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Canister Storage Building (CSB) Technical Safety Requirements

Description: The purpose of this section is to explain the meaning of logical connectors with specific examples. Logical connectors are used in Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) to discriminate between, and yet connect, discrete Conditions, Required Actions, Completion Times, Surveillances, and Frequencies. The only logical connectors that appear in TSRs are AND and OR. The physical arrangement of these connectors constitutes logical conventions with specific meanings.
Date: May 10, 2000
Creator: KRAHN, D.E.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Canister Storage Building Receiving Pit Modification Informal Design Verification

Description: The design for modifications to the CSB Cask Receiving pit guides was verified by the informal design verification (meeting) method on August 9, 2000. The invited list of attendees and the meeting attendance sheet are included in attachment 1. The design modifications that were reviewed are documented in ECN 654484 (attachment 2). The requirement that the design is to be verified against is to ''center the transportation cask sufficiently to allow installation of the guide funnel on the cask ({+-} 0.25 inches or less)''. The alternatives considered are detailed in attachment 3. Alternative number 4, ''Modify The Pit Guides'', was determined to be the preferred alternative primarily due to considerations of simplicity, reliability, and low cost. Alternative 1, ''Rotate the impact Absorber 180{sup o}'', was successfully performed but was considered a temporary fix that was not acceptable for a long term operational mode. The requirement to position the receiving crane accurately enough to lower the transportation cask into the pit with the redesigned guides was discussed and considered to be achievable without undue effort from the operator. The tolerance on the OD of the transfer cask was discussed ({+-} 1/8 inch) relative to the clearance with the guides. As-built dimensions for the cask OD will be looked at to verify sufficient clearance exists with the maximum cask OD. The final design thickness of the shims under the guides will be based on the as-built cask OD dimensions and field measurements between the pit guides. The need for a ''plastic'' cover for the guides was discussed and deemed unnecessary. Thermal growth of the cask OD was calculated at 3-5 mils and considered insignificant. The possibility of reducing the OD of the guide funnel was reviewed but this was considered impractical due to the requirement for the MCO to miss the edge ...
Date: October 9, 2000
Creator: KRIEG, S.A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Central Waste Complex (CWC) Safety Equipment List

Description: This document lists all safety equipment for the Central Waste Complex, per HNF-PRO-704. This document provides a list of structures, systems, and components that are essential to the continuing safe operation of the Central Waste Complex, as designated by the applicable facility management and the cognizant engineer.
Date: January 20, 2000
Creator: WHITLOCK, R.W.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Characterization Program Management Plan for Hanford K Basin Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) (OCRWM)

Description: The management plan developed to characterize the K Basin spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and sludge was originally developed for Westinghouse Hanford Company and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to work together on a program to provide characterization data to support removal, conditioning, and subsequent dry storage of the SNF stored at the Hanford K Basins. The plan also addressed necessary characterization for the removal, transport, and storage of the sludge from the Hanford K Basins. This plan was revised in 1999 (i.e., Revision 2) to incorporate actions necessary to respond to the deficiencies revealed as the result of Quality Assurance surveillances and audits in 1999 with respect to the fuel characterization activities. Revision 3 to this Program Management Plan responds to a Worker Assessment resolution determined in Fical Year 2000. This revision includes an update to current organizational structures and other revisions needed to keep this management plan consistent with the current project scope. The plan continues to address both the SNF and the sludge accumulated at K Basins. Most activities for the characterization of the SNF have been completed. Data validation, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) document reviews, and OCRWM data qualification are the remaining SNF characterization activities. The transport and storage of K Basin sludge are affected by recent path forward revisions. These revisions require additional laboratory analyses of the sludge to complete the acquisition of required supporting engineering data. Hence, this revision of the management plan provides the overall work control for these remaining SNF and sludge characterization activities given the current organizational structure of the SNF Project.
Date: December 12, 2000
Creator: BAKER, R.B. & TRIMBLE, D.J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Cold Vacuum Dryer (CVD) Facility Security System Design Description (SYS 54)

Description: This system design description (SDD) addresses the Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Facility security system. The system's primary purpose is to provide reasonable assurance that breaches of security boundaries are detected and assessment information is provided to protective force personnel. In addition, the system is utilized by Operations to support reduced personnel radiation goals and to provide reasonable assurance that only authorized personnel are allowed to enter designated security areas.
Date: September 11, 2000
Creator: WHITEHURST, R.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Cold Vacuum Dryer (CVD) Facility Fire Protection System Design Description (SYS 24)

Description: This system design description (SDD) addresses the Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Facility fire protection system (FPS). The primary features of the FPS for the CVD are a fire alarm and detection system, automatic sprinklers, and fire hydrants. The FPS also includes fire extinguishers located throughout the facility and fire hydrants to assist in manual firefighting efforts. In addition, a fire barrier separates the operations support (administrative) area from the process bays and process bay support areas. Administrative controls to limit combustible materials have been established and are a part of the overall fire protection program. The FPS is augmented by assistance from the Hanford Fire Department (HED) and by interface systems including service water, electrical power, drains, instrumentation and controls. This SDD, when used in conjunction with the other elements of the definitive design package, provides a complete picture of the FPS for the CVD Facility.
Date: October 17, 2000
Creator: SINGH, G.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Electrical System Design Description

Description: This system design description (SDD) provides a technical explanation of the design and operation of the electrical system for the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF). This SDD also identifies the requirements, and the basis for the requirements and details on how the requirements have been implemented in the design and construction of the facility. This SDD also provides general guidance for the surveillance, testing, and maintenance of this system.
Date: May 1, 2000
Creator: SINGH, G.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Accident and Off Normal Response and Recovery from Multi Canister Overpack (MCO) Processing Events

Description: In the process of removing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from the K Basins through its subsequent packaging, drymg, transportation and storage steps, the SNF Project must be able to respond to all anticipated or foreseeable off-normal and accident events that may occur. Response procedures and recovery plans need to be in place, personnel training established and implemented to ensure the project will be capable of appropriate actions. To establish suitable project planning, these events must first be identified and analyzed for their expected impact to the project. This document assesses all off-normal and accident events for their potential cross-facility or Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) process reversal impact. Table 1 provides the methodology for establishing the event planning level and these events are provided in Table 2 along with the general response and recovery planning. Accidents and off-normal events of the SNF Project have been evaluated and are identified in the appropriate facility Safety Analysis Report (SAR) or in the transportation Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP). Hazards and accidents are summarized from these safety analyses and listed in separate tables for each facility and the transportation system in Appendix A, along with identified off-normal events. The tables identify the general response time required to ensure a stable state after the event, governing response documents, and the events with potential cross-facility or SNF process reversal impacts. The event closure is predicated on stable state response time, impact to operations and the mitigated annual occurrence frequency of the event as developed in the hazard analysis process.
Date: September 19, 2000
Creator: ALDERMAN, C.A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

ALARA Design Review for the Resumption of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Cementation Process Project Activities

Description: The requirements for the performance of radiological design reviews are codified in 10CFR835, Occupational Radiation Protection. The basic requirements for the performance of ALARA design reviews are presented in the Hanford Site Radiological Control Manual (HSRCM). The HSRCM has established trigger levels requiring radiological reviews of non-routine or complex work activities. These requirements are implemented in site procedures HNF-PRO-1622 and 1623. HNF-PRO-1622 Radiological Design Review Process requires that ''radiological design reviews [be performed] of new facilities and equipment and modifications of existing facilities and equipment''. In addition, HNF-PRO-1623 Radiological Work Planning Process requires a formal ALARA Review for planned activities that are estimated to exceed 1 person-rem total Dose Equivalent (DE). The purpose of this review is to validate that the original design for the PFP Cementation Process ensures that the principles of ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) were included in the original project design. That is, that the design and operation of existing Cementation Process equipment and processes allows for the minimization of personnel exposure in its operation, maintenance and decommissioning and that the generation of radioactive waste is kept to a minimum.
Date: June 14, 2000
Creator: DAYLEY, L.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Analysis and Summary Report of Historical Dry Well Gamma Logs for the 241-B Tank Farm 200 East

Description: This report provides a summary of the gross gamma ray data for the 241-B Tank Farm and is intended to identify changes in the gamma activity of gamma-emitting radionuclide contaminants around each accessible borehole, and is not intended to provide interpretation of the data relative to vadose zone mechanics. Trends in data, as well as areas where additional information would be helpful in evaluating the unusual nature of some of the data, are discussed.
Date: June 5, 2000
Creator: SYDNOR, H.A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Analysis for Eccentric Multi Canister Overpack (MCO) Drops at the Canister Storage Building (CSB) (CSB-S-0073)

Description: The Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Canister Storage Building (CSB) is the interim storage facility for the K-Basin SNF at the US. Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site. The SNF is packaged in multi-canister overpacks (MCOs). The MCOs are placed inside transport casks, then delivered to the service station inside the CSB. At the service station, the MCO handling machine (MHM) moves the MCO from the cask to a storage tube or one of two sample/weld stations. There are 220 standard storage tubes and six overpack storage tubes in a below grade reinforced concrete vault. Each storage tube can hold two MCOs.
Date: May 8, 2000
Creator: HOLLENBECK, R.G.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Anticipated Radiological Dose to Worker for Plutonium Stabilization and Handling at PFP Project W-460

Description: This report provides estimates of the expected whole body and extremity radiological dose, expressed as dose equivalent (DE), to workers conducting planned plutonium (Pu) stabilization processes at the Hanford Site Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). The report is based on a time and motion dose study commissioned for Project W-460, Plutonium Stabilization and Handling, to provide personnel exposure estimates for construction work in the PFP storage vault area plus operation of stabilization and packaging equipment at PFP.
Date: March 6, 2000
Creator: WEISS, E.V.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Annual Hanford Site Environmental Permitting Status Report

Description: The information contained in, and/or referenced in, this Annual Hanford Site Environmental Permitting Status Report addresses Permit Condition II.W (Other Permits and/or Approvals) of the Dangerous Waste Portion of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit for the Treatment, Storage, and Disposal of Dangerous Waste, issued by the Washington State Department of Ecology (WA7890008967). Condition II.W specifies that the Permittees are responsible for obtaining all other applicable federal, state, and local permits authorizing the development and operation of the Hanford Facility. This status report also addresses Permit Condition I.E.22, as interpreted in Section 12.1.25 of the Hanford Facility Dangerous Waste Permit Application, General Information Portion (DOE/RL-91-28, Rev. 4), that states this report will be prepared annually and a copy of this report will be placed in the Facility Operating Record, General Information file by October 1 of each year.
Date: October 1, 2000
Creator: Homan, N. A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Facility Sampling and Analysis Plan

Description: The Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Facility provides the required process systems, supporting equipment, and facilities needed for the conditioning of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from the Hanford K-Basins prior to storage at the Canister Storage Building (CSB). The process water conditioning (PWC) system collects and treats the selected liquid effluent streams generated by the CVD process. The PWC system uses ion exchange modules (IXMs) and filtration to remove radioactive ions and particulate from CVD effluent streams. Water treated by the PWC is collected in a 5000-gallon storage tank prior to shipment to an on-site facility for additional treatment and disposal. The purpose of this sampling and analysis plan is to document the basis for achieving the following data quality objectives: (1) Measurement of the radionuclide content of the water transferred from the multi-canister overpack (MCO), vacuum purge system (VPS) condensate tank, MCO/Cask annulus and deionized water flushes to the PWC system receiver tanks. (2) Trending the radionuclide inventory of IXMs to assure that they do not exceed the limits prescribed in HNF-2760, Rev. 0-D, ''Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (Onsite) Ion Exchange Modules,'' and HNF-EP-0063 Rev. 5, ''Hanford Site Solid Waste Acceptance Criteria'' for Category 3, non-TRU, low level waste (LLW). (3) Determining the radionuclide content of the PWC system bulk water storage tank to assure that it meets the limits set forth in HNF-3 172, Rev. 0, ''Hanford Site Liquid Waste Acceptance Criteria,'' to permit transfer and disposal at the Effluent Treatment Facility (ETF) located at the 200 East Area.
Date: September 22, 2000
Creator: IRWIN, J.J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Facility Electrical System Captor and Dapper Study

Description: The objective of this report is to Validate and as-build the Load and Fault hand calculations performed by Meier Associates. Perform a protective device coordination study, not performed by Meier's, and furnish any recommendations, including recommended device settings. Perform Transient Motor Starting (TMS) analysis for the chillers and also the motors on the standby generator system. Indicate any design problems or NEC Code Violations, if found.
Date: November 20, 2000
Creator: SINGH, G.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Facility Vacuum Purge System Chilled Water System Design Description (SYS 47-4)

Description: This system design description (SDD) addresses the Vacuum Purge System Chilled Water (VPSCHW) system. The discussion that follows is limited to the VPSCHW system and its interfaces with associated systems. The reader's attention is directed to Drawings H-1-82162, Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Process Equipment Skid P&ID Vacuum System, and H-1-82224, Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Mechanical Utilities Process Chilled Water P&ID. Figure 1-1 shows the location and equipment arrangement for the VPSCHW system. The VPSCHW system provides chilled water to the Vacuum Purge System (VPS). The chilled water provides the ability to condense water from the multi-canister overpack (MCO) outlet gases during the MCO vacuum and purge cycles. By condensing water from the MCO purge gas, the VPS can assist in drying the contents of the MCO.
Date: June 13, 2000
Creator: IRWIN, J.J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Comparison Evaluation of the PFP FSAR and NRC Regulatory Guide 3.39 with DOE-STD-3009-94

Description: One of the Plutonium Finishing Plant's (PFP) current Authorization Basis (AB) documents is the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). This FSAR (HNF-SD-CP-SAR-02 1) was prepared to the format and content guidance specified in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide 3.39, Standard Format and Content of License Applications for Plutonium Processing and Fuel Fabrication Plants (RG 3.39). In April 1992, the US Department of Energy (DOE) issued DOE Order 5480.23 which established the FSAR requirements for DOE nonreactor nuclear facilities. In 1994, DOE issued DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for US. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports, which is a format and content guide addressing the preparation of FSARs in accordance with DOE Order 5480.23. During the initial preparation and issuance of the PFP FSAR the format and content guidance contained in NRC Regulatory Guide 3.39 was utilized, since it was the most applicable guidance at the time for the preparation of Safety Analysis Reports for plutonium processing plants. With the adoption of DOE Order 5480.23 and DOE-STD-3009-94, DOE required the preparation of SARs to meet the format and content of those DOE documents. The PFP was granted an exemption to continue with RG 3.39 format for future FSAR revisions. PFP modifications and additions have required PFP FSAR modifications that have typically been prepared to the same NRC Regulatory Guide 3.39 format and content, to provide consistency with the PFP FSAR. This document provides a table comparison between the 3009 and RG 3.39 formats to validate the extent of PFP FSAR compliance with the intent of DOE Order 5480.23 and DOE-STD-3009-94. This evaluation was initially performed on Revisions 1 and 1A of the PFP FSAR. With the preparation of a Revision 2 draft to the FSAR, sections with significant changes were reevaluated for compliance and the tables were updated, ...
Date: July 28, 2000
Creator: OSCARSON, E.E.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Contamination Control Techniques

Description: Welcome to a workshop on contamination Control techniques. This work shop is designed for about two hours. Attendee participation is encouraged during the workshop. We will address different topics within contamination control techniques; present processes, products and equipment used here at Hanford and then open the floor to you, the attendees for your input on the topics.
Date: May 16, 2000
Creator: EBY, J.L.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Calibration Report for the WRAP Facility Gamma Energy Analysis System [104-ND-06-102A]

Description: The Waste Receiving And Processing facility (WRAP) adheres to providing gamma-ray spectroscopy instrument calibrations traceable to the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) standards. The detectors are used to produce quantitative results for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) and must meet calibration programmatic calibration goals. Instruments must meet portions of ANSI N42.14, 1978 guide for Germanium detectors. The Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) Gamma Energy Analysis (GEA) utilizes NIST traceable line source standards for the detector system calibrations. The counting configuration is a series of drums containing the line sources and different density filler matrices. The drums are used to develop system efficiencies with respect to density. The efficiency and density correction factors are required for the processing of drummed waste materials of similar densities. The calibration verification is carried out after the calibration is deemed final, by counting a second drum of NIST traceable sources. Three in-depth calibrations have been completed on one of the two systems to date, the first being the system acceptance plan. This report has a secondary function; that being the development of the instrument calibration errors which are to be folded into the Total Instrument Uncertainty document, HNF-4050.
Date: February 15, 2000
Creator: Wills, C. E.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Canberra Alpha Sentry Installation Functional Design Criteria (FDC)

Description: This document provides the functional design criteria for the installation of the Canberra Alpha Sentry System at selected locations within the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). The equipment being installed is identified by part number in Section 3 and the locations are given in Section 5. The design, procurement and installation are assigned to Fluor Federal Services.
Date: December 16, 1999
Creator: White, W. F.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department