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Opportunities for Process Monitoring Techniques at Delayed Access Facilities

Description: Except for specific cases where the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) maintains a continuous presence at a facility (such as the Japanese Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant), there is always a period of time or delay between the moment a State is notified or aware of an upcoming inspection, and the time the inspector actually enters the material balance area or facility. Termed by the authors as “delayed access,” this period of time between inspection notice and inspector entrance to a facility poses a concern. Delayed access also has the potential to reduce the effectiveness of measures applied as part of the Safeguards Approach for a facility (such as short-notice inspections). This report investigates the feasibility of using process monitoring to address safeguards challenges posed by delayed access at a subset of facility types.
Date: September 20, 2013
Creator: Curtis, Michael M.; Gitau, Ernest TN; Johnson, Shirley J.; Schanfein, Mark & Toomey, Christopher
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Program of technical assistance to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons - lessons learned from the U.S. program of technical assistance to IAEA safeguards. Final report

Description: The Defense Nuclear Agency is sponsoring a technical study of the requirements of a vehicle to meet the OPCW`s future needs for enhanced chemical weapons verification capabilities. This report provides information about the proven mechanisms by which the U.S. provided both short- and long-term assistance to the IAEA to enhance its verification capabilities. Much of the technical assistance has generic application to international organizations verifying compliance with disarmament treaties or conventions. In addition, some of the equipment developed by the U.S. under the existing arrangements can be applied in the verification of other disarmament treaties or conventions. U.S. technical assistance to IAEA safeguards outside of the IAEA`s regular budget proved to be necessary. The U.S. technical assistance was successful in improving the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards for its most urgent responsibilities and in providing the technical elements for increased IAEA {open_quotes}readiness{close_quotes} for the postponed responsibilities deemed important for U.S. policy objectives. Much of the technical assistance was directed to generic subjects and helped to achieve a system of international verification. It is expected that the capabilities of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to verify a state`s compliance with the {open_quotes}Chemical Weapons Convention{close_quotes} will require improvements. This report presents 18 important lessons learned from the experience of the IAEA and the U.S. Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS), organized into three tiers. Each lesson is presented in the report in the context of the difficulty, need and history in which the lesson was learned. Only the most important points are recapitulated in this executive summary.
Date: June 1, 1995
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Handbook for the implementation of IAEA inspection activities at Department of Energy nuclear facilities

Description: The Nonproliferation Support Program (NSP) in the United States Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) has responsibility for supporting and aiding implementation of international and multilateral programs, agreements, and treaties at domestic facilities. In late 1995, the {open_quotes}Readiness Planning Guide for Nonproliferation Visits{close_quotes} (DOE 470.1-1) was issued to assist DOE sites prepare for the host foreign delegations visiting DOE facilities. Since then, field and head-quarters programs have expressed a need for a document that addresses domestic safeguards and security activities, specifically planning for and hosting International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) technical visits and inspections. As a result, OSS/NSP conducted a workshop to prepare a handbook that would contain guidance on domestic safeguards and security preparation and follow-on activities to ensure that this handbook could be utilized by all facilities to improve operational efficiencies and reduce implementation problems. The handbook has been structured to provide detailed background and guidance concerning the obligation, negotiation, inspection, and reporting processes for IAEH safeguards activities in DOE nuclear facilities as well as the lessons-learned by currently inspected facilities and how-we-do-it implementation examples. This paper will present an overview of the preparation and content of this new Handbook.
Date: November 1, 1997
Creator: Zack, N.R.; Thomas, K.E.; Coady, K.J. & Desmond, W.J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Private sector involvement in the US program of technical assistance to IAEA safeguards

Description: The US Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS) relies on technical expertise found in the U. S private and public sectors. Since 1993, the international Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) has sought to increase the role of the private sector in POTAS. ISPO maintains and continues to develop a database of US companies interested in providing technical expertise to the IAEA. This database is used by ISPO to find appropriate contractors to respond to IAEA requests for technical assistance when the assistance can be provided by the private sector. The private sector is currently providing support in the development of equipment, training, and procedure preparation. POTAS also supports the work of private consultants. This paper discusses ISPO`s efforts to identify suitable vendors and discusses conditions that hinder more substantial involvement by the private sector. In addition, the paper will discuss selected projects that are currently in progress and identify common problems that impede the progress and success of tasks performed by the private sector.
Date: December 1, 1995
Creator: Pepper, S.E.; Epel, L.; Maise, G.; Reisman, A. & Skalyo, J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

The US Support Program Assistance to the IAEA Safeguards Information Technology, Collection, and Analysis 2008

Description: One of the United States Support Program's (USSP) priorities for 2008 is to support the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) development of an integrated and efficient safeguards information infrastructure, including reliable and maintainable information systems, and effective tools and resources to collect and analyze safeguards-relevant information. The USSP has provided funding in support of this priority for the ISIS Re-engineering Project (IRP), and for human resources support to the design and definition of the enhanced information analysis architecture project (nVision). Assistance for several other information technology efforts is provided. This paper will report on the various ongoing support measures undertaken by the USSP to support the IAEA's information technology enhancements and will provide some insights into activities that the USSP may support in the future.
Date: June 12, 2008
Creator: Tackentien,J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

The US Support program to IAEA Safeguards - 2008

Description: The U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards (USSP) was established in 1977 to provide technical assistance to the IAEA Department of Safeguards. Since that time the U.S. Department of State has provided funding of over $200 million and over 900 tasks have been completed by USSP contractors on behalf of the KEA. The USSP is directed by a U.S. interagency subcommittee known as the Subgroup on Safeguards Technical Support (SSTS) and is managed by the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory. In recent years, the SSTS and ISPO have identified priorities to guide the process of determining which IAEA requests are aligned with US. policy and will be funded. The USSP priorities are reviewed and updated prior to the USSP Annual Review Meeting which is hosted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) each spring in Vienna, Austria. This paper will report on the 2008 USSP priorities and be an introduction for a session which will consist of four papers on USSP priorities and four other papers related to USSP activities.
Date: June 9, 2008
Creator: Pepper,S.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

The US Support Program to IAEA Safeguards Priority of Training and Human Resources

Description: The U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards (USSP) priority of training and human resources is aimed at providing the Department of Safeguards with an appropriate mixture of regular staff and extrabudgetary experts who are qualified to meet the IAEA's technical needs and to provide personnel with appropriate instruction to improve the technical basis and specific skills needed to perform their job functions. The equipment and methods used in inspection activities are unique, complex, and evolving. New and experienced safeguards inspectors need timely and effective training to perform required tasks and to learn new skills prescribed by new safeguards policies or agreements. The role of the inspector has changed from that of strictly an accountant to include that of a detective. New safeguards procedures are being instituted, and therefore, experienced inspectors must be educated on these new procedures. The USSP also recognizes the need for training safeguards support staff, particularly those who maintain and service safeguards equipment (SGTS), and those who perform information collection and analysis (SGIM). The USSP is committed to supporting the IAEA with training to ensure the effectiveness of all staff members and will continue to offer its assistance in the development and delivery of basic, refresher, and advanced training courses. This paper will discuss the USSP ongoing support in the area of training and IAEA staffing.
Date: June 13, 2008
Creator: Queirolo,A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

The U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards - How It Works

Description: The U.S. Support Program to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards (USSP) was established in 1977 to transfer US technology and expertise to assist the IAEA Department of Safeguards because its limited budget and scope would not allow for R&D activities and the procurement of specialized or customized equipment. Over the years, the USSP and the Department of Safeguards have worked together continuously to develop and improve processes for requesting, selecting, and managing projects that support the Safeguards verification mission. This paper will discuss the main USSP processes for accepting and processing Safeguards requests, and managing and reporting task progress.
Date: July 13, 2008
Creator: Nock,C. & Hoffheins,B.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Case Study: Iran, Islam, the NPT, and the Bomb

Description: The goals of this case study are: (1) To examine the correlation between Iran's nuclear program and clerical statements; (2) To evaluate the importance of these statements; (3) To understand the relationship between policy and fatwas (Islamic decrees); (4) To address the issue of a 'nuclear fatwa'; and (5) To examine how, if at all, Sharia (Islamic law) has influenced Iran's actions or inactions with respect to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and Iran's adherence to its IAEA Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocol. The Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter Iran) is one of two theocracies in the world, the second being Vatican City. Iran's government derives its constitutional, moral, and political legitimacy from Islam. As a result of this theocratic culture, rules are set and interpreted with a much different calibrator than that of the Western world. Islam affects all aspects of Iranian life. This is further complicated by the fact that Islam is not a nationalistic faith, in that many people all over the world believe in and adhere to Islamic principles. As a result, a political system that derives much of its fervor from being nationalistic is caught between two worlds, one within the land boundaries of Iran and the other within a faith that transcends boundaries. Thus, any understanding of Islamic law must first be understood within this delicate balance of nationalism and transcendence. Iran has found itself on the international stage concerning its nuclear program. Because Iran is a theocratic state, it is imperative to examine its political moves, speeches, rights, and obligations through the lens of Islam. This study will examine how Islam plays a role in Iran's dealing with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), its understanding of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), including parties obligations under Safeguards ...
Date: April 1, 2011
Creator: Saunders, E .
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Remote Monitoring and Tracking of UF6 Cylinders Using Long-Range Passive Ultra-wideband (UWB) RFID Tags

Description: An IAEA Technical Meeting on Techniques for IAEA Verification of Enrichment Activities identified 'smart tags' as a technology that should be assessed for tracking and locating UF6 cylinders. Although there is vast commercial industry working on RFID systems, the vulnerabilities of commercial products are only beginning to emerge. Most of the commercially off-the-shelf (COTS) RFID systems operate in very narrow frequency bands, making them vulnerable to detection, jamming and tampering and also presenting difficulties when used around metals (i.e. UF6 cylinders). Commercial passive RFID tags have short range, while active RFID tags that provide long ranges have limited lifetimes. There are also some concerns with the introduction of strong (narrowband) radio frequency signals around radioactive and nuclear materials. Considering the shortcomings of commercial RFID systems, in their current form, they do not offer a promising solution for continuous monitoring and tracking of UF6 cylinders. In this paper, we identify the key challenges faced by commercial RFID systems for monitoring UF6 cylinders, and introduce an ultra-wideband approach for tag/reader communications that addresses most of the identified challenges for IAEA safeguards applications.
Date: June 6, 2007
Creator: Nekoogar, F & Dowla, F
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

Description: In 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a yearlong review of the challenges facing the international safeguards system today and over the next 25 years. The study found that without new investment in international safeguards, the U.S. safeguards technology base, and our ability to support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, will continue to erode and soon may be at risk. To reverse this trend, the then U.S. Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman, announced at the 2007 IAEA General Conference that the Department of Energy (DOE) would launch the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). He stated 'IAEA safeguards must be robust and capable of addressing proliferation threats. Full confidence in IAEA safeguards is essential for nuclear power to grow safely and securely. To this end, the U.S. Department of Energy will seek to ensure that modern technology, the best scientific expertise, and adequate resources are available to keep pace with expanding IAEA responsibilities.' To meet this goal, the NGSI objectives include the recruitment of international safeguards experts to work at the U.S. national laboratories and to serve at the IAEA's headquarters. Part of the latter effort will involve enhancing our existing efforts to place well-qualified Americans in a sufficient number of key safeguards positions within the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. Accordingly, the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards (ERIS) on October 22 and 23, 2008. The ISPO used a workshop format developed earlier with Sonalysts, Inc., that was followed at the U.S. Support Program's (USSP's) technology road-mapping sessions. ISPO invited participants from the U.S. DOE, the IAEA, the U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who either are experts in international safeguards, or understand the challenges of ...
Date: October 22, 2008
Creator: Pepper, S.; Rosenthal, M.; Fishbone, L.; Occhiogrosso, D.; Carroll, C.; Dreicer, M. et al.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

A review of existing model of no-notice randomized inspection and their potential application to model Pu handling facilities

Description: Literature regarding two alternative safeguards concepts--randomization and zones--is reviewed. The concepts were introduced in the early 1980`s to address the need to make safeguards more efficient in the light of the increasing number of facilities under safeguards and a fixed IAEA inspection budget. The paper discusses literature broadly relating these approaches to IAEA needs and objectives, reports from IAEA consultants meetings, reports of field trials, and other technical papers. The review suggests that the approaches have been extensively considered on a theoretical and practical level, and that the safeguards community endorses them on a conceptual level as potentially valid ways of achieving safeguards objectives. Actual utilization of the ideas in safeguards practice has to proceed on a case-by-case basis, but progress is being made.
Date: December 31, 1997
Creator: Sanborn, J. & Lu, M.S.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Safeguards and security research and development: Progress report, October 1994--September 1995

Description: The primary goal of the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development Program, International Safeguards, and other Safeguards and Security Programs is to continue to be the center of excellence in the field of Safeguards and Security. This annual report for 1995 describes those scientific and engineering projects that contribute to all of the aforementioned programs. The authors have presented the information in a different format from previous annual reports. Part I is devoted to Nuclear Material Measurement Systems. Part II contains projects that are specific to Integrated Safeguards Systems. Part III highlights Safeguards Systems Effectiveness Evaluations and Part IV is a compilation of highlights from Information Assurance projects. Finally Part V highlights work on the projects at Los Alamos for International Safeguards. The final part of this annual report lists titles and abstracts of Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development reports, technical journal articles, and conference papers that were presented and published in 1995. This is the last annual report in this format. The authors wish to thank all of the individuals who have contributed to this annual report and made it so successful over the years.
Date: March 1, 1997
Creator: Rutherford, D.R. & Henriksen, P.W.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

International Atomic Energy Agency/Hanford Site shared use of calorimeters

Description: Hanford Site operators combine gamma ray isotopic and calorimetry measurements for nondestructive plutonium assay. Such measurements offer lower variability (particularly for heterogeneous materials) and decreased radiation exposure, cost, waste, intrusiveness, and material handling compared to destructive analysis. Until now, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has relied on destructive analysis to perform the most accurate verification requirements for plutonium stored under safeguards at the Hanford Site. It was recognized that using calorimetry could significantly reduce the need for the IAEA to perform destructive analysis. To authorize the operator`s calorimeters for routine IAEA use, however, it was necessary to develop authentication features and perform independent 1558 testing. Authentication features include IAEA control of the hardware and calorimeter operating system software, measurement of certified IAEA standards, sealing of calorimeter chambers, and limited destructive analysis of IAEA selected items. A field test of these authentication features was performed at the Hanford Site in June 1997. The field test also was meant to enhance the credibility the IAEA imputes to calorimetry prior to its implementation. Progress in shared use of the Hanford Site calorimeters is reported.
Date: July 21, 1997
Creator: Welsh, T. L.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Remote monitoring for international safeguards

Description: Remote monitoring is not a new technology, and its application to safeguards relevant activities has been examined for a number of years. On behalf of the US Department of Energy and international partners, remote monitoring systems have been emplaced in nuclear facilities and laboratories in various parts of the world. The experience gained from these field trials of remote monitoring systems has shown the viability of the concept of using integrated monitoring systems. Although a wide variety of sensors has been used in the remote monitoring field trials conducted to date, the possible range of instrumentation that might be used has scarcely been touched. As the technology becomes widespread, large amounts of data will become available to inspectors responsible for safeguards activities at the sites. Effective use of remote monitoring will require processing, archiving, presenting, and assessing of these data. To provide reasonable efficiency in the application of this technology, data processing should be done in a careful and organized manner. The problem will be not an issue of poring over scant records but of surviving under a deluge of information made possible by modern technology. Fortunately, modern technology, which created the problem of the data glut, is available to come to the assistance of those inundated by data. Apart from the technological problems, one of the most important aspects of remote monitoring is the potential constraint related to the transmission of data out of a facility or beyond national borders. Remote monitoring across national borders can be seriously considered only in the context of a comprehensive, transparent, and open implementation regime.
Date: September 1, 1997
Creator: Dupree, S.A. & Sonnier, C.S.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

A suggested approach to applying IAEA safeguards to plutonium in weapons components

Description: It is the announced policy of the United States to make fissile material removed from its nuclear weapons stockpile subject to the US-IAEA voluntary safeguards agreement. Much of this material is plutonium in the form of pits. The application of traditional IAEA safeguards would reveal Restricted Data to unauthorized persons which is prohibited by US law and international treaties. Prior to the availability of a facility for the conversion of the plutonium in the pits to a non-sensitive form this obvious long-term solution to the problem is foreclosed. An alternative near-term approach to applying IAEA safeguards while preserving the necessary degree of confidentiality is required. This paper identifies such an approach. It presents in detail the form of the US declaration; the safeguards objectives which are met; inspection techniques which are utilized and the conclusion which the IAEA could reach concerning the contents of each item and the aggregate of all items. The approach would reveal the number of containers and the aggregate mass of plutonium in a set of n containers presented to the IAEA for verification while protecting data of the isotopic composition and plutonium mass of individual components. The suggested approach provides for traceability from the time the containers are sealed until the conversion of the plutonium to a non-sensitive form.
Date: August 1, 1998
Creator: Lu, M.S. & Allentuck, J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Lessons learned in implementing IAEA safeguards on U.S. excess fissile materials, Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant

Description: Highly enriched uranium (HEU) at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant was the initial US excess fissile material to be placed under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. This presentation describes the setting in which the US offer was made and five lessons learned from that experience which are: Lesson 1--Things may happen quickly; Lesson 2--Facility and supporting areas must provide for need of the IAEA to perform their inspection activities; Lesson 3--Familiarize site personnel with IAEA safeguards; Lesson 4--Prepare for the initial inventory verification; and Lesson 5--Prepare for inspections.
Date: February 21, 1997
Creator: Whitaker, J.M.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

US technical assistance to the IAEA and the chemical weapons convection (CWC) - a review and look to the future

Description: This paper reviews the Safeguards mandate of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and describes U.S. technical support programs. We also review the mandate of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and speculate on the technical areas where U.S. assistance may prove useful. The IAEA was organized in 1957 in response to President Eisenhower`s {open_quotes}Atoms for Peace{close_quotes} initiative presented to the UN General Assembly on December 8, 1953. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has been organized by a Preparatory Commission (PREPCOM) to prepare for the entry-into-force of this new convention which prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The safeguards mandate of the IAEA is to carry out verifications of nuclear material pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and other voluntary but legally binding agreements. U.S. technical support programs have provided and continue to provide assistance in the form of Cost-Free Experts (CFE`s), systems studies on new safeguards approaches, training, computerized information systems, and equipment for nuclear materials measurements and containment and surveillance systems. Because the CWC just recently entered into force (April 29, 1997), verification procedures of the OPCW are not yet fully developed. However, it is expected, and can already be seen for many aspects of the technical task, that there are many similarities between the verification activities of the OPCW and those carried out by the IAEA. This paper will discuss potential technical support areas that can help strengthen the OPCW. 9 refs.
Date: August 1, 1997
Creator: Indusi, J.; Parsick, R.J. & Reisman, A.W.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

International Physical Protection Advisory Service

Description: Since its inception in 1996, the purpose of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) has been to provide advice and assistance to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Member States on strengthening and enhancing the effectiveness of their state system of physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. Since the protection of nuclear materials and facilities is a Member State`s responsibility, participation within the IPPAS program is voluntary. At the request of a Member State, the IAEA forms a multinational IPPAS team consisting of physical protection specialists. These specialists have broad experience in physical protection system design, implementation, and regulatory oversight. The exact make-up of the team depends upon the needs of the requesting state. IPPAS missions to participating states strive to compare the domestic procedures and practices of the state against international physical protection guidelines (IAEA Information Circular 225) and internationally accepted practice. The missions utilize a top to bottom approach and begin by reviewing the legal and regulatory structure and conclude with reviews of the implementation of the state regulations and international guidelines at individual facilities. IPPAS findings are treated as IAEA Safeguards Confidential Information. To date, IPPAS missions have been concluded in Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Poland.
Date: August 1, 1998
Creator: Soo Hoo, M.S.; Ek, D.; Hageman, A.; Jenkin, T.; Price, C. & Weiss, B.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

FUTURE SAFEGUARDS EFFECTIVENESS: CONCEPTS AND ISSUES

Description: With new safeguards measures (under old and new authority) now available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there will be fundamental changes in the manner IAEA safeguards are implemented, raising questions about their effectiveness in meeting expanded Agency safeguards objectives. In order to characterize the capability of various safeguards approaches in meeting their objectives, it will be necessary to fully understand what is involved in the new safeguards equation. Both old and new measures will be required to construct a comprehensive picture of a State's nuclear activities and capabilities, and they both have strengths and weaknesses. There are (for political and cost reasons) likely to be tradeoffs between the two types of measures. Significant differences among measures with respect to the probability of their detecting an anomaly, along with other characteristics, need be considered in this context. Given the important role of both types of measures in future approaches, their inherent differences with regard to their capabilities and limitations, and their potential impact on the credibility of safeguards, it will be essential to consider these measures systematically, independently, and in combination in any effectiveness evaluation. This paper will consider concepts and issues in addressing this need.
Date: September 1, 2000
Creator: BUDLONG-SYLVESTER, K. W. & PILAT, J. F.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

IAEA safeguards for the Fissile Materials Disposition Project

Description: This document is an overview of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and the basic requirements or elements of an IAEA safeguards regime. The primary objective of IAEA safeguards is the timely detection of the diversion of a significant quantity of material and the timely detection of undeclared activities. The two important components of IAEA safeguards to accomplish their primary objective are nuclear material accountancy and containment and surveillance. This overview provides guidance to the Fissile Materials Disposition Project for IAEA inspection requirements. IAEA requirements, DOE Orders, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations will be used as the basis for designing a safeguards and security system for the facilities recommended by the Fissile Materials Disposition Project.
Date: June 1, 1995
Creator: Close, D.A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

U.S. SUPPORT PROGRAM CONTRIBUTIONS TO REMOTE MONITORING

Description: Since 1993, the IAEA has made great progress in the implementation of remote monitoring. Equipment has been developed and tested, and installed systems are being used for safeguards purposes. The cost of equipment, the complexity of communication technology, and maintenance of the equipment are challenges that still face the IAEA. Resolution of these challenges will require significant effort. The USSP is committed to assisting the IAEA to overcome these challenges.
Date: May 8, 2000
Creator: PEPPER,S.E.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Remote monitoring: A global partnership for safeguards

Description: With increased awareness of the significant changes of the past several years and their effect on the expectations to international safeguards, it is necessary to reflect on the direction for development of nuclear safeguards in a new era and the resulting implications. The time proven monitoring techniques, based on quantitative factors and demonstrated universal application, have shown their merit. However, the new expectations suggest a possibility that a future IAEA safeguards system could rely more heavily on the value of a comprehensive, transparent, and open implementation regime. With the establishment of such a regime, it is highly likely that remote monitoring will play a significant role. Several states have seen value in cooperating with each other to address the many problems associated with the remote interrogation of integrated monitoring systems. As a consequence the International Remote Monitoring Project was organized to examine the future of remote monitoring in International Safeguards. This paper provides an update on the technical issues, the future plans, and the safeguards implications of cooperative programs relating to remote monitoring. Without providing answers to the policy questions involved, it suggests that it is timely to begin addressing these issues.
Date: August 1, 1996
Creator: Bardsley, J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Routine inspection effort required for verification of a nuclear material production cutoff convention

Description: Preliminary estimates of the inspection effort to verify a Nuclear Material Cutoff Convention are presented. The estimates are based on a database of about 650 facilities in a total of eight states, the five nuclear-weapons states and three ``threshold`` states plus facility-specific inspection requirements. Typical figures for inspection requirements for specific facility types derive from IAEA experience, where applicable. Alternative estimates of inspection effort are used in cutoff options where full IAEA safeguards are not stipulated.
Date: August 1, 1995
Creator: Fishbone, L.G. & Sanborn, J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department