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Program of technical assistance to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons - lessons learned from the U.S. program of technical assistance to IAEA safeguards. Final report

Description: The Defense Nuclear Agency is sponsoring a technical study of the requirements of a vehicle to meet the OPCW`s future needs for enhanced chemical weapons verification capabilities. This report provides information about the proven mechanisms by which the U.S. provided both short- and long-term assistance to the IAEA to enhance its verification capabilities. Much of the technical assistance has generic application to international organizations verifying compliance with disarmament treaties or conventions. In addition, some of the equipment developed by the U.S. under the existing arrangements can be applied in the verification of other disarmament treaties or conventions. U.S. technical assistance to IAEA safeguards outside of the IAEA`s regular budget proved to be necessary. The U.S. technical assistance was successful in improving the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards for its most urgent responsibilities and in providing the technical elements for increased IAEA {open_quotes}readiness{close_quotes} for the postponed responsibilities deemed important for U.S. policy objectives. Much of the technical assistance was directed to generic subjects and helped to achieve a system of international verification. It is expected that the capabilities of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to verify a state`s compliance with the {open_quotes}Chemical Weapons Convention{close_quotes} will require improvements. This report presents 18 important lessons learned from the experience of the IAEA and the U.S. Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS), organized into three tiers. Each lesson is presented in the report in the context of the difficulty, need and history in which the lesson was learned. Only the most important points are recapitulated in this executive summary.
Date: June 1, 1995
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Opportunities for Process Monitoring Techniques at Delayed Access Facilities

Description: Except for specific cases where the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) maintains a continuous presence at a facility (such as the Japanese Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant), there is always a period of time or delay between the moment a State is notified or aware of an upcoming inspection, and the time the inspector actually enters the material balance area or facility. Termed by the authors as “delayed access,” this period of time between inspection notice and inspector entrance to a facility poses a concern. Delayed access also has the potential to reduce the effectiveness of measures applied as part of the Safeguards Approach for a facility (such as short-notice inspections). This report investigates the feasibility of using process monitoring to address safeguards challenges posed by delayed access at a subset of facility types.
Date: September 20, 2013
Creator: Curtis, Michael M.; Gitau, Ernest TN; Johnson, Shirley J.; Schanfein, Mark & Toomey, Christopher
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Safeguards Approaches for Black Box Processes or Facilities

Description: The objective of this study is to determine whether a safeguards approach can be developed for “black box” processes or facilities. These are facilities where a State or operator may limit IAEA access to specific processes or portions of a facility; in other cases, the IAEA may be prohibited access to the entire facility. The determination of whether a black box process or facility is safeguardable is dependent upon the details of the process type, design, and layout; the specific limitations on inspector access; and the restrictions placed upon the design information that can be provided to the IAEA. This analysis identified the necessary conditions for safeguardability of black box processes and facilities.
Date: September 25, 2013
Creator: Diaz-Marcano, Helly; Gitau, Ernest TN; Hockert, John; Miller, Erin & Wylie, Joann
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Market Research Survey of Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Portable MS Systems for IAEA Safeguards Applications

Description: This report summarizes the results for the market research survey of mass spectrometers that are deemed pertinent to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) needs and strategic objectives. The focus of the report is on MS instruments that represent currently available (or soon to be) commercial off-the shelf (COTS) technology and weigh less than 400 pounds. A compilation of all available MS instruments (36 COTS and 2 R&D) is presented, along with pertinent information regarding each instrument.
Date: February 1, 2013
Creator: Hart, Garret L.; Hager, George J.; Barinaga, Charles J. & Duckworth, Douglas C.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Summary Report: First Research Coordination Meeting on ReferenceDatabase for Neutron Activation Analysis

Description: Potential problems associated with nuclear data for neutronactivation analysis were identified, the scope of the work to beundertaken was defined together with its priorities, and tasks wereassigned to participants. Data testing and measurements refer to gammaspectrumpeak evaluations, detector efficiency calibration, neutronspectrum characteristics and reference materials analysis.
Date: October 1, 2005
Creator: Firestone, Richard B. & Trkov, Andrej
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department


Description: In this section of the report, the development of INFCIRC/540 is traced by a compilation of citations from the IAEA documents presented to the Board of Governors and the records of discussions in the Board that took place prior to the establishment of Committee 24 as well as the documents and discussions of that committee. The evolution of the text is presented separately for each article or, for the more complex articles, for each paragraph or group of paragraphs of the article. This section covers all articles, including those involving no issues. Background, issues, interpretations and conclusions, which were addressed in Volumes I, II, and III are not repeated here. The comments by states that are included are generally limited to objections and suggested changes. Requests for clarification or elaboration have been omitted, although it is recognized that such comments were sometimes veiled objections.
Date: January 1, 2010
Creator: Rosenthal, M.D. & Houck, F.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

The US Support Program Assistance to the IAEA Safeguards Information Technology, Collection, and Analysis 2008

Description: One of the United States Support Program's (USSP) priorities for 2008 is to support the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) development of an integrated and efficient safeguards information infrastructure, including reliable and maintainable information systems, and effective tools and resources to collect and analyze safeguards-relevant information. The USSP has provided funding in support of this priority for the ISIS Re-engineering Project (IRP), and for human resources support to the design and definition of the enhanced information analysis architecture project (nVision). Assistance for several other information technology efforts is provided. This paper will report on the various ongoing support measures undertaken by the USSP to support the IAEA's information technology enhancements and will provide some insights into activities that the USSP may support in the future.
Date: June 12, 2008
Creator: Tackentien,J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

The US Support program to IAEA Safeguards - 2008

Description: The U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards (USSP) was established in 1977 to provide technical assistance to the IAEA Department of Safeguards. Since that time the U.S. Department of State has provided funding of over $200 million and over 900 tasks have been completed by USSP contractors on behalf of the KEA. The USSP is directed by a U.S. interagency subcommittee known as the Subgroup on Safeguards Technical Support (SSTS) and is managed by the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory. In recent years, the SSTS and ISPO have identified priorities to guide the process of determining which IAEA requests are aligned with US. policy and will be funded. The USSP priorities are reviewed and updated prior to the USSP Annual Review Meeting which is hosted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) each spring in Vienna, Austria. This paper will report on the 2008 USSP priorities and be an introduction for a session which will consist of four papers on USSP priorities and four other papers related to USSP activities.
Date: June 9, 2008
Creator: Pepper,S.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

The US Support Program to IAEA Safeguards Priority of Training and Human Resources

Description: The U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards (USSP) priority of training and human resources is aimed at providing the Department of Safeguards with an appropriate mixture of regular staff and extrabudgetary experts who are qualified to meet the IAEA's technical needs and to provide personnel with appropriate instruction to improve the technical basis and specific skills needed to perform their job functions. The equipment and methods used in inspection activities are unique, complex, and evolving. New and experienced safeguards inspectors need timely and effective training to perform required tasks and to learn new skills prescribed by new safeguards policies or agreements. The role of the inspector has changed from that of strictly an accountant to include that of a detective. New safeguards procedures are being instituted, and therefore, experienced inspectors must be educated on these new procedures. The USSP also recognizes the need for training safeguards support staff, particularly those who maintain and service safeguards equipment (SGTS), and those who perform information collection and analysis (SGIM). The USSP is committed to supporting the IAEA with training to ensure the effectiveness of all staff members and will continue to offer its assistance in the development and delivery of basic, refresher, and advanced training courses. This paper will discuss the USSP ongoing support in the area of training and IAEA staffing.
Date: June 13, 2008
Creator: Queirolo,A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

The U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards - How It Works

Description: The U.S. Support Program to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards (USSP) was established in 1977 to transfer US technology and expertise to assist the IAEA Department of Safeguards because its limited budget and scope would not allow for R&D activities and the procurement of specialized or customized equipment. Over the years, the USSP and the Department of Safeguards have worked together continuously to develop and improve processes for requesting, selecting, and managing projects that support the Safeguards verification mission. This paper will discuss the main USSP processes for accepting and processing Safeguards requests, and managing and reporting task progress.
Date: July 13, 2008
Creator: Nock,C. & Hoffheins,B.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Case Study: Iran, Islam, the NPT, and the Bomb

Description: The goals of this case study are: (1) To examine the correlation between Iran's nuclear program and clerical statements; (2) To evaluate the importance of these statements; (3) To understand the relationship between policy and fatwas (Islamic decrees); (4) To address the issue of a 'nuclear fatwa'; and (5) To examine how, if at all, Sharia (Islamic law) has influenced Iran's actions or inactions with respect to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and Iran's adherence to its IAEA Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocol. The Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter Iran) is one of two theocracies in the world, the second being Vatican City. Iran's government derives its constitutional, moral, and political legitimacy from Islam. As a result of this theocratic culture, rules are set and interpreted with a much different calibrator than that of the Western world. Islam affects all aspects of Iranian life. This is further complicated by the fact that Islam is not a nationalistic faith, in that many people all over the world believe in and adhere to Islamic principles. As a result, a political system that derives much of its fervor from being nationalistic is caught between two worlds, one within the land boundaries of Iran and the other within a faith that transcends boundaries. Thus, any understanding of Islamic law must first be understood within this delicate balance of nationalism and transcendence. Iran has found itself on the international stage concerning its nuclear program. Because Iran is a theocratic state, it is imperative to examine its political moves, speeches, rights, and obligations through the lens of Islam. This study will examine how Islam plays a role in Iran's dealing with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), its understanding of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), including parties obligations under Safeguards ...
Date: April 1, 2011
Creator: Saunders, E .
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Remote Monitoring and Tracking of UF6 Cylinders Using Long-Range Passive Ultra-wideband (UWB) RFID Tags

Description: An IAEA Technical Meeting on Techniques for IAEA Verification of Enrichment Activities identified 'smart tags' as a technology that should be assessed for tracking and locating UF6 cylinders. Although there is vast commercial industry working on RFID systems, the vulnerabilities of commercial products are only beginning to emerge. Most of the commercially off-the-shelf (COTS) RFID systems operate in very narrow frequency bands, making them vulnerable to detection, jamming and tampering and also presenting difficulties when used around metals (i.e. UF6 cylinders). Commercial passive RFID tags have short range, while active RFID tags that provide long ranges have limited lifetimes. There are also some concerns with the introduction of strong (narrowband) radio frequency signals around radioactive and nuclear materials. Considering the shortcomings of commercial RFID systems, in their current form, they do not offer a promising solution for continuous monitoring and tracking of UF6 cylinders. In this paper, we identify the key challenges faced by commercial RFID systems for monitoring UF6 cylinders, and introduce an ultra-wideband approach for tag/reader communications that addresses most of the identified challenges for IAEA safeguards applications.
Date: June 6, 2007
Creator: Nekoogar, F & Dowla, F
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

Description: In 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a yearlong review of the challenges facing the international safeguards system today and over the next 25 years. The study found that without new investment in international safeguards, the U.S. safeguards technology base, and our ability to support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, will continue to erode and soon may be at risk. To reverse this trend, the then U.S. Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman, announced at the 2007 IAEA General Conference that the Department of Energy (DOE) would launch the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). He stated 'IAEA safeguards must be robust and capable of addressing proliferation threats. Full confidence in IAEA safeguards is essential for nuclear power to grow safely and securely. To this end, the U.S. Department of Energy will seek to ensure that modern technology, the best scientific expertise, and adequate resources are available to keep pace with expanding IAEA responsibilities.' To meet this goal, the NGSI objectives include the recruitment of international safeguards experts to work at the U.S. national laboratories and to serve at the IAEA's headquarters. Part of the latter effort will involve enhancing our existing efforts to place well-qualified Americans in a sufficient number of key safeguards positions within the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. Accordingly, the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards (ERIS) on October 22 and 23, 2008. The ISPO used a workshop format developed earlier with Sonalysts, Inc., that was followed at the U.S. Support Program's (USSP's) technology road-mapping sessions. ISPO invited participants from the U.S. DOE, the IAEA, the U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who either are experts in international safeguards, or understand the challenges of ...
Date: October 22, 2008
Creator: Pepper, S.; Rosenthal, M.; Fishbone, L.; Occhiogrosso, D.; Carroll, C.; Dreicer, M. et al.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

US technical assistance to the IAEA and the chemical weapons convection (CWC) - a review and look to the future

Description: This paper reviews the Safeguards mandate of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and describes U.S. technical support programs. We also review the mandate of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and speculate on the technical areas where U.S. assistance may prove useful. The IAEA was organized in 1957 in response to President Eisenhower`s {open_quotes}Atoms for Peace{close_quotes} initiative presented to the UN General Assembly on December 8, 1953. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has been organized by a Preparatory Commission (PREPCOM) to prepare for the entry-into-force of this new convention which prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The safeguards mandate of the IAEA is to carry out verifications of nuclear material pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and other voluntary but legally binding agreements. U.S. technical support programs have provided and continue to provide assistance in the form of Cost-Free Experts (CFE`s), systems studies on new safeguards approaches, training, computerized information systems, and equipment for nuclear materials measurements and containment and surveillance systems. Because the CWC just recently entered into force (April 29, 1997), verification procedures of the OPCW are not yet fully developed. However, it is expected, and can already be seen for many aspects of the technical task, that there are many similarities between the verification activities of the OPCW and those carried out by the IAEA. This paper will discuss potential technical support areas that can help strengthen the OPCW. 9 refs.
Date: August 1, 1997
Creator: Indusi, J.; Parsick, R.J. & Reisman, A.W.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

International Physical Protection Advisory Service

Description: Since its inception in 1996, the purpose of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) has been to provide advice and assistance to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Member States on strengthening and enhancing the effectiveness of their state system of physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. Since the protection of nuclear materials and facilities is a Member State`s responsibility, participation within the IPPAS program is voluntary. At the request of a Member State, the IAEA forms a multinational IPPAS team consisting of physical protection specialists. These specialists have broad experience in physical protection system design, implementation, and regulatory oversight. The exact make-up of the team depends upon the needs of the requesting state. IPPAS missions to participating states strive to compare the domestic procedures and practices of the state against international physical protection guidelines (IAEA Information Circular 225) and internationally accepted practice. The missions utilize a top to bottom approach and begin by reviewing the legal and regulatory structure and conclude with reviews of the implementation of the state regulations and international guidelines at individual facilities. IPPAS findings are treated as IAEA Safeguards Confidential Information. To date, IPPAS missions have been concluded in Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Poland.
Date: August 1, 1998
Creator: Soo Hoo, M.S.; Ek, D.; Hageman, A.; Jenkin, T.; Price, C. & Weiss, B.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department


Description: With new safeguards measures (under old and new authority) now available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there will be fundamental changes in the manner IAEA safeguards are implemented, raising questions about their effectiveness in meeting expanded Agency safeguards objectives. In order to characterize the capability of various safeguards approaches in meeting their objectives, it will be necessary to fully understand what is involved in the new safeguards equation. Both old and new measures will be required to construct a comprehensive picture of a State's nuclear activities and capabilities, and they both have strengths and weaknesses. There are (for political and cost reasons) likely to be tradeoffs between the two types of measures. Significant differences among measures with respect to the probability of their detecting an anomaly, along with other characteristics, need be considered in this context. Given the important role of both types of measures in future approaches, their inherent differences with regard to their capabilities and limitations, and their potential impact on the credibility of safeguards, it will be essential to consider these measures systematically, independently, and in combination in any effectiveness evaluation. This paper will consider concepts and issues in addressing this need.
Date: September 1, 2000
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department


Description: Since 1993, the IAEA has made great progress in the implementation of remote monitoring. Equipment has been developed and tested, and installed systems are being used for safeguards purposes. The cost of equipment, the complexity of communication technology, and maintenance of the equipment are challenges that still face the IAEA. Resolution of these challenges will require significant effort. The USSP is committed to assisting the IAEA to overcome these challenges.
Date: May 8, 2000
Creator: PEPPER,S.E.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department


Description: Volume I of this Review traces the origins of the Model Additional Protocol. It covers the period from 1991, when events in Iraq triggered an intensive review of the safeguards system, until 1996, when the IAEA Board of Governors established Committee 24 to negotiate a new protocol to safeguards agreement. The period from 1991-1996 set the stage for this negotiation and shaped its outcome in important ways. During this 5-year period, many proposals for strengthening safeguards were suggested and reviewed. Some proposals were dropped, for example, the suggestion by the IAEA Secretariat to verify certain imports, and others were refined. A rough consensus was established about the directions in which the international community wanted to go, and this was reflected in the draft of an additional protocol that was submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors on May 6, 1996 in document GOV/2863, Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System - Proposals For Implementation Under Complementary Legal Authority, A Report by the Director General. This document ended with a recommendation that, 'the Board, through an appropriate mechanism, finalize the required legal instrument taking as a basis the draft protocol proposed by the Secretariat and the explanation of the measures contained in this document.'
Date: January 1, 2010
Creator: Rosenthal, M.D.; Saum-Manning, L. & Houck, F.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Implications of Export/Import Reporting Requirements in the United States - International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Additional Protocol

Description: The United States has signed but not ratified the US/IAEA Safeguards Additional Protocol. If ratified, the Additional Protocol will require the US to report to the IAEA certain nuclear-related exports and imports to the IAEA. This document identifies and assesses the issues associated with the US making those reports. For example, some regulatory changes appear to be necessary. The document also attempts to predict the impact on the DOE Complex by assessing the historical flow of exports and imports that would be reportable if the Additional Protocol were in force.
Date: February 20, 2001
Creator: Killinger, Mark H.; Benjamin, Eugene L. & McNair, Gary W.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Validation of International Atomic Energy Agency Equipment Performance Requirements

Description: Performance requirements and testing protocols are needed to ensure that equipment used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is reliable. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), through the US Support Program, tested equipment to validate performance requirements protocols used by the IAEA for the subject equipment categories. Performance protocol validation tests were performed in the Environmental Effects Laboratory in the categories for battery, DC power supply, and uninterruptible power supply (UPS). Specific test results for each piece of equipment used in the validation process are included in this report.
Date: February 17, 2004
Creator: Chiaro, PJ
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

Description: Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL’s International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations
Date: July 12, 2009
Creator: Pepper, S. E.; Rosenthal, M. D.; Fishbone, L. G.; Occhogrosso, D. M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C. J. et al.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Handbook for the implementation of IAEA inspection activities at Department of Energy nuclear facilities

Description: The Nonproliferation Support Program (NSP) in the United States Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) has responsibility for supporting and aiding implementation of international and multilateral programs, agreements, and treaties at domestic facilities. In late 1995, the {open_quotes}Readiness Planning Guide for Nonproliferation Visits{close_quotes} (DOE 470.1-1) was issued to assist DOE sites prepare for the host foreign delegations visiting DOE facilities. Since then, field and head-quarters programs have expressed a need for a document that addresses domestic safeguards and security activities, specifically planning for and hosting International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) technical visits and inspections. As a result, OSS/NSP conducted a workshop to prepare a handbook that would contain guidance on domestic safeguards and security preparation and follow-on activities to ensure that this handbook could be utilized by all facilities to improve operational efficiencies and reduce implementation problems. The handbook has been structured to provide detailed background and guidance concerning the obligation, negotiation, inspection, and reporting processes for IAEH safeguards activities in DOE nuclear facilities as well as the lessons-learned by currently inspected facilities and how-we-do-it implementation examples. This paper will present an overview of the preparation and content of this new Handbook.
Date: November 1, 1997
Creator: Zack, N.R.; Thomas, K.E.; Coady, K.J. & Desmond, W.J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Proliferation Risk Characterization Model Prototype Model - User and Programmer Guidelines

Description: A model for the estimation of the risk of diversion of weapons-capable materials was developed. It represents both the threat of diversion and site vulnerability as a product of a small number of variables (two to eight), each of which can take on a small number (two to four) of qualitatively defined (but quantitatively implemented) values. The values of the overall threat and vulnerability variables are then converted to threat and vulnerability categories. The threat and vulnerability categories are used to define the likelihood of diversion, also defined categorically. The evaluator supplies an estimate of the consequences of a diversion, defined categorically, but with the categories based on the IAEA Attractiveness levels. Likelihood and Consequences categories are used to define the Risk, also defined categorically. The threat, vulnerability, and consequences input provided by the evaluator contains a representation of his/her uncertainty in each variable assignment which is propagated all the way through to the calculation of the Risk categories. [Appendix G available on diskette only.]
Date: December 1, 1998
Creator: Dukelow, J.S. & Whitford, D.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department