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Knowledge discovery: Extracting usable information from large amounts of data

Description: The threat of nuclear weapons proliferation is a problem of world wide concern. Safeguards are the key to nuclear nonproliferation and data is the key to safeguards. The safeguards community has access to a huge and steadily growing volume of data. The advantages of this data rich environment are obvious, there is a great deal of information which can be utilized. The challenge is to effectively apply proven and developing technologies to find and extract usable information from that data. That information must then be assessed and evaluated to produce the knowledge needed for crucial decision making. Efficient and effective analysis of safeguards data will depend on utilizing technologies to interpret the large, heterogeneous data sets that are available from diverse sources. With an order-of-magnitude increase in the amount of data from a wide variety of technical, textual, and historical sources there is a vital need to apply advanced computer technologies to support all-source analysis. There are techniques of data warehousing, data mining, and data analysis that can provide analysts with tools that will expedite their extracting useable information from the huge amounts of data to which they have access. Computerized tools can aid analysts by integrating heterogeneous data, evaluating diverse data streams, automating retrieval of database information, prioritizing inputs, reconciling conflicting data, doing preliminary interpretations, discovering patterns or trends in data, and automating some of the simpler prescreening tasks that are time consuming and tedious. Thus knowledge discovery technologies can provide a foundation of support for the analyst. Rather than spending time sifting through often irrelevant information, analysts could use their specialized skills in a focused, productive fashion. This would allow them to make their analytical judgments with more confidence and spend more of their time doing what they do best.
Date: December 31, 1998
Creator: Whiteson, R.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Information barrier functional requirements

Description: for the purpose of this paper, the authors have used the term functional requirement to indicate a required task rather than the recommended method for accomplishing this task. The creation of effective information barrier technology will proceed as a series of steps: (1) IB conceptual Description; (2) IB Functional Requirements (this document--ongoing); (3) IB hardware and software specification; (4) IB hardware and software construction; and (5) IB implementation. This functional requirements document is not intended to supplant or supersede the conceptual description; rather, these functional requirements are intended to be used along with the earlier description to help generate hardware and software requirements.
Date: December 31, 1998
Creator: MacArthur, D. & Whiteson, R.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

US-Russian collaboration in MPC & A enhancements at the Elektrostal Uranium Fuel-Fabrication Plant

Description: Enhancement of the nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting of (MPC&A) at the Elektrostal Machine-Building Plant (ELEMASH) has proceeded in two phases. Initially, Elektrostal served as the model facility at which to test US/Russian collaboration and to demonstrate MPC&A technologies available for safeguards enhancements at Russian facilities. This phase addressed material control and accounting (MC&A) in the low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel-fabrication processes and the physical protection (PP) of part of the (higher-enrichment) breeder-fuel process. The second phase, identified later in the broader US/Russian agreement for expanded MPC&A cooperation. includes implementation of appropriate MC&A and PP systems in the breeder-fuel fabrication processes. Within the past year, an automated physical protection system has been installed and demonstrated in building 274, and an automated MC&A system has been designed and is being installed and will be tested in the LEU process. Attention has now turned to assuring longterm sustainability for the first phase and beginning MPC&A upgrades for the second phase. Sustainability measures establish the infrastructure for operation, maintenance, and repair of the installed systems-with US support for the lifetime of the US/Russian Agreement, but evolving toward full Russian operation of the system over the long term. For phase 2, which will address higher enrichments, projects have been identified to characterize the facilities, design MPC&A systems, procure appropriate equipment, and install and test final systems. One goal in phase 2 will be to build on initial work to create shared, plant-wide MPC&A assets for operation, maintenance, and evaluation of all safeguards systems.
Date: November 1, 1997
Creator: Smith, H.; Murray, W. & Whiteson, R.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Information barriers in the trilateral initiative: Conceptual description

Description: In this paper the authors attempt to define the structure and requirements (both in hardware and software) of an information barrier (IB) for the trilateral initiative. This IB concept will be employed in the radiation measurement instrument(s) used for attribute verification of excess fissile materials offered for international safeguarding. In this paper, they will specifically not attempt to present a list of solutions to the problems, but instead, concentrate on generating a thorough discussion of the goals and problems themselves. In some cases they have presented potential solutions; these discussions are meant as illustrations of the types of systems required and are not intended as endorsements of any particular solution.
Date: November 1, 1998
Creator: Whiteson, R. & MacArthur, D.W.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Anomaly detection applied to a materials control and accounting database

Description: An important component of the national mission of reducing the nuclear danger includes accurate recording of the processing and transportation of nuclear materials. Nuclear material storage facilities, nuclear chemical processing plants, and nuclear fuel fabrication facilities collect and store large amounts of data describing transactions that involve nuclear materials. To maintain confidence in the integrity of these data, it is essential to identify anomalies in the databases. Anomalous data could indicate error, theft, or diversion of material. Yet, because of the complex and diverse nature of the data, analysis and evaluation are extremely tedious. This paper describes the authors work in the development of analysis tools to automate the anomaly detection process for the Material Accountability and Safeguards System (MASS) that tracks and records the activities associated with accountable quantities of nuclear material at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Using existing guidelines that describe valid transactions, the authors have created an expert system that identifies transactions that do not conform to the guidelines. Thus, this expert system can be used to focus the attention of the expert or inspector directly on significant phenomena.
Date: September 1, 1995
Creator: Whiteson, R.; Spanks, L. & Yarbro, T.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

An application of neural networks to process and materials control

Description: Process control consists of two basic elements: a model of the process and knowledge of the desired control algorithm. In some cases the level of the control algorithm is merely supervisory, as in an alarm-reporting or anomaly-detection system. If the model of the process is known, then a set of equations may often be solved explicitly to provide the control algorithm. Otherwise, the model has to be discovered through empirical studies. Neural networks have properties that make them useful in this application. They can learn (make internal models from experience or observations). The problem of anomaly detection in materials control systems fits well into this general control framework. To successfully model a process with a neutral network, a good set of observables must be chosen. These observables must in some sense adequately span the space of representable events, so that a signature metric can be built for normal operation. In this way, a non-normal event, one that does not fit within the signature, can be detected. In this paper, we discuss the issues involved in applying a neural network model to anomaly detection in materials control systems. These issues include data selection and representation, network architecture, prediction of events, the use of simulated data, and software tools. 10 refs., 4 figs., 1 tab.
Date: January 1, 1991
Creator: Howell, J.A. & Whiteson, R.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Use of information barriers to protect classified information

Description: This paper discusses the detailed requirements for an information barrier (IB) for use with verification systems that employ intrusive measurement technologies. The IB would protect classified information in a bilateral or multilateral inspection of classified fissile material. Such a barrier must strike a balance between providing the inspecting party the confidence necessary to accept the measurement while protecting the inspected party`s classified information. The authors discuss the structure required of an IB as well as the implications of the IB on detector system maintenance. A defense-in-depth approach is proposed which would provide assurance to the inspected party that all sensitive information is protected and to the inspecting party that the measurements are being performed as expected. The barrier could include elements of physical protection (such as locks, surveillance systems, and tamper indicators), hardening of key hardware components, assurance of capabilities and limitations of hardware and software systems, administrative controls, validation and verification of the systems, and error detection and resolution. Finally, an unclassified interface could be used to display and, possibly, record measurement results. The introduction of an IB into an analysis system may result in many otherwise innocuous components (detectors, analyzers, etc.) becoming classified and unavailable for routine maintenance by uncleared personnel. System maintenance and updating will be significantly simplified if the classification status of as many components as possible can be made reversible (i.e. the component can become unclassified following the removal of classified objects).
Date: December 31, 1998
Creator: MacArthur, D.; Johnson, M.W.; Nicholas, N.J. & Whiteson, R.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Detecting errors and anomalies in computerized materials control and accountability databases

Description: The Automated MC and A Database Assessment project is aimed at improving anomaly and error detection in materials control and accountability (MC and A) databases and increasing confidence in the data that they contain. Anomalous data resulting in poor categorization of nuclear material inventories greatly reduces the value of the database information to users. Therefore it is essential that MC and A data be assessed periodically for anomalies or errors. Anomaly detection can identify errors in databases and thus provide assurance of the integrity of data. An expert system has been developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory that examines these large databases for anomalous or erroneous data. For several years, MC and A subject matter experts at Los Alamos have been using this automated system to examine the large amounts of accountability data that the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility generates. These data are collected and managed by the Material Accountability and Safeguards System, a near-real-time computerized nuclear material accountability and safeguards system. This year they have expanded the user base, customizing the anomaly detector for the varying requirements of different groups of users. This paper describes the progress in customizing the expert systems to the needs of the users of the data and reports on their results.
Date: December 31, 1998
Creator: Whiteson, R.; Hench, K.; Yarbro, T. & Baumgart, C.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

LANMAS: A new generation computerized MC&A system for the DOE complex

Description: The Local Area Network Material Accountability System (LANMAS) is a network-based nuclear material accountability system that runs in a client/server mode. The LANMAS core software was developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory and released in a production mode in March 1996. Several Department of Energy sites are working to implement the core program and modify it by adding additional functionality and customizing the user interface. These modifications to the core software are made to meet site-specific accountability needs and to adapt the system to conform to the work environment at the individual sites. The result is the successful implementation of a new computerized accounting system at each site. This paper will provide an update on current activities, performance issues, core software support issues, and the status of the various site systems and will discuss the future direction of the LANMAS project.
Date: September 1, 1996
Creator: Erkkila, B.; Boor, M.; Whiteson, R.; Smith, J.; Painter, J. & Claborn, J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Anomaly and error detection in computerized materials control & accountability databases

Description: Unites States Department of Energy sites use computerized material control and accountability (MC&A) systems to manage the large amounts of data necessary to control and account for their nuclear materials. Theft or diversion of materials from these sites would likely result in anomalies in the data, and erroneous information greatly reduces the value of the information to its users. Therefore, it is essential that MC&A data be periodically assessed for anomalies or errors. At Los Alamos National Laboratory, we have been developing expert systems to provide efficient, cost-effective, automated error and anomaly detection. Automated anomaly detection can provide assurance of the integrity of data, reduce inventory frequency, enhance assurance of physical inventory, detect errors in databases, and gain a better perspective on overall facility operations. The Automated MC&A Database Assessment Project is aimed at improving anomaly and error detection in MC&A databases and increasing confidence in the data. We are working with data from the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility and the Material Accountability and Safeguards System, the Facility`s near-real-time computerized nuclear material accountability and safeguards system. This paper describes progress in customizing the expert systems to the needs of the users of the data and reports on our results.
Date: September 1, 1997
Creator: Whiteson, R.; Hoffbauer, B. & Yarbro, T.F.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Development of computerized materials, protection, control and accountability systems in the former Soviet republics: a joint effort

Description: The laboratory-to-laboratory programs of cooperation between the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Institutes of the Russian Federation and the government-to-government programs between the US and Russia have the goal of reducing the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation by strengthening systems of nuclear materials protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A). As part of these programs, DOE is making available to sites in the former Soviet Republics a new-generation nuclear materials accountability system similar to one developed for DOE sites. This new system, the Core Materials Accountability System (COREMAS), is designed for international use. It is a core system to which facility-specific extensions are expected to be made. This paper describes the joint efforts of US personnel and software development teams at sites in Russia, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine to develop sophisticated computerized MPC&A systems that are customized for the site-specific needs of each facility.
Date: July 1, 1996
Creator: Whiteson, R.; Ryan, R.H.; Seitz, S. & Landry, R.P.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Simulation of facility operations and materials accounting for a combined reprocessing/MOX fuel fabrication facility

Description: We are developing a computer model of facility operations and nuclear materials accounting for a facility that reprocesses spent fuel and fabricates mixed oxide (MOX) fuel rods and assemblies from the recovered uranium and plutonium. The model will be used to determine the effectiveness of various materials measurement strategies for the facility and, ultimately, of other facility safeguards functions as well. This portion of the facility consists of a spent fuel storage pond, fuel shear, dissolver, clarifier, three solvent-extraction stages with uranium-plutonium separation after the first stage, and product concentrators. In this facility area mixed oxide is formed into pellets, the pellets are loaded into fuel rods, and the fuel rods are fabricated into fuel assemblies. These two facility sections are connected by a MOX conversion line in which the uranium and plutonium solutions from reprocessing are converted to mixed oxide. The model of the intermediate MOX conversion line used in the model is based on a design provided by Mike Ehinger of Oak Ridge National Laboratory (private communication). An initial version of the simulation model has been developed for the entire MOX conversion and fuel fabrication sections of the reprocessing/MOX fuel fabrication facility, and this model has been used to obtain inventory difference variance estimates for those sections of the facility. A significant fraction of the data files for the fuel reprocessing section have been developed, but these data files are not yet complete enough to permit simulation of reprocessing operations in the facility. Accordingly, the discussion in the following sections is restricted to the MOX conversion and fuel fabrication lines. 3 tabs.
Date: January 1, 1991
Creator: Coulter, C.A.; Whiteson, R. & Zardecki, A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Determining information management needs for enhanced international safeguards

Description: The Safeguards Information Management System initiative is a program of the Department of Energy`s (DOE) Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation aimed at supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency`s (IAEA) efforts to strengthen safeguards through the enhancement of information management capabilities. The DOE hopes to provide the IAEA with the ability to correlate and analyze data from existing and new sources of information, including publicly available information, information on imports and exports, design information, environmental monitoring data, and non-safeguards information. The first step in this effort is to identify and define IAEA requirements. In support of this, we have created a users` requirements document based on interviews with IAEA staff that describes the information management needs of the end user projected by the IAEA, including needs for storage, retrieval, analysis, communication, and visualization of data. Also included are characteristics of the end user and attributes of the current environment. This paper describes our efforts to obtain the required information. We discuss how to accurately represent user needs and involve users for an international organization with a multi-cultural user population. We describe our approach, our experience in setting up and conducting the interviews and brainstorming sessions, and a brief discussion of what we learned.
Date: August 1, 1994
Creator: Badalamente, R. V.; DeLand, S. M.; Whiteson, R. & Anzelon, G.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

End user needs for enhanced IAEA Safeguards Information Management Capabilities

Description: The International Atomic Energy Agency is undertaking a program for strengthening its safeguards on the recognition that safeguards must give assurance not only of the non-diversion of declared material or that declared facilities are not being misused, but also of the absence of any undeclared nuclear activities in States which have signed comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. The IAEA has determined that the detection of undeclared nuclear activities and the creation of confidence in the continuing peaceful use of declared material and facilities is largely dependent on more information being made available to the Agency and on the capability of the Agency to make more effective use of this additional information, as well as existing information.
Date: July 1, 1994
Creator: Badalamente, R.; Anzelon, G.; Deland, S. & Whiteson, R.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

An anomaly detector applied to a materials control and accounting system

Description: Large amounts of safeguards data are automatically gathered and stored by monitoring instruments used in nuclear chemical processing plants, nuclear material storage facilities, and nuclear fuel fabrication facilities. An integrated safeguards approach requires the ability to identify anomalous activities or states in these data. Anomalies in the data could be indications of error, theft, or diversion of material. The large volume of the data makes analysis and evaluation by human experts very tedious, and the complex and diverse nature of the data makes these tasks difficult to automate. This paper describes the early work in the development of analysis tools to automate the anomaly detection process. Using data from accounting databases, the authors are modeling the normal behavior of processes. From these models they hope to be able to identify activities or data that deviate from that norm. Such tools would be used to reveal trends, identify errors, and recognize unusual data. Thus the expert`s attention can be focused directly on significant phenomena.
Date: August 1, 1994
Creator: Whiteson, R.; Kelso, F.; Baumgart, C. & Tunnell, T. W.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Computerized materials protection, control, and accountability

Description: The proliferation of nuclear weapons, along with the technical knowledge and materials needed to make these weapons, is an enduring problem of international urgency. Current international nuclear nonproliferation efforts are aimed at deterring, detecting, and responding to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These safeguards efforts are being implemented by applying preeminent science and technology to the management and control of nuclear materials. By strengthening systems of nuclear material protection, control, and accountability (MPC and A), one can reduce the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation. Two major programs of international cooperation are now underway to achieve this goal. The first is between the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Institutes of the Russian Federation (Laboratory-to-Laboratory Program), and the second is between the US Government and Governments of the former Soviet Republics (Government-to-Government Program). As part of these programs, the DOE is working with facilities to assist them in implementing computerized MPC and A systems. This work is a collaboration between computer scientists and safeguards experts in both the US and the new Republics. The US is making available technology and expertise to enable Russian experts to build on computerized MPC and A software developed in the US. This paper describes the joint efforts of these international teams to develop sophisticated computerized MPC and A systems using modern computer hardware and software technology. These systems are being customized to meet the site-specific needs of each facility.
Date: May 1, 1997
Creator: Whiteson, R.; Seitz, S.; Landry, R.P.; Hadden, M.L. & Painter, J.A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

A network evaluation and analysis tool

Description: The rapid emergence of large hetemgeneous networks, distributed systems, and massively parallel computers has resulted in economies of scale, enhanced productivity, efficient communication, resource sharing, and increased reliability, which are computationally beneficial. In addition to these benefits, networking presents technical challenges and problems with respect to maintaining and ensuring the security, design, compatibility, integrity, functionality, and management of these systems. In this paper we describe a computer security tool, Network Evaluation and Analysis Tool (NEAT), that we have developed to address these concerns.
Date: January 1, 1993
Creator: Stoltz, L.A.; Whiteson, R.; Fasel, P.K.; Temple, R. & Dreicer, J.S.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

A network evaluation and analysis tool

Description: The rapid emergence of large hetemgeneous networks, distributed systems, and massively parallel computers has resulted in economies of scale, enhanced productivity, efficient communication, resource sharing, and increased reliability, which are computationally beneficial. In addition to these benefits, networking presents technical challenges and problems with respect to maintaining and ensuring the security, design, compatibility, integrity, functionality, and management of these systems. In this paper we describe a computer security tool, Network Evaluation and Analysis Tool (NEAT), that we have developed to address these concerns.
Date: May 1, 1993
Creator: Stoltz, L. A.; Whiteson, R.; Fasel, P. K.; Temple, R. & Dreicer, J. S.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

The Effects of information barrier requirements on the trilateral initiative attribute measurement system (AVNG).

Description: Although the detection techniques used for measuring classified materials are very similar to those used in unclassified measurements, the surrounding packaging is generally very different. If iZ classified item is to be measured, an information barrier is required to protect any classified data acquired. This information barrier must protect the classified information while giving the inspector confidence that the unclassified outputs accurately reflect the classified inputs, Both information barrier and authentication considerations must be considered during all phases of system design and fabrication. One example of such a measurement system is the attribute measurement system (termed the AVNG) designed for the: Trilateral Initiative. We will discuss the integration of information barrier components into this system as well as the effects of an information barrier (including authentication) concerns on the implementation of the detector systems.
Date: January 1, 2001
Creator: MacArthur, D. W. (Duncan W.); Langner, D. C. (Diana C.); Whiteson, R. (Rena) & Wolford, J. K. (James K.)
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

E/Z MAS: An easy-to-use computerized materials control and accountability system

Description: Nuclear facilities that handle and process nuclear materials are required to track their nuclear holdings and to keep adequate records that manage and control the inventory of those holdings. The complexity of a system that does this job is directly proportional to the complexity of the facility`s operations. This paper describes an approach to computerized materials protection, control, and accountability (MPC and A) that was introduced by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in the fall of 1997. This new system, E/Z MAS, is the latest addition to the LANL suite of computerized MPC and A tools, which also includes the CoreMAS system. E/Z MAS was initially designed to address the needs of those facilities that have small to modest MPC and A needs but has been expanded to provide full functionality for any facility. The system name, E/Z MAS, reflects the system`s easy-to-use characteristics, which include ease of installation and ease of software maintenance. Both CoreMAS and E/Z MAS have been provided to facilities in the Former Soviet Union to assist them in implementing a computerized MPC and A system that meets their needs. In this paper the authors will address the functionality of CoreMAS and E/Z MAS, and an argument in favor of intranet-based material control and accountability will be advanced.
Date: December 31, 1998
Creator: Anderson, L.K.; Boor, M.G.; Hurford, J.M.; Landry, R.P.; Martinez, B.J.; Solem, A.M. et al.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

E/Z MAS demonstration

Description: Los Alamos National Laboratory has developed E/Z MAS, a new generation nuclear material accountability application based on the latest technology and designed for facilities required to track nuclear materials with a simple-to-use interface. E/Z MAS is based on years of experience spent developing nuclear material accounting systems. E/Z MAS uses a modern relational database with a web server and enables users on a classified local area network to interact with the database with web browsers. The E/Z MAS Demonstration poster session demonstrates the E/Z MAS functions required by an operational nuclear facility to track material as it enters and leaves a facility and to account for the material as it moves through a process. The generation of internal facility reports and external reports for the Russian Federal system will be demonstrated. Bar-code readers will be used to demonstrate the ability of EZ MAS to automate certain functions, such as physical inventories at facilities.
Date: December 31, 1998
Creator: Boor, M.G.; Hurford, J.M.; Landry, R.P.; Martinez, B.J.; Solem, A.M.; Whiteson, R. et al.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Safeguarding nuclear materials in the former Soviet Republics through computerized materials protection, control and accountability

Description: The threat of nuclear weapons proliferation is a problem of global concern. International efforts at nonproliferation focus on preventing acquisition of weapons-grade nuclear materials by unauthorized states, organizations, or individuals. Nonproliferation can best be accomplished through international cooperation in the application of advanced science and technology to the management and control of nuclear materials. Computerized systems for nuclear material protection, control, and accountability (MPC and A) are a vital component of integrated nuclear safeguards programs. This paper describes the progress of scientists in the United States and former Soviet Republics in creating customized, computerized MPC and A systems. The authors discuss implementation of the Core Material Accountability System (CoreMAS), which was developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory by the US Department of Energy and incorporates, in condensed and integrated form, the most valuable experience gained by US nuclear enterprises in accounting for and controlling nuclear materials. The CoreMAS approach and corresponding software package have been made available to sites internationally. CoreMAS provides methods to evaluate their existing systems and to examine advantages and disadvantages of customizing CoreMAS or improving their own existing systems. The sites can also address crucial issues of software assurance, data security, and system performance; compare operational experiences at sites with functioning computerized systems; and reasonably evaluate future efforts. The goal of the CoreMAS project is to introduce facilities at sites all over the world to modern international MPC and A practices and to help them implement effective, modern, computerized MPC and A systems to account for their nuclear materials, and thus reduce the likelihood of theft or diversion. Sites are assisted with MPC and A concepts and the implementation of an effective computerized MPC and A system.
Date: November 1, 1997
Creator: Roumiantsev, A.N.; Ostroumov, Y.A.; Whiteson, R.; Seitz, S.L.; Landry, R.P.; Martinez, B.J. et al.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Attribute measurement systems prototypes and equipment in the United States.

Description: Since the fall of 1997, the United States has been developing prototypical attribute verification technology for potential use by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the Trilateral Initiative. The first attribute measurement equipment demonstration took place in December 1997 at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. This demonstration led to a series of joint Russian Federatioin/US/IAEA technical discussions that focused on attribute measurement technology that could be applied to plutonium bearing items having classified characteristics. A first prototype attribute verification system with an information barrier was demonstrated at a Trilateral Technical Workshop in June 1999 at Los Alamos. This prototype nourished further fruitful discussions between the three parties that has in turn led to the documents discussed in a previous paper. Prototype development has continued in the US, under other initiatives, using an integrated approach that includes the Trilatleral Initiative. Specifically for the Trilateral Initiative, US development has turned to some peripheral equipment that would support verifications by the IAEA. This equipment includes an authentication tool for measurement systems with information barriers and in situ probes that would facilitate inspections by reducing the need to move material out of storage locations for reverification. In this paper, we will first summarize the development of attribute verification measurement system technology in the US and then report on the status of the development of other equipment to support the Trilateral Initiative.
Date: January 1, 2001
Creator: Langner, D. C. (Diana C.); Landry, R. P. (Robert P.); Hsue, S.-T. (Sin-Tao); MacArthur, D. W. (Duncan W.); Mayo, D. R. (Douglas R.); Smith, M. K. (Morag K.) et al.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department