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Nevada National Security Site Radiation Protection Program

Description: Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 835, “Occupational Radiation Protection,” establishes radiation protection standards, limits, and program requirements for protecting individuals from ionizing radiation resulting from the conduct of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) activities. 10 CFR 835.101(a) mandates that DOE activities be conducted in compliance with a documented Radiation Protection Program (RPP) as approved by DOE. This document promulgates the RPP for the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), related (on-site or off-site) U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operations, and environmental restoration off-site projects. This RPP section consists of general statements that are applicable to the NNSS as a whole. The RPP also includes a series of appendices which provide supporting detail for the associated NNSS Tennant Organizations (TOs). Appendix H, “Compliance Demonstration Table,” contains a cross-walk for the implementation of 10 CFR 835 requirements. This RPP does not contain any exemptions from the established 10 CFR 835 requirements. The RSPC and TOs are fully compliant with 10 CFR 835 and no additional funding is required in order to meet RPP commitments. No new programs or activities are needed to meet 10 CFR 835 requirements and there are no anticipated impacts to programs or activities that are not included in the RPP. There are no known constraints to implementing the RPP. No guides or technical standards are adopted in this RPP as a means to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 835.
Date: April 30, 2013
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria

Description: This document establishes the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO), Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NNSSWAC). The NNSSWAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) will accept the following:  DOE hazardous and non-hazardous non-radioactive classified waste  DOE low-level radioactive waste (LLW)  DOE mixed low-level waste (MLLW)  U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) classified waste The LLW and MLLW listed above may also be classified waste. Classified waste is the only waste accepted for disposal that may be non-radioactive and shall be required to meet the waste acceptance criteria for radioactive waste as specified in this document. Classified waste may be sent to the NNSS as classified matter. Section 3.1.18 provides the requirements that must be met for permanent burial of classified matter. The NNSA/NFO and support contractors are available to assist the generator in understanding or interpreting this document. For assistance, please call the NNSA/NFO Environmental Management Operations (EMO) at (702) 295-7063, and the call will be directed to the appropriate contact.
Date: June 1, 2013
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Radiation Hard AlGaN Detectors and Imager

Description: Radiation hardness of AlGaN photodiodes was tested using a 65 MeV proton beam with a total proton fluence of 3x10{sup 12} protons/cm{sup 2}. AlGaN Deep UV Photodiode have extremely high radiation hardness. These new devices have mission critical applications in high energy density physics (HEDP) and space explorations. These new devices satisfy radiation hardness requirements by NIF. NSTec is developing next generation AlGaN optoelectronics and imagers.
Date: May 1, 2012
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 366: Area 11 Plutonium Valley Dispersion Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

Description: This Corrective Action Plan has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 366, Area 11 Plutonium Valley Dispersion Sites, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO, 1996 as amended). CAU 366 consists of the following six Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Area 11 of the Nevada National Security Site: · CAS 11-08-01, Contaminated Waste Dump #1 · CAS 11-08-02, Contaminated Waste Dump #2 · CAS 11-23-01, Radioactively Contaminated Area A · CAS 11-23-02, Radioactively Contaminated Area B · CAS 11-23-03, Radioactively Contaminated Area C · CAS 11-23-04, Radioactively Contaminated Area D Site characterization activities were performed in 2011 and 2012, and the results are presented in Appendix A of the Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) for CAU 366 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2012a). The following closure alternatives were recommended in the CADD: · No further action for CAS 11-23-01 · Closure in place for CASs 11-08-01, 11-08-02, 11-23-02, 11-23-03, and 11-23-04 The scope of work required to implement the recommended closure alternatives includes the following: · Non-engineered soil covers approximately 3 feet thick will be constructed at CAS 11-08-01 over contaminated waste dump (CWD) #1 and at CAS 11-08-02 over CWD #2. · FFACO use restrictions (URs) will be implemented for the areas where the total effective dose (TED) exceeds the final action level (FAL) of 25 millirems per Occasional Use Area year (mrem/OU-yr). The FAL is based on an assumption that the future use of the site includes occasional work activities and that workers will not be assigned to the area on a regular basis. A site worker under this scenario is assumed to be on site for a maximum of 80 hours per year for 5 years. The FFACO UR boundaries will encompass the areas ...
Date: April 30, 2013
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Corrective Action Site 02-37-02 Background Information and Comparison to Corrective Action Site 09-99-06

Description: Corrective Action Site (CAS) 02-37-02, Gas Sampling Assembly, is associated with nuclear test MULLET. MULLET was an underground safety test conducted on October 17, 1963. The experiment also involved prompt sampling of particulate material from the detonation, similar to CAS 09-99-06, Gas Sampling Assembly, which is associated with PLAYER/YORK. The sampling system at MULLET was similar to that of PLAYER/YORK and was used to convey gas from the MULLET emplacement hole (U2ag) to a sampling assembly. Beyond the sampling assembly, the system had a 'Y' junction with one branch running to a filter unit and the other running to a scrubber unit. The total system length was approximately 250 feet and is depicted on the attached drawing. According to the available background information, retrieval of the sample material from the MULLET event caused significant alpha (plutonium) contamination, limited to an area near ground zero (GZ). Test support Radiological Control Technicians did not detect contamination outside the immediate GZ area. In addition, vehicles, equipment, and workers that were contaminated were decontaminated on site. Soil contamination was addressed through the application of oil, and the site was decommissioned after the test. Any equipment that could be successfully decontaminated and had a future use was removed from the site. The contaminated equipment and temporary buildings erected to support the test were buried on site, most likely in the area under the dirt berm. The exact location of the buried equipment and temporary buildings is unknown. No information was found describing the disposition of the filter and scrubber, but they are not known to be at the site. The COMMODORE test was conducted at U2am on May 20, 1967, and formed the crater next to CAS 02-37-02. The COMMODORE test area had been surveyed prior to the test, and alpha contamination was not identified. ...
Date: June 26, 2012
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Counterintuitive MCNPX Results for Scintillator Surface Roughness Effect

Description: We have reported on our recent MCNPX simulation results of energy deposition for a group of 8 scintillation detectors, coupled with various rough surface patterns. The MCNPX results generally favored the detectors with various rough surface patterns. The observed MCNPX results are not fully explained by this work.
Date: August 12, 2012
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Completion Report for Well ER-EC-14, Corrective Action Units 101 and 102: Central and Western Pahute Mesa

Description: Well ER-EC-14 was drilled for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office in support of the Nevada Environmental Management Operations Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS; formerly Nevada Test Site), Nye County, Nevada. The well was drilled in September and October 2012, as part of the Central and Western Pahute Mesa Corrective Action Unit Phase II drilling program. The primary purpose of the well was to provide detailed hydrogeologic information for the Fortymile Canyon composite hydrostratigraphic unit in the Timber Mountain moat area, within the Timber Mountain caldera complex, that will help address uncertainties within the Pahute Mesa–Oasis Valley hydrostratigraphic framework model. The main 55.9-centimeter (cm) hole was drilled to a total depth of 325.5 meters (m) and cased with 40.6-cm casing to 308.1 m. The hole diameter was then decreased to 37.5 cm, and drilling continued to a total depth of 724.8 m. The completion casing string, set to the depth of 690.9 m, consists of 16.8-cm stainless-steel casing hanging from 19.4-cm carbon-steel casing. The stainless-steel casing has two slotted intervals open to the Rainier Mesa Tuff. Two piezometer strings were installed in Well ER-EC-14. Both piezometer strings, each with one slotted interval, consist of 6.0-cm carbon-steel tubing at the surface, then cross over to 7.3-cm stainless-steel tubing just above the water table. The shallow piezometer string was landed at 507.8 m, and the deep piezometer string was landed at 688.6 m. Both piezometer strings are set to monitor groundwater within moderately to densely welded Rainier Mesa Tuff. Data collected during and shortly after hole construction include composite drill cuttings samples collected every 3.0 m, various geophysical logs, water quality (including tritium and other radionuclides) measurements, and water level measurements. The well penetrated 15.2 m of alluvium and ...
Date: March 5, 2013
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Computational Age Dating of Special Nuclear Materials

Description: This slide-show presented an overview of the Constrained Progressive Reversal (CPR) method for computing decays, age dating, and spoof detecting. The CPR method is: Capable of temporal profiling a SNM sample; Precise (compared with known decay code, such a ORIGEN); Easy (for computer implementation and analysis).  We have illustrated with real SNM data using CPR for age dating and spoof detection. If SNM is pure, may use CPR to derive its age. If SNM is mixed, CPR will indicate that it is mixed or spoofed.
Date: June 30, 2012
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 547: Miscellaneous Contaminated Waste Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

Description: This addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 547: Miscellaneous Contaminated Waste Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/NV--1480, dated July 2012, documents repairs of erosion and construction of engineered erosion protection features at Corrective Action Site (CAS) 02-37-02 (MULLET) and CAS 09-99-06 (PLAYER). The final as-built drawings are included in Appendix A, and photographs of field work are included in Appendix B. Field work was completed on March 11, 2013.
Date: July 31, 2013
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Determination of Natural Beryllium (Be) in Soil and Swipe Samples Utilizing Yttrium/Beryllium Ratio

Description: 1. Objective: A method to determine whether beryllium (Be) components in surface swipe samples are from a natural source is needed. 2. Methods: Soil samples and surface swipes from area facilities were analyzed for marker elements to identify source pathways for beryllium (Be). To be useful, the natural marker element must be present at reasonably consistent levels across the site, must correlate with the Be concentration, and not have the potential to be present from non-natural sources. 3. Results: The research on marker elements used to identify source pathways for beryllium (Be) concentrations demonstrates a clear correlation between Be and yttrium (Y) in natural soils on the Nevada National Security Site. The Y/Be ratio is proposed as a method to characterize the source of Be in soil and surface swipe samples and to aid in recommendations for follow up actions. Swipe samples are analyzed using an ICP/MS method and compared with results from soil samples. Natural soil constituent levels and the Y/Be Ratio range is determined for the occupied and historical facilities and surrounding areas. Y/Be ratios within the statistical range established indicate the Be is from a natural source. Y/Be ratios lower than this range indicate the presence of another Be source, and may then be correlated to alloy, ceramic, or other operational sources by the ratios of copper, nickel, cobalt, uranium, and/or niobium. Example case studies of evaluations of buildings with historical operational beryllium usage, current ongoing technical processes, and heavy equipment used in large building demolitions are included demonstrating the value of the ratio approach. 4. Conclusions: This differentiation is valuable as there is no known correlation between natural beryllium in soil and beryllium disease.
Date: September 30, 2010
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

External Service Providers to the National Security Technology Incubator

Description: This report documents the identification and assessment of external service providers to the National Security Technology Incubator (NSTI) program for southern New Mexico. The NSTI is being developed as part of the National Security Preparedness Project (NSPP), funded by a Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) grant to Arrowhead Center, New Mexico State University. This report contains 1) a summary of the services to be provided by NSTI; 2) organizational descriptions of external service providers; and 3) a comparison of NSTI services and services offered by external providers.
Date: February 28, 2008
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

External Service Providers to the National Security Technology Incubator: Formalization of Relationships

Description: This report documents the formalization of relationships with external service providers in the development of the National Security Technology Incubator (NSTI). The technology incubator is being developed as part of the National Security Preparedness Project (NSPP), funded by a Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) grant. This report summarizes the process in developing and formalizing relationships with those service providers and includes a sample letter of cooperation executed with each provider.
Date: April 30, 2008
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Workforce Development Advisory Team Mission, Goals, and Objectives

Description: This report documents the creation of a mission, goals, and objectives for the New Mexico Workforce Development Advisory Team as part of the National Security Preparedness Project (NSPP), being performed by the Arrowhead Center of New Mexico State University under a DOE/NNSA grant. The goal of workforce development under the NSPP grant is to assess workforce needs in national security and implement strategies to develop the appropriate workforce. To achieve this goal, it will be necessary to involve the workforce development advisory team in determining the current status of the national security workforce and the educational efforts to train such a workforce. Strategies will be developed and implemented to address gaps and to make progress towards a strong, well-trained workforce available for current and future national security employers.
Date: March 31, 2008
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Test and Demonstration Assets of New Mexico

Description: This document was developed by the Arrowhead Center of New Mexico State University as part of the National Security Preparedness Project (NSPP), funded by a DOE/NNSA grant. The NSPP has three primary components: business incubation, workforce development, and technology demonstration and validation. The document contains a survey of test and demonstration assets in New Mexico available for external users such as small businesses with security technologies under development. Demonstration and validation of national security technologies created by incubator sources, as well as other sources, are critical phases of technology development. The NSPP will support the utilization of an integrated demonstration and validation environment.
Date: March 31, 2008
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Status of the National Security Workforce

Description: This report documents the status of the national security workforce as part of the National Security Preparedness Project, being performed by the Arrowhead Center of New Mexico State University under a DOE/NNSA grant. This report includes an assessment of the current workforce situation. The national security workforce is an important component of national security for our country. With the increase of global threats of terrorism, this workforce is being called upon more frequently. This has resulted in the need for an increasing number of national security personnel. It is imperative to attract and retain a skilled and competitive national security workforce.
Date: March 31, 2008
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Strategies for Overcoming Key Barriers to Development of a National Security Workforce

Description: This report documents the strategies for overcoming identified key barriers to development of an adequate national security workforce as part of the National Security Preparedness Project (NSPP) being performed under a Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) grant. Many barriers currently exist that prevent the development of an adequate number of properly trained national security personnel. The identified strategies to address the barriers will focus on both short-term and long-term efforts, as well as strategies to capture legacy knowledge of retiring national security workforce personnel.
Date: June 30, 2008
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Strategies to Address Identified Education Gaps in the Preparation of a National Security Workforce

Description: This report will discuss strategies available to address identified gaps and weaknesses in education efforts aimed at the preparation of a skilled and properly trained national security workforce.The need to adequately train and educate a national security workforce is at a critical juncture. Even though there are an increasing number of college graduates in the appropriate fields, many of these graduates choose to work in the private sector because of more desirable salary and benefit packages. This is contributing to an inability to fill vacant positions at NNSA resulting from high personnel turnover from the large number of retirements. Further, many of the retirees are practically irreplaceable because they are Cold War scientists that have experience and expertise with nuclear weapons.
Date: June 30, 2008
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Student Experiential Opportunities in National Security Careers

Description: This report documents student experiential opportunities in national security careers as part of the National Security Preparedness Project (NSPP), being performed under a Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) grant. This report includes a brief description of how experiential opportunities assist students in the selection of a career and a list of opportunities in the private sector and government. The purpose of the NSPP is to promote national security technologies through business incubation, technology demonstration and validation, and workforce development. Workforce development activities will facilitate the hiring of students to work with professionals in both the private and public sectors, as well as assist in preparing a workforce for careers in national security. The goal of workforce development under the NSPP grant is to assess workforce needs in national security and implement strategies to develop the appropriate workforce.
Date: December 31, 2007
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Status of Educational Efforts in National Security Workforce

Description: This report documents the status of educational efforts for the preparation of a national security workforce as part of the National Security Preparedness Project, being performed by the Arrowhead Center of New Mexico State University under a DOE/NNSA grant. The need to adequately train and educate a national security workforce is at a critical juncture. Even though there are an increasing number of college graduates in the appropriate fields, many of these graduates choose to work in the private sector because of more desirable salary and benefit packages. This report includes an assessment of the current educational situation for the national security workforce.
Date: March 31, 2008
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Small Technology Business Incubation Needs

Description: This report contains a summary of typical business incubation needs of small technology companies. This document will serve as a guide in the design and implementation of services offered by the National Security Technology Incubator (NSTI), an incubator program being designed and developed as part of the National Security Preparedness Project (NSPP), performed under a Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) grant. This report includes a brief description of the methodology used to perform the needs assessment and services proposed to meet the needs of client companies. The purpose of the NSPP is to promote national security technologies through business incubation, technology demonstration and validation, and workforce development. The NSTI will focus on serving businesses with national security technology applications by nurturing them through critical stages of early development. The vision of the NSTI is to be a successful incubator of technologies and private enterprise that assist the NNSA in meeting new challenges in national safety, security, and protection of the homeland.
Date: December 31, 2007
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Demonstration and Validation Assets: User Manual Development

Description: This report documents the development of a database-supported user manual for DEMVAL assets in the NSTI area of operations and focuses on providing comprehensive user information on DEMVAL assets serving businesses with national security technology applications in southern New Mexico. The DEMVAL asset program is being developed as part of the NSPP, funded by both Department of Energy (DOE) and NNSA. This report describes the development of a comprehensive user manual system for delivering indexed DEMVAL asset information to be used in marketing and visibility materials and to NSTI clients, prospective clients, stakeholders, and any person or organization seeking it. The data about area DEMVAL asset providers are organized in an SQL database with updateable application structure that optimizes ease of access and customizes search ability for the user.
Date: June 30, 2008
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Identification of Key Barriers in Workforce Development

Description: This report documents the identification of key barriers in the development of an adequate national security workforce as part of the National Security Preparedness Project, being performed under a Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration grant. Many barriers exist that prevent the development of an adequate number of propertly trained national security personnel. Some barriers can be eliminated in a short-term manner, whereas others will involve a long-term strategy that takes into account public policy.
Date: March 31, 2008
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

National Security Technology Incubation Strategic Plan

Description: This strategic plan contains information on the vision, mission, business and technology environment, goals, objectives, and incubation process of the National Security Technology Incubation Program (NSTI) at Arrowhead Center. The development of the NSTI is a key goal of the National Security Preparedness Project (NSPP). Objectives to achieve this goal include developing incubator plans (strategic, business, action, and operations), creating an incubator environment, creating a support and mentor network for companies in the incubator program, attracting security technology businesses to the region, encouraging existing business to expand, initiating business start-ups, evaluating products and processes of the incubator program, and achieving sustainability of the incubator program. With the events of 9/11, the global community faces ever increasing and emerging threats from hostile groups determined to rule by terror. According to the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Strategic Plan, the United States must be able to quickly respond and adapt to unanticipated situations as they relate to protection of our homeland and national security. Technology plays a key role in a strong national security position, and the private business community, along with the national laboratories, academia, defense and homeland security organizations, provide this technology. Fostering innovative ideas, translated into relevant technologies answering the needs of NNSA, is the purpose of the NSTI. Arrowhead Center of New Mexico State University is the operator and manager of the NSTI. To develop the NSTI, Arrowhead Center must meet the planning, development, execution, evaluation, and sustainability activities for the program and identify and incubate new technologies to assist the NNSA in meeting its mission and goals. Technology alone does not give a competitive advantage to the country, but the creativity and speed with which it is employed does. For a company to succeed, it must have sustainable competitive advantages in seven key areas: geography, products and ...
Date: January 1, 2007
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

National Security Technology Incubator Action Plan

Description: This report documents the action plan for developing the National Security Technology Incubator (NSTI) program for southern New Mexico. The NSTI program is being developed as part of the National Security Preparedness Project (NSPP), funded by Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). This action plan serves as a tool in measuring progress in the development process and delivery of services for the NSTI program. Continuous review and evaluation of the action plan is necessary in the development process of the NSTI. The action plan includes detailed steps in developing the NSTI program based on recommended best practices in incubator development by the National Business Incubation Association (NBIA). Included are tasks required to implement the NSTI, developed within a work breakdown structure. In addition, a timeline is identified for each task.
Date: February 28, 2008
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department