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Comparison of air and water quenching of HDS slugs

Description: This memorandum recommends the use of water quenching, rather than air quenching, for pressed slugs in any future project to substantially update the Building 313-M slug manufacturing facility. At the outset of the recently canceled Project S-4092, Improved Slug Processing Facility (ISPF), 313-M, consensus of the SRP liaison team was to replace the existing water quench facility with air quenching. Principal motivations were to eliminate a liquid waste stream, reduce the quantity of process water used, and attain a more reliable mechanical system. During the ensuing years, unforeseen difficulties with air quenching have been realized. Also, effective methods of reducing and treating the waste streams generated by water quenching have been developed. Both methods the author believes will work. However, the propriety of either method of quenching is a function of the system into which it is being incorporated. Each method carried with it a lot of concealed constraint s and carefully designed additional equipment. There is today a consensus that water quenching is preferable. For future reference, some advantages and disadvantages of the two quenching methods are discussed.
Date: February 3, 1988
Creator: Burk, J. A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Plutonium Finishing Plant assessment of confinement system bypass leakage

Description: The purpose of this report is to document walk-through`s of the safety class confinement systems at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). In addition this document outlines the actions taken to assess the confinement system for bypass leakage as well as establishing disposition for discovered deficiencies at the PFP.
Date: September 30, 1996
Creator: Dick, J.D.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Licensed fuel facility status report. Inventory difference data, July 1, 1995--June 30, 1996

Description: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is committed to an annual publication of licensed fuel cycle facility inventory difference data, following Agency review of the information and completion of any related investigations. Information in this report includes inventory difference results for active fuel fabrication facilities possessing more than one effective kilogram of special nuclear material. 1 tab.
Date: February 1, 1998
Creator: Pham, T.N.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Cost estimate and economic issues associated with the MOX option (prior to DOE`s record of decision)

Description: Before the January 1997 Record of Decision (ROD), the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD) evaluated three technologies for the disposition of {approximately}50 MT of surplus plutonium from defense-related programs-reactors, immobilization, and deep boreholes. As part of the process supporting the ROD, and comprehensive assessment of technical viability, cost, and schedule was conducted by DOE-MD and its national laboratory contractors. Oak Ridge National Laboratory managed and coordinated the life-cycle cost (LCC) assessment effort for this program. This report discusses the economic analysis methodology and the results for the reactor options considered prior to ROD. A secondary intent of the report is to discuss major technical and economic issues that impact cost and schedule. To evaluate the economics of the reactor option and other technologies on an equitable basis, a set of cost-estimating guidelines and a common cost-estimating format were utilized by all three technology teams. This report includes the major economic analysis assumptions and the comparative constant-dollar and discounted-dollar LCCs for all nine reactor scenarios.
Date: April 1, 1997
Creator: Reid, R.L. & Miller, J.W.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Material accountancy for metallic fuel pin casting

Description: The operation of the Fuel Conditioning Facility (FCF) is based on the electrometallurgical processing of spent metallic reactor fuel. The pin casting operation, although only one of several operations in FCF, was the first to be on-line. As such, it has served to demonstrate the material accountancy system in many of its facets. This paper details, for the operation of the pin casting process with depleted uranium, the interaction between the mass tracking system (MTG) and some of the ancillary computer codes which generate pertinent information for operations and material accountancy. It is necessary to distinguish between two types of material balance calculations -- closeout for operations and material accountancy for safeguards. The two have much in common, for example, the mass tracking system database and the calculation of an inventory difference, but, in general, are not congruent with regard to balance period and balance spatial domain. Moreover, the objective, assessment, and reporting requirements of the calculated inventory difference are very different in the two cases.
Date: August 1, 1995
Creator: Bucher, R.G.; Orechwa, Y. & Beitel, J.C.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Process modeling of plutonium conversion and MOX fabrication for plutonium disposition

Description: Two processes are currently under consideration for the disposition of 35 MT of surplus plutonium through its conversion into fuel for power production. These processes are the ARIES process, by which plutonium metal is converted into a powdered oxide form, and MOX fuel fabrication, where the oxide powder is combined with uranium oxide powder to form ceramic fuel. This study was undertaken to determine the optimal size for both facilities, whereby the 35 MT of plutonium metal will be converted into fuel and burned for power. The bounding conditions used were a plutonium concentration of 3--7%, a burnup of 20,000--40,000 MWd/MTHM, a core fraction of 0.1 to 0.4, and the number of reactors ranging from 2--6. Using these boundary conditions, the optimal cost was found with a plutonium concentration of 7%. This resulted in an optimal throughput ranging from 2,000 to 5,000 kg Pu/year. The data showed minimal costs, resulting from throughputs in this range, at 3,840, 2,779, and 3,497 kg Pu/year, which results in a facility lifetime of 9.1, 12.6, and 10.0 years, respectively.
Date: October 1, 1998
Creator: Schwartz, K. L.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Calculation of parameters for inspection planning and evaluation: mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facilities

Description: As part of Task C.35 (Calculation of Parameters for Inspection Planning and Evaluation) of the US Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards, Pacific Northwest Laboratory has performed some quantitative analyses of IAEA inspection activities for mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facilities. There were four distinct efforts involved in this task. These were as follows: show the effect on a material balance verification of using two variables measurement methods in some strata; perform additional calculations for the reference facility described in STR-89; modify the INSPECT computer programs to be used as an after-inspection analysis tool, as well as a preinspection planning tool; provide written comments and explantations of text and graphs of the first draft of STR-89, Safeguards Considerations for Mixed-Oxide Fuel Element Fabrication Facilities, by W. Bahm, T. Shea, and D. Tolchenkov, System Studies Section, IAEA.
Date: August 1, 1982
Creator: Reardon, P.T. & Mullen, M.F.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Simulated physical inventory verification exercise at a mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility

Description: A physical inventory verification (PIV) was simulated at a mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility. Safeguards inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducted the PIV exercise to test inspection procedures under ''realistic but relaxed'' conditions. Nondestructive assay instrumentation was used to verify the plutonium content of samples covering the range of material types from input powders to final fuel assemblies. This paper describes the activities included in the exercise and discusses the results obtained. 5 refs., 1 fig., 6 tabs.
Date: January 1, 1985
Creator: Reilly, D. & Augustson, R.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Coordinated safeguards for materials management in a mixed-oxide fuel facility

Description: A coordinated safeguards system is described for safeguarding strategic quantities of special nuclear materials in mixed-oxide recycle fuel fabrication facilities. The safeguards system is compatible with industrial process requirements and combines maximum effectiveness consistent with modest cost and minimal process interference. It is based on unit process accounting using a combination of conventional and state-of-the-art NDA measurement techniques. The effectiveness of the system against single and multiple thefts is evaluated using computer modeling and simulation techniques.
Date: February 1, 1977
Creator: Shipley, J. P.; Cobb, D. D.; Dietz, R. J.; Evans, M. L.; Schelonka, E. P.; Smith, D. B. et al.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

U-Al alloy charge makeup equation

Description: The {sup 235}U content in fuel tubes (g{sup 235}U/ft) is directly proportional to the {sup 235}U concentration (g{sup 235}U/cc) in the U-Al core alloy. In order to prepare enriched uranium metal, aluminum, and U-Al scrap for U-Al production melts, the overall alloy composition (wt % U-Al) must be calculated for the desired {sup 235}U concentration (g{sup 235}U/cc) and uranium enrichment (*wt % {sup 235}U). This memorandum documents an alternative equation for calculation of U-Al alloy casting compositions in Building 321-M. This equation confirms the results of another, undocumented equation that has been used in the past.
Date: December 13, 1988
Creator: Rhode, F. C.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Application of nondestructive assay techniques in Kazakstan

Description: As Kazakstan has transitioned from being part of the Soviet Union to a nonweapons state (Treaty of Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons [NPT] signatory) under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, significant changes have been required. Some of these changes have occurred in nuclear material protection, control, and accounting at the four nuclear facility sites in the Republic of Kazakstan. Specifically, the Republic of Kazakstan has changed from relying primarily on a subset of physical protection methods to a graded safeguards approach using a balance of material control, material accounting, and physical protection. Once more intensive material control and accounting procedures and systems are in place, a necessary step is to supply the accounting systems with measured values of high quality. This need can be met with destructive and nondestructive methods. Material control systems can also use qualitative nondestructive assay information as input. This paper will discuss the nondestructive assay techniques and systems the US Department of Energy (DOE) is providing to Kazakstan under both DOE programs and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act as part of the nuclear material control and accounting upgrades at four facilities in Kazakstan. 4 refs., 6 figs.
Date: November 1, 1997
Creator: Sprinkle, J.K. Jr.; Butler, G. & Collins, M.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Low-enriched uranium holdup measurements in Kazakhstan

Description: Quantification of the residual nuclear material remaining in process equipment has long been a challenge to those who work with nuclear material accounting systems. Fortunately, nuclear material has spontaneous radiation emissions that can be measured. If gamma-ray measurements can be made, it is easy to determine what isotope a deposit contains. Unfortunately, it can be quite difficult to relate this measured signal to an estimate of the mass of the nuclear deposit. Typically, the measurement expert must work with incomplete or inadequate information to determine a quantitative result. Simplified analysis models, the distribution of the nuclear material, any intervening attenuation, background(s), and the source-to-detector distance(s) can have significant impacts on the quantitative result. This presentation discusses the application of a generalized-geometry holdup model to the low-enriched uranium fuel pellet fabrication plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan. Preliminary results will be presented. Software tools have been developed to assist the facility operators in performing and documenting the measurements. Operator feedback has been used to improve the user interfaces.
Date: December 31, 1998
Creator: Barham, M.A.; Ceo, R.N. & Smith, S.E.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Design impacts of safeguards and security requirements for a US MOX fuel fabrication facility

Description: The disposition of plutonium that is no longer required for the nation`s defense is being structured to mitigate risks associated with the material`s availability. In the 1997 Record of Decision, the US Government endorsed a dual-track approach that could employ domestic commercial reactors to effect the disposition of a portion of the plutonium in the form of mixed oxide (MOX) reactor fuels. To support this decision, the Office of Materials Disposition requested preparation of a document that would review US requirements for safeguards and security and describe their impact on the design of a MOX fuel fabrication facility. The intended users are potential bidders for the construction and operation of the facility. The document emphasizes the relevant DOE Orders but also considers the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements. Where they are significantly different, the authors have highlighted this difference and provided guidance on the impact to the facility design. Finally, the impacts of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on facility design are discussed. Security and materials control and accountability issues that influence facility design are emphasized in each area of discussion. This paper will discuss the prepared report and the issues associated with facility design for implementing practical, modern safeguards and security systems into a new MOX fuel fabrication facility.
Date: December 31, 1998
Creator: Erkkila, B.H.; Rinard, P.M.; Thomas, K.E.; Zack, N.R. & Jaeger, C.D.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Seismic engineering for an expanded tritium facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Description: An existing complex of three single story concrete and masonry shear wall buildings will be integrated into an expanded tritium facility for neutron tube target loading. Known as the NTTL Project, the expanded plant is a major element of the Department of Energy`s tritium program at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. This paper describes seismic evaluation and upgrade modifications for the 1950`s concrete shear wall building; drift analyses of two 1980`s CMU [concrete masonry unit] shear wall buildings; design of a new CMU shear wall building linking existing structures and providing personnel change room services; and design of a new steel frame building housing HVAC and electrical power and communication equipment for the complex. All buildings are closely adjacent and drift analysis to establish separation to prevent pounding is a major seismic engineering concern for the project.
Date: October 1, 1997
Creator: Volkman, D.E.; Olive, W.B.; Endebrocid, E.E.; Khan, P.K. & Rebillet, W.R.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Development of a near-real-time accountability system

Description: This paper discusses design issues for establishing a near-real-time accountability (NRTA) system for modem fuel fabrication facilities; however, the approach for developing an NRTA could be applied to many nuclear facilities planned for construction. The proposed design is for a computerized materials accounting system capable of providing near-real-time materials balances and associated variances. The system must accommodate data from both destructive analysis (DA) and nondestructive analyses (NDA) of material-in-process and interim storage. DA and mass measurements are used by facility operations for process control and drawing material balances. NDA measurements will be used primarily by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors for verification of inventories. An essential component of the NRTA system is a software interface between the facility`s process control computer and the NRTA computer. The purpose of the interface is to facilitate the use of process measurement and material transfer data to compute materials unaccounted for (MUF), limit of error of MUF (LEMUF), and covariance matrices for a sequence of MUFs. The design of the interface facilitates use of LANL developed software Materials Accounting with Sequential Testing (MAWST) for the NRTA calculations described above. The basic approach involves a comprehensive systems analysis to evaluate the NRTA system design; development of simulation software for analysis of process flows, holdup, and MUF/LEMUF; development of evaluation software for analysis of NRTA systems; and preparation of design specifications for software to implement NRTA.
Date: September 1, 1995
Creator: Wilkey, D.D. & Whitty, W.J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Ashtabula Environmental Management Project Main Extrusion Plant Demolition Project. Demolition of the Ashtabula Environmental Management Project's Main Extrusion Plant

Description: Significant progress was made this year toward closure of the Department of Energy's Ashtabula Environmental Management Project (AEMP) with the demolition of the 9-building Main Extrusion Plant Complex. The 44,000 square foot building complex formerly housed uranium extrusion facilities and equipment. At the start of the project in October of 2001, the buildings still contained a RCRA Part B storage area, operating mixed waste treatment facilities, active waste shredding and compacting process areas, and a state EPA permitted HEPA ventilation system. This paper presents a discussion of the multidisciplinary effort to bring the building to a safe shutdown condition in just six months, including relocation of existing process areas, utility isolation, and preliminary decontamination. Also discussed is the demolition strategy in which portions of the facility remained active while demolition was proceeding in other areas. Other details of the technical approach to the demolition are also discussed, including innovative techniques for demolition, galbestos removal, contamination control, and waste minimization. These techniques contributed to the early completion of demolition in July of 2002, fully two months ahead of schedule and $1.5 million under budget.
Date: February 27, 2003
Creator: Colborn, Kurt & Johnson, Kathryn K.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department