18 Matching Results

Search Results

Advanced search parameters have been applied.

Radiological considerations for the operation of the Advanced Photon Source storage ring (revised).

Description: This report deals with the radiological considerations of operations using 7700-MeV positron and electron beams in the storage ring (SR) tunnel. The radiological considerations addressed include the following: prompt secondary radiation (bremsstrahlung, giant resonance neutrons, medium and high energy neutrons, and muons) produced by electrons/positrons interacting in a beam stop or by particle losses in the component structures; skyshine radiation, which produces a radiation field in nearby areas and at the nearest off-site location; radioactive gases produced by neutron irradiation of air in the vicinity of a particle loss site; noxious gases (ozone and others) produced in air by the escaping bremsstrahlung radiation that results from absorbing particles in the components or by synchrotron radiation escaping into the tunnel; activation of the storage ring components that results in a residual radiation field in the vicinity of these materials following shutdown; potential activation of water used for cooling the magnets and other purposes in the SR tunnel; evaluation of the radiation fields due to escaping synchrotron radiation and gas bremsstrahlung. Estimated dose rates outside of the tunnel, in the early assembly area (EAA), and in the Experiment Hall for several modes of operation (including potential safety envelope beam power, normal beam power, and MCI (maximum credible incident) conditions) have been computed. Shielding in the first optics enclosure (FOE) and for the photon beamlines is discussed in ANL/APS/TB-7 (IPE 93), but additional radiological considerations for the ASD diagnostic beamlines are contained in Appendix C. Although the calculations refer to positrons, electron operation would produce essentially the same effects for the identical assumptions.
Date: May 2, 2002
Creator: Moe, H. J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Radiological considerations for top-up operation of the storage ring.

Description: Radiological considerations for the operation of the storage ring prior to top-up operation have been discussed in the document (MOE 94). This document was prepared to serve as the technical basis for the hazard analysis considerations and the statements in the APS Safety Assessment Document (SAD) dealing with shielding adequacy and other radiological considerations. The methodology used in that document and, subsequently, in the analysis of hazards from the low-energy undulator test line (MOE 98) was also used for shielding analysis and dose determinations in this document. The hazards and potential consequences of storage ring (SR) operation covered in (MOE 94) still apply to non-top-up operations of the SR. Two additional issues relevant to top-up operation, which give rise to potential radiological considerations, are (1) the possible use of the vertical scraper in the booster-to-storage ring (BTS) line to control the amount of charge that is being delivered to the storage ring, and (2) the potential accident situations, which give rise to radiation doses to individuals on the experiment hall floor and SR roof. By introducing the scraper, a portion of the beam produces a shower in the tungsten scraper, which leads to radiation fields on the top of the SR tunnel and in the Early Assembly Area (EAA). This requires additional shielding of the scraper. Potential doses to individuals on the floor of the experiment hall can result from a loss of particles down a photon beamline. Tracking results (COR 98) have shown that particles that find their way down a photon beamline will eventually be lost either in a Pb collimator or in the safety shutters in the front end of a bending magnet (BM), or on the safety shutters in an insertion device (ID) beamline. Either of these situations will result in a significant dose rate on ...
Date: May 25, 1999
Creator: Moe, H. J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Radiological considerations in the operation of the low-energy undulator test line (LEUTL).

Description: The Low-Energy Undulator Test Line (LEUTL) is a facility that uses the existing APS linac to accelerate electrons up to an energy of 700 MeV. These electrons are transported through the Pm into a portion of the booster synchrotrons and on into the LEUTL main enclosure (MIL 97). Figure 1 shows the layout of the LEUTL building, which consists of an earth-benned concrete enclosure and an end-station building. The concrete enclosure houses the electron beamline, test undulator, and beam dump. This facility is about 51 m long and 3.66 m wide. Technical components and diagnostics for characterizing the undulator light are found in the end station. This building has about 111 m{sup 2} of floor space. This note deals with the radiological considerations of operations using electrons up to 700 MeV and at power levels up to the safety envelope of 1 kW. Previous radiological considerations for electron and positron operations in the linac, PAR, and synchrotrons have been addressed else-where (MOE 93a, 93b, and 93c). Much of the methodology discussed in the previous writeups, as well as in MOE 94, has been used in the computations in this note. The radiological aspects that are addressed include the following: prompt secondary radiation (bremsstrahlung, giant resonance neutrons, medium- and high-energy neutrons) produced by electrons interacting in a beam stop or in component structures; skyshine radiation, which produces a radiation field in nearby areas and at the nearest off-site location; radioactive gases produced by neutron irradiation of air in the vicinity of a particle loss site; noxious gases (ozone and others) produced in air by the escaping bremsstrahlung radiation that results from absorbing particles in the components; activation of the LEUTL components that results in a residual radiation field in the vicinity of these materials following shutdown; potential activation of water used ...
Date: November 11, 1998
Creator: Moe, H.J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Dose estimates for the 1104 m APS storage ring

Description: The estimated dose equivalent rates outside the shielded storage ring, and the estimated annual dose equivalent to members of the public due to direct radiation and skyshine from the ring, have been recalculated. The previous estimates found in LS-84 (MOE 87) and cited in the 1987 Conceptual Design Report of the APS (ANL 87) required revision because of changes in the ring circumference and in the proposed location of the ring with respect to the nearest site boundary. The values assumed for the neutron quality factors were also overestimated (by a factor of 2) in the previous computation, and the correct values have been used for this estimate. The methodology used to compute dose and dose rate from the storage ring is the same as that used in LS-90 (MOE 87a). The calculations assumed 80 cm thick walls of ordinary concrete (or the shielding equivalent of this) and a roof thickness of 1 meter of ordinary concrete. The circumference of the ring was increased to 1,104 m, and the closest distance to the boundary was taken as 140 m. The recalculation of the skyshine component used the same methodology as that used in LS-84.
Date: June 1, 1989
Creator: Moe, H.J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Recalculation of shielding for the addition of a PAR

Description: The shielding estimates for the Electron and Positron Linacs and the Booster Synchrotron, contained in the 1987 Conceptual Design Report (CDR) of the APS (ANL-87-15), have been reviewed and recalculated, along with newly initiated calculations of the required shielding for the addition of a Positron Accumulator Ring (PAR). Several new assumptions with respect to beam intensity, projected losses in the system, and assumed operational time have been incorporated into the calculations. Details of the previous calculations, which describe the methodology used, may be found in APS Light Source Note LS-90.
Date: August 1, 1988
Creator: Moe, H.J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Dose estimates for the heavy concrete ratchet wall configuration

Description: The recalculation of the estimated doses due to a beam loss at a single point in the storage-ring system indicates that the redesigned shielding geometry, using heavy concrete for the ratchet walls, is generally adequate for the parameters of no local lead shielding and an operating current of 0.1 A. For operation at 0.3 A, additional local lead shielding of 8 cm of lead will assure that all doses outside the ratchet wall shield from a beam loss at a given point will be {lt} 1 mSv.
Date: September 1, 1988
Creator: Knott, M.J. & Moe, H.J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Dose rate estimates in the first optical enclosure due to particle beam loss in the insertion device transition region during injection

Description: The particle beam, during injection into the storage ring, can be partly lost in one of the transition regions between the storage-ring vacuum chamber and the insertion-device (ID) straight section. The transition region is a copper interface between a standard aluminum vacuum chamber and an insertion-device vacuum chamber. This can be a problem, at least in the first few insertion devices where the injected beam is still unstable. It may create higher photon and neutron dose rates in the first optical enclosures of the upstream ID beamlines adjacent to this region. This report presents the results of the dose rate estimates for such an event and some recommendations for mitigation.
Date: May 9, 1995
Creator: Job, P.K. & Moe, H.J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Shielding estimates for the ANL advanced photon source

Description: Shielding estimates for the Advanced Photon Source (APS) have been computed utilizing presently available design parameters. Calculations of the resulting radiation fields have been made for several considerations involving normal beam loss, as well as for certain postulated accidental beam losses. Whenever available, experimental data from existing accelerators and light sources have been used in lieu of theoretical estimates.
Date: April 1, 1987
Creator: Moe, H.J. & Veluri, V.R.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Operational Health Physics Training

Description: This revised publication updates a previous report (ANL-7291) initially published in 1965, entitled Radiation Safety Technician Training Course which was intended to complement on-the-job monitoring training for Health Physics Technicians. Sections include basic information concerning atomic structure and other useful physical quantities, natural radioactivity, the properties of alpha, beta, gamma, x rays and neutrons, and the concepts and units of radiation dosimetry (including SI units).
Date: June 1992
Creator: Moe, H. J. & Vallario, Edward J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Radiation measurements at the Advanced Photon Source (APS) linear accelerator

Description: The injector and source of particles for the Advanced Photon Source is a 2856-MHz, S-band, electron-positron linear accelerator (linac). It produces electrons with energies up to 650 MeV or positrons with energies up to 450 MeV. Radiation measurements were made during normal electron and positron operation, as well as during several beam loss scenarios. Neutron and gamma measurements made outside the shielding walls during normal operation are within DOE guidelines. Measured radiation fields are compared to predicted levels for different conditions.
Date: July 1, 1995
Creator: Moe, H.J.; Vacca, J.H.; Veluri, V.R. & White, M.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Decontamination and Decommissioning of the Argonne National Laboratory East Area Radioactively Contaminated Surplus Facilities : Final Report

Description: ANL has decontaminated and decommissioned (D and D) seven radiologically contaminated surplus facilities at its Illinois site: a ''Hot'' Machine Shop (Building 17) and support facilities; Fan House No. 1 (Building 37), Fan House No. 2 (Building 38), the Pangborn Dust Collector (Building 41), and the Industrial Waste Treatment Plant (Building 34) for exhaust air from machining of radioactive materials. Also included were a Nuclear Materials Storage Vault (Building 16F) and a Nuclear Research Laboratory (Building 22). The D and D work involved dismantling of all process equipment and associated plumbing, ductwork, drain lines, etc. After radiation surveys, floor and wall coverings, suspended ceilings, room partitions, pipe, conduit and electrical gear were taken down as necessary. In addition, underground sewers were excavated. The grounds around each facility were also thoroughly surveyed. Contaminated materials and soil were packaged and shipped to a low-level waste burial site, while nonactive debris was buried in the ANL landfill. Clean, reusable items were saved, and clean metal scrap was sold for salvage. After the decommissioning work, each building was torn down and the site relandscaped. The project was completed in 1985, ahead of schedule, with substantial savings.
Date: July 1987
Creator: Kline, W. H.; Fassnacht, G. F. & Moe, H. J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Decontamination and Decommissioning of the Argonne National Laboratory Building 350 Plutonium Fabrication Facility : Final Report

Description: In 1973, Argonne National Laboratory began consolidating and upgrading its plutonium-handling operations with the result that the research fuel-fabrication facility located in Building 350 was shut down and declared surplus. Sixteen of the twenty-three gloveboxes which comprised the system were disassembled and relocated for reuse or placed into controlled storage during 1974 but, due to funding constraints, full-scale decommissioning did not start until 1978. Since that time the fourteen remaining contaminated gloveboxes, including all internal and external equipment as well as the associated ventilation systems, have been assayed for radioactive content, dismantled, size reduced to fit acceptable packaging and sent to a US Department of Energy (DOE) transuranic retrievable-storage site or to a DOE low-level nuclear waste burial ground. The project which was completed in 1983, required 5 years to accomplish, 32 man years of effort, produced some 540 cubic meters (19,000 cubic ft) of radioactive waste of which 60% was TRU, and cost 2.4 million dollars.
Date: February 1985
Creator: Kline, W. H.; Moe, H. J. & Lahey, T. J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

``Maximal credible accident`` simulation studies at the storage ring of the APS

Description: This study was aimed at determining the adequacy of the storage ring bulk shielding for reducing the radiation hazard outside of secured areas, due to errant particle beam losses. The hazard class (Low, Medium or High) of an accelerator is determined by the onsite and offsite effective dose equivalent under the assumption of a maximal credible accident occurring. The credible maximal accident condition is that which produces at the weakest part of the shielding at full power the greatest amount of radiation at the subject position outside the secured area during one hour. For the hazard class to be Low, the onsite radiation level must be between 1 and 25 rem in the one hour duration of the maximal credible accident. The safety envelope defines the bounding conditions for the safe operation of a DOE accelerator facility. The measured dose rate results at each location showed wide variations, which tends to indicate that the missteered beam may not have hit at the same point for each repeat of a given loss scenario. However, all measured results were comfortably below the calculated values. It appears the use of semi-empirical calculational methods are generally quite conservative, which is desirable for perceived beam loss accidents at the safety envelope. With respect to the disagreement between the calculated dose rates and the measured values for the maximal credible accident, the authors suspect that the actual showering which takes place is more distributed along the beamline than the 4-m-long beam spill assumed in the calculations. Since the distribution is not known this adds further to the difficulty in correlating the measured results with the calculated values. In all controlled loss studies, it appears that the measured results were obtained for showers that may not have been fully developed.
Date: September 1, 1997
Creator: Decker, G.; Justus, A.L.; Job, P.K.; Moe, H.J.; Vacca, J.H. & Veluri, V.R.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Plutonium Safety Training Course

Description: This course seeks to achieve two objectives: to provide initial safety training for people just beginning work with plutonium, and to serve as a review and reference source for those already engaged in such work. Numerous references have been included to provide information sources for those wishing to pursue certain topics more fully. The first part of the course content deals with the general safety approach used in dealing with hazardous materials. Following is a discussion of the four properties of plutonium that lead to potential hazards: radioactivity, toxicity, nuclear properties, and spontaneous ignition. Next, the various hazards arising from these properties are treated. The relative hazards of both internal and external radiation sources are discussed, as well as the specific hazards when plutonium is the source. Similarly, the general hazards involved in a criticality, fire, or explosion are treated. Comments are made concerning the specific hazards when plutonium is involved. A brief summary comparison between the hazards of the trans-plutonium nuclides relative to plutonium-239 follows. The final portion deals with control procedures with respect to contamination, internal and external exposure, nuclear safety, and fire protection. The philosophy and approach to emergency planning are also discussed.
Date: March 1976
Creator: Moe, H. J.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department