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ORNL Trusted Corridors Project: Watts Bar Dam Inland Waterway Project

Description: Radiation has existed everywhere in the environment since the Earth's formation - in rocks, soil, water, and plants. The mining and processing of naturally occurring radioactive materials for use in medicine, power generation, consumer products, and industry inevitably generate emissions and waste. Radiological measuring devices have been used by industry for years to measure for radiation in undesired locations or simply identify radioactive materials. Since the terrorist attacks on the United States on 9-11-01 these radiation measuring devices have proliferated in many places in our nation's commerce system. DOE, TVA, the Army Corps and ORNL collaborated to test the usefulness of these devices in our nation's waterway system on this project. The purpose of the Watts Bar Dam ORNL Trusted Corridors project was to investigate the security, safety and enforcement needs of local, state and federal government entities for state-of-the-art sensor monitoring in regards to illegal cargo including utilization of the existing infrastructure. TVA's inland waterways lock system is a recognized and accepted infrastructure by the commercial carrier industry. Safety Monitoring activities included tow boat operators, commercial barges and vessels, recreational watercraft and their cargo, identification of unsafe vessels and carriers, and, monitoring of domestic and foreign commercial vessels and cargo identification. Safety Enforcement activities included cargo safety, tracking, identification of hazardous materials, waterway safety regulations, and hazardous materials regulations. Homeland Security and Law Enforcement Applications included Radiological Dispersive Devices (RDD) identification, identification of unsafe or illicit transport of hazardous materials including chemicals and radiological materials, and screening for shipments of illicit drugs. In the Fall of 2005 the SensorNet funding for the project expired. After several unsuccessful attempts to find a Federal sponsor to continue with the project, the Watts Bar Dam Project was canceled and the Exploranium radiation monitors were removed from the doors of Watts Bar Dam ...
Date: November 1, 2011
Creator: Walker, Randy M; Gross, Ian G; Smith, Cyrus M & Hill, David E
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Roadmap for Nondestructive Evaluation of Reactor Pressure Vessel Research and Development by the Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program

Description: The Department of Energy s (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program is a five year effort which works to develop the fundamental scientific basis to understand, predict, and measure changes in materials and systems, structure, and components as they age in environments associated with continued long-term operations of existing commercial nuclear power reactors. This year, the Materials Aging and Degradation (MAaD) Pathway of this program has placed emphasis on emerging Non-Destructive Evaluation (NDE) methods which support these objectives. DOE funded Research and Development (R&D) on emerging NDE techniques to support commercial nuclear reactor sustainability is expected to begin next year. This summer, the MAaD Pathway invited subject matter experts to participate in a series of workshops which developed the basis for the research plan of these DOE R&D NDE activities. This document presents the results of one of these workshops which are the DOE LWRS NDE R&D Roadmap for Reactor Pressure Vessels (RPV). These workshops made a substantial effort to coordinate the DOE NDE R&D with that already underway or planned by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) through their representation at these workshops.
Date: September 1, 2012
Creator: Smith, Cyrus M; Nanstad, Randy K; Clayton, Dwight A; Matlack, Katie; Ramuhalli, Pradeep & Light, Glenn
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

RadSTraM: Radiological Source Tracking and Monitoring, Phase II Final Report

Description: This report focuses on the technical information gained from the Radiological Source Tracking and Monitoring (RadSTraM) Phase II investigation and its implications. The intent of the RadSTraM project was to determine the feasibility of tracking radioactive materials in commerce, particularly International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Category 3 and 4 materials. Specifically, Phase II of the project addressed tracking radiological medical isotopes in commerce. These categories of materials are susceptible to loss or theft but the problem is not being addressed by other agencies.
Date: December 1, 2008
Creator: Warren, Tracy A; Walker, Randy M; Hill, David E; Gross, Ian G; Smith, Cyrus M & Abercrombie, Robert K
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Requirements Definition for ORNL Trusted Corridors Project

Description: The ORNL Trusted Corridors Project has several other names: SensorNet Transportation Pilot; Identification and Monitoring of Radiation (in commerce) Shipments (IMR(ic)S); and Southeastern Transportation Corridor Pilot (SETCP). The project involves acquisition and analysis of transportation data at two mobile and three fixed inspection stations in five states (Kentucky, Mississippi, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Washington DC). Collaborators include the State Police organizations that are responsible for highway safety, law enforcement, and incident response. The three states with fixed weigh-station deployments (KY, SC, TN) are interested in coordination of this effort for highway safety, law enforcement, and sorting/targeting/interdiction of potentially non-compliant vehicles/persons/cargo. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is interested in these deployments, as a Pilot test (SETCP) to identify Improvised Nuclear Devices (INDs) in highway transport. However, the level of DNDO integration among these state deployments is presently uncertain. Moreover, DHS issues are considered secondary by the states, which perceive this work as an opportunity to leverage these (new) dual-use technologies for state needs. In addition, present experience shows that radiation detectors alone cannot detect DHS-identified IND threats. Continued SETCP success depends on the level of integration of current state/local police operations with the new DHS task of detecting IND threats, in addition to emergency preparedness and homeland security. This document describes the enabling components for continued SETCP development and success, including: sensors and their use at existing deployments (Section 1); personnel training (Section 2); concept of operations (Section 3); knowledge discovery from the copious data (Section 4); smart data collection, integration and database development, advanced algorithms for multiple sensors, and network communications (Section 5); and harmonization of local, state, and Federal procedures and protocols (Section 6).
Date: February 1, 2008
Creator: Walker, Randy M; Hill, David E; Smith, Cyrus M; DeNap, Frank A; White, James D; Gross, Ian G et al.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department