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Existing Data Format for Two-Parameter Beta-Gamma Histograms for Radioxenon

Description: There is a need to establish a commonly acceptable format for storing beta-gated coincidence data for stations in the International Monitoring System (IMS) for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The current aerosol RMS type data format is not applicable for radioxenon in that the current format contains implicit assumptions specific to conventional gamma-ray spectrometry. Some assumptions in the current RMS format are not acceptable for the beta-gated spectra expected from the U.S. Department of Energy PNNL Automated Radioxenon Sampler-Analyzer (ARSA) and other similar systems under use or development from various countries. The RMS data format is not generally applicable for radioxenon measurements in the CTBT for one or more of the following main reasons: 1) The RMS format does not currently support 2-dimensional data. That is, the RMS data format is setup for a simple l-dimensional gamma-ray energy histogram. Current data available from the ARSA system and planned for other radioxenon monitors includes spectral information from gamma-rays and betas/conversion electrons. It is worth noting that the beta/conversion electron energy information will be used to separate the contributions from the different radioxenons. 2) The RMS data format assumes that the conversion between counts and activity can be calculated based (in part) on a simple calibration curve (detector efficiency curve) that depends only on energy of the gamma-ray. In the case of beta-gated gamma-ray spectra and for 2-dimensional spectra, there are generally two detector calibration curves that must be convoluted, the lower energy cutoff for the betas must be considered, and the energy acceptance window must be taken into account to convert counts into activity. . 3) The RMS format has header information that contains aerosol-specific information that allows the activity (Bq) calculated to be converted into a concentration (Bq/SCM). This calculation is performed by dividing the activity calculated (Bq) into number ...
Date: March 23, 1999
Creator: Bowyer, TW; Heimbigner, TR; McIntyre, JI; McKinnon, AD; Reeder, PL & Wittinger, E
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Nonproliferation through international lab-to-lab technology cooperation

Description: At the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) one of the fastest growing programs as a result of the end of the Cold War is the Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and International Security Directorate (NAI). Since the early 1990's NAI types of programs have grown from a small percentage of LLNL's budget to constitute one of its major programs. NAI's work includes developing instruments to detect chemicals and radiation, analyzing complex national defense problems, anticipating threats to the US, and providing personnel to support national and international efforts in crisis management and arms control. These functions support the US government in dealing with weapons-of-mass-destruction challenges� proliferation, terrorism, and nuclear-state instability. To combat the rapidly emerging chem-bio-terrorism threats, NAI is drawing on LLNL�s advanced technologies in bioscience, microfabrication, and computations to help the Department of Energy (DOE )provide major support to the US government. Half of NAI's effort is directed toward preventing proliferation before it starts, which is the mission of the Proliferation Prevention and Arms Control Program (PPAC). Until recently, our emphasis was on arms control. Now, arms control continues to be an important component while international cooperation and fissile material control are our dominant activities for the Department of Energy. Many of the post-Cold-War changes are highly visible, such as the elimination of nuclear testing by the United States, Russia, China and other major powers; agreements and continuing negotiations to dramatically reduce numbers of nuclear weapons; and increasing international focus on nonproliferation and counterterrorism. Other changes are less highly publicized but are no less significant. One such area is the increasing interactions between DOE Laboratory scientists and their counterparts in the nuclear weapons institutes of the former Soviet Union. Although the large majority of these Lab-to- Lab activities are currently with the FSU, that experience is leading to important and productive ...
Date: September 10, 1998
Creator: Dunlop, W H
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Nuclear relations in South Asia

Description: The strategic landscape of South Asia changed dramatically in 1998. With the reciprocal testing of nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan emerged from the world of threshold status to an overt posture which has yet to be fully defined. Each claims the status of a nuclear weapon state, yet the contours of that status are unclear. A number of important strategic issues have been raised by these dramatic events. This paper will attempt to examine the implications of this new posture for each country and for the region. First and foremost, the decisions to test nuclear weapons are a product of each individual state making a sovereign decision about its national security needs. Both have made clear for a number of years that their attitudes toward nuclear weapons-and by default, toward nuclear nonproliferation-will not be directed by outsiders. They have rejected the global norms that oppose the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, embodied in the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and that embrace the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, captured in Article VI of that treaty. The decisions reached in New Delhi and lslamabad have been questioned by many, but the tests cannot be undone and it now falls on both countries to make further decisions about what strategies will best serve them, and what obligations they must now assume. Issues such as strategic planning, weaponization, deployment, and command and control, which heretofore were relegated to the back burner, may no longer be deferred.
Date: December 18, 1998
Creator: Joeck, N.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Representing regional P/S discriminants for event indentification: a comparison of distance corrections, path parameter regressions, cap-averaging and kriging

Description: Short-period regional P/S amplitude ratios hold much promise for discriminating low magnitude explosions from earthquakes in a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty monitoring context. However, propagation effects lead to variability in regional phase amplitudes that if not accounted for can reduce or eliminate the ability of P/S ratios to discriminate the seismic source. lo this study, several representations of short-period regional P/S amplitude ratios are compared in order to determine which methodology best accounts for the effect of heterogeneous structure on P/S amplitudes. These methodologies are: I) distance corrections, including azimuthal subdivision of the data; 2) path specific crustal waveguide parameter regressions; 3) cap-averaging (running mean smoothing); and 4) kriging. The "predictability" of each method is established by cross-validation (leave-one-out) analysis. We apply these techniques to represent Pn/Lg, Pg/Lg and Pn/Sn observations in three frequency bands (0.75-6.0 Hz) at station ABKT (Alibek, Turkmenistan), site of a primary seismic station of the It~temational Monitoring System (IMS). Paths to ABKT sample diverse crustal stmctores (e.g. various topographic, sedimentary and geologic structures), leading to great variability in the observed P/S amplitude ratios. Subdivision of the data be back-azimuth leads to stronger distance trends than that for the entire data set. This observation alone indicates that path propagation effects due to laterally varying shucture are important for the P/S ratios recorded at ABKT. For these data to be useful for isolating source characteristics, the scatter needs to be reduced by accounting for the path effects and the resulting P/S ratio distribution needs to Gaussian for spatial interpolation and discrimination strategies to be most effective. Each method reduces the scatter of the P/S ratios with varying degrees of success, however kriging has the distinct advantages of providing the greatest variance reduction and a continuous correction surface with an estimate of the model uncertainty. The largest scatter ...
Date: June 18, 1998
Creator: Myers, S C; Rodgers, A J; Schultz, C A & Walter, W R
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Identification of mine collapses, explosions and earthquakes using INSAR: a preliminary investigation

Description: Interferograms constmcted from satellite-borne synthetic aperture radar images have the capability of mapping sub-cm ground surface deformation over areas on the order of 100 x 100 km with a spatial resolution on the order of 10 meters. We investigate the utility of synthetic aperture radar interferomehy (InSAR) used in conjunction with regional seismic methods in detecting and discriminating different types of seismic events in the context of special event analysis for the CTBT. For this initial study, we carried out elastic dislocation modeling of underground explosions, mine collapses and small (M<5.5) shallow earthquakes to produce synthetic interferograms and then analyzed satellite radar data for a large mine collapse. The synthetic modeling shows that, for a given magnitude each type of event produces a distinctive pattern of ground deformation that can be recognized in, and recovered from, the corresponding interferogram. These diagnostic characteristics include not only differences in the polarities of surface displacements but also differences in displacement amplitudes from the different sources. The technique is especially sensitive to source depth, a parameter that is crucial in discriminating earthquakes from the other event types but is often very poorly constrained by regional seismic data alone. The ERS radar data analyzed is from a M<sub>L</sub> 5.2 seismic event that occurred in southwestern Wyoming on February 3,1995. Although seismic data from the event have some characteristics of an underground explosion, based on seismological and geodetic data it has been identified as being caused by a large underground collapse in the Solvay Mine. Several pairs of before-collapse and after-collapse radar images were phase processed to obtain interferograms. The minimum time separation for a before-collapse and after-collapse pair was 548 days. Even with this long time separation, phase coherence between the image pairs was acceptable and a deformation map was successfully obtained. Two images, separated ...
Date: July 7, 1998
Creator: Foxall, B; Sweeney, J J & Walter, W R
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

New Horizons and New Strategies in Arms Control

Description: In the last ten years, since the break-up of the Soviet Union, remarkable progress in arms control and disarmament has occurred. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the completion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Chemical Weapons Treaty (CWC) are indicative of the great strides made in the non- proliferation arena. Simultaneously, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the Conventional Forces Treaty in Europe (CFE), and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START), all associated with US-Soviet Union (now Russia) relations have assisted in redefining European relations and the security landscape. Finally, it now appears that progress is in the offing in developing enhanced compliance measures for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). In sum, all of these achievements have set the stage for the next round of arms control activities, which may lead to a much broader, and perhaps more diffused multilateral agenda. In this new and somewhat unpredictable international setting, arms control and disarmament issues will require solutions that are both more creative and innovative than heretofore.
Date: December 4, 1998
Creator: Brown, J. editor
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Robust Bearing Estimation for 3-Component Stations

Description: A robust bearing estimation process for 3-component stations has been developed and explored. The method, called SEEC for Search, Estimate, Evaluate and Correct, intelligently exploits the in- herent information in the arrival at every step of the process to achieve near-optimal results. In particular, the approach uses a consistent framework to define the optimal time-frequency windows on which to make estimates, to make the bearing estimates themselves, to construct metrics helpful in choosing the better estimates or admitting that the bearing is immeasurable, andjinally to apply bias corrections when calibration information is available to yield a single final estimate. The method was applied to a small but challenging set of events in a seismically active region. The method demonstrated remarkable utility by providing better estimates and insights than previously available. Various monitoring implications are noted fiom these findings.
Date: June 3, 1999
Creator: Claassen, John P.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Application of proposed mutual reciprocal inspection measurement techniques to a weapon component

Description: The shape-measurement technique proposed by Russian scientists for mutual reciprocal inspections (MRI) of plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons has been applied to a US weapon component. Measurement procedures are described. Results of the measurements are {open_quotes}self-normalized{close_quotes} to remove any classified information and further renormalized to results of previous joint US/Russian measurements of an unclassified plutonium piece. Data are presented in tabular and graphical form, conforming to the method of presentation recommended by Russian experts during the previous measurements.
Date: April 1, 1997
Creator: Johnson, M.W.; Frankle, C.M. & Gosnell, T.B.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

First strike stability at low weapon levels

Description: Proportional force reductions could reduce stability by giving the side with fewer vulnerable significant benefit in preemption by allowing the use of his full force in damage limitation at intermediate force levels. That benefit would be reduced if both sides shifted towards larger fractions of survivable forces.
Date: July 1, 1997
Creator: Canavan, G.H.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

The value of auxiliary stations and the need for network calibration

Description: To address the question of the value of auxiliary stations placed before the GSE by the Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Test Ban, we examined the published location error estimates given by both the NEIS and the IDC. The results of our analysis demonstrate the well-known principle that the uncertainty in the location for a given event decreases as the number of defining phases (or stations) increases and as the azimuthal coverage increases. More importantly, however, the results also show that the location uncertainty dramatically decreases as the distance to the nearest station decreases. We also show that the empirically observed rate of overlap of corresponding IDC and NEIS error ellipses is inconsistent with expectation as determined by statistically modeling the performance of each. To overcome this shortcoming the IMS must be calibrated.
Date: February 1, 1996
Creator: Denny, M.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

The development of the shadow analysis team concept

Description: Part II, Section E, Paragraphs 52-55 of the {open_quotes}Verification Annex{close_quotes} (Annex 2) of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) provides the general rights and obligations of both the Inspected State Party (ISP) and the Inspection Team (IT) as to the collection and analysis of samples. In summary, the inspection team has the right to request the collection of samples which will be collected by the ISP unless the decision is made by the ISP to allow the inspectors to collect them. Samples will, if possible, be analyzed at the inspection site, with the assistance of the ISP if requested by the IT. The ISP has the right to retain portions all collected samples. Samples may be sent off-site for independent analysis if deemed necessary. These rights are modified in the case of {open_quotes}Challenge Inspections{close_quotes} by the {open_quotes}Managed Access{close_quotes} Provisions of Part X, Section C, Paragraphs 4648 which specifies that sample collection is to be negotiated between the Inspection Team and the Inspected State Party. In order to assist the ISP in fulfilling its obligation to assist the IT in determining compliance, and in preserving its rights to protect sensitive information not relevant to the CWC, we propose to establish the Army Material Command Treaty Laboratory (AMCTL) Shadow Analysis Team.
Date: November 1, 1995
Creator: McGuire, R.R.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Novel tamper-indicating protective devices

Description: Several novel tamper-indicating devices, originally developed under DOE auspices for arms control applications, might be useful in nonproliferation. Some devices that have reached the laboratory prototype stage could provide specialized alternatives to established seals. As locks and cables, the following might be useful: (1) a brittle ceramic lock--impervious to toxic, radiation, and thermal extremes--interrogated for identification and continuity by ultrasonic means, (2) a flexible ceramic-fiber seal that also tolerates severe environments, (3) an ultrasonic smart-material strip seal, and (4) an RF-resonant coaxial cable, verified by radio frequency and microwave signals. To validate the identity of secured surfaces, joints, welds, and fasteners--two techniques are applicable: (1) the scanning electron microscope, which examines three- dimensional micron-level topography, and (2) the plastic-casting fingerprint, a simple low-cost technique, analogous to human fingerprinting. The techniques mentioned above have one or more of the potential advantages of low cost, immediate availability, security for large-area enclosures, application to hazardous environments, usability in the FSU, or suitability for covert use.
Date: July 1, 1995
Creator: DeVolpi, A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Virtual nuclear weapons

Description: The term virtual nuclear weapons proliferation and arsenals, as opposed to actual weapons and arsenals, has entered in recent years the American lexicon of nuclear strategy, arms control, and nonproliferation. While the term seems to have an intuitive appeal, largely due to its cyberspace imagery, its current use is still vague and loose. The author believes, however, that if the term is clearly delineated, it might offer a promising approach to conceptualizing certain current problems of proliferation. The first use is in a reference to an old problem that has resurfaced recently: the problem of growing availability of weapon-usable nuclear materials in civilian nuclear programs along with materials made `excess` to defense needs by current arms reduction and dismantlement. It is argued that the availability of these vast materials, either by declared nuclear-weapon states or by technologically advanced nonweapon states, makes it possible for those states to rapidly assemble and deploy nuclear weapons. The second use has quite a different set of connotations. It is derived conceptually from the imagery of computer-generated reality. In this use, one thinks of virtual proliferation and arsenals not in terms of the physical hardware required to make the bomb but rather in terms of the knowledge/experience required to design, assemble, and deploy the arsenal. Virtual weapons are a physics reality and cannot be ignored in a world where knowledge, experience, materials, and other requirements to make nuclear weapons are widespread, and where dramatic army reductions and, in some cases, disarmament are realities. These concepts are useful in defining a continuum of virtual capabilities, ranging from those at the low end that derive from general technology diffusion and the existence of nuclear energy programs to those at the high end that involve conscious decisions to develop or maintain militarily significant nuclear-weapon capabilities.
Date: August 1, 1997
Creator: Pilat, J.F.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Policy issues facing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and prospects for the future

Description: This report is divided into the following 5 sections: (1) Background; (2) Major Issues Facing Ratification of CTBT; (3) Current Status on CTBT Ratification; (4) Status of CTBT Signatories and Ratifiers; and (5) CTBT Activities Not Prohibited. The major issues facing ratification of CTBT discussed here are: impact on CTBT of START II and ABM ratification; impact of India and Pakistan nuclear tests; CTBT entry into force; and establishment of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization.
Date: April 1, 1999
Creator: Sweeney, J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Summary report of the workshop on the U.S. use of surface waves for monitoring the CTBT

Description: The workshop addressed the following general research goals of relevance to monitoring and verifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT): A) To apprise participants of current and planned research in order to facilitate information exchange, collaboration, and peer review. B) To compare and discuss techniques for data selection, measurement, error assessment, modeling methodologies, etc. To compare results in regions where they overlap and understand the causes of obsenied differences. C) To hear about the U.S. research customer� s (AFTAC and DOE Knowledge Base) current and anticipated interests in surface wave research. D) To discuss information flow and integration. How can research results be prepared for efficient use and integration into operational systems� ? E) To identify and discuss fruitful future directions for research.
Date: September 1, 1998
Creator: Ritzwoller, M. & Walter, W. R.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Arms control and the rule of law: National measures for enforcement and verification

Description: Much has been written about the deterrence strategies that justified the arms race. Walter Slocombe explained that {open_quotes}[t]he dominant problem of U.S. nuclear strategy is credibly using U.S. nuclear power to deter and if necessary resist nonnuclear as well as nuclear threats to America`s allies, forces, and interests overseas.{close_quotes} As a result, the {open_quotes}flexible response{close_quotes} doctrine was developed to declare {open_quotes}that the United States, in consultation with its allies, is prepared to use nuclear weapons should other means of protection from Soviet attack threaten to fail.{close_quotes} In contrast, Freeman Dyson pointed out the Soviet Union was committed to the concept of {open_quotes}counterforce,{close_quotes} which meant that {open_quotes}if the Soviet Union sees a nuclear attack coming or has reason to believe that an attack is about to be launched, the Soviet Union will strike first at the attacker`s weapons with all available forces, and will then do whatever is necessary in order to survive.{close_quotes} Out of these military postures a tense peace ironically emerged, but the terms by which decisions were made about controlling weapons of mass destruction (i.e., nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons) were the terms of war. The thesis of this paper is that the end of the Cold War marks a shift away from reliance on military might toward an international commitment to control weapons of mass destruction through the `rule of law.`
Date: April 19, 1997
Creator: Tanzman, E.A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Program of technical assistance to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons - lessons learned from the U.S. program of technical assistance to IAEA safeguards. Final report

Description: The Defense Nuclear Agency is sponsoring a technical study of the requirements of a vehicle to meet the OPCW`s future needs for enhanced chemical weapons verification capabilities. This report provides information about the proven mechanisms by which the U.S. provided both short- and long-term assistance to the IAEA to enhance its verification capabilities. Much of the technical assistance has generic application to international organizations verifying compliance with disarmament treaties or conventions. In addition, some of the equipment developed by the U.S. under the existing arrangements can be applied in the verification of other disarmament treaties or conventions. U.S. technical assistance to IAEA safeguards outside of the IAEA`s regular budget proved to be necessary. The U.S. technical assistance was successful in improving the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards for its most urgent responsibilities and in providing the technical elements for increased IAEA {open_quotes}readiness{close_quotes} for the postponed responsibilities deemed important for U.S. policy objectives. Much of the technical assistance was directed to generic subjects and helped to achieve a system of international verification. It is expected that the capabilities of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to verify a state`s compliance with the {open_quotes}Chemical Weapons Convention{close_quotes} will require improvements. This report presents 18 important lessons learned from the experience of the IAEA and the U.S. Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS), organized into three tiers. Each lesson is presented in the report in the context of the difficulty, need and history in which the lesson was learned. Only the most important points are recapitulated in this executive summary.
Date: June 1, 1995
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Proliferation prevention in the commercial fuel cycle

Description: This website contains the papers presented on November 17, 1998 during the session, "Proliferation Prevention in the Commercial Fuel Cycle," at the American Nuclear Society meeting in Washington, DC. The abstracts are in a separate section; individual papers also contain the author's bio and e-mail address. In the session planning phase, it was suggested that the following questions and other relevant issues be addressed: * What are the difficulties and issues with defining and enforcing international standards for the physical protection of Pu and HEU (beyond the Convention on the Physical protection of Nuclear Material, which primarily addresses transportation)? * How do we (or can we) keep nuclear technology in general, and reprocessing and enrichment technologies in particular, from spreading to undesirable organizations (including governments), in light of Article IV of the NPT? Specifically, can we (should we) prevent the construction of light-water reactors in Iran; and should we support the construction of light-water reactors in North Korea? * Are there more proliferation-resistant fuel cycles that would be appropriate in developing countries? * Can the concept of "nonproliferation credentials" be defined in a useful way? * Is there historical evidence to indicate that reprocessing (or enrichment of HEU) in the US, Japan, or the EURATOM countries has impacted the acquisition (or attempted acquisition) of nuclear weapons by other nations or groups? * What is the impact of a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) be on commercial nuclear fuel cycles? * Does MOX spent fuel present a greater proliferation risk than LEU spent fuel? Although the authors did not explicitly attempt to answer all these questions, they did enlighten us about a number of these and related issues.
Date: April 9, 1999
Creator: Sutcliffe, W G
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Legal aspects of national implementation of the chemical weapons convention confidential provisions

Description: Today, I shall discuss legal aspects of implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention`s (CORK) confidentiality provisions. These implementing measures are universal, applying not only to the few States Parties that will declare and destroy chemical weapons, but also to the many States Parties that have never had a chemical weapons program. Progress is reported in actually developing implementing measures for the cork`s confidentiality requirements from Australia, Germany, Norway, South Africa, and Sweden.
Date: May 9, 1995
Creator: Tanzman, E.A. & Kellman, B.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

PNNL Review of Proposed Relevant Radionuclide List

Description: A list of fission products and activation products has been proposed for possible adoption as an official table of relevant isotopes for CTBT use. It is our understanding that the purpose of this list is to discriminate Level 4 spectra from Level 5 spectra in the decision logic diagram. The current understanding is that a single short-lived, relevant isotope that is atypical for a station would cause a spectrum to be marked as Level 4. A second relevant isotope would cause a spectrum to be marked as Level 5, which would perhaps require a sample to undergo additional laboratory conflation measurements. The list consists of a very comprehensive set of fission products and activation products. We have examined the list for accuracy and have also flagged potential problems with members of the list. in our opinion, several of these isotopes have serious problems and many have no practical chance of ever being the first or second detected isotopes. We are not arguing whether or not these isotopes might be seen in a large atmospheric test. On the other hand, there may be no harm associated with having a long list. The issue of activation products is different. Some activation products are indicative of the soil or rock composition in the vicinity of an explosion. Others may only be dependent on materials in the weapon or in the support structures. We don't think that a great deal of analysis of these isotopes by the CTBTO should be encouraged. In any case, if particulate activation products are in the atmosphere, fission products should be even more prevalent, thus removing the need for an activation list component.
Date: May 10, 1999
Creator: Miley, HS & Arthur, RJ
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

The Present Status of the Technological Development of Remote Monitoring Systems

Description: Let me begin with some comments about transparency. We all have some perception or vision about the use of transparency for nuclear technology and nuclear non-proliferation. Although we probably have some common understanding of what it implies, there is no precise definition that is agreed upon. One of the most significant ideas in transparency is that it is considered to be a voluntary or unilateral action. The party, or organization, or nation that wants its activities to be transparent voluntarily provides information to other parties with the expectation of receiving some acceptance or good will in return. The organization giving the information determines what information to provide, how much, how often, and when. This is in contrast to official treaties and monitoring regimes, in which specific verification information and activities are prescribed. This should have the advantage for the transparent organization of being less intrusive and less costly than a treaty monitoring regime. Information related to sensitive nuclear technology, proprietary processes, and physical security is more easily protected. The difficultly for both parties, the transparent organization and the information recipients, is in determining what information is necessary for the desired confidence building. It must be recognized that this state of transparency or confidence will only be achieved over an extended period of time, when history confirms that the information was reliable in conveying the true picture.
Date: January 28, 1999
Creator: Matter, J.C.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Cooperative Mmonitoring Center Occasional Paper/5: Propspects of Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

Description: The intensely adversarial relationship between India and Pakistan is marked by military rivalry, mutual distrust, and suspicion. The most dividing disagreement has been over the Kashmir region. An inability to discuss the Kashmir issue has prevented discussion on other important issues. Since there is little prospect of detente, at least in the near-term, the question is whether this rivalry can be contained by other means, such as arms control approaches. Conventional arms control has been applied flexibly and successfully in some regions to reduce threat-perceptions and achieve reassuring military stability. Some lessons from other international models might be applied to the India/Pakistan context. This paper discusses the status of conventional arms control in South Asia, the dominant Indian and Pakistani perceptions about arms control, the benefits that could be derived from arms control, as well as the problems and prospects of arms control. It also discusses existing conventional arms control agreements at the regional and global levels as well as the potential role of cooperative monitoring technology.
Date: November 1, 1998
Creator: Gupta, Amit & Kamal, Nazir
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper/4: Missile Control in South Asia and the Role of Cooperative Monitoring Technology

Description: The succession of nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998 has changed the nature of their missile rivalry, which is only one of numerous manifestations of their relationship as hardened adversaries, deeply sensitive to each other's existing and evolving defense capabilities. The political context surrounding this costly rivalry remains unmediated by arms control measures or by any nascent prospect of detente. As a parallel development, sensible voices in both countries will continue to talk of building mutual confidence through openness to avert accidents, misjudgments, and misinterpretations. To facilitate a future peace process, this paper offers possible suggestions for stabilization that could be applied to India's and Pakistan's missile situation. Appendices include descriptions of existing missile agreements that have contributed to better relations for other countries as well as a list of the cooperative monitoring technologies available to provide information useful in implementing subcontinent missile regimes.
Date: October 1, 1998
Creator: Kamal, N. & Sawhney, P.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department