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B Plant interim safety basis

Description: This interim safety basis (ISB-008) replaces the B Plant Safety Analysis Report, WHC-SD-WM-SAR-013, Rev. 2 (WHC 1993a). ISB-008 uses existing accident analyses, modified existing accident analyses, and new accident analyses to prove that B Plant remains within the safety envelope for transition, deactivation, standby, and shutdown activities. The analyses in ISB-008 are in accordance with the most current requirements for analytical approach, risk determination, and configuration management. This document and supporting accident analyses replace previous design-basis documents.
Date: September 1, 1996
Creator: Chalk, S.E.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Estimate of Legacy Tritium in Building 232-H Tritium Facility, Savannah River Site

Description: This report describes an estimate of how much tritium will be held up in those parts of the 232-H process that will remain in the building after deactivation The anticipated state of this tritium is also discussed. This information will be used to assess the radiological status of the deactivated facility.
Date: January 7, 2003
Creator: Clark, E.A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

PUREX Plant deactivation mission analysis report

Description: The purpose of the PUREX Deactivation Project mission analysis is to define the problem to be addressed by the PUREX mission, and to lay the ground work for further system definition. The mission analysis is an important first step in the System Engineering (SE) process. This report presents the results of the PUREX Deactivation Project mission analysis. The purpose of the PUREX Deactivation Project is to prepare PUREX for Decontamination and Decommissioning within a five year time frame. This will be accomplished by establishing a passively safe and environmentally secure configuration of the PUREX Plant, that can be preserved for a 10-year horizon. During deactivation, appropriate portions of the safety envelop will be maintained to ensure deactivation takes place in a safe and regulatory compliant manner.
Date: May 24, 1995
Creator: Lund, D.P.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Waste analysis plan for T Plant Complex

Description: Washington Administration Code 173-303-300 requires that a waste analysis plan (WAP) be provided by a treatment, storage, and/or disposal (TSD) unit to confirm their knowledge about a dangerous and/or mixed waste to ensure that the waste is managed properly. The specific objectives of the WAP are as follows: Ensure safe management of waste during treatment and storage; Ensure that waste generated during operational activities is properly designated in accordance with regulatory requirements; Provide chemical and physical analysis of representative samples of the waste stored for characterization and/or verification before the waste is transferred to another TSD unit; Ensure compliance with land disposal restriction (LDR) requirements for treated waste; and Provide basis for work plans that describes waste analysis for development of new treatment technologies.
Date: April 12, 1996
Creator: Williams, J.F.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

B Plant facility description

Description: Buildings 225B, 272B, 282B, 282BA, and 294B were removed from the B Plant facility description. Minor corrections were made for tank sizes and hazardous and toxic inventories.
Date: October 4, 1996
Creator: Chalk, S.E.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

PUREX/UO{sub 3} facilities deactivation lessons learned: History

Description: In May 1997, a historic deactivation project at the PUREX (Plutonium URanium EXtraction) facility at the Hanford Site in south-central Washington State concluded its activities (Figure ES-1). The project work was finished at $78 million under its original budget of $222.5 million, and 16 months ahead of schedule. Closely watched throughout the US Department of Energy (DOE) complex and by the US Department of Defense for the value of its lessons learned, the PUREX Deactivation Project has become the national model for the safe transition of contaminated facilities to shut down status.
Date: November 25, 1997
Creator: Gerber, M. S.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Deactivating a major nuclear fuels reprocessing facility cost effectively

Description: This paper describes three key processes used in deactivating the Plutonium Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Facility, a large, complex nuclear reprocessing facility, 15 months ahead of schedule and $77 million under budget. The organization was reengineered to refine its business processes and more effectively organize around the deactivation work scope. Multi-disciplined work teams were formed to be self-sufficient and empowered to make decisions and perform work. A number of benefits were realized by reengineering. A comprehensive process to develop end points which clearly identified specific results and the post-project facility configuration was developed so all areas of a facility were addressed. Clear and specific end points allowed teams to focus on completing deactivation activities and helped ensure there were no unfulfilled end-of-project expectations. The RCRA regulations require closure of permitted facilities within 180 days after cessation of operations which may essentially necessitate decommissioning. A more cost effective approach was adopted which significantly reduced risk to human health and the environment by taking the facility to a passive, safe, inexpensive-to-maintain surveillance and maintenance condition (deactivation) prior to disposition. PUREX thus became the first large reprocessing facility with active TSD [treatment, storage, and disposal] units to be deactivated under the RCRA regulations.
Date: August 15, 1997
Creator: LeBaron, G.J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Authentication of reprocessing plant safeguards data through correlation analysis

Description: This report investigates the feasibility and benefits of two new approaches to the analysis of safeguards data from reprocessing plants. Both approaches involve some level of plant modeling. All models involve some form of mass balance, either applied in the usual way that leads to material balances for individual process vessels at discrete times or applied by accounting for pipe flow rates that leads to material balances for individual process vessels at continuous times. In the first case, material balances are computed after each tank-to-tank transfer. In the second case, material balances can be computed at any desired time. The two approaches can be described as follows. The first approach considers the application of a new multivariate sequential test. The test statistic is a scalar, but the monitored residual is a vector. The second approach considers the application of recent nonlinear time series methods for the purpose of empirically building a model for the expected magnitude of a material balance or other scalar variable. Although the report restricts attention to monitoring scalar time series, the methodology can be extended to vector time series.
Date: April 1, 1995
Creator: Burr, T.L.; Wangen, L.E. & Mullen, M.F.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

PUREX/UO3 Facilities deactivation lessons learned history

Description: Disconnecting the criticality alarm permanently in June 1996 signified that the hazards in the PUREX (plutonium-uranium extraction) plant had been so removed and reduced that criticality was no longer a credible event. Turning off the PUREX criticality alarm also marked a salient point in a historic deactivation project, 1 year before its anticipated conclusion. The PUREX/UO3 Deactivation Project began in October 1993 as a 5-year, $222.5- million project. As a result of innovations implemented during 1994 and 1995, the project schedule was shortened by over a year, with concomitant savings. In 1994, the innovations included arranging to send contaminated nitric acid from the PUREX Plant to British Nuclear Fuels, Limited (BNFL) for reuse and sending metal solutions containing plutonium and uranium from PUREX to the Hanford Site tank farms. These two steps saved the project $36.9- million. In 1995, reductions in overhead rate, work scope, and budget, along with curtailed capital equipment expenditures, reduced the cost another $25.6 million. These savings were achieved by using activity-based cost estimating and applying technical schedule enhancements. In 1996, a series of changes brought about under the general concept of ``reengineering`` reduced the cost approximately another $15 million, and moved the completion date to May 1997. With the total savings projected at about $75 million, or 33.7 percent of the originally projected cost, understanding how the changes came about, what decisions were made, and why they were made becomes important. At the same time sweeping changes in the cultural of the Hanford Site were taking place. These changes included shifting employee relations and work structures, introducing new philosophies and methods in maintaining safety and complying with regulations, using electronic technology to manage information, and, adopting new methods and bases for evaluating progress. Because these changes helped generate cost savings and were accompanied by and ...
Date: September 19, 1996
Creator: Gerber, M.S.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Report on the emergency response to the event on May 14, 1997, at the plutonuim reclamation facility, Hanford Site, Richland,Washington

Description: On the evening of May 14,1997, a chemical explosion Occurred at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) in the 200 West Area(200-W) of the Hanford Site. The event warranted the declaration of an Alert emergency, activation of the Hanford Emergency Response Organization (BRO), and notification of offsite agencies. As a result of the emergency declaration, a subsequent evaluation was conducted to assess: 9 the performance of the emergency response organization o the occupational health response related to emergency activities o event notifications to offsite and environmental agencies. Additionally, the evaluation was designed to: 9 document the chronology of emergency and occupational health responses and environmental notifications connected with the explosion at the facility 0 assess the adequacy of the Hanford Site emergency preparedness activities; response readiness; and emergency management actions, occupational health, and environmental actions 0 provide an analysis of the causes of the deficiencies and weaknesses in the preparedness and response system that have been identified in the evaluation of the response a assign organizational responsibility to correct deficiencies and weaknesses a improve future performance 0 adjust elements of emergency implementing procedures and emergency preparedness activities.
Date: August 20, 1997
Creator: Shoop, D. S.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Definition and means of maintaining the criticality detectors and alarms portion of the PFP safety envelope

Description: The Criticality Alarm System (CAS) provides continuous detection for high radiation (criticality) events and automatically initiates an evacuation signal to affected personnel. The Safety Envelope (SE) for PFP includes the necessary equipment and the required procedures to ensure the CAS is capable of performing its intended function. This document provides the definition and means of maintaining the SE for PFP related to the CAS. This document also identifies and provides a justification for those portions of the CAS excluded from the PFP Safety Envelope.
Date: August 25, 1997
Creator: White, W.F.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Methods to estimate equipment and materials that are candidates for removal during the decontamination of fuel processing facilities

Description: The methodology presented in this report provides a model for estimating the volume and types of waste expected from the removal of equipment and other materials during Decontamination and Decommissioning (D and D) of canyon-type fuel reprocessing facilities. This methodology offers a rough estimation technique based on a comparative analysis for a similar, previously studied, reprocessing facility. This approach is especially useful as a planning tool to save time and money while preparing for final D and D. The basic methodology described here can be extended for use at other types of facilities, such as glovebox or reactor facilities.
Date: February 1, 1995
Creator: Duncan, D.R.; Valero, O.J.; Hyre, R.A.; Pottmeyer, J.A.; Millar, J.S. & Reddick, J.A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Export control guide: Spent nuclear fuel reprocessing and preparation of plutonium metal

Description: The international Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also referred to as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), states in Article III, paragraph 2(b) that {open_quotes}Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide . . . equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.{close_quotes} This guide was prepared to assist export control officials in the interpretation, understanding, and implementation of export laws and controls relating to the international Trigger List for irradiated nuclear fuel reprocessing equipment, components, and materials. The guide also contains information related to the production of plutonium metal. Reprocessing and its place in the nuclear fuel cycle are described briefly; the standard procedure to prepare metallic plutonium is discussed; steps used to prepare Trigger List controls are cited; descriptions of controlled items are given; and special materials of construction are noted. This is followed by a comprehensive description of especially designed or prepared equipment, materials, and components of reprocessing and plutonium metal processes and includes photographs and/or pictorial representations. The nomenclature of the Trigger List has been retained in the numbered sections of this document for clarity.
Date: October 1, 1993
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

1997 project of the year, PUREX deactivation project

Description: At the end of 1992, the PUREX and UO{sub 3} plants were deemed no longer necessary for the defense needs of the United States. Although no longer necessary, they were very costly to maintain in their post-operation state. The DOE embarked on a deactivation strategy for these plants to reduce the costs of providing continuous surveillance of the facilities and their hazards. Deactivation of the PUREX and UO{sub 3} plants was estimated to take 5 years and cost $222.5 million and result in an annual surveillance and maintenance cost of $2 million. Deactivation of the PUREX/UO{sub 3} plants officially began on October 1, 1993. The deactivation was 15 months ahead of the original schedule and $75 million under the original cost estimate. The annual cost of surveillance and maintenance of the plants was reduced to less than $1 million.
Date: February 13, 1998
Creator: Bailey, R.W.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Plutonium Reclamation Facility incident response project progress report

Description: This report provides status of Hanford activities in response to process deficiencies highlighted during and in response to the May 14, 1997, explosion at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility. This report provides specific response to the August 4, 1997, memorandum from the Secretary which requested a progress report, in 120 days, on activities associated with reassessing the known and evaluating new vulnerabilities (chemical and radiological) at facilities that have been shut down, are in standby, are being deactivated or have otherwise changed their conventional mode of operation in the last several years. In addition, this report is intended to provide status on emergency response corrective activities as requested in the memorandum from the Secretary on August 28, 1997. Status is also included for actions requested in the second August 28, 1997, memorandum from the Secretary, regarding timely notification of emergencies.
Date: November 25, 1997
Creator: Austin, B.A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

PUREX SAMCONS uninterruptible power supply (UPS) acceptance test report

Description: This Acceptance Test Report for the PUREX Surveillance and Monitoring and Control System (SAMCONS) Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) Acceptance Test Procedure validates the operation of the UPS, all alarming and display functions and the ability of the UPS to supply power to the SAMCONS as designed. The proper installation of the PUREX SAMCONS Trailer UPS components and wiring will be systematically evaluated by performance of this procedure. Proper operation of the SAMCONS computer UPS will be verified by performance of a timed functional load test, and verification of associated alarms and trouble indications. This test procedure will be performed in the SAMCONS Trailer and will include verification of receipt of alarms at the SAMCONS computer stations. This test may be performed at any time after the completion of HNF-SD-CP-ATP-083, PUREX Surveillance and Monitoring and Control System (SAMCONS) Acceptance Test Procedure, when computer display and alarm functions have been proven to operate correctly.
Date: October 7, 1997
Creator: Blackaby, W.B.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Chloride content of dissolver solution from Rocky Flats scrub alloy ninth and tenth campaigns following head end treatment

Description: F-Canyon continues to obtain excellent chloride removal from Rocky Flats scrub alloy (RFSA) dissolver solution during head end treatment. One single batch of solution from the ninth RFSA campaign, dissolved in January and February of this year, and two batches from the tenth campaign, dissolved in February, have been successfully processed. Following dissolution in Tank 6.4D, chloride was precipitated with mercurous ion added as the nitrate. The precipitate, Hg{sub 2}Cl{sub 2}, was concurrently removed with the gelatin floc via centrifugation. For each of these three batches processed, a set of duplicate samples was obtained from Tank 11.2 or from Tank 13.3, containing the head end product. The samples were preanalyzed by Laboratories Department for density and acidity to ensure them to be representative of the tank`s contents prior to chloride analysis by the Separations Technology Laboratory. Previous work indicated that in order to protect downstream canyon equipment from chloride attack, the chloride content of RFSA solutions should be less than 100 ppm. All batches from these two RFSA campaigns meet this criterion.
Date: March 8, 1988
Creator: Holcomb, H.P.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Recommendations for the addition of standard quantities of chemicals in certain reduction operations in the 234-5 Building

Description: This report lists recommendations to be adopted in the process for the reduction of plutonium fluorides by calcium metal in order to save time and money in the Plutonium Finishing Plant. These recommendations regard the standardization of procedures for batch operations. Instead of weighing chemicals to be added to each PuF{sub 4} batch, standard quantities of iodine and calcium would be prepared and stored for later use. The reagents would be added to PuF{sub 4} batches in the 410--430 gram range without further weighing.
Date: September 17, 1951
Creator: Desposato, F. E.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

PFP total process throughput calculation and basis of estimate

Description: The PFP Process Throughput Calculation and Basis of Estimate document provides the calculated value and basis of estimate for process throughput associated with material stabilization operations conducted in 234-52 Building. The process throughput data provided reflects the best estimates of material processing rates consistent with experience at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) and other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) sites. The rates shown reflect demonstrated capacity during ''full'' operation. They do not reflect impacts of building down time. Therefore, these throughput rates need to have a Total Operating Efficiency (TOE) factor applied.
Date: May 3, 1999
Creator: SINCLAIR, J.C.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Fire hazard analysis for Plutonium Finishing Plant complex

Description: A fire hazards analysis (FHA) was performed for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Complex at the Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford site. The scope of the FHA focuses on the nuclear facilities/structures in the Complex. The analysis was conducted in accordance with RLID 5480.7, [DOE Directive RLID 5480.7, 1/17/94] and DOE Order 5480.7A, ''Fire Protection'' [DOE Order 5480.7A, 2/17/93] and addresses each of the sixteen principle elements outlined in paragraph 9.a(3) of the Order. The elements are addressed in terms of the fire protection objectives stated in paragraph 4 of DOE 5480.7A. In addition, the FHA also complies with WHC-CM-4-41, Fire Protection Program Manual, Section 3.4 [1994] and WHC-SD-GN-FHA-30001, Rev. 0 [WHC, 1994]. Objectives of the FHA are to determine: (1) the fire hazards that expose the PFP facilities, or that are inherent in the building operations, (2) the adequacy of the fire safety features currently located in the PFP Complex, and (3) the degree of compliance of the facility with specific fire safety provisions in DOE orders, related engineering codes, and standards.
Date: February 23, 1999
Creator: MCKINNIS, D.L.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

PFP functional development planning guide

Description: The PFP Functional Development Planning Guide presents the strategy and process used for the identification, development, and analysis of functions (activities) necessary to satisfy the requirements within the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) integrated project baseline. The functional analysis will provide the basis for the development of a function driven work breakdown structure. Future revisions to this document will include as attachments the results of the PFP Functional Analysis resulting from this approach. This document is intended be a Project-owned management tool. As such, the guide will periodically require revisions resulting from improvements of the information, processes, and techniques as now described.
Date: May 3, 1999
Creator: SINCLAIR, J.C.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

PFP operational safety requirement (OSR) transition procedure

Description: The purpose of this document is to provide a detailed sequential procedure to control the transition from the current WHC-SD-CP-OSR-010 Revision O-H to WHC-SD-CP-OSR-010 Revision O-I. This plan provides a structure for the implementation of OSR Revision O-I and ensures that compliance with the current OSR Revision is maintained until Revision O-I is fully implemented. This document applies to plan processes, policies and personnel during transition from the current OSR Revision O-H to the revised OSR Revision O-I. Implementation of the OSR Revision O-I will begin upon approval of Engineering Change Notice (ECN) 631097 by the Department of Energy Richland Operations Office (DOE-RL) and approval and issuance of this implementation plan.
Date: May 12, 1999
Creator: KING, J.P.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

PFP Interface identification and management planning guide

Description: The purpose of-this planning guide is to present the process used to identify, document, and control PFP Stabilization and Deactivation Project interfaces. Revisions to this document will include, as attachments, the most recent version of the Project Interface Management List. A preliminary Interface Management List is included in Appendix A. This document is intended be a Project owned management tool. As such, this document will periodically require revisions resulting from improvements of the information, processes, and techniques as now described. For most revisions that suggest improved processes, PFP management approval is all that will be required.
Date: May 20, 1999
Creator: SINCLAIR, J.C.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Chloride Analysis of RFSA Second Campaign Dissolver Solution

Description: The dissolver solution from the second RFSA campaign was analyzed for chloride using the recently-developed turbidimetric method. Prior to chloride removal in head end, the solution contained 1625 ppm chloride. After chloride removal with Hg(I) and prior to feeding to solvent extraction, the solution contained only 75 ppm chloride. This report discusses those analysis results.
Date: May 17, 2001
Creator: Holcomb, H.P.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department