44 Matching Results

Search Results

Advanced search parameters have been applied.

Kazakhstan: Current Developments and U.S. Interests

Description: This report discusses the relationship between the U.S. and Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is becoming an important power in Central Asia by virtue of its large territory, ample natural resources, and strategic location. However, it faces political, ethnic, economic, and environmental challenges to its stability and integrity. After the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, Kazakhstan granted overflight rights for U.S.-led coalition actions in Afghanistan, and in 2003 provided some troops for post-conflict rebuilding in Iraq.
Date: May 4, 2004
Creator: Nichol, Jim
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Kazakhstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

Description: Kazakhstan is an important power in Central Asia by virtue of its geographic location, large territory, ample natural resources, and economic growth, but it faces ethnic, political, and other challenges to stability. This report discusses U.S. policy and assistance. Basic facts and biographical data are provided. Related products include CRS Report RL33458, Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests.
Date: June 20, 2008
Creator: Nichol, Jim
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Data base of array characteristics instrument response and data, recorded at NNC

Description: A northern and east-northern parts of Kazakstan Republic are utterly favorable for a placing of seismic stations. There is a very low level of natural and industrial seismic noise. Rocks of Kazakh epi-Hercynian platform have a very good transmissive properties. Geophysical observatories (GOs), now belonging to the Institute of Geophysical Researches of National Nuclear Center of Kazakstan Republic (IGR NNC RK), were established in especially selected low-noise places of Northern Kazakstan, in accordance with Soviet program for nuclear weapons test monitoring. In 1994, these GOs were transferred by Russian Federation into the possession of Kazakstan. A location of GOs is shown on the Fig. 1. According to the studying of seismic noises, jointly implemented by scientists from IGR and IRIS, places, where a `Borovoye` and `Kurchatov` seismic stations are located, are among the best places for seismic observations in the world. A seismic arrays exist in `Borovoye` and `Kurchatov` observatories - in two observatories out four (`Aktiubinsk`, `Borovoye`, `Kurchatov` and `Makanchi`). These two observatories are described in this report. A history of geophysical observatories, conditions of equipment operations (climatic, geological and so on) are presented in this report, as well as it is described the equipment of GOs and seismic arrays, and samples of digital seismograms, recorded on the equipment of various types, are presented in this report. GO `Borovoye` is described in the 2nd chart, GO `Kurchatov` is described in the 3rd chart of the report. The main results of work are presented in the conclusion. A list of used papers, a list of tables and figures is given in the end of the report. 14 refs., 95 figs., 12 tabs.
Date: December 1, 1996
Creator: Bushueva, E.A.; Ermolenko, E.A. & Efremova, N.A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Analysis of HEU samples from the ULBA Metallurgical Plant

Description: In early March 1994, eight highly enriched uranium (HEU) samples were collected from materials stored at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in Oskamen (Ust Kamenogorsk), Kazakhstan. While at the plant site, portions of four samples were dissolved and analyzed by mass spectrograph at the Ulba analytical laboratory by Ulba analysts. Three of these mass spectrograph solutions and the eight HEU samples were subsequently delivered to the Y-12 Plant for complete chemical and isotopic analyses. Chemical forms of the eight samples were uranium metal chips, U0{sub 2} powder, uranium/beryllium oxide powder, and uranium/beryllium alloy rods. All were declared by the Ulba plant to have a uranium assay of {approximately}90 wt % {sup 235}U. The uranium/beryllium powder and alloy samples were also declared to range from about 8 to 28 wt % uranium. The chemical and uranium isotopic analyses done at the Y-12 Plant confirm the Ulba plant declarations. All samples appear to have been enriched using some reprocessed uranium, probably from recovery of uranium from plutonium production reactors. As a result, all samples contain some {sup 236}U and {sup 232}U and have small but measurable quantities of plutonium. This plutonium could be the result of either contamination carried over from the enrichment process or cross-contamination from weapons material. It is not the result of direct reactor exposure. Neither the {sup 232}U nor the plutonium concentrations are sufficiently high to provide a significant industrial health hazard. Both are well within established or proposed acceptance criteria for storage at Y-12. The trace metal analyses showed that, with the exception of beryllium, there are no trace metals in any of these HEU samples that pose a significant health hazard.
Date: May 1, 1995
Creator: Gift, E.H.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

International Collaboration with the Shutdown of the BN-350 Reactor

Description: Representatives from the United States and the United Kingdom discussed areas where collaboration on the shutdown of the BN-350 Reactor in Aktau, Kazakhstan would benefit not only Kazakhstan, but would also help to assure the successful shutdown of the reactor. A fundamental understanding of the basis for collaboration has been for each side to ‘add value’ to each of the project areas, rather than simply substitute for each other’s experience. This approach has brought distinct technical and management benefits to the decommissioning activities in Kazakhstan.
Date: August 1, 2005
Creator: Michelbacher, J. A.; Wells, P. B.; Organ, N. & Wells, D.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Depth of burial experiments at Balapan

Description: We report of a series of experiments designed to discriminate underground explosion sources at various depths by means of their seismic signatures at regional distances. This series was a joint effort of the US Department of Energy (DOE), the US Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA), and the National Nuclear Center of the Republic of Kazakhstan (NNC). The series consisted of three 25-ton explosions, at depths of 55 m, 300 m, and 50 m. In addition, a 5-ton checkout explosion was fired at a depth of 630 m, and small-scale explosions at each site were carried out so that the empirical Green`s functions could be derived. Broadband and short-period seismic data were recorded at an eight-station network within Kazakhstan, at nominal ranges varying from 100-1500 km, and with good azimuthal coverage for regional phases. In addition, seismic measurements were made at former NRDC sites (BAY and KKL), infrasound recordings were made at the cross array at Kurchatov, and close-in seismic measurements were also made at ranges from ground zero to 20 km. Although the main objective of this series was to study depth-of- burial (DOB) effects on the excitation of regional phases such as LG and RG, and to determine whether peaks in the coda spectral shape correlate well with DOB, a secondary objective was to help calibrate the site of the Kazakhstan seismic network, especially the primary IMS station at MAKanchi, and the auxiliary IMS stations at KURchatov and AKTyubinsk.
Date: November 1, 1997
Creator: Glenn, L.A. & Myers, S.C.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization: Report of the On-Site Inspection Workshop-5-Planning Examination of Inspection Phases

Description: On-Site Inspection (OSI) Workshop-5 met 8-12 November, 1999 in Farnborough, UK and was hosted by the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA). The purpose of the workshop was to provide guidance on OSI Operational Manual (OM) development for Working Group B (WGB) of the CTBT Preparatory Commission (PrepCom). The two main topics of the workshop involved logistics/preparatory activities for the pre-inspection phase and in-depth examination of technology application during the initial and continuation phases of an OSI. Reports from the PTS-sponsored Kazakhstan OSI experiment set the tone for the discussions of logistics and preparatory activities. The most important recommendation coming out of the experiment and workshop discussions is a need for Working Group A to develop specific administrative and financial rules regarding OSIs and define the status of inspectors and inspector assistants with respect to the CTBTO. There was also extensive discussion of a need for Working Group B to develop and/or adapt safety standards. With respect to OSI preparations, the group agreed that the time line and quick response required by an OSI necessitate development of special procedures; standing arrangements and/or advanced parties are suggested as one possible approach and a list of relevant issues has been initiated. A chart was developed that outlines the various elements of logistics required for an OSI that can serve as a basis for development of checklists, databases, and other preparation activities. Technology presentations and discussion focused on three major areas: phenomenology, synergy, and specifications.
Date: January 1, 2000
Creator: Krioutchenkov, V.; Shchukin, V.; Davies, A. & Sweeney, J.J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Department of Energy nuclear material physical protection program in the Republic of Kazakstan

Description: As part of the joint U.S. and Republic of Kazakstan nuclear Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC{ampersand}A) program, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is providing assistance at four nuclear facilities in Kazakstan. These facilities are the Ulba Metallurgical Plant, the National Nuclear Center (NNC) Institute of Atomic Energy at Kurchatov (IAE-K), the Mangyshlak Atomic Energy Complex (BN-350) Reactor, and the NNC Institute of Atomic Energy at Almaty (IAE-A). This paper describes the DOE MPC{ampersand}A physical protection program at each of the facilities.
Date: September 1, 1997
Creator: Eras, A.; Berry, R.B. & Case, R.S.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Evolution of the Kazakstan export control system: The critical role of technical expertise

Description: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Transfer and Supplier Policy Division is sponsoring technical cooperative agreements between Kazakstani partners and U.S. National Laboratories. Those agreements allow Kazakstan to make both political and technical advances in their nuclear export control policy. Kazakstan has shown a very serious commitment to nonproliferation ever since its independence and the subsequent rapid closing of the Semipalatinsk test site in 1991. The experience Kazakstan had with the test site, which was one of the more active in the world, has largely shaped its strong commitment to global nonproliferation. Kazakstan has taken seriously its responsibility for nuclear nonproliferation. Some of the many examples of that commitment are the complete disarmament of all inherited nuclear weapons, the 1994 signing of the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the completion of a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and the transfer of 600 kg of highly enriched uranium to the United States through Project Sapphire. These actions all exhibit a strong Kazakstani devotion to nuclear nonproliferation. Moreover, there are a variety of programs dealing with the very sensitive and important topic of material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) for the many nuclear sites within Kazakstan.
Date: November 1997
Creator: Wolfe, K. D. & Cernicek, A. T.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Technical cooperation between IAE/NNC and U.S. DOE National Laboratories on nuclear export controls in Kazakhstan -- a status report

Description: The US Department of Energy (DOE) sponsors technical cooperative agreements, also known as Lab to Lab agreements, between its National Laboratories and similar institutions in the Newly Independent States (NIS) for the purpose of sharing some of the experience and expertise on nuclear export controls and nonproliferation of the former with their NIS counterparts so that, in turn, they can provide technical support to their respective governments in nonproliferation matters. In Kazakhstan, two separate technical cooperative agreements involving the Institute of Atomic Energy of the National Nuclear Center, Argonne National Laboratory, and Los Alamos National Laboratory were established in 1996. The tasks carried out during the first year of these technical cooperative agreements are described and the objectives and end products of the tasks are discussed.
Date: September 1, 1997
Creator: Picologlou, B.; Cernicek, A.; Pakhnitz, V. & Koltysheva, G.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Application of nondestructive assay techniques in Kazakstan

Description: As Kazakstan has transitioned from being part of the Soviet Union to a nonweapons state (Treaty of Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons [NPT] signatory) under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, significant changes have been required. Some of these changes have occurred in nuclear material protection, control, and accounting at the four nuclear facility sites in the Republic of Kazakstan. Specifically, the Republic of Kazakstan has changed from relying primarily on a subset of physical protection methods to a graded safeguards approach using a balance of material control, material accounting, and physical protection. Once more intensive material control and accounting procedures and systems are in place, a necessary step is to supply the accounting systems with measured values of high quality. This need can be met with destructive and nondestructive methods. Material control systems can also use qualitative nondestructive assay information as input. This paper will discuss the nondestructive assay techniques and systems the US Department of Energy (DOE) is providing to Kazakstan under both DOE programs and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act as part of the nuclear material control and accounting upgrades at four facilities in Kazakstan. 4 refs., 6 figs.
Date: November 1, 1997
Creator: Sprinkle, J.K. Jr.; Butler, G. & Collins, M.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Low-enriched uranium holdup measurements in Kazakhstan

Description: Quantification of the residual nuclear material remaining in process equipment has long been a challenge to those who work with nuclear material accounting systems. Fortunately, nuclear material has spontaneous radiation emissions that can be measured. If gamma-ray measurements can be made, it is easy to determine what isotope a deposit contains. Unfortunately, it can be quite difficult to relate this measured signal to an estimate of the mass of the nuclear deposit. Typically, the measurement expert must work with incomplete or inadequate information to determine a quantitative result. Simplified analysis models, the distribution of the nuclear material, any intervening attenuation, background(s), and the source-to-detector distance(s) can have significant impacts on the quantitative result. This presentation discusses the application of a generalized-geometry holdup model to the low-enriched uranium fuel pellet fabrication plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan. Preliminary results will be presented. Software tools have been developed to assist the facility operators in performing and documenting the measurements. Operator feedback has been used to improve the user interfaces.
Date: December 31, 1998
Creator: Barham, M.A.; Ceo, R.N. & Smith, S.E.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Opportunities for renewable energy sources in Central Asia countries

Description: This report presents an overview of the state of conventional energy sources and the potential for development of renewable energy sources in the Central Asia countries of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. The region has a population of about 50 million in an area of more than four million square kilometers. The per capita gross internal product is more than $2,500, although the economy has been declining the past five years. The area has substantial coal, oil, uranium, and natural gas reserves, although they are not distributed equally among the five countries. Energy production is such that the countries do not have to rely heavily on imports. One of the problems in Central Asia is that the energy prices are substantially below the world prices. This is a factor in development of renewable energy sources. The primary renewable energy resources available are wind in Kazakhstan, solar in the entire region, biomass in Kyrgyzstan, and micro-hydropower stations in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. All of these have the potential to provide a significant amount of the required energy for the region. However, all of the countries have an abundance of various renewable energy resources. To effectively use these resources, however, a number of barriers to their development and commercialization must be overcome. These include low prices of conventional energy sources, absence of legislative support, lack of financing for new technologies, and lack of awareness of renewable energy sources by the population. A number of specific actions are proposed to overcome these barriers. These include establishment of a Central Asia coordinating council for renewable energy, development of a regional renewable energy program, and setting up a number of large demonstration projects. 16 figs.
Date: July 1, 1998
Creator: Obozov, A.J. & Loscutoff, W.V.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Disposition of highly enriched uranium obtained from the Republic of Kazakhstan. Environmental assessment

Description: This EA assesses the potential environmental impacts associated with DOE`s proposal to transport 600 kg of Kazakhstand-origin HEU from Y-12 to a blending site (B&W Lynchburg or NFS Erwin), transport low-enriched UF6 blending stock from a gaseous diffusion plant to GE Wilmington and U oxide blending stock to the blending site, blending the HEU and uranium oxide blending stock to produce LEU in the form of uranyl nitrate, and transport the uranyl nitrate from the blending site to USEC Portsmouth.
Date: May 1, 1995
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Status of U.S. programs for material protection, control & accounting assistance to Ukraine and Kazakstan

Description: The United States is one of several donor states providing technical assistance to the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) for improving their systems for control of nuclear materials. Ukraine and Kazakstan have significant nuclear energy programs. Both countries have committed to nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. They have signed the NPT and have safeguards agreements with the U.S. concerning development of state systems of control, accounting and physical protection of nuclear materials. As directed by the DOE - International Safeguards Division (now the DOE - Russia/NIS Nuclear Materials Security Task Force), technical specialists from several national laboratories, including Argonne, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, Pacific Northwest and Sandia, as well as representatives of other U.S. Government organizations, such as the NRC, DOD/DNA and the New Brunswick Laboratory, are interacting with government regulatory and facility personnel of Ukraine and Kazakstan. Argonne has program coordination responsibilities for both countries. In support of agreements between the U.S. and Ukraine and the U.S. and Kazakstan, the DOE is responsible for providing technical assistance and training to aid in the evaluation, design, development, and implementation of nuclear material safeguards. This assistance includes: (1) information systems for tracking and reporting the location of nuclear materials, (2) application of nuclear measurement techniques for verifying inventories, (3) material control and accounting (MC&A) systems, and (4) physical protection (PP) systems. Site survey teams, including both MC&A and PP experts from several national labs, have visited Ukraine and Kazakstan. This paper summarizes activities to date and future plans.
Date: December 1, 1995
Creator: Roche, C.T.; Zinneman, T.E. & Rudolph, R.R.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

The US program of technical assistance to the Atomic Energy Agency of the Republic of Kazakstan

Description: In the summer of 1993, the US Department of Energy (US government) received a formal invitation from the Atomic Energy Agency of the Republic of Kazakstan (AEARK) to visit Kazakstan to prepare a program for US cooperation with the AEARK to improve material protection, control, and accounting (MPCA) at Kazakstani nuclear facilities. As a result of this visit, an agreement for such cooperation was prepared and a program plan was formulated. The Program Plan includes provisions for Technical Working Group meetings, a site survey of a Kazakstani nuclear facility for possible upgrades in MPCA, assistance to AEARK in the regulatory area, training courses to familiarize AEARK and nuclear facility personnel with US safeguards practices, and supply of US safeguards equipment. This cooperative program is funded by the Nunn-Lugar program and the Department of Energy. The program is coordinated with the International Atomic Energy Agency and similar programs of other donor countries (Sweden, Japan, and the United Kingdom). This paper summarizes accomplishments of the program to date and future plans.
Date: August 1, 1995
Creator: Tittemore, G.; Kuzmycz, G. & Caudill, S.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Aktau Plastics Plant Explosives Material Report

Description: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has been cooperating with the Republic of Kazakhstanin Combined Threat Reduction (CTR) activities at the BN350 reactor located at the Mangyshlak Atomic Energy Complex (MAEC) in the city of Aktau, Kazakhstan since 1994. DOE contract personnel have been stationed at this facility for the last two years and DOE representatives regularly visit this location to oversee the continuing cooperative activities. Continued future cooperation is planned. A Russian news report in September 1999 indicated that 75 metric tons of organic peroxides stored at the Plastics Plant near Aktau were in danger of exploding and killing or injuring nearby residents. To ensure the health and safety of the personnel at the BN350 site, the DOE conducted a study to investigate the potential danger to the BN350 site posed by these materials at the Plastics Plant. The study conclusion was that while the organic peroxides do have hazards associated with them, the BN350 site is a safe distance from the Plastics Plant. Further, because the Plastics Plant and MAEC have cooperative fire-fighting agreements,and the Plastics Plant had exhausted its reserve of fire-fighting foam, there was the possibility of the Plastics Plant depleting the store of fire-fighting foam at the BN350 site. Subsequently, the DOE decided to purchase fire-fighting foam for the Plastics Plant to ensure the availability of free-fighting foam at the BN350 site.
Date: December 1, 1999
Creator: CASE JR.,ROGER S.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department