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Description: Waste containers may contain volatile organic compounds (VOCs), methane, hydrogen and possibly propane. These constituents may occur individually or in mixtures. Determining if a waste container contains a flammable concentration of flammable gases and vapors (from VOCs) is important to the safety of the handling, repackaging and shipping activities. This report provides the basis for determining the flammability of mixtures of flammable gases and vapors. The concentration of a mixture that is at the lowest flammability limit for that mixture is called the action concentration. The action concentration can be determined using total VOC concentrations or actual concentration of each individual VOC. The concentrations of hydrogen and methane are included with the total VOC or individual VOC concentration to determine the action concentration. Concentrations below this point are not flammable. Waste containers with gas/vapor concentrations at or above the action concentration are considered flammable.
Date: July 10, 2006
Creator: MARUSICH, R.M.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department


Description: Waste in large waste boxes can generate volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and hydrogen. These waste boxes may or may not have flow paths out of them (although it is believed that most do). These boxes will be retrieved, sampled, and then coated with polyurea. After coating, filters will be installed in the box to keep the concentration of VOCs and hydrogen acceptably low. The MDSA requires that a vent path must be protected during application of the polyurea coating. If the box has been sampled then it is vented and the vent path must be protected. This report provides a model in which the user inputs the free volume of the waste box, sample concentration (ppm of total VOC or volume fraction hydrogen) along with the number of filters to be placed into the waste box lid. Using this information, the model provides an estimate of concentration vs. time or the number of filters needed to reduce the concentration by a specified fraction. If the equations from this report are placed into spreadsheets which are then used to demonstrate TSR compliance, the spreadsheets must come under the Software QA Plan for such documents. Chapters 2 and 3 present the theory. Chapter 4 presents the method with examples of its use found in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 provides the basis far the use of 1,000 ppm as the concentration below which the method is valid under any condition.
Date: May 17, 2007
Creator: MARUSICH, R.M.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department


Description: The concentration of 15% hydrogen in air in a waste drum is used as the concentration at which the drum remains intact in the case of a deflagration. The following describes what could happen to the drum if 15% hydrogen or more in air were ignited. Table 2 of the Savannah River report WSRC-TR-90-165 ''TRU Drum Hydrogen Explosion Tests'' provides the results of tests performed in 55-gallon drums filled with hydrogen and air mixtures. The hydrogen-air mixtures were ignited by a hot-wire igniter. The results of the tests are shown in Table 1. They concluded that drums can withstand deflagration involving hydrogen concentration up to 15% hydrogen. Testing was performed at Idaho Falls and documented in a letter from RH Beers, Waste Technology Programs Division, EG&G Idaho, to CP Gertz, Radioactive Waste Technology Branch, DOE dated Sept. 29, 1983. In these tests, 55-gallon drums were filled with hydrogen-air mixtures which were ignited. The results in Table 2.2 showed that ignition for drums containing 11% and 14% hydrogen, the drum lid remained on the drum. Ignition in drum with 30% hydrogen resulted in lid loss. It is concluded from the results of these two tests that, for uncorroded drums, a 15% hydrogen in air mixture will not result in loss of drum integrity (i.e., lid remains on, walls remain intact). The drum walls however, may be thinned due to corrosion. The effect of the deflagration on thinner walls is assessed next. Assume a 15% hydrogen in air mixture exists in a drum. The pressure assuming adiabatic isochoric complete combustion (AICC) conditions is 69 psig (using the same deflagration pressure calculation method as in HNF-19492, ''Revised Hydrogen Deflagration Analysis which got 82 psig for 20% hydrogen in air).
Date: January 4, 2007
Creator: MARUSICH, R.M.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department


Description: Rags containing RadPro{reg_sign} solution will be generated during the decontamination of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). Under normal conditions, the rags will be neutralized with sodium carbonate prior to placing in the drums. The concern with RadPro solutions and cotton rags is that some of the RadPro solutions contain nitric acid. Under the right conditions, nitric acid and cotton rags exothermically react. The concern is, will RadPro solutions react with cotton rags exothermically? The potential for a runaway reaction for any of the RadPro solutions used was studied in Section 5.2 of PNNL-15410, Thermal Stability Studies of Candidate Decontamination Agents for Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant Plutonium-Contaminated Gloveboxes. This report shows the thermal behavior of cotton rags having been saturated in one of the various neutralized and non-neutralized RadPro solutions. The thermal analysis was performed using thermogravimetric Analysis (TGA), Differential Thermal Analysis (DTA) and Accelerating Rate Calorimetry (ARC).
Date: August 11, 2009
Creator: Marusich, R. M.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

An analysis of the impact of having uranium dioxide mixed in with plutonium dioxide

Description: An assessment was performed to show the impact on airborne release fraction, respirable fraction, dose conversion factor and dose consequences of postulated accidents at the Plutonium Finishing Plant involving uranium dioxide rather than plutonium dioxide.
Date: October 21, 1998
Creator: MARUSICH, R.M.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Calculation notes that support accident scenario and consequence determination of a waste tank criticality

Description: The purpose of this calculation note is to provide the basis for criticality consequences for the Tank Farm Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). Criticality scenario is developed and details and description of the analysis methods are provided.
Date: September 6, 1996
Creator: Marusich, R.M., Westinghouse Hanford
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Engineering study of tank leaks related to hydraulic retrieval of sludge from tank 241-C-106. Revision 1

Description: This study evaluates hydraulic retrieval (sluicing) of the waste in single-shell tank 241-C-106 with respect to the likelihood of tank leaks, gross volumes of potential leaks, and their consequences. A description of hydraulic retrieval is developed to establish a baseline for the study. Leak models are developed based on postulated leak mechanisms to estimate the amount of waste that could potentially leak while sluicing. Transport models describe the movement of the waste constituents in the surrounding soil and groundwater after a leak occurs. Environmental impact and risk associated with tank leaks are evaluated. Transport of leaked material to the groundwater is found to be dependent on the rate of recharge of moisture in the soil for moderate-sized leaks. Providing a cover over the tank and surrounding area would eliminate the recharge. The bulk of any leaked material would remain in the vicinity of the tank for remedial action.
Date: June 9, 1993
Creator: Lowe, S. S.; Carlos, W. C.; Irwin, J. J.; Khaleel, R.; Kline, N. W.; Ludowise, J. D. et al.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department