to SAS processes throughout the Hanford Site. The goal of STPO is to align the SAS work and organization with the new Site mission. This report describes the key strategy, tools, methods, and techniques used by STPO to change SAS processes at Hanford. A particular focus of this review is transferring STPO`s experience to other DOE sites and federal agency efforts: that is, to extract, analyze, and provide a critical review of the approach, tools, and techniques used by STPO that will be useful to other DOE sites and national laboratories in transitioning from a defense production mode to environmental restoration and other missions. In particular, what lessons does STPO provide as a pilot study or model for implementing change in other transition activities throughout the DOE complex? More broadly, what theoretical and practical contributions do DOE transition efforts, such as STPO, provide to federal agency streamlining efforts and attempts to {open_quotes}reinvent{close_quotes} government enterprises in the public sector? The approach used by STPO should provide valuable information to those examining their own processes in light of new mission requirements.
Date: September 1, 1994
Creator: Hauth, J.T.; Forslund, C.R.J. & Underwood, J.A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Advanced research workshop: nuclear materials safety

Description: The Advanced Research Workshop (ARW) on Nuclear Materials Safety held June 8-10, 1998, in St. Petersburg, Russia, was attended by 27 Russian experts from 14 different Russian organizations, seven European experts from six different organizations, and 14 U.S. experts from seven different organizations. The ARW was conducted at the State Education Center (SEC), a former Minatom nuclear training center in St. Petersburg. Thirty-three technical presentations were made using simultaneous translations. These presentations are reprinted in this volume as a formal ARW Proceedings in the NATO Science Series. The representative technical papers contained here cover nuclear material safety topics on the storage and disposition of excess plutonium and high enriched uranium (HEU) fissile materials, including vitrification, mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication, plutonium ceramics, reprocessing, geologic disposal, transportation, and Russian regulatory processes. This ARW completed discussions by experts of the nuclear materials safety topics that were not covered in the previous, companion ARW on Nuclear Materials Safety held in Amarillo, Texas, in March 1997. These two workshops, when viewed together as a set, have addressed most nuclear material aspects of the storage and disposition operations required for excess HEU and plutonium. As a result, specific experts in nuclear materials safety have been identified, know each other from their participation in t he two ARW interactions, and have developed a partial consensus and dialogue on the most urgent nuclear materials safety topics to be addressed in a formal bilateral program on t he subject. A strong basis now exists for maintaining and developing a continuing dialogue between Russian, European, and U.S. experts in nuclear materials safety that will improve the safety of future nuclear materials operations in all the countries involved because of t he positive synergistic effects of focusing these diverse backgrounds of nuclear experience on a common objectiveÑthe safe and secure ...
Date: January 28, 1999
Creator: Jardine, L J & Moshkov, M M
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department


Description: As part of the US-Russia Cooperative Program of Material Protection, Control and Accounting, staff members of the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE) have implemented procedures for taking physical inventory of nuclear materials at many of the facilities within the IPPE site. These include both large facilities, with substantial inventories and requiring dedicated inventory equipment and computers, and small facilities, with smaller amounts of material and subject to inventory by portable equipment. The experience to date demonstrates good progress toward the goal of regular PITs for the most attractive nuclear materials at IPPE.
Date: April 15, 1999
Creator: Poplavko, V. Ya.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Report on follow-up inspection of the double funding of security for special nuclear material at the Richland Operations Office

Description: In a June 3, 1993, Office of Inspections Letter Report, the Office of Inspector General notified the Department`s Acting Chief Financial Officer that the Department had requested and received $60 million, double the funds needed, for the safeguard and security of special nuclear material at the Department`s Richland Operations Office in Fiscal Year 1993. In response to the Letter Report, in a June 28, 1993, memorandum, the Acting Chief Financial Officer advised the Office of Inspector General that the extra $30 million received by the Office of Environmental Management would either be: (1) applied to unanticipated requirements in Fiscal Year 1993; (2) applied to the anticipated Congressional reduction to the Department`s Fiscal Year 1994 budget request; or (3) used as an offset to the Fiscal Year 1995 budget request. The purpose of this follow-up inspection was to review the circumstances surrounding the Fiscal Year 1993 double funding for the security of special nuclear material at Richland. The principal objectives of this inspection were to: (1) identify contributing factors to the double funding and corrective actions needed to prevent the double funding from reoccurring; and (2) review Departmental Managers` response to the double funding issue.
Date: August 28, 1995
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Nuclear Materials Management U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO)

Description: In light of the changing Defense Complex mission, the high cost to storing and protecting nuclear materials, and in consideration of scarcity of resources, it is imperative that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) owned nuclear materials are managed effectively. The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Strategic Action Plan outlines the strategy for continuing to meet America’s nuclear security goals, meeting the overall mission challenges of DOE and NNSA as well as giving focus to local missions. The mission of the NNSA/NSO Nuclear Materials Management (NMM) Program is to ensure that nuclear material inventories are accurately assessed and reported, future material needs are adequately planned, and that existing Nevada Test Site (NTS) inventories are efficiently utilized, staged, or dispositioned. The NNSA/NSO understands that the NTS has unique characteristics to serve and benefit the nation with innovative solutions to the complex problems involving Special Nuclear Materials, hazardous materials, and multi-agency, integrated operations. The NNSA/NSO is defining infrastructure requirements for known future missions, developing footprint consolidation strategic action plans, and continuing in the path of facility modernization and improvements. The NNSA/NSO is striving for the NTS to be acknowledged as an ideal location towards mission expansion and growth. The NTS has the capability of providing isolated, large scale construction and development locations for nuclear power or alternate energy source facilities, expanded nuclear material storage sites, and for new development in “green” technology.
Date: July 1, 2008
Creator: Schrieber, Jesse
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

LANL Safeguards and Security Assurance Program. Revision 6

Description: The Safeguards and Security (S and S) Assurance Program provides a continuous quality improvement approach to ensure effective, compliant S and S program implementation throughout the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Any issues identified through the various internal and external assessments are documented, tracked and closed using the Safeguards and Security Issue Management Program. The Laboratory utilizes an integrated S and S systems approach to protect US Department of Energy (DOE) interests from theft or diversion of special nuclear material (SNM), sabotage, espionage, loss or theft of classified/controlled matter or government property, and other hostile acts that may cause unacceptable impacts on national security, health and safety of employees and the public, and the environment. This document explains the basis, scope, and conduct of the S and S process to include: self-assessments, issue management, risk assessment, and root cause analysis. It also provides a discussion of S and S topical areas, roles and responsibilities, process flow charts, minimum requirements, methodology, terms, and forms.
Date: April 3, 1995
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

A Continuous Automated Vault Inventory System (CAVIS) for accountability monitoring of stored nuclear materials

Description: Nearly all facilities that store hazardous (radioactive or non-radioactive) materials must comply with prevailing federal, state, and local laws. These laws usually have components that require periodic physical inspections to insure that all materials remain safely and securely stored. The inspections are generally labor intensive, slow, put personnel at risk, and only find anomalies after they have occurred. The system described in this paper was developed for monitoring stored nuclear materials resulting from weapons dismantlement, but its applications extend to any storage facility that meets the above criteria. The traditional special nuclear material (SNM) accountability programs, that are currently used within most of the Department of Energy (DOE) complex, require the physical entry of highly trained personnel into SNM storage vaults. This imposes the need for additional security measures, which typically mandate that extra security personnel be present while SNM inventories are performed. These requirements increase labor costs and put additional personnel at risk to radiation exposure. In some cases, individuals have received radiation exposure equivalent to the annual maximum during just one inventory verification. With increasing overhead costs, the current system is rapidly becoming too expensive to operate, the need for an automated method of inventory verification is evident. The Continuous Automated Vault Inventory System (CAVIS) described in this paper was designed and prototyped as a low cost, highly reliable, and user friendly system that is capable of providing, real-time weight, gamma. and neutron energy confirmation from each item stored in a SNM vault. This paper describes the sensor technologies, the CAVIS prototype system (built at Y- 12 for highly enriched uranium storage), the technical requirements that must be achieved to assure successful implementation, and descriptions of sensor technologies needed for a plutonium facility.
Date: December 8, 1994
Creator: Pickett, C. A.; Barham, M. A.; Gafford, T. A.; Hutchinson, D. P.; Jordan, J. K.; Maxey, L. C. et al.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Inter-Site SNF Shipment Preparation Plan

Description: The Inter-Site SNF Shipment Preparation Plan provides the information on the activities, times, description, schedule, and cost of a generic inter-site SNF shipment preparation and shipment campaign that can be used for the development of a specific inter- site SNF shipment campaign. It provides the basis and method for estimating site-specific activities, times, description, schedule, and costs. The schedule that is provided shows the interaction of the activities and with the provided set of blank inter-site SNF shipment preparation tables provides for the development of a specific SNF shipment case. The sum of these features provides the reader and user with a tool by which an inter-site SNF shipment campaign can be setup and successfully completed. The generic cost estimate and times were derived primarily from INEL experiences and detailed cost estimates for shipments and receipts, in particular from Russ Cottam, as well as the experiences, cost estimates and reviews from the Savannah River Site, Oak Ridge, and West Valley. Electronic versions of the tables and schedules are available by disk or E-mail to interested users.
Date: September 1, 1996
Creator: Houck, E.D. & Jefimoff, J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Applicability of International and DOE Target Values to ALD Destructive Measurement Applications

Description: International Target values and target value applicability are a function of the nuclear material processing campaign or application for which the accountability measurement method is being applied. Safeguarding significant quantities of nuclear-grade materials requires that accountability measurements be as accurate, precise, and representative as practically possible. In general, the ITV provides a benchmark for determining generic acceptability of the performance of the various accountability measurement methods, since it represents a performance level that is accepted as highly reliable. There are cases where it is acceptable to select alternative accountability methods not specifically referenced by the ITV, or to use the recognized measurement method, even though the uncertainties are greater than the target values.
Date: December 19, 2002
Creator: Holland, M.K.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Plutonium management for the future

Description: Managment of excess nuclear materials from US weapons dismantlement has been the subject of numerous intellectual discussions during the past 5 years. Although there has been some objective recommendations, there is still much controversy surrounding the procsses that could lead to a national decision on Pu management. Two immediate needs are to secure the inventories of all Pu in safe configurations and to develop strategies for reducing proliferation risks. Specific suggestions discussed here are to (a) accept the deterrence value of Pu, (b) reappraise its potential as an energy resource, (c) recognize limitations to influence the future of Pu use world-wide, (d) isolate recoverable weapons-grade Pu and store it in stable configurations under international safeguards, and (e) manage Pu in spent fuels so that the valuable resources are not lost to a future generation.
Date: May 1, 1996
Creator: Pillay, K.K.S.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Conceptual baseline document for the nuclear materials safeguards system

Description: This document defines the baseline scope, schedule, and cost requirements of the Nuclear Materials Safeguards System (NMSS) replacement for the Plutonium Finishing Plant. The Nuclear Material Safeguards System (NMSS), operating in PFP, comprises data from several site safeguards systems that have been merged since 1987. NMSS was designed and implemented to the state of computer technology for the mid 1970`s. Since implementation, the hardware vendor has stopped producing computer systems and the availability of personnel trained and willing to work with the technology has diminished. Maintenance has become expensive and `reliability is a serious concern. -This effort provides a replacement in kind of the NMSS, using modern, scalable, upgradable hardware and software to the same standards used for the Hanford Local Area Network (HLAN) system. The NMSS Replacement is a Client/Server architecture designed on a Personal Computer based local area network (LAN) platform. The LAN is provided through an ethernet interface running the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). This architecture conforms to the HLAN standard, including the End System Operating Environment (ESOE). The Server runs the Microsoft Windows NT` Server operating system, Microsoft SQL Server2 database management system, and application tools. Clients run Microsoft Windows` and application software provided as part of the system. The interface between the clients and the database is through Microsoft ODBC4.
Date: August 1, 1995
Creator: Nelson, R.A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Safeguards summary event list (SSEL), January 1, 1990--December 31, 1995

Description: The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), Vol. 2, Rev. 4, provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) which occurred and were reported from January 1, 1990, rough December 31, 1995. Because of public interest, the Miscellaneous category includes a few events which involve either source material, byproduct material, or natural uranium which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of Bomb-related, Intrusion, Missing and/or Allegedly Stolen, Transportation-related, Tampering/Vandalism, Arson, Firearms, Radiological Sabotage, Nonradiological Sabotage, and Miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels.
Date: July 1996
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Assembly procedure for Shot Loading Platform

Description: This supporting document describes the assembly procedure for the Shot Loading Platform. The Shot Loading Platform is used by multiple equipment removal projects to load shielding shot in the annular spaces of the equipment storage containers. The platform height is adjustable to accommodate different sizes of storage containers and transport assemblies.
Date: April 1, 1995
Creator: Routh, R.D.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department