11 Matching Results

Search Results

Advanced search parameters have been applied.

An approach for sampling solid heterogeneous waste at the Hanford Site waste receiving and processing and solid waste projects

Description: This paper addresses the problem of obtaining meaningful data from samples of solid heterogeneous waste while maintaining sample rates as low as practical. The Waste Receiving and Processing Facility, Module 1, at the Hanford Site in south-central Washington State will process mostly heterogeneous solid wastes. The presence of hazardous materials is documented for some packages and unknown for others. Waste characterization is needed to segregate the waste, meet waste acceptance and shipping requirements, and meet facility permitting requirements. Sampling and analysis are expensive, and no amount of sampling will produce absolute certainty of waste contents. A sampling strategy is proposed that provides acceptable confidence with achievable sampling rates.
Date: March 1, 1993
Creator: Sexton, R. A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

MCO Monitoring activity description

Description: Spent Nuclear Fuel remaining from Hanford's N-Reactor operations in the 1970s has been stored under water in the K-Reactor Basins. This fuel will be repackaged, dried and stored in a new facility in the 200E Area. The safety basis for this process of retrieval, drying, and interim storage of the spent fuel has been established. The monitoring of MCOS in dry storage is a currently identified issue in the SNF Project. This plan outlines the key elements of the proposed monitoring activity. Other fuel stored in the K-Reactor Basins, including SPR fuel, will have other monitoring considerations and is not addressed by this activity description.
Date: November 9, 1998
Creator: SEXTON, R.A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Process Validation Technical Support Plan

Description: The purpose of Process Validation is to confirm that nominal process operations are consistent with the expected process envelope. The Process Validation activities described in this document are not part of the safety basis, but are expected to demonstrate that the process operates well within the safety basis. Some adjustments to the process may be made as a result of information gathered in Process Validation.
Date: March 13, 2000
Creator: SEXTON, R.A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Process Validation Technical Support Plan

Description: The purpose of Process Validation is to confirm that nominal process operations are consistent with the expected process envelope. The Process Validation activities described in this document are not part of the safety basis, but are expected to demonstrate that the process operates well within the safety basis. Some adjustments to the process may be made as a result of information gathered in Process Validation.
Date: October 17, 2000
Creator: SEXTON, R.A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

MCO Monitoring Plan

Description: The basis for development of the Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) Monitoring Plan was established in HNF-3312, MCO Monitoring Activity Description (Sexton 1998), with the following specific objectives: The safety of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project processes for retrieving, packaging, handling, conditioning, and storing the N Reactor spent nuclear fuel has been demonstrated by conservative analyses, as compiled in the project safety basis and licensing documentation. Appropriate quality assurance and independent checking of engineering, fabrication, and construction are being applied, and there will be in-process monitoring and verification of MCO loading and conditioning actions. Once the MCOs have been placed in storage, there is no safety requirement, regulatory requirement, or precedent to monitor them. Although not required, a monitoring program which would acquire data for use by Process Engineering is considered valuable for several reasons (Sexton 1998): Good engineering practice--Acquiring data at a reasonable cost that may be useful in developing a fuller understanding of the behavior of an engineered system is good engineering practice. Actual data on full scale MCOs is otherwise unavailable--Previous investigations have been limited to small fuel samples or simulant prototypes and have been relatively short in duration. MCO monitoring can provide data on large loads of actual fuel, in full-scale configuration, over longer time periods. Additional knowledge of the fuel type may prove valuable in future analyses or applications. On that basis, a program with two components was planned: The pressure/temperature/gas composition relationships will be observed in a limited number of MCOs during the first two years in storage. The remaining MCOs will incorporate a simple means to confirm at any time in the future, that internal pressure of the MCO is not high enough to threaten its structural integrity. The MCOs are likely to be stored for 40 years or longer. While routine checking of high ...
Date: September 8, 2000
Creator: SEXTON, R.A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Drop Accidents in the Canister Storage Building (CSB) Addressed by Design Features and or Design Calculations

Description: A variety of drop shear or impact scenarios have been identified for the Canister Storage Building. Some of these are being addressed by new calculations or require no specific action. This document describes five of them which are addressed by design features and/or existing design calculations. For each of the five a position is stated indicating the reason for assurance that the safety functions of the MCO will not be jeopardized by the accident. Following the position is a description of the basis for that position.
Date: January 6, 2000
Creator: SEXTON, R.A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Process Validation Technical Support Plan

Description: The purpose of Process Validation is to confirm that nominal process operations are consistent with the expected process envelope. The Process Validation activities described in this document are not part of the safety basis, but are expected to demonstrate that the process operates well within the safety basis. Some adjustments to the process may be made as a result of information gathered in Process Validation.
Date: May 9, 2000
Creator: SEXTON, R.A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

MCO Monitoring issue closure package

Description: Agreement on a focused, limited approach to MCO monitoring has been documented. While the value of monitoring has been understood by those interested in the SNF Project, there had been a diversity of opinion on details of approach and implementation. For this reason, MCO monitoring had been identified as a technical issue. A cooperative effort involving the contractor, RL, and the technical assistance group (TAG), resulted in the definition of an approach agreeable to all and of the remaining details to be resolved through conceptual engineering. MCO monitoring will consist of temperature, pressure, and gas composition monitoring of 4 to 6 MCOs for up to two years. High pressure detection capability for the duration of interim storage for every MCO will also be evaluated and implemented within the current project baseline, if possible. Otherwise a BCR will be prepared and submitted.
Date: November 9, 1998
Creator: SEXTON, R.A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Cost/risk/benefit analysis report on the decontamination and decommissioning of Z-plant

Description: This study was performed to estimate the cost of decontaminating and decommissioning Z-Plant. All of the buildings in the Z-Plant exclusion area except Building 2736-Z, the plutonium storage vault, are included in the study. The study also excludes all underground facilities within the exclusion area which are not contained within a building and all Z-Plant related facilities outside the perimeter fence. The contamination in Z-Plant is primarily /sup 239/Pu which has a half-life of 24,360 years. Because of the long half-life of /sup 239/Pu, it is not practical to consider the isolation of the facility to await reduction of the contamination level by natural decay. Therefore, this study analyzes the costs, risk and benefit of decontaminating Z-Plant to four different levels of residual contamination. The three principle criteria used in the analysis are cost, the risk of offsite dose to the public, and the occupational exposure to onsite personnel.
Date: September 28, 1979
Creator: Melvin, J. P.; Sexton, R. A.; Fort, M. L. & Nunn, S. E.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department