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Innovative Measurement Diagnostics for Analysis of Jet Interactions in Rotating Flowfields

Description: The present document summarizes the experimental efforts of a three-year study funded under the Laboratory Directed Research and Development program of Sandia National Laboratories. The Innovative Diagnostics LDRD project was designed to develop new measurement capabilities to examine the interaction of a propulsive spin jet in a transonic freestream for a model in a wind tunnel. The project motivation was the type of jet/fin interactions commonly occurring during deployment of weapon systems. In particular, the two phenomena of interest were the interaction of the propulsive spin jet with the freestream in the vicinity of the nozzle and the impact of the spin rocket plume and its vortices on the downstream fins. The main thrust of the technical developments was to incorporate small-size, Lagrangian sensors for pressure and roll-rate on a scale model and include data acquisition, transmission, and power circuitry onboard. FY01 was the final year of the three-year LDRD project and the team accomplished much of the project goals including use of micron-scale pressure sensors, an onboard telemetry system for data acquisition and transfer, onboard jet exhaust, and roll-rate measurements. A new wind tunnel model was designed, fabricated, and tested for the program which incorporated the ability to house multiple MEMS-based pressure sensors, interchangeable vehicle fins with pressure instrumentation, an onboard multiple-channel telemetry data package, and a high-pressure jet exhaust simulating a spin rocket motor plume. Experiments were conducted for a variety of MEMS-based pressure sensors to determine performance and sensitivity in order to select pressure transducers for use. The data acquisition and analysis path was most successful by using multiple, 16-channel data processors with telemetry capability to a receiver outside the wind tunnel. The development of the various instrumentation paths led to the fabrication and installation of a new wind tunnel model for baseline non-rotating experiments to validate ...
Date: January 1, 2002
Creator: AMATUCCI, VINCENT A.; BERESH, STEVEN J.; HENFLING, JOHN F.; ERVEN, ROCKY J. & BOURDON, CHRIS J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Post-Closure Inspection Report for Corrective Action Unit 404: Roller Coaster Lagoons and Trench Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Calendar Year 2001

Description: Post-closure monitoring requirements for the Roller Coaster Lagoons and Trench (Corrective Action Unit [CAU] 404) (Figure 1) are described in Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 404. Roller Coaster Sewage Lagoons and North Disposal Trench. Tonopah Test Range. Nevada, report number DOE/NV--187, September 1998. The Closure Report (CR) was submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) on September 11, 1998. Permeability results of soils adjacent to the engineered cover and a request for closure of CAU 404 were transmitted to the NDEP on April 29, 1999. The CR (containing the Post-Closure Monitoring Plan) was approved by the NDEP on May 18, 1999. As stated in Section 5.0 of the NDEP-approved CRY post-closure monitoring at CAU 404 consists of the following: (1) Visual site inspections done twice a year to evaluate the condition of the cover and plant development. (2) Verification that the site is secure and condition of the fence and posted warning signs. (3) Notice of any subsidence, erosion, unauthorized excavation, etc., deficiencies that may compromise the integrity of the unit. (4) Remedy of any deficiencies within 90 days of discovery. (5) Preparation and submittal of an annual report. In addition to the above activities, vegetative monitoring of the cover (a plant census) will be done in the first, third and fifth year following revegetation. (Vegetative monitoring will done in fiscal year 2001, and the results reported in the 2002 Post-Closure Inspection Report.) Site inspections were conducted on May 16, 2001, and November 6, 2001. The site inspections were conducted after completion of the revegetation activities (October 30, 1997) and NDEP approval of the CR (May 18, 1999). All site inspections were conducted in accordance with the Post-Closure Monitoring Plan in the NDEP-approved CR. This report includes copies of inspection checklists, photographs, recommendations, and conclusions. The Post-Closure ...
Date: January 1, 2002
Creator: Campbell, K. B.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Oxidized Metal Powders for Mechanical Shock and Crush Safety Enhancers

Description: The use of oxidized metal powders in mechanical shock or crush safety enhancers in nuclear weapons has been investigated. The functioning of these devices is based on the remarkable electrical behavior of compacts of certain oxidized metal powders when subjected to compressive stress. For example, the low voltage resistivity of a compact of oxidized tantalum powder was found to decrease by over six orders of magnitude during compaction between 1 MPa, where the thin, insulating oxide coatings on the particles are intact, to 10 MPa, where the oxide coatings have broken down along a chain of particles spanning the electrodes. In this work, the behavior of tantalum and aluminum powders was investigated. The low voltage resistivity during compaction of powders oxidized under various conditions was measured and compared. In addition, the resistivity at higher voltages and the dielectric breakdown strength during compaction were also measured. A key finding was that significant changes in the electrical properties persist after the removal of the stress so that a mechanical shock enhancer is feasible. This was verified by preliminary shock experiments. Finally, conceptual designs for both types of enhancers are presented.
Date: January 1, 2002
Creator: GARINO, TERRY J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Post-Closure Inspection Report for Corrective Action Unit 407: Roller Coaster RadSafe Area Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Calendar Year 2001

Description: Post-closure monitoring requirements for the Roller Coaster RadSafe Area (Corrective Action Unit [CAU] 407) (Figure 1) are described in Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 407, Roller Coaster RadSafe Area, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, report number DOEN-694, October 2001. The Closure Report (CR) was submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) on April 24,2001. No issues with the post-closure monitoring plan, Section 5 .O, were raised. However, other concerns raised by stakeholders required that the CR be revised. Revision 1 of CR was issued in December of 2001 and was approved by NDEP on January 7,2002. Section 5.2 of the NDEP-approved CR calls for site inspections to be conducted within the first six months following completion of cover construction. Following the first six months, site inspection are to be conducted twice yearly for the next two years. This report provides the results of the six month post-construction site inspection. As stated in Section 5.2 of the CR, Post-closure site inspections at CAU 407 consists of the following: (1) Visual site inspections done twice a year to evaluate the condition of the cover and plant development. (2) Verification that the site is secure and condition of the fence and posted warning signs. (3) Notice of any subsidence, erosion, unauthorized excavation, etc., deficiencies that may compromise the integrity of the unit. (4) Remedy of any deficiencies within 90 days of discovery. (5) Preparation and submittal of an annual report. To meet the fiscal year 2002 post-closure inspection schedule, the first post-closure site inspection was conducted on November 6,2001. The site inspection was conducted after completion of the revegetation activities (October 24,2000) and submittal of revision 0 of the CR (October 31,2001). All site inspections were conducted in accordance with the Post-Closure Inspection requirements stated in revision 0 of the CR. ...
Date: January 1, 2002
Creator: Campbell, K. B.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Site Characterization Work Plan for Gasbuggy, New Mexico (Rev.1, Jan. 2002)

Description: Project Gasbuggy was the first of three joint government-industry experiments conducted to test the effectiveness of nuclear explosives to fracture deeply buried, low-permeability natural gas reservoirs to stimulate production. The scope of this work plan is to document the environmental objectives and the proposed technical site investigation strategies that will be utilized for the site characterization of the Project Gasbuggy Site. Its goal is the collection of data in sufficient quantity and quality to determine current site conditions, support a risk assessment for the site surfaces, and evaluate if further remedial action is required to achieve permanent closure of the site that is both protective of human health and the environment. The Gasbuggy Site is located approximately 55 air miles east of Farmington, New Mexico, in Rio Arriba County within the Carson National Forest in the northeast portion of the San Juan Basin. Historically, Project Gasbuggy consisted of the joint government-industry detonation of a nuclear device on December 10, 1967, followed by reentry drilling and gas production testing and project evaluation activities in post-detonation operations from 1967 to 1976. Based on historical documentation, no chemical release sites other than the mud pits were identified; additionally, there was no material buried at the Gasbuggy Site other than drilling fluids and construction debris. Although previous characterization and restoration activities including sensitive species surveys, cultural resources surveys, surface geophysical surveys, and limited soil sampling and analysis were performed in 1978 and again in 2000, no formal closure of the site was achieved. Also, these efforts did not adequately address the site's potential for chemical contamination at the surface/shallow subsurface ground levels or the subsurface hazards for potential migration outside of the current site subsurface intrusion restrictions. Additional investigation activities will focus on the surface/shallow subsurface sampling and deep subsurface modeling. Suspected potential contaminants ...
Date: January 25, 2002
Creator: U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office (NNSA/NV)
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

ERRATA SHEET for Post-Closure Inspection Report for Corrective Action Unit 407: Roller Coaster RadSafe Area Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Calendar year 2001

Description: The fifth sentence of the first paragraph on Page 1 of the Post Closure Inspection Report for Corrective Action Unit 407: Roller Coaster RadSafe Area, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada erroneously states that Revision 1 of the CR was issued in December of 2001 and was approved by NDEP on January 7, 2002. The sentence should state that Revision 1 of the CR was issued in December of 2001 and was approved by NDEP on February 22, 2002.
Date: January 1, 2002
Creator: Campbell, K. B.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Post-Closure Inspection Report for Corrective Action Unit 427: Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 2 and 6 Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Calendar Year 2001

Description: Post-closure inspection requirements for the Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 2 and 6 (Corrective Action Unit [CAU] 427) (Figure 1) are described in Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 427, Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 2 and 6, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, report number DOENV-56 1, August 1999. The Closure Report (CR) was submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) on August 16, 1999. The CR (containing the Post-Closure Inspection Plan) was approved by the NDEP on August 27, 1999. As stated in Section 5.1 of the NDEP-approved CR, the annual Post-Closure inspection at CAU 427 consists of the following: (1) Verification of the presence of all leachfield and septic tank below-grade markers. (2) Verification that all warning signs are in-place, intact, and readable. (3) Visual observation of the soil and asphalt cover for indications of subsidence, erosion, and unauthorized use. The site inspections were conducted on May 16, 2001, and November 6, 2001. All inspections were made after NDEP approval of the CR, and were conducted in accordance with the Post-Closure Inspection Plan in the NDEP-approved CR. No maintenance or repairs were conducted at the site. This report includes copies of inspection checklists, photographs, recommendations, and conclusions. Copies of the Post-Closure Inspection Checklists are found in Attachment A, a copy of the field notes is found in Attachment B, and a copy of the inspection photographs is found in Attachments C.
Date: January 1, 2002
Creator: Campbell, K. B.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Post-Closure Inspection Report for Corrective Action Unit 453: Area 9 UXO Landfill Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Calendar Year 2001

Description: Post-closure monitoring requirements for the Area 9 Unexploded Ordinance Landfill (Corrective Action Unit [CAU] 453) (Figure 1) are described in Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 453: Area 9 UXO Landfill, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, report number DOE/NV--284, August 1999. The Closure Report (CR) was submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) on August 5 , 1999. The CR (containing the Post-Closure Monitoring Plan) was approved by the NDEP on September 10,1999. As stated in Section 5.0 of the NDEP-approved CR, post-closure monitoring at CAU 453 consists of the following: (1) Visual site inspections are conducted twice a year to evaluate the condition of the cover. (2) Verification that the site is secure and the condition of the fence and posted warning signs. (3) Notice of any subsidence, erosion, unauthorized excavation, etc., deficiencies that may compromise the integrity of the unit. (4) Remedy of any deficiencies within 90 days of discovery. (5) Preparation and submittal of an annual report. Site inspections were conducted on May 15, 2001 and November 6, 2001. Both site inspections were conducted in accordance with the Post-Closure Monitoring Plan in the NDEP-approved CR. This report includes copies of the inspection checklists, photographs, recommendations, and conclusions. The Post-Closure Inspection Checklists are found in Attachment A, a copy of the field notes is found in Attachment B, and inspection photographs are found in Attachment C.
Date: January 1, 2002
Creator: Campbell, K. B.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

VA and Defense Health Care: Progress Made, but DOD Continues To Face Military Medical Surveillance System Challenges

Description: A statement of record issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "GAO, the Institute of Medicine, and others have cited weaknesses in the Defense Department's (DOD) medical surveillance during the Gulf War and Operation Joint Endeavor. DOD was unable to collect, maintain, and transfer accurate data on the movement of troops, potential exposures to health risks, and medical incidents during deployment in the Gulf war. DOD improved its medical surveillance system under Operation Joint Endeavor, providing useful information to military commanders and medical personnel. However, GAO found several problems with this system. For example, incomplete or inaccurate information related to service members' health and deployment status. DOD's has not established a single, comprehensive electronic system to document, archive, and access medical surveillance data. DOD has begun several initiatives to improve the reliability of deployment information and to enhance its information technology capabilities, but some initiatives are several years away from full implementation. Nonetheless, these efforts reflect a commitment by DOD to establish a comprehensive medical surveillance system. The ability of the Department of Veterans Affairs to fulfill its role in serving veterans and providing backup to DOD in times of war will be enhanced as DOD increases its medical surveillance capability."
Date: January 24, 2002
Creator: United States. General Accounting Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Best Practices: Taking a Strategic Approach Could Improve DOD's Acquisition of Services

Description: A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "GAO studied several leading companies in the private sector that have made dramatic changes to their process for acquiring services. GAO found that these changes generally began with a corporate decision to pursue a more strategic approach to acquiring services--from developing a better picture of what the company was actually spending on services to developing new ways of doing business. The Defense Department (DOD), the government's largest purchaser of services, already has some elements in place that are essential to such a strategic approach, such as a commitment by top management to adopting best practices. However, DOD has yet to conduct a comprehensive analysis of its spending on services or thoroughly assess it's current structure, processes, and roles. DOD's size, the range and complexity of the services that it acquires, the capacity of its information and financial systems, and the unique requirements of the federal government are among the factors that DOD will need to consider as it tailors a strategic approach to its diverse needs."
Date: January 18, 2002
Creator: United States. General Accounting Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Defense Acquisitions: Collection and Reporting of Information Technology Purchases

Description: A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Recent legislation requires that, beginning in October 2001, the Defense Department (DOD) collect procurement data on purchases of information technology (IT) products and services worth more than $100,000. DOD is required to issue its first annual report to Congress by March 2001. GAO found that DOD is making good progress in meeting the requirements of the legislation. DOD has modified data collection systems to enable them to collect and report mandated data. DOD officials see no obstacles to issuing their first report on IT data collection efforts by the March 2002 deadline."
Date: January 18, 2002
Creator: United States. General Accounting Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Information Technology: Inconsistent Software Acquisition Processes at the Defense Logistics Agency Increase Project Risks

Description: A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) plays a critical role in supporting America's military forces worldwide. DLA relies on software-intensive systems to support its work. An important determinant of the quality of software-intensive systems, and thus DLA's mission performance, is the quality of the processes used to acquire these systems. DLA lacks mature software acquisition processes across the agency, as seen in the wide disparity in the rigor and discipline of processes between the two systems GAO evaluated. DLA also lacks a software process improvement program to effectively strengthen its corporate software acquisition processes."
Date: January 10, 2002
Creator: United States. General Accounting Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Defense Inventory: Control Weaknesses Leave Restricted and Hazardous Excess Property Vulnerable to Improper Use, Loss, and Theft

Description: A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The Defense Department (DOD) encourages the reuse of excess property, including vehicles, weapons, hand tools, lumber, medical equipment, and furniture. DOD components, civilian federal agencies, and "special programs" have equal priority and first rights to excess property. This report discusses excess property issued to three of 12 special programs--the Military Affiliate Radio System, the Civil Air Patrol, and the 12th Congressional Regional Equipment Center. Between 1995 and 2000, these programs obtained $34 million worth of items that they were not eligible to receive. The three programs were able to obtain the items because the DOD facilities that store the property are not required to verify which items the programs are eligible to receive, and because program officials do not consistently follow applicable guidelines. GAO also noted that the programs' lists of property they are allowed to obtain are not comprehensive because the lists exclude mission-related items similar to those already permitted. Furthermore, these programs did not have reliable records for more than three-quarters of their excess property. Together, the three special programs obtained more than 80,000 hazardous supplies. In many cases, program officials were unaware that their programs had received such items. GAO found similar problems in other special programs. This lack of accountability increases the risk of mishandling excess property and the potential for waste, fraud, and abuse."
Date: January 25, 2002
Creator: United States. General Accounting Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Defense Management: Industry Practices Can Help Military Exchanges Better Assure That Their Goods Are Not Made by Child or Forced Labor

Description: A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The military exchanges operate retail stores similar to department stores in more than 1,500 locations worldwide. The exchanges stock merchandise from many sources, including name-brand companies, brokers and importers, and overseas firms. Reports of worker rights abuses, such as child labor and forced overtime, and antilabor practices have led human rights groups and the press to scrutinize working conditions in overseas factories. GAO found that the military exchanges are not as proactive as private sector companies in determining working conditions at the overseas factories that manufacture their private label merchandise. Moreover, the exchanges have not sought to verify that overseas factories comply with labor laws and regulations. A single industrywide standard for working conditions at overseas factories was not considered practical by the 10 retailers GAO contacted. However, these retailers have taken the following three steps to ensure that goods are not produced by child or forced labor: (1) developing workplace codes of conduct that reflect their expectations of suppliers; (2) disseminating information on fair and safe labor conditions and educating their employees, suppliers, and factory workers on them; and (3) using their own employees or contractors to regularly inspect factories to ensure that their codes of conduct are upheld."
Date: January 31, 2002
Creator: United States. General Accounting Office.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

LDRD Final Report for''Tactical Laser Weapons for Defense'' SI (Tracking Code 01-SI-011)

Description: The focus of this project was a convincing demonstration of two new technological approaches to high beam quality; high average power solid-state laser systems that would be of interest for tactical laser weapon applications. Two pathways had been identified to such systems that built on existing thin disk and fiber laser technologies. This SI was used as seed funding to further develop and vet these ideas. Significantly, the LLNL specific enhancements to these proposed technology paths were specifically addressed for devising systems scaleable to the 100 kW average power level. In the course of performing this work we have established an intellectual property base that protects and distinguishes us from other competitive approaches to the same end.
Date: January 30, 2002
Creator: Beach, R & Zapata, L
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

HEU Transparency Implementation Program and its Radiation Safety Program

Description: In February 1993, the Governments of the United States (U.S.) and the Russian Federation (R.F.) signed a bilateral Agreement for the U.S. purchase of low enriched uranium (LEU) derived from 500 metric tons (MT) of highly enriched uranium (HEU) resulting from the dismantlement of Russian nuclear weapons. The HEU Purchase Agreement serves important national security and nonproliferation policy imperatives for both countries since its implementation reduces the quantity of surplus Russian HEU that could be stolen and diverted for weapons use. In return, Russia receives much needed U.S. dollars over a 20-year delivery period. In 2001, Russia received over half a billion US dollars from the purchase of the LEU blended from 30 MT HEU. As part of this Agreement, transparency rights were agreed upon that provide confidence to both governments that the nonproliferation objectives of the Agreement are being fulfilled. While the U.S. Department of State, in concert with the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is responsible negotiating transparency rights associated with this nuclear material, the NNSA is responsible for implementing those rights. These rights allow U.S. and R.F., personnel (called ''monitors'') to visit the processing facilities and observe the steps for processing the HEU into fuel for nuclear reactors. In this fashion, the processing of HEU to LEU is made ''transparent.'' For DOE, there are three transparency objectives: (1) that the HEU is extracted from nuclear weapons, (2) that this same HEU is oxidized, and (3) that the HEU is blended into LEU. For MINATOM, the transparency objective is: (1) that the LEU is fabricated into fuel for commercial nuclear power reactors: The transparency is based on visits by designated transparency monitors (100 preapproved U.S. and Russian monitors) with specific rights to monitor and to access storage and processing areas to provide confidence ...
Date: January 31, 2002
Creator: Radev, R
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Deterring Asymmetric Threats from Sub-State Actors

Description: Deterrence means preventing another's actions by influencing their decisionmaking process. Nuclear deterrence was successfully accomplished during the Cold War by holding the adversary's valuable assets at risk by targeting them with nuclear weapons, a policy known as mutually assured destruction (MAD). In this case neither player attacks the other, because the ultimate outcome is self-destruction. Deterrence based upon MAD is largely ineffective against sub-state actors who may have few if any assets, the location of which may be unknown. Furthermore, the threat of destroying their assets may only serve to strengthen their motivation to do more stealthy violence, the threat being interpreted as a taunt. The key to establishing deterrence is understanding the adversary's decision process, starting with the factors upon which decisions are made, called decision attributes. Asymmetric threats are assumed to involve chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons. So, the key decision attributes here are concerned with the acquisition and use of CBRN weapons. We have identified the following five countermeasure objectives for establishing deterrence: (1) Reduce access to CBRN weapons, expertise, materials, and equipment; (2) Make CBRN weapons difficult to use; (3) Reduce the effectiveness of CBRN weapons; (4) Increase the likelihood of being caught acquiring and using CBRN weapons; and (5) Establish a policy of retribution for acquiring and using CBRN weapons. It should be emphasized that an adversary's perception toward these objectives is most important in affecting their decisionmaking. Of course each adversary will respond differently toward these countermeasures, depending upon their motivations, objectives, preferences, resources, and willingness to gamble. Motivation of violence is defined as the fundamental cause or driving force; absent which the intent to do violence no longer exists. Correct understanding of motivations requires adapting your adversary's perspective. This work builds upon an earlier study of bioterrorism target attractiveness that identified ...
Date: January 31, 2002
Creator: Homsy, R V
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Final Report (OO-ERD-056) MEDIOS: Modeling Earth Deformation Using Interferometric Observations from Space

Description: This final report summarizes the accomplishments of the 2-year LDRD-ER project ''MEDIOS: Modeling Earth Deformation using Interferometric Observations from Space'' (00-ERD-056) which began in FY00 and ended in FY01. The structure of this report consists of this summary part plus two separate journal papers, each having their own UCRL number, which document in more detail the major results in two (of three) major categories of this study. The two categories and their corresponding paper titles are (1) Seismic Hazard Mitigation (''Aseismic Creep Events along the Southern San Andreas Fault System''), and (2) Ground-based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring, or GNEM (''New Signatures of Underground Nuclear Tests Revealed by Satellite Radar Interferometry''). The third category is Energy Exploitation Applications and does not have a separate journal article associated with it but is described briefly. The purpose of this project was to develop a capability within the Geophysics and Global Security Division to process and analyze InSAR data for the purposes of constructing more accurate ground deformation source models relevant to Hazards, Energy, and NAI applications. Once this was accomplished, an inversion tool was to be created that could be applied to many different types (sources) of surface deformation so that accurate source parameters could be determined for a variety of subsurface processes of interest to customers of the GGS Division. This new capability was desired to help attract new project funding for the division.
Date: January 29, 2002
Creator: Vincent, P; Walter, B; Zucca, J; Larsen, S; Goldstein, P; Foxall, W et al.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Institutional Plan FY 2002-2006

Description: This Institutional Plan for FY 2002-2006 is the principal annual planning document submitted to the Department of Energy's Office of Science by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory in Richland, Washington. This plan describes the Laboratory's mission, roles, and technical capabilities in support of Department of Energy priorities, missions, and plans. It also describes the Laboratory strategic plan, key planning assumptions, major research initiatives, and program strategy for fundamental science, energy resources, environmental quality, and national security.
Date: January 2, 2002
Creator: Fisher, Darrell R. & Pearson, Erik W.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

The National Ignition Facility: Status and Plans for Laser Fusion and High-Energy-Density Experimental Studies

Description: The National Ignition Facility (NIF), currently under construction at the University of California's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is a $2.25B stadium-sized facility containing a 192-beam, 1.8-Megajoule, 500-Terawatt, 351-nm laser system. NIF is being built by the National Nuclear Security Agency and when completed will be the world's largest laser system, providing a national center to study inertial confinement fusion and the physics of extreme energy densities and pressures. In NIF up to 192 energetic laser beams will compress small fusion targets to conditions where they will ignite and burn, liberating more energy than is required to initiate the fusion reactions. NIF experiments will allow the study of physical processes at temperatures approaching 100 million K and 100 billion times atmospheric pressure. These conditions exist naturally only in the interior of stars and in nuclear weapons explosions. In the course of designing the world's most energetic laser system, a number of significant technology breakthroughs have been achieved. Research is also underway to develop a shorter pulse capability on NIF for high power applications. We discuss here the technology challenges and solutions that have made NIF possible along with enhancements to NIF's design that could lead to exawatt power levels.
Date: January 11, 2002
Creator: Moses, E I
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Time Reversal Signal Processing in Communications - A Feasibility Study

Description: A typical communications channel is subjected to a variety of signal distortions, including multipath, that corrupt the information being transmitted and reduce the effective channel capacity. The mitigation of the multipath interference component is an ongoing concern for communication systems operating in complex environments such as might be experienced inside buildings, urban environments, and hilly or heavily wooded areas. Communications between mobile units and distributed sensors, so important to national security, are dependent upon flawless conveyance of information in complex environments. The reduction of this multipath corruption necessitates better channel equalization, i.e., the removal of channel distortion to extract the transmitted information. But, the current state of the art in channel equalization either requires a priori knowledge of the channel or the use of a known training sequence and adaptive filtering. If the ''assumed'' model within the equalization processor does not at least capture the dominant characteristics of the channel, then the received information may still be highly distorted and possibly useless. Also, the processing required for classical equalization is demanding in computational resources. To remedy this situation, many techniques have been investigated to replace classical equalization. Such a technique, the subject of this feasibility study, is Time Reversal Signal Processing (TRSP). Multipath is particularly insidious and a major factor in the deterioration of communication channels. Unlike most other characteristics that corrupt a communications channel, the detrimental effects of multipath cannot be overcome by merely increasing the transmitted power. Although the power in a signal diminishes as a function of the distance between the transmitter and receiver, multipath further degrades a signal by creating destructive interference that results in a loss of received power in a very localized area, a loss often referred to as fading. Furthermore, multipath can reduce the effectiveness of a channel by increasing inter-symbol interference. Here, ...
Date: January 30, 2002
Creator: Meyer, A W; Candy, J V & Poggio, A J
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

2nd Annual Los Alamos Plutonium Metal Standard Exchange Workshop : "preliminary" results

Description: The Rocky Flats Plutonium (Pu) Metal Sample Exchange program was conducted to insure the quality and intercomparability of measurements such as Pu assay, Pu isotopics, and impurity analyses. This program was discontinued in 1989 after more than 30 years. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has reestablished the Pu metal exchange program. During the first year, five DOE facilities, Argonne East, Argonne West, Livermore, Los Alamos, and New Brunswick Laboratory, Savannah River and the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE)' at Aldermaston are participating in the program. Plutonium metal samples are being prepared and distributed to the various sites primarily for destructive measurements for elemental concentration, isotopic abundance, and both metallic and nonmetallic impurity levels. The program is intended to provide independent verification of analytical measurement capability for each participating facility and to allow problems to be identified. Significants achievements in FY02 will be described. Results from category 1 elements and comparisons with Rocky Flats standards exchange metal historical data will also be presented. The roles and responsibilities of LANL and the external laboratories have been defined.
Date: January 1, 2002
Creator: Tandon, L. (Lav) & Slemmons, A. K. (Alice K.)
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Compressive properties of PBXN-110 and its HTPB binder as a function of temperature and strain rate

Description: The compressive constitutive strength behavior of PBXN-110 and its HTPB-based binder system was measured as a function of temperature (-55 C to +20 C) and strain rate (10{sup -3} and 2000 s{sup -1}). PBXN-110 is a plastic bonded explosive (PBX) with relatively high binder content that contains 88wt% HMX and 12wt% HTPB-based binder. A pure analog of the PBXN-110 binder system was tested for comparison to the strain rate and temperature dependence of the composite PBXN-110. As expected, the strength of PBXN-110 was found to exhibit strong temperature and strain rate dependence, attributable to the large fraction of the very soft HTPB binder. The strength of the pure HTPB binder analog was challenging to measure using the split Hopkinson pressure bar (SHPB) because of its extreme softness, however satisfactory results were obtained at and below room temperature by optimizing the SHPB technique. These measurements provide the basis to develop and validate predictive material strength models for PBXN-110.
Date: January 1, 2002
Creator: Blumenthal, W. R. (William R.); Thompson, D. G. (Darla G.); Cady, C. M. (Carl McElhinney); Gray, G. T. (George T.), III & Idar, D. J. (Deanne J.)
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department