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HEU to LEU conversion and blending facility: Metal blending alternative to produce LEU oxide for disposal

Description: US DOE is examining options for disposing of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials and storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials. The nuclear material is converted to a form more proliferation- resistant than the original form. Blending HEU (highly enriched uranium) with less-enriched uranium to form LEU has been proposed as a disposition option. Five technologies are being assessed for blending HEU. This document provides data to be used in environmental impact analysis for the HEU-LEU disposition option that uses metal blending with an oxide waste product. It is divided into: mission and assumptions, conversion and blending facility descriptions, process descriptions and requirements, resource needs, employment needs, waste and emissions from plant, hazards discussion, and intersite transportation.
Date: September 1, 1995
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Analysis of HEU samples from the ULBA Metallurgical Plant

Description: In early March 1994, eight highly enriched uranium (HEU) samples were collected from materials stored at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in Oskamen (Ust Kamenogorsk), Kazakhstan. While at the plant site, portions of four samples were dissolved and analyzed by mass spectrograph at the Ulba analytical laboratory by Ulba analysts. Three of these mass spectrograph solutions and the eight HEU samples were subsequently delivered to the Y-12 Plant for complete chemical and isotopic analyses. Chemical forms of the eight samples were uranium metal chips, U0{sub 2} powder, uranium/beryllium oxide powder, and uranium/beryllium alloy rods. All were declared by the Ulba plant to have a uranium assay of {approximately}90 wt % {sup 235}U. The uranium/beryllium powder and alloy samples were also declared to range from about 8 to 28 wt % uranium. The chemical and uranium isotopic analyses done at the Y-12 Plant confirm the Ulba plant declarations. All samples appear to have been enriched using some reprocessed uranium, probably from recovery of uranium from plutonium production reactors. As a result, all samples contain some {sup 236}U and {sup 232}U and have small but measurable quantities of plutonium. This plutonium could be the result of either contamination carried over from the enrichment process or cross-contamination from weapons material. It is not the result of direct reactor exposure. Neither the {sup 232}U nor the plutonium concentrations are sufficiently high to provide a significant industrial health hazard. Both are well within established or proposed acceptance criteria for storage at Y-12. The trace metal analyses showed that, with the exception of beryllium, there are no trace metals in any of these HEU samples that pose a significant health hazard.
Date: May 1, 1995
Creator: Gift, E.H.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

HEU age determination

Description: A criteria that a sample of highly enriched uranium (HEU) had come from a weapons stockpile and not newly produced in an enrichment plant is to show that the HEU had been produced a significant time in the past. The time since the HEU has produced in an enrichment plant is defined as the age of the HEU in this paper. The HEU age is determined by measuring quantitatively the daughter products {sup 230}Th and {sup 231}Pa of {sup 234}U and {sup 235}U, respectively, by first chemical separation of the thorium and protactinium and then conducting alpha spectrometry of the daughter products.
Date: December 31, 1994
Creator: Moorthy, A.R. & Kato, W.Y.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Estimated Critical Conditions for UO(Sub 2)F(Sub 2)-H(Sub 2)O Systems in Fully Water-Reflected Spherical Geometry

Description: The purpose of this report is to document reference calculations performed using the SCALE-4.0 code system to determine the critical parameters of UO{sub 2}F{sub 2}-H{sub 2}O spheres. The calculations are an extension of those documented in ORNL/CSD/TM-284. Specifically, the data for low-enriched UO{sub 2}F{sub 2}-H{sub 2}O spheres have been extended to highly enriched uranium. These calculations, together with those reported in ORNL/CSD/TM-284, provide a consistent set of critical parameters (k{sub {infinity}}, volume, mass, mass of water) for UO{sub 2}F{sub 2} and water over the full range of enrichment and moderation ratio.
Date: January 1, 1992
Creator: Jordan, W.C.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

RECENT ACTIVITIES OF THE NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP TO THWART ILLICIT TRAFFICKING

Description: The Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group (ITWG) is an informal association of nuclear forensic practitioners working in partnership with law enforcement, first responder, and nuclear regulatory professionals that cooperate to deter the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. The objective of the ITWG is to advance the science of nuclear forensics and to provide a common approach and effective technical solutions to governments who request assistance. the ITWG was chartered in 1996 and since that time 30 nations and organizations have participated in 12 annual meetings and two analytical round-robin trials involving plutonium and highly enriched uranium. A third analytical round-robin as well as several table-top exercises are planned for later in 2007-2008. International interest in the ITWG has grown in over the past five years measured by the number of participants at its annual meetings. This growth has spawned the ITWG Nuclear Forensics Laboratories as a companion technical affiliate focusing exclusively on the scientific aspects of nuclear forensics and nuclear smuggling incident response.
Date: October 25, 2007
Creator: Smith, D K; Biro, T; Chartier, B; Mayer, K; Niemeyer, S & Thompson, P
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

CALIBRATION OF THE HB LINE ACTIVE WELL NEUTRON COINCIDENCE COUNTER FOR MEASUREMENT OF LANL 3013 HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM PRODUCT SPLITS

Description: In this paper we describe set-up, calibration, and testing of the F-Area Analytical Labs active well neutron coincidence counter(HV-221000-NDA-X-1-DK-AWCC-1)in SRNL for use in HB-Line to enable assay of 3013EU/Pu metal product. The instrument was required within a three-month window for availability upon receipt of LANL Category IV uranium oxide samples into the SRS HB-Line facility. We describe calibration of the instrument in the SRNL nuclear nondestructive assay facility in the range 10-400 g HEU for qualification and installation in HB-Line for assay of the initial suite of product samples.
Date: January 22, 2008
Creator: Dewberry, R; Donald02 Williams, D; Rstephen Lee, R; David-W Roberts, D & Leah Arrigo, L
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Plutonium Finishing Plant transition project function analysis report

Description: The document contains the functions, function definitions, function interfaces, function interface definitions, Input Computer Automated Manufacturing Definition (IDEFO) diagrams, and function hierarchy charts that describe what needs to be performed to deactivate PFP and to continue safe storage, treatment and disposition of Plutonium and High Enriched Uranium.
Date: September 1, 1995
Creator: Lund, D.P.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Prompt neutron decay for an unreflected and unmoderated uranium (HEU) metal sphere

Description: Prompt neutron decay constants were measured for a delayed critical, unmoderated and unreflected U metal sphere at the Oak Ridge Critical Experiments Facility. Prompt neutron decay constant was 1.1095{+-}0.0013 {mu}s{sup -1}. This can be used to verify calculational methods, both deterministic and Monte Carlo neutron transport methods. This value is in agreement with the value from GODIVA I data corrected for effects of support structure (1.10{+-}0.01 {mu}s{sup -1}) but has a much smaller error as a result of the large number (167) of the measurements here and the high degree of sphericity of the sphere.
Date: August 1, 1996
Creator: Mihalczo, J.T.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

An optimized international vehicle monitor

Description: The security plans for many DOE facilities require the monitoring of pedestrians and vehicles to control the movement of special nuclear material (SNM). Vehicle monitors often provide the outer-most barrier against the theft of SNM. Automatic monitors determine the presence of SNM by comparing the gamma-ray and neutron intensity while occupied, to the continuously updated background radiation level which is measured while the unit is unoccupied. The most important factors in choosing automatic vehicle monitors are sensitivity, cost and in high traffic applications total monitoring time. The two types of automatic vehicle monitors presently in use are the vehicle monitoring station and the drive-through vehicle monitor. These two types have dramatically different cost and sensitivities. The vehicle monitoring station has a worst-case detection sensitivity of 40 g of highly enriched uranium, HEU, and a cost approximately $180k. This type of monitor is very difficult to install and can only be used in low traffic flow locations. The drive-through vehicle portal has a worst-case detection sensitivity of 1 kg of HEU and a cost approximately $20k. The world`s political situation has created a pressing need to prevent the diversion of SNM from FSU nuclear facilities and across international borders. Drive-through vehicle monitors would be an effective and practical nuclear material proliferation deterrent if their sensitivity can be improved to a sufficient level. The goal of this project is to evaluate different detector configurations as a means of improving the sensitivity of these instruments to achieve a vehicle monitor that is economical, practical to install, and has adequate sensitivity to be an effective barrier to illegal transportation of SNM.
Date: March 1, 1997
Creator: York, R.L.; Close, D.A. & Fehlau, P.E.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Disposition of excess highly enriched uranium status and update

Description: This paper presents the status of the US DOE program charged with the disposition of excess highly enriched uranium (HEU). Approximately 174 metric tonnes of HEU, with varying assays above 20 percent, has been declared excess from US nuclear weapons. A progress report on the identification and characterization of specific batches of excess HEU is provided, and plans for processing it into commercial nuclear fuel or low-level radioactive waste are described. The resultant quantities of low enriched fuel material expected from processing are given, as well as the estimated schedule for introducing the material into the commercial reactor fuel market. 2 figs., 3 tabs.
Date: September 1, 1997
Creator: Williams, C.K. III & Arbital, J.G.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Lessons learned in implementing IAEA safeguards on U.S. excess fissile materials, Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant

Description: Highly enriched uranium (HEU) at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant was the initial US excess fissile material to be placed under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. This presentation describes the setting in which the US offer was made and five lessons learned from that experience which are: Lesson 1--Things may happen quickly; Lesson 2--Facility and supporting areas must provide for need of the IAEA to perform their inspection activities; Lesson 3--Familiarize site personnel with IAEA safeguards; Lesson 4--Prepare for the initial inventory verification; and Lesson 5--Prepare for inspections.
Date: February 21, 1997
Creator: Whitaker, J.M.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Initial report on characterization of excess highly enriched uranium

Description: DOE`s Office of Fissile Materials Disposition assigned to this Y-12 division the task of preparing a report on the 174.4 metric tons of excess highly enriched U. Characterization included identification by category, gathering existing data (assay), defining the likely needed processing steps for prepping for transfer to a blending site, and developing a range of preliminary cost estimates for those steps. Focus is on making commercial reactor fuel as a final disposition path.
Date: July 1, 1996
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

HEU to LEU Conversion and Blending Facility: UNH blending alternative to produce LEU UNH for commercial use

Description: US DOE is examining options for disposing of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials and storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials. The nuclear material is converted to a form that is more proliferation-resistant than the original form. Examining options for increasing the proliferation resistance of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is part of this effort. Five technologies for blending HEU will be assessed. This document provides data to be used in the environmental impact analysis for the UNH blending HEU disposition option. Process requirements, resource needs, employment needs, waste/emissions from plant, hazards, accident scenarios, and intersite transportation are discussed.
Date: September 1, 1995
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND ZEUS CRITICAL EXPERIMENT

Description: The Zeus experiments have been designed to test the adequacy of {sup 235}U cross sections in the intermediate energy range. The first Zeus experiment achieved initial criticality on April 26, 1999 with 10 HEU platters and 79 platters of graphite. The second experiment reached a critical condition on October 24, 2000, with 9 HEU platters and 54 platters of graphite. The first experiment, which has been described and analyzed previously, had a C/{sup 235}U ratio of approximately 52:1. The corresponding ratio for the second experiment was approximately 40:1. This summary describes the analysis of the second Zeus critical experiment.
Date: January 1, 2001
Creator: MOSTELLER, R. & JAEGERS, P.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

UF{sub 6} fissile mass flow simulation at Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Description: Basis for measuring fissile mass flow in slurries, liquid, and gaseous streams is activation of a fissile stream by neutrons and then detection of delayed radiation from resulting fission products. This paper describes recent simulation measurements with the first prototype of the system for fissile mass flow measurements with HEU UF{sub 6} gas for use in blenddown facilities. Theory was only 15% higher than actual measured; thus calibration factor would be 0.85. This simulation of HEU gas flow confirms well the understanding of the physical phenomena associated with this measurement system.
Date: August 1, 1997
Creator: Mihalczo, J.T.; March-Leuba, J.; Valentine, T.E.; Mattingly, J.K.; Uckan, T. & McEvers, J.A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Processing of LEU targets for {sup 99}Mo production--testing and modification of the Cintichem process

Description: Recent experimental results on testing and modification of the Cintichem process to allow substitution of low enriched uranium (LEU) for high enriched uranium (HEU) targets are presented in this report. The main focus is on {sup 99}Mo recovery and purification by its precipitation with {alpha}-benzoin oxime. Parameters that were studied include concentrations of nitric and sulfuric acids, partial neutralization of the acids, molybdenum and uranium concentrations, and the ratio of {alpha}-benzoin oxime to molybdenum. Decontamination factors for uranium, neptunium, and various fission products were measured. Experiments with tracer levels of irradiated LEU were conducted for testing the {sup 99}Mo recovery and purification during each step of the Cintichem process. Improving the process with additional processing steps was also attempted. The results indicate that the conversion of molybdenum chemical processing from HEU to LEU targets is possible.
Date: September 1, 1995
Creator: Wu, D.; Landsberger, S. & Buchholz, B.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Routine inspection effort required for verification of a nuclear material production cutoff convention

Description: Preliminary estimates of the inspection effort to verify a Nuclear Material Cutoff Convention are presented. The estimates are based on a database of about 650 facilities in a total of eight states, the five nuclear-weapons states and three ``threshold`` states plus facility-specific inspection requirements. Typical figures for inspection requirements for specific facility types derive from IAEA experience, where applicable. Alternative estimates of inspection effort are used in cutoff options where full IAEA safeguards are not stipulated.
Date: August 1, 1995
Creator: Fishbone, L.G. & Sanborn, J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Conversion and Blending Facility highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium as metal. Revision 1

Description: The mission of this Conversion and Blending Facility (CBF) will be to blend surplus HEU metal and alloy with depleted uranium metal to produce an LEU product. The primary emphasis of this blending operation will be to destroy the weapons capability of large, surplus stockpiles of HEU. The blended LEU product can only be made weapons capable again by the uranium enrichment process. The blended LEU will be produced as a waste suitable for storage or disposal.
Date: July 5, 1995
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

In-field analysis and assessment of nuclear material

Description: Los Alamos National Laboratory has actively developed and implemented a number of instruments to monitor, detect, and analyze nuclear materials in the field. Many of these technologies, developed under existing US Department of Energy programs, can also be used to effectively interdict nuclear materials smuggled across or within national borders. In particular, two instruments are suitable for immediate implementation: the NAVI-2, a hand-held gamma-ray and neutron system for the detection and rapid identification of radioactive materials, and the portable mass spectrometer for the rapid analysis of minute quantities of radioactive materials. Both instruments provide not only critical information about the characteristics of the nuclear material for law-enforcement agencies and national authorities but also supply health and safety information for personnel handling the suspect materials.
Date: May 1, 1996
Creator: Morgado, R.E.; Myers, W.S.; Olivares, J.A.; Phillips, J.R. & York, R.L.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Conversion and Blending Facility highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium as uranyl nitrate hexahydrate. Revision 1

Description: This Conversion and Blending Facility (CBF) will have two missions: (1) convert HEU materials to pure HEU uranyl nitrate (UNH) and (2) blend pure HEU UNH with depleted and natural UNH to produce HEU UNH crystals. The primary emphasis of this blending operation will be to destroy the weapons capability of large, surplus stockpiles of HEU. The blended LEU product can only be made weapons capable again by the uranium enrichment process. To the extent practical, the chemical and isotopic concentrations of blended LEU product will be held within the specifications required for LWR fuel. Such blended LEU product will be offered to the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) to be sold as feed material to the commercial nuclear industry. Otherwise, blended LEU Will be produced as a waste suitable for storage or disposal.
Date: July 5, 1995
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Transient analysis for the tajoura critical facility with IRT-2M HEU fuel and IRT-4M leu fuel : ANL independent verification results.

Description: Calculations have been performed for postulated transients in the Critical Facility at the Tajoura Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) in Libya. These calculations have been performed at the request of staff of the Renewable Energy and Water Desalinization Research Center (REWDRC) who are performing similar calculations. The transients considered were established during a working meeting between ANL and REWDRC staff on October 1-2, 2005 and subsequent email correspondence. Calculations were performed for the current high-enriched uranium (HEU) core and the proposed low-enriched uranium (LEU) core. These calculations have been performed independently from those being performed by REWDRC and serve as one step in the verification process.
Date: December 2, 2005
Creator: Garner, P. L. & Hanan, N. A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department