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The first 50 years: A review of the Department of Energy domestic safeguards and security program

Description: World War II not only brought the United States rapidly into the nuclear age, but it also brought a new term, {open_quotes}safeguards.{close_quotes} By that time, physical security was an already established activity that dealt with the protection of possessions such as property, vehicles, and other valuables. A secret nuclear project under a stadium at the University of Chicago would add a new dimension to physical security. Similarly, a community known only by its post office box at a location 27 miles from Santa Fe, New Mexico (PO Box 1663) would initiate new programs to protect information and technology while their programs changed the science and warfare around the world. The Manhattan Project and what was to become the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (now Los Alamos National Laboratory) would extend the applications of physical security and, soon to be implemented, safeguards to produce important technical advances for the protection, accounting, control, and nonproliferation of fissile nuclear materials. Security for nuclear materials and weapons information began as a foremost consideration with the start of the nuclear programs in the early 1940s. In the 1960s, the Atoms for Peace Program promoted the peaceful use of nuclear energy and made the US a supplier of nuclear materials and peaceful-use nuclear technology to other states. This program also changed the focus on nuclear materials from that of worldwide control to inspection by an independent agency, the proposed International Atomic Energy Agency. At this same time the nuclear weapons states increased from three to five. Other nations worked to obtain a nuclear weapons capability, resulting in increasing concerns about nuclear proliferation.
Date: December 1, 1997
Creator: Desmond, W.J.; Zack, N.R. & Tape, J.W.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Personal views on integrated safeguards and the status of safeguards R&D in the united states.

Description: Nearly one year ago, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) completed the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards .' This important document, which was the product of extensive efforts by the Secretariat, the Director General's Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI), and outside experts over a number of years, provides a basis for discussions of proposed approaches to integrated safeguards . I will refer to this framework paper to share with you my personal views of integrated safeguards .
Date: January 1, 2003
Creator: Tape, J. W. (James W.)
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Safeguards and security research and development: Progress report, October 1994--September 1995

Description: The primary goal of the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development Program, International Safeguards, and other Safeguards and Security Programs is to continue to be the center of excellence in the field of Safeguards and Security. This annual report for 1995 describes those scientific and engineering projects that contribute to all of the aforementioned programs. The authors have presented the information in a different format from previous annual reports. Part I is devoted to Nuclear Material Measurement Systems. Part II contains projects that are specific to Integrated Safeguards Systems. Part III highlights Safeguards Systems Effectiveness Evaluations and Part IV is a compilation of highlights from Information Assurance projects. Finally Part V highlights work on the projects at Los Alamos for International Safeguards. The final part of this annual report lists titles and abstracts of Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development reports, technical journal articles, and conference papers that were presented and published in 1995. This is the last annual report in this format. The authors wish to thank all of the individuals who have contributed to this annual report and made it so successful over the years.
Date: March 1, 1997
Creator: Rutherford, D.R. & Henriksen, P.W.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Implementation of a Dual Containment/Surveillance System utilizing scene-change detection and radio frequency technology

Description: This paper will examine the implementation of scene-change detection and radio frequency technology within a Dual Containment/Surveillance (C/S) System. Additionally, this paper will examine the human performance factors in the operation of these systems. Currently, Westinghouse Savannah River Company utilizes the Continuous Item Monitoring and Surveillance System (CIMS) in the performance of Dual C/S to monitor special nuclear materials within International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards and Domestic Safeguards. CIMS is comprised of the Material Monitoring System (MMS) (R), a multi-media electronic surveillance system developed by Sandia National Laboratory which incorporates the use of active seals commonly called Radio Frequency Tamper Indicating Devices (RFTIDs), NT Vision (R) as developed by Los Alamos National Laboratory, a Microsoft Windows NT (R) based operating system providing for domestic scene-change detection and the Digital Multi-Camera Optical Surveillance System (DMOS) (R) which provides scene-change detection for IAEA. Although this paper will focus on the implementation of Dual C/S utilizing the Continuous Item Monitoring and Surveillance System, the necessity for a thorough review of Safeguards and Security requirements with organizations and personnel having minimal to no prior MPC&A training will also be covered. Successful Dual C/S implementation plans must consider not only system design and failure modes, but must also be accompanied with the appropriate ''mind shift'' within operations and technical personnel. This is required to ensure completion of both physical and electronic activities, and system design changes are performed conscientiously and with full awareness of MPC&A requirements.
Date: June 27, 2005
Creator: FITZGERALD, ERIC & KOENIG, RICHARD
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

RESULTS FROM A DEMONSTRATION OF RF-BASED UF6 CYLINDER ACCOUNTING AND TRACKING SYSTEM INSTALLED AT A USEC FACILITY

Description: Approved industry-standard cylinders are used globally for storing and transporting uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) at uranium enrichment plants and processing facilities. To verify that no diversion or undeclared production of nuclear material involving UF{sub 6} cylinders at the facility has occurred, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts periodic, labor-intensive physical inspections to validate facility records, cylinder identities, and cylinder weights. A reliable cylinder monitoring system that would improve overall inspector effectiveness would be a significant improvement to the current international safeguards inspection regime. Such a system could include real-time unattended monitoring of cylinder movements, situation-specific rules-based event detection algorithms, and the capability to integrate with other types of safeguards technologies. This type of system could provide timely detection of abnormal operational activities that may be used to ensure more appropriate and efficient responses by the IAEA. A system of this type can reduce the reliance on paper records and have the additional benefit of facilitating domestic safeguards at the facilities at which it is installed. A radio-frequency (RF)-based system designed to track uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) cylinders during processing operations was designed, assembled, and tested at the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) facility in Portsmouth, Ohio, to determine the operational feasibility and durability of RF technology. The overall objective of the effort was to validate the robustness of RF technology for potential use as a future international safeguards tool for tracking UF6 cylinders at uranium-processing facilities. The results to date indicate that RF tags represent a feasible technique for tracking UF{sub 6} cylinders in operating facilities. Additional work will be needed to improve the operational robustness of the tags for repeated autoclave processing and to add tamper-indicating and data authentication features to some of the pertinent system components. Future efforts will focus on these needs along with implementing protocols ...
Date: September 1, 2008
Creator: Pickett, Chris A; Kovacic, Donald N; Morgan, Jim; Younkin, James R; Carrick, Bernie; Ken, Whittle et al.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

An American Academy for Training Safeguards Inspectors - An Idea Revisited

Description: In 2009, we presented the idea of an American academy for training safeguards inspectors for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), due to the declining percentage of Americans in that international organization. In this paper we assert that there is still a compelling need for this academy. While the American Safeguards Academy would be useful in preparing and pre-training American inspectors for the IAEA, it would also be useful for preparing Americans for domestic safeguards duties in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. DOE National Laboratories, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It is envisioned that such an academy would train graduate and post-graduate university students, DOE National Laboratory interns, and nuclear safeguards professionals in the modern equipment, safeguards measures, and approaches currently used by the IAEA. It is also envisioned that the Academy would involve the domestic nuclear industry, which could provide use of commercial nuclear facilities for tours and demonstrations of the safeguards tools and methods in actual nuclear facilities. This would be in support of the U.S. DOE National Nuclear Security Administration’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). This training would also help American nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation professionals better understand the potential limitations of the current tools used by the IAEA and give them a foundation from which to consider even more effective and efficient safeguards measures and approaches.
Date: July 1, 2010
Creator: Durst, Philip Casey & Bean, Robert
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Facility Safeguardability Analysis In Support of Safeguards-by-Design

Description: The following report proposes the use of Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) to: i) compare and evaluate nuclear safeguards measures, ii) optimize the prospective facility safeguards approach, iii) objectively and analytically evaluate nuclear facility safeguardability, and iv) evaluate and optimize barriers within the facility and process design to minimize the risk of diversion and theft of nuclear material. As proposed by the authors, Facility Safeguardability Analysis would be used by the Facility Designer and/or Project Design Team during the design and construction of the nuclear facility to evaluate and optimize the facility safeguards approach and design of the safeguards system. Through a process of “Safeguards-by-Design” (SBD), this would be done at the earliest stages of project conceptual design and would involve domestic and international nuclear regulators and authorities, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The benefits of the Safeguards-by-Design approach is that it would clarify at a very early stage the international and domestic safeguards requirements for the Construction Project Team, and the best design and operating practices for meeting these requirements. It would also minimize the risk to the construction project, in terms of cost overruns or delays, which might otherwise occur if the nuclear safeguards measures are not incorporated into the facility design at an early stage. Incorporating nuclear safeguards measures is straight forward for nuclear facilities of existing design, but becomes more challenging with new designs and more complex nuclear facilities. For this reason, the facility designer and Project Design Team require an analytical tool for comparing safeguards measures, options, and approaches, and for evaluating the “safeguardability” of the facility. The report explains how preliminary diversion path analysis and the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PRPP) evaluation methodology can be adapted for evaluating and assessing the safeguardability of nuclear facilities – both existing, as well as those ...
Date: July 1, 2010
Creator: Durst, Philip Casey; Wigeland, Roald; Bari, Robert; Bjornard, Trond; Hockert, John & Zentner, Michael
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

The potential use of domestic safeguards interior monitors in International Safeguards

Description: An important future element of International Safeguards instrumentation is expected to be the merging of containment/surveillance and nondestructive assay equipment with domestic physical protection equipment into integrated systems, coupled with remote monitoring. Instrumentation would include interior monitoring and assessment and entry/exit monitoring. Of particular importance is the application of interior monitors in spaces of declared inactivity; for example, in nuclear material storage locations that are entered infrequently. The use of modern interior monitors in International Safeguards offers potential for improving effectiveness and efficiency. Within the context of increased cooperation, one can readily envision increased interaction between International Safeguards and Domestic Safeguards, including increased joint use of State System of Accounting and Control data.
Date: August 1, 1998
Creator: Williams, J.D.; Dupree, S.A. & Sonnier, C.S.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Uranium-233 waste definition: Disposal options, safeguards, criticality control, and arms control

Description: The US investigated the use of {sup 233}U for weapons, reactors, and other purposes from the 1950s into the 1970s. Based on the results of these investigations, it was decided not to use {sup 233}U on a large scale. Most of the {sup 233}U-containing materials were placed in long-term storage. At the end of the cold war, the US initiated, as part of its arms control policies, a disposition program for excess fissile materials. Other programs were accelerated for disposal of radioactive wastes placed in storage during the cold war. Last, potential safety issues were identified related to the storage of some {sup 233}U-containing materials. Because of these changes, significant activities associated with {sup 233}U-containing materials are expected. This report is one of a series of reports to provide the technical bases for future decisions on how to manage this material. A basis for defining when {sup 233}U-containing materials can be managed as waste and when they must be managed as concentrated fissile materials has been developed. The requirements for storage, transport, and disposal of radioactive wastes are significantly different than those for fissile materials. Because of these differences, it is important to classify material in its appropriate category. The establishment of a definition of what is waste and what is fissile material will provide the guidance for appropriate management of these materials. Wastes are defined in this report as materials containing sufficiently small masses or low concentrations of fissile materials such that they can be managed as typical radioactive waste. Concentrated fissile materials are defined herein as materials containing sufficient fissile content such as to warrant special handling to address nuclear criticality, safeguards, and arms control concerns.
Date: July 7, 1998
Creator: Forsberg, C.W.; Storch, S.N. & Lewis, L.C.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

International inspection activity impacts upon DOE safeguards requirements

Description: The US has placed certain special nuclear materials declared excess to their strategic needs under international safeguards through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This Presidential initiative has obligated materials at several Department of Energy (DOE) facilities for these safeguards activities to demonstrate the willingness of the US to ban production or use of nuclear materials outside of international safeguards. However, IAEA inspection activities generally tend to be intrusive in nature and are not consistent with several domestic safeguards procedures implemented to reduce worker radiation exposures and increase the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of accounting for and storing of special nuclear materials. To help identify and provide workable solutions to these concerns, the Office of Safeguards and Security has conducted a program to determine possible changes to the DOE safeguards and security requirements designed to help facilities under international safeguards inspections more easily comply with domestic safeguards goals during international inspection activities. This paper will discuss the impact of international inspection activities on facility safeguards operations and departmental safeguards procedures and policies.
Date: September 1, 1995
Creator: Zack, N.R. & Crawford, D.W.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Process monitoring in support of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards

Description: A review of previous efforts in process monitoring for safeguards was conducted. Previous efforts touched on various concepts and a few specific applications, but none was comprehensive in addressing all aspects of a process monitoring application for safeguards. This report develops prototypical process monitoring concepts that can be incorporated into the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) general safeguards approach for fuel reprocessing plants. This effort considers existing approaches, recognizing limitations and needed improvements. Prototypical process monitoring applications are developed and proposed for implementation and demonstration in the Integrated Equipment Test facility, which is located at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The specific information needed to accomplish the process monitoring objectives are defined, and the mechanics for obtaining that information are described. Effort is given to the identification and assessment of potential impacts and benefits associated with process monitoring concepts, with particular attention to IAEA, state, and plant operator interests. The historical development of process monitoring is described and the implications of using process monitoring in international safeguards are discussed. Specific process process monitoring applications for demonstration in the IET facility are developed in Sects. 6 through 14. 1 fig.
Date: August 1, 1987
Creator: Ehinger, M.H.; Wachter, J.W.; Hebble, T.L. & Kerr, H.T.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

IAEA Inspections for Undeclared and Declared Activities: Is a More Robust Approach Needed?

Description: The United States has long supported a strong international safeguards system and for many years has served as the foremost supplier of technology, equipment, and training to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In doing so, it drew in many instances on DOE sponsored R&D and training that was directed towards domestic safeguards and then adapted for IAEA purposes. This was relatively straightforward because of the strong overlap between the development of nuclear material accountancy measures needed for both domestic and international purposes. Two factors have emerged that have made this strong reliance on domestic measures less and less able to be a source of support for the IAEA. One is the shift by the IAEA safeguards system towards detecting undeclared activities. The second is the shift of domestic attention away from nuclear material accountancy and towards physical protection. As a result, a gap in US sponsored R&D and training relevant to international safeguards has developed. The NNSA Next Generation Safeguards Initiative and the DOE NA-22 Safeguards R&D program are intended to help fill this gap and, thereby, permit the U.S. to remain as the pre-eminent supplier of technology for international safeguards purposes. In this context, IAEA challenges have been examined from the perspective of detecting the diversion of nuclear material from declared stocks; detecting undeclared production of nuclear material and activities at locations declared under INFCIRC/153; and detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities elsewhere in a state. Of these, the detection of undeclared nuclear material and activities is, perhaps, the IAEA’s most significant challenge. It is a challenge that even the international community finds difficult to meet because of the scope and the geographic scale of the problem, the technical constraints, the knowledge required, and the significant resources needed to deploy effective systems world-wide (e.g., satellite surveillance systems). The ...
Date: July 1, 2009
Creator: Schanfein, Mark
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Data validation and security for reprocessing.

Description: Next generation nuclear fuel cycle facilities will face strict requirements on security and safeguards of nuclear material. These requirements can result in expensive facilities. The purpose of this project was to investigate how to incorporate safeguards and security into one plant monitoring system early in the design process to take better advantage of all plant process data, to improve confidence in the operation of the plant, and to optimize costs. An existing reprocessing plant materials accountancy model was examined for use in evaluating integration of safeguards (both domestic and international) and security. International safeguards require independent, secure, and authenticated measurements for materials accountability--it may be best to design stand-alone systems in addition to domestic safeguards instrumentation to minimize impact on operations. In some cases, joint-use equipment may be appropriate. Existing domestic materials accountancy instrumentation can be used in conjunction with other monitoring equipment for plant security as well as through the use of material assurance indicators, a new metric for material control that is under development. Future efforts will take the results of this work to demonstrate integration on the reprocessing plant model.
Date: October 1, 2008
Creator: Tolk, Keith Michael; Merkle, Peter Benedict; DurÔan, Felicia Angelica & Cipiti, Benjamin B.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

DATA RECOVERY EFFORTS AT IDAHO NATIONAL LABORATORY, OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY, AND SAVANNAH RIVER NATIONAL LABORATORY

Description: Abstract was already submitted. Could not find the previous number. Would be fine with attaching/update of old number. Abstract Below: Modern nuclear facilities will have significant process monitoring capability for their operators. These systems will also be used for domestic safeguards applications, which has led to research over new diversion-detection algorithms. Curiously missing from these efforts are verification and validation data sets. A tri-laboratory project to locate the existing data sets and recover their data has yielded three major potential sources of data. The first is recovery of the process monitoring data of the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant, which now has a distributable package for algorithm developers. The second data set is extensive sampling and process data from Savannah River National Laboratory’s F- and H-canyon sites. Finally, high fidelity data from the start-up tests at the Barnwell Reprocessing Facility is in recovery. This paper details the data sets and compares their relative attributes.
Date: July 1, 2010
Creator: Metcalf, Richard; Salaymeh, Saleem & Ehinger, Michael
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Safeguards considerations in the study of proliferation resistance of plutonium disposition options

Description: Domestic and international safeguards considerations of the various plutonium disposition program options were studied. The options included immobilization in either glass or ceramic; deep borehole disposal, either directly as oxide or after immobilization in ceramic pellets; and nine options of burning in reactors as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. Two of the MOX options considered burning in CANDU (Canadian deuterium uranium) reactors in Canada; the remaining options used either existing or new reactors in the US. A facility for conversion of weapons-grade PU metal to plutonium oxide is common to all options. Although domestic safeguards are applied for all material in the facility, international verification probably will not be possible until weapons design information from material form can no longer be inferred. Assuming that the facility processed 5 tonnes of Pu/year and all measurements are made to meet 1993 ESARDA (European Safeguards Research and Development Association) Target Values, the best annual detection limit (false alarm probability = 0.05, detection probability = 0.95) for loss of Pu can be no smaller than 16.5 kg, and probably will be higher. A MOX fuel fabrication facility is required for all of the reactor options, and location of the facility either in the US or in a EURATOM country was considered. Assuming that the facility processes 3.2 tonnes of Pu/year, and all measurements are made to meet ESARDA Target Values, the best annual detection limit for loss of Pu can be no smaller than 24 kg. Location in Europe adds an additional international safeguards burden. Impact of the various disposal options on domestic and international safeguards will be reviewed.
Date: November 1, 1997
Creator: Hakkila, E.A. & Burr, T.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Panel on protection and management of plutonium: Subpanel on safeguards and security

Description: Nuclear materials safeguards and security systems are described in the context of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Materials of interest to safeguards, threats, proposals to strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, evolving safeguards issues and requirements, system effectiveness, and elements of a global nuclear materials management regime are discussed. Safeguards are seen as an essential element of nuclear materials management, but not a driver for decisions regarding nuclear power or the disposal of excess weapon nuclear materials.
Date: July 1, 1995
Creator: Tape, J.W.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

The development and significance of the DOE Safeguards and Security standards and criteria

Description: In October 1985, the DOE Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs created a task force to develop inspection standards and criteria for Safeguards and Security. These standards and criteria (S/C) would provide the DOE Inspection and Evaluation (I and E) teams with the guidance needed to assess the security posture of DOE's nuclear and other important facilities. The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory was designated the lead management organization for the structuring, administration, and execution of the overall task force effort and appointed the Executive Secretary. The Office of Security Evaluations (OSE) became the responsible DOE organization, and its Director assumed the role of Chairman of the Task Force Executive Committee. At its peak, the Task Force consisted of approximately 200 people who were considered to be experts in eight major topical areas. The composition of the experts was almost evenly divided between DOE and contractor employees. The collective wisdom of these experts was used in a consensus process to develop the S/C that are now published in draft form. These S/C have been used in more than ten inspections since May 1986 with much success. This paper discusses the process used to achieve the desired end result and the significance of the Task Force's accomplishments.
Date: January 1, 1987
Creator: Toman, J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Estimates of LLEA officer availability

Description: One element in the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in Transit Program is a determination of the number of local law enforcement agency (LLEA) officers available to respond to an attack upon a special nuclear material (SNM) carrying convoy. A computer model, COPS, has been developed at Sandia Laboratories to address this problem. Its purposes are to help identify to the SNM shipper areas along a route which may have relatively low police coverage and to aid in the comparison of alternate routes to the same location. Data bases used in COPS include population data from the Bureau of Census and police data published by the FBI. Police are assumed to be distributed in proportion to the population, with adjustable weighting factors. Example results illustrating the model's capabilities are presented for two routes between Los Angeles, CA, and Denver, CO, and for two routes between Columbia, SC, and Syracuse, NY. The estimated police distribution at points along the route is presented. Police availability as a function of time is modeled based on the time-dependent characteristics of a trip. An example demonstrating the effects of jurisdictional restrictions on the size of the response force is given. Alternate routes between two locations are compared by means of cumulative plots.
Date: May 1, 1978
Creator: Berkbigler, K.P.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Structure of safeguards systems

Description: An effective safeguards system for domestic nuclear fuel cycle facilities consists of several important subsystems that must coordinate their functions with plant management and process control. The safeguards system must not unnecessarily disrupt plant operations, compromise safety requirements, or infringe on employee working conditions. This report describes concepts, which have been developed with the cooperation of the nuclear industry and the safeguards community, for achieving these objectives.
Date: June 1, 1978
Creator: Shipley, J.P.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Material Control and Accounting Design Considerations for High-Temperature Gas Reactors

Description: The subject of this report is domestic safeguards and security by design (2SBD) for high-temperature gas reactors, focusing on material control and accountability (MC&A). The motivation for the report is to provide 2SBD support to the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) project, which was launched by Congress in 2005. This introductory section will provide some background on the NGNP project and an overview of the 2SBD concept. The remaining chapters focus specifically on design aspects of the candidate high-temperature gas reactors (HTGRs) relevant to MC&A, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements, and proposed MC&A approaches for the two major HTGR reactor types: pebble bed and prismatic. Of the prismatic type, two candidates are under consideration: (1) GA's GT-MHR (Gas Turbine-Modular Helium Reactor), and (2) the Modular High-Temperature Reactor (M-HTR), a derivative of Areva's Antares reactor. The future of the pebble-bed modular reactor (PBMR) for NGNP is uncertain, as the PBMR consortium partners (Westinghouse, PBMR [Pty] and The Shaw Group) were unable to agree on the path forward for NGNP during 2010. However, during the technology assessment of the conceptual design phase (Phase 1) of the NGNP project, AREVA provided design information and technology assessment of their pebble bed fueled plant design called the HTR-Module concept. AREVA does not intend to pursue this design for NGNP, preferring instead a modular reactor based on the prismatic Antares concept. Since MC&A relevant design information is available for both pebble concepts, the pebble-bed HTGRs considered in this report are: (1) Westinghouse PBMR; and (2) AREVA HTR-Module. The DOE Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) sponsors the Fuel Cycle Research and Development program (FCR&D), which contains an element specifically focused on the domestic (or state) aspects of SBD. This Material Protection, Control and Accountancy Technology (MPACT) program supports the present work summarized in this report, namely the ...
Date: August 1, 2011
Creator: Bjornard, Trond & Hockert, John
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Operations monitoring concept. Consolidated Fuel Reprocessing Program

Description: Operations monitoring is a safeguards concept which could be applied in future fuel cycle facilities to significantly enhance the effectiveness of an integrated safeguards system. In general, a variety of operations monitoring techniques could be developed for both international and domestic safeguards application. The goal of this presentation is to describe specific examples of operations monitoring techniques as may be applied in a fuel reprocessing facility. The operations monitoring concept involves monitoring certain in-plant equipment, personnel, and materials to detect conditions indicative of the diversion of nuclear material. An operations monitoring subsystem should be designed to monitor operations only to the extent necessary to achieve specified safeguards objectives; there is no intent to monitor all operations in the facility. The objectives of the operations monitoring subsystem include: verification of reported data; detection of undeclared uses of equipment; and alerting the inspector to potential diversion activities. 1 fig.
Date: January 1, 1985
Creator: Kerr, H.T.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department