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Acceptance test report, plutonium finishing plant life safety upgrade

Description: This acceptance Test Procedure (ATP) has been prepared to demonstrate that modifications to the Fir Protection systems function as required by project criteria. The ATP will test the Fire Alarm Control Panels, Flow Alarm Pressure Switch, Heat Detectors, Smoke Detectors, Flow Switches, Manual Pull Stations, and Gong/Door By Pass Switches.
Date: December 2, 1994
Creator: Hodge, S.G.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Design review report for modifications to RMCS safety class equipment

Description: This report documents the completion of the formal design review for modifications to the Rotary Mode Core Sampling (RMCS) safety class equipment. These modifications are intended to support core sampling operations in waste tanks requiring flammable gas controls. The objective of this review was to approve the Engineering Change Notices affecting safety class equipment used in the RMCS system. The conclusion reached by the review committee was that these changes are acceptable.
Date: May 30, 1997
Creator: Corbett, J.E.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

LANSCE personnel access control system

Description: The Radiation Security System (RSS) at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) provides personnel protection from prompt radiation due to accelerated beam. The Personnel Access Control System (PACS) is a component of the RSS that is designed to prevent personnel access to areas where prompt radiation is a hazard. PACS was designed to replace several older personnel safety systems (PSS) with a single modem unified design. Lessons learned from the operation over the last 20 years were incorporated into a redundant sensor, single-point failure safe, fault tolerant, and tamper-resistant system that prevents access to the beam areas by controlling the access keys and beam stoppers. PACS uses a layered philosophy to the physical and electronic design. The most critical assemblies are battery backed up, relay logic circuits; less critical devices use Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) for timing functions and communications. Outside reviewers have reviewed the operational safety of the design. The design philosophy, lessons learned, hardware design, software design, operation, and limitations of the device are described.
Date: January 1, 1997
Creator: Sturrock, J.C.; Gallegos, F.R. & Hall, M.J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

The CEBAF beam loss sensors

Description: The CEBAF beam can burn through the vacuum wall in approximately 100 {mu}s. The authors have developed an inexpensive beam loss sensor that will unambiguously detect a true beam loss and shut off the beam within this time without tripping on moderate interference from other sources. They have incorporated a full system test into the system, with provision for direct replacement of faulty sensors without adjustment. They describe the sensors, the signal processing design, system test results, and characterization procedures.
Date: May 1, 1993
Creator: Perry, J.; Woodworth, E.; Merminga, L.; Simrock, S.; May, R. & Stapleton, G.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Status of the Control System for the CLAS Detector at Jefferson Lab

Description: A control system for Hall B at the Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility is being developed within the framework of the Experimental Physics and Industrial Control System (EPICS). The Hall B equipment currently under EPICS control include numerous beam line devices, high voltage supplies, detector gas systems, and safety systems. The status of the control system is described.
Date: November 1, 1997
Creator: Carroll, T.; Gilmer, A.; Vineyard, M.; Auger, T.; Brooks, W.; Fabbro, S. et al.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Survey of electronic safety systems in accelerator applications

Description: This paper presents the preliminary results and analysis of a comprehensive survey of the implementation of accelerator safety interlock systems from over 30 international labs. At the present time there is not a self consistent means to evaluate both the experiences and level of protection provided by electronic safety interlock systems. This research is intended to analyze the strength and weaknesses of several different types of interlock system implementation methodologies. Research, medical, and industrial accelerators are compared. Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility (TJNAF) was one of the first large particle accelerators to implement a safety interlock system using programmable logic controllers. Since that time all of the major new U.S. accelerator construction projects plan to use some form of programmable electronics as part of a safety interlock system in some capacity.
Date: May 1, 1997
Creator: Mahoney, K.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Commercial off the shelf (COTS) software in safety systems

Description: Many safety systems, such as those in nuclear power plants, are systems for which the consequences of failure can be severe or catastrophic. These systems must be developed, implemented, and maintained in ways that provide assurance that catastrophic consequences will be prevented. This paper discusses various aspects of the question of using commercially available software in these systems. Risk, grading, and system assessment are discussed, and relevant standards are summarized. Recommendations for addressing key issues are given.
Date: January 25, 1998
Creator: Scott, J.A. & Preckshot, G.G.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Lightning protection for the process canyons at the Savannah River site

Description: Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC) has performed Lightning Studies for the existing Process Canyons at the Savannah River Site (SRS). These studies were initiated to verify the lightning protection systems for the facilities and to compare the installations to the National Fire Protection (NFPA) Standard 780, Lighting Protection Code, 1992. The original study of the F-Canyon was initiated to develop answers to concerns raised by the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB). Once this study was completed it was determined that a similar study for H-Canyon would be prudent; followed by an evaluation of the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) Vitrification Building (S-Canyon). This paper will provide an overview of the nature of lightning and the principals of lightning protection. This will provide the reader with a basic understanding of the phenomena of lighting and its potential for damaging structures, components, and injuring personnel in or near the structure.
Date: December 31, 1995
Creator: McAfee, D.E.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Inactive Tanks Remediation Program Batch I, Series I tanks 3001-B, 3004-B, 3013, and T-30 technical memorandum. Environmental Restoration Program

Description: This technical memorandum provides information that can be used to make decisions concerning the disposition of four inactive tank systems that have been designated Batch 1, Series 1, by the Inactive Tanks Remediation Program team. The Batch I, Series 1, tanks are 3001-B, 3004-B, 3013, and T-30. The report offers viable alternatives for tank system disposition. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) requires a Federal Facility Agreement (FFA) for federal facilities placed on the National Priorities List. The Oak Ridge Reservation was placed on that list on December 21, 1989, and the agreement was signed in November 1991 by DOE`s Oak Ridge Operations Office, the US Environmental Protection Agency-Region IV, and the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation. The effective date of the FFA is January 1, 1992. One objective of the FFA is to ensure that inactive liquid low-level radioactive waste tank systems are evaluated and, if appropriate, remediated through the CERCLA process. The Inactive Tanks Remediation Program and the Gunite and Associated Tanks Project (GAAT) are the two efforts that will meet this FFA objective. This memorandum addresses tank systems within the Inactive Tanks Remediation Program. Separate CERCLA documentation addresses the tank systems within the GAAT Project.
Date: May 1, 1995
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Passive safety concepts applied to critical functions

Description: Safety is of paramount concern in todays high technology environment. Because of technological advances, there are numerous situations (high consequence operations) for which the implications of a safety failure are so severe that extreme attention to safety systems is essential. Some of those situations are: nuclear weapon detonation safety, nuclear reactor safety, dam safety, mass transit transportation safety, and hazardous materials transportation and handling safety. In each case, specific safety systems, human control, and administrative procedures have been designed to give a high level of assurance against disasters. In an overview sense, safety concepts can be divided into two broad approaches: active safety and passive safety. Active safety systems, in general, are based on the need for ``functioning`` elements (operating motors, operator action, etc.) and safety may be based in a large measure on ``reliability`` data (historical records of the operability success of components). Passive safety basically depends on non-functionality.
Date: March 1, 1995
Creator: Spray, S.D. & Cooper, J.A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

A high reliability oxygen deficiency monitoring system

Description: The escalating use of cryogens at national laboratories in general and accelerators in particular, along with the increased emphasis placed on personnel safety, mandates the development and installation of oxygen monitoring systems to insure personnel safety in the event of a cryogenic leak. Numerous vendors offer oxygen deficiency monitoring systems but fail to provide important features and/or flexibility. This paper describes a unique oxygen monitoring system developed for the Magnet Test Laboratory (MTL) at the Superconducting Super Collider Laboratory (SSCL). Features include: high reliability, oxygen cell redundancy, sensor longevity, simple calibration, multiple trip points, offending sensor audio and visual indication, global alarms for building evacuation, local and remote analog readout, event and analog data logging, EMAIL event notification, phone line voice status system, and multi-drop communications network capability for reduced cable runs. Of particular importance is the distributed topology of the system which allows it to operate in a stand-alone configuration or to communicate with a host computer. This flexibility makes it ideal for small applications such as a small room containing a cryogenic dewar, as well as larger systems which monitor many offices and labs in several buildings.
Date: May 1, 1993
Creator: Parry, R.; Claborn, G.; Haas, A.; Landis, R.; Page, W. & Smith, J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

ATR/OTR-SY Tank Camera Purge System and in Tank Color Video Imaging System

Description: This procedure will document the satisfactory operation of the 101-SY tank Camera Purge System (CPS) and 101-SY in tank Color Camera Video Imaging System (CCVIS). Included in the CPRS is the nitrogen purging system safety interlock which shuts down all the color video imaging system electronics within the 101-SY tank vapor space during loss of nitrogen purge pressure.
Date: June 6, 1995
Creator: Werry, S.M.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Development of a guidance document for lightning protection of DOE facilities

Description: The purpose of this guidance document is to introduce Lighting Hazard Management, a unified approach that combines hazard identification and facility categorization (not discussed in this paper) with a new concept -- the Lighting Safety System. We do not intend to develop a brand new lightning code or standard, but rather reference other codes, standards and guides that we determine to be applicable. Using the graded approach to systematic risk management allows for in-depth protection and aids in ensuring personnel safety and optimizing resource protection.
Date: February 6, 1995
Creator: Hasbrouck, R.T. & Majumdar, K.C.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Modular reliability modeling of the TJNAF personnel safety system

Description: A reliability model for the Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility (formerly CEBAF) personnel safety system has been developed. The model, which was implemented using an Excel spreadsheet, allows simulation of all or parts of the system. Modularity os the model`s implementation allows rapid {open_quotes}what if{open_quotes} case studies to simulate change in safety system parameters such as redundancy, diversity, and failure rates. Particular emphasis is given to the prediction of failure modes which would result in the failure of both of the redundant safety interlock systems. In addition to the calculation of the predicted reliability of the safety system, the model also calculates availability of the same system. Such calculations allow the user to make tradeoff studies between reliability and availability, and to target resources to improving those parts of the system which would most benefit from redesign or upgrade. The model includes calculated, manufacturer`s data, and Jefferson Lab field data. This paper describes the model, methods used, and comparison of calculated to actual data for the Jefferson Lab personnel safety system. Examples are given to illustrate the model`s utility and ease of use.
Date: August 1, 1997
Creator: Cinnamon, J. & Mahoney, K.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

The evolution of cryogenic safety at Fermilab

Description: Over the past twenty-five years, Fermilab has been involved in cryogenic technology as it relates to pursuing experimentation in high energy physics. The Laboratory has instituted a strong cryogenic safety program and has maintained a very positive safety record. The solid commitment of management and the cryogenic community to incorporating safety into the system life cycle has led to policies that set requirements and help establish consistency for the purchase and installation of equipment and the safety analysis and documentation.
Date: December 1, 1992
Creator: Stanek, R. & Kilmer, J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

LANSCE radiation security system (RSS)

Description: The Radiation Security System (RSS) is an engineered safety system which automatically terminates transmission of accelerated ion beams in response to pre-defined abnormal conditions. It is one of the four major mechanisms used to protect people from radiation hazards induced by accelerated pulsed ion beams at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE). The others are shielding, administrative policies and procedures, and qualified, trained personnel. Prompt radiation hazards at the half-mile long LANSCE accelerator exist due to average beam intensities ranging from 1 milli-amp for H{sup +} beam to 100 micro-amps for the high intensity H{sup {minus}} beam. Experimental programs are supplied with variable energy (maximum 800 MeV), pulse-width (maximum 1 msec), and pulse frequency (maximum 120 Hz) ion beams. The RSS includes personnel access control systems, beam spill monitoring systems, and beam current level limiting systems. It is a stand-alone system with redundant logic chains. A fault of the RSS will cause the insertion of fusible beam plugs in the accelerator low energy beam transport. The design philosophy, description, and operation of the RSS are described in this paper.
Date: December 31, 1996
Creator: Gallegos, F.R.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

LANSCE beam current limiter

Description: The Radiation Security System (RSS) at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) provides personnel protection from prompt radiation due to accelerated beam. Active instrumentation, such as the Beam Current Limiter, is a component of the RSS. The current limiter is designed to limit the average current in a beam line below a specific level, thus minimizing the maximum current available for a beam spill accident. The beam current limiter is a self-contained, electrically isolated toroidal beam transformer which continuously monitors beam current. It is designed as fail-safe instrumentation. The design philosophy, hardware design, operation, and limitations of the device are described.
Date: June 1, 1996
Creator: Gallegos, F.R.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Compilation of formal comments on the tank farms interim hazard and accident analyses

Description: This document is a compilation of the formal comments on the Tank Farms Interim Hazard and Accident Analyses. This document contains the RCR`s that were received and subsequently resolved to develop Rev. A of WHC-SD-WM-SAR-065, Interim Chapter 3.0 Hazard and Accident Analysis.
Date: March 1, 1995
Creator: Ryan, G.W.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Radiation safety system (RSS) backbones: Design, engineering, fabrication and installation

Description: The Radiation Safety System (RSS) Backbones are part of an electrical/electronic/mechanical system insuring safe access and exclusion of personnel to areas at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) accelerator. The RSS Backbones control the safety fusible beam plugs which terminate transmission of accelerated ion beams in response to predefined conditions. Any beam or access fault of the backbone inputs will cause insertion of the beam plugs in the low energy beam transport. The Backbones serve the function of tying the beam plugs to the access control systems, beam spill monitoring systems and current-level limiting systems. In some ways the Backbones may be thought of as a spinal column with beam plugs at the head and nerve centers along the spinal column. The two Linac Backbone segments and experimental area segments form a continuous cable plant over 3,500 feet from beam plugs to the tip on the longest tail. The Backbones were installed in compliance with current safety standards, such as installation of the two segments in separate conduits or tray. Monitoring for ground-faults and input wiring verification was an added enhancement to the system. The system has the capability to be tested remotely.
Date: December 1, 1998
Creator: Wilmarth, J.E.; Sturrock, J.C. & Gallegos, F.R.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Using Level 1 PRA for enhanced safety of the Advanced Neutron Source Reactor

Description: The Phase 1 Level I probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of the Advanced Neutron Source Reactor (ANS) has been completed as part of the conceptual design phase of this proposed research facility. Since project inception, PRA and reliability concepts have been an integral part of the design evolution, contributing to many of the safety features in the current design. The Level I PRA has been used to evaluate the internal events core damage frequency against project goals, to identify systems important to safety and availability, and will continue to guide and provide support to accident analysis, both severe and nonsevere. The results also reflect the risk value of defense-in-depth safety features in reducing the likelihood of core damage.
Date: April 1995
Creator: Ramsey, C. T. & Linn, M. A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Safety equipment list for the light duty utility arm system

Description: The initial issue (Revision 0) of this Safety Equipment List (SEL) for the Light Duty Utility Arm (LDUA) requires an explanation for both its existence and its being what it is. All LDUA documentation leading up to creation of this SEL, and the SEL itself, is predicated on the LDUA only being approved for use in waste tanks designated as Facility Group 3, i.e., it is not approved for use in Facility Group 1 or 2 waste tanks. Facility Group 3 tanks are those in which a spontaneous or induced hydrogen gas release would be small, localized, and would not exceed 25% of the LFL when mixed with the remaining air volume in the dome space; exceeding these parameters is considered unlikely. Thus, from a NFPA flammable gas environment perspective the waste tank interior is not classified as a hazardous location. Furthermore, a hazards identification and evaluation (HNF-SD-WM-HIE-010, REV 0) performed for the LDUA system concluded that the consequences of actual LDUA system postulated accidents in Flammable Gas Facility Group 3 waste tanks would have either NO IMPACT or LOW IMPACT on the offsite public and onsite worker. Therefore, from a flammable gas perspective, there is not a rationale for classifying any of SSCs associated with the LDUA as either Safety Class (SC) or Safety Significant (SS) SSCs, which, by default, categorizes them as General Service (GS) SSCs. It follows then, based on current PHMC procedures (HNF-PRO-704 and HNF-IP-0842, Vol IV, Section 5.2) for SEL creation and content, and from a flammable gas perspective, that an SEL is NOT REQ@D HOWEVER!!! There is both a precedent and a prudency to capture all SSCS, which although GS, contribute to a Defense-In-Depth (DID) approach to the design and use of equipment in potentially flammable gas environments. This Revision 0 of the LDUA ...
Date: March 2, 1998
Creator: Barnes, G.A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

TWRS hydrogen mitigation gas characterization system design and fabrication engineering task plan

Description: The flammable gas watch-list (FGWL) tanks, which have demonstrated a gas release event (GRE) exceeding 0.625% hydrogen by volume will require additional characterization. The purpose of this additional characterization is to accurately measure the flammable and hazardous gas compositions and resulting lower flammability limit (LFL) of the tank vapor space during baseline and GRE emissions. Data from this characterization will help determine methods to resolve the unreviewed safety questions for the FGWL tanks. This document details organization responsibilities and engineering requirements for the design and fabrication of two gas characterization systems used to monitor flammable gas watch-list tanks.
Date: January 1, 1995
Creator: Straalsund, E.K.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department