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The Application of Statistical Classification to Business Failure Prediction

Description: Bankruptcy is a costly event. Holders of publicly traded securities can rely on security prices to reflect their risk. Other stakeholders have no such mechanism. Hence, methods for accurately forecasting bankruptcy would be valuable to them. A large body of literature has arisen on bankruptcy forecasting with statistical classification since Beaver (1967) and Altman (1968). Reported total error rates typically are 10%-20%, suggesting that these models reveal information which otherwise is unavailable and has value after financial data is released. This conflicts with evidence on market efficiency which indicates that securities markets adjust rapidly and actually anticipate announcements of financial data. Efforts to resolve this conflict with event study methodology have run afoul of market model specification difficulties. A different approach is taken here. Most extant criticism of research design in this literature concerns inferential techniques but not sampling design. This paper attempts to resolve major sampling design issues. The most important conclusion concerns the usual choice of the individual firm as the sampling unit. While this choice is logically inconsistent with how a forecaster observes financial data over time, no evidence of bias could be found. In this paper, prediction performance is evaluated in terms of expected loss. Most authors calculate total error rates, which fail to reflect documented asymmetries in misclassification costs and prior probabilities. Expected loss overcomes this weakness and also offers a formal means to evaluate forecasts from the perspective of stakeholders other than investors. This study shows that cost of misclassifying bankruptcy must be at least an order of magnitude greater than cost of misclassifying nonbankruptcy before discriminant analysis methods have value. This conclusion follows from both sampling experiments on historical financial data and Monte Carlo experiments on simulated data. However, the Monte Carlo experiments reveal that as the cost ratio increases, robustness of linear ...
Date: December 1994
Creator: Haensly, Paul J.
Partner: UNT Libraries

Empirical Tests of the Signaling and Monitoring Hypotheses for Initial Public Offerings

Description: The research questions investigated are: 1. Are the expected post-issue fractional holdings of the directors and officers, venture capitalists and institutions signals of firm value? 2. Are the expected post-issue fractional holdings of the directors and officers, venture capitalists and institutions signals of underpricing? and 3. Are the directors and officers, venture capitalists and institutions monitors of IPO investments? The signaling theory developed by Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) (GH) and the monitoring theory for IPO investments have been used to develop the hypotheses for this dissertation. Four factors make my methodology unique. These factors are: 1. I apply and test the GH IPO signaling model over a unique data set collected from the IPO prospectuses, proxy statements and annual reports; 2. I disaggregate the expected post-issue holdings of the different groups of pre-issue blockholders and insiders and hypothesizes that these individual groups represents signals of firm value and underpricing; 3. I hypothesize that these groups, in aggregate and separately, monitor IPO investments over the long term; And 4. I develop signaling and monitoring hypotheses to make predictions at the two stages of the IPO. The results show that firm value is positively related to the level of underpricing, at a given variance of the firms cash flows; the level of underpricing is positively related to the holdings of the directors and officers as a group and the aggregate of the directors and officers, VCs and institutions, at given variances of the firm's cash flows; the firm value is not related to the level of underpricing, at a given level of capital outlay and holdings of either the aggregate blockholders, directors and officers, VCs or institutions. For the monitoring hypotheses, the results show that the long-run buy-and-hold-returns are positively related to the investment bank reputation and the gross spread. Also, the ...
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Date: May 2006
Creator: Gordon, Sean Anthony Garnet
Partner: UNT Libraries

Bank Loans as a Financial Discipline: A Direct Agency Cost of Equity Perspective

Description: In a 2004 study, Harvey, Lin and Roper argue that debt makers with a commitment to monitoring can create value for outside shareholders whenever information asymmetry and agency costs are pronounced. I investigate Harvey, Lin and Roper's claim for bank loans by empirically testing the effect of information asymmetry and direct agency costs on the abnormal returns of the borrowers' stock around the announcement of bank loans. I divide my study into two main sections. The first section tests whether three proxies of the direct agency costs of equity are equally significant in measuring the direct costs associated with outside equity agency problems. I find that the asset utilization ratio proxy is the most statistically significant proxy of the direct agency costs of equity using a Chow F-test statistic. The second main section of my dissertation includes and event study and a cross-sectional analysis. The event study results document significant and positive average abnormal returns of 1.01% for the borrowers' stock on the announcement day of bank loans. In the cross sectional analysis of the borrowers' average abnormal stock returns, I find that higher quality and more reputable banks/lenders provide a reliable certification to the capital market about the low level of the borrowers' direct agency costs of equity and information asymmetry. This certification hypothesis holds only for renewed bank loans. In other words, in renewing the borrowers' line of credit, the bank/lender is actually confirming that the borrower has a low level of information asymmetry and direct costs of equity. Given such a certificate from the banks/lenders, shareholders reward the company/borrower by bidding the share price up in the capital market.
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Date: December 2006
Creator: Hijazi, Bassem
Partner: UNT Libraries

Studies in Bank Contagion: Three Regulatory Events

Description: This research describes an analysis, using event-study methodology, of the reaction of the stock returns of a sample, drawn from the one-hundred largest bank holding companies, to certain actions of regulatory agencies. The first part of the analysis examines the reaction of the bank stocks to the closure of the Bank of New England, using cross-sectional variables not previously examined by other investigators. The second event considers the invalidation of interest-rate swap contracts by the British Law Lords, the highest court in Britain. The third case is an examination of the effects of actions taken to enforce the Community Reinvestment Act. All three events have significant abnormal returns in at least one sub-sample and event window. The results of the cross-sectional analysis and the lack of response to later events are consistent with market efficiency in the semi-strong form. The results are also consistent with the hypothesis that regulatory policies that emphasize consistency and banking system safety are desirable.
Date: May 1998
Creator: Springstube, Woodard R. (Woodard Rex)
Partner: UNT Libraries

Predictability of Credit Watch Placements and the Distribution of Wealth Effects Across the Trigger Event, Placement and Removal Dates

Description: Standard and Poor's began publication of Credit Watch in November of 1981 as an early warning list for firms whose debt is under review for a possible rating change. This dissertation is composed of three essays which address various aspects of Credit Watch and the impact on shareholder wealth. The first essay uses a discriminant analysis model to classify the Credit Watch status of firms which engaged in mergers and acquisitions activity in 1991. The model correctly classifies 69.85% of the in-sample firms and 65.83% of the out of sample firms. The second essay examines whether the stock market reacts more strongly to trigger events which cause Credit Watch placements than to the actual placement. Significantly larger negative abnormal return are found around the trigger event than the placement. No evidence is found for the differential reaction evolving over time. The third essay examines firm specific and economy-wide factors which may be related to the strength of the abnormal stock return around the Credit Watch removal date. The removal return is found to be positively related to the number of trading days a firm remains on Credit Watch, negatively related to the number of updates regarding the firm released by Standard and Poor's while on the list, and positively related to the cumulative abnormal return measured between the placement and removal. This evidence suggests that the number of trading days a firm remains on Credit Watch is a proxy for information leakage to the market. The negative relationship between the removal return and the number of updates implies that the market reacts to a string of negative news of which the removal announcement is the final announcement. Finally, the positive relationship with the cumulative abnormal return between placement and removal suggests that much of the information content of the removal ...
Date: May 1996
Creator: Hudson, William C. (William Carl)
Partner: UNT Libraries

The Wealth Effect of the Risk-Based Capital Regulation on the Commercial Banking Industry

Description: The purpose of this study is to examine the wealth effect of the Risk-Based Capital (RBC) regulation on the U.S. commercial banking industry. The RBC plan was first proposed in January 1986, and its final form was announced on July 11, 1988. This plan resulted from dissatisfaction with the old capital regulation, which did not account for asset risk and off-balance sheet activities. The present study hypothesizes that the new regulation restricted bank optimal behavior and, therefore, adversely affected stock prices. The second and third hypotheses suggest that investors used company specific information, Net Tier 1 and Total risk-based capital ratios respectively, in valuing stocks of the affected bank holding companies. Hypotheses four and five suggest that abnormal returns are proportionally related to the levels of Net Tier 1 or Total RBC ratio. Both the traditional event study and the portfolio time-series regression, with RBC ratios (Net Tier 1 or Total) as the weight factors, are used in this study.
Date: August 1994
Creator: Zoubi, Marwan M. Sharif (Marwan Mohd Sharif)
Partner: UNT Libraries