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Preliminary Failure Modes and Effects Analysis of the US Massive Gas Injection Disruption Mitigation System Design

Description: This report presents the results of a preliminary failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) of a candidate design for the ITER Disruption Mitigation System. This candidate is the Massive Gas Injection System that provides machine protection in a plasma disruption event. The FMEA was quantified with “generic” component failure rate data as well as some data calculated from operating facilities, and the failure events were ranked for their criticality to system operation.
Date: October 1, 2013
Creator: Cadwallader, Lee C.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Preliminary Failure Modes and Effects Analysis of the US DCLL Test Blanket Module

Description: This report presents the results of a preliminary failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) of a small tritium-breeding test blanket module design for the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor. The FMEA was quantified with “generic” component failure rate data, and the failure events are binned into postulated initiating event families and frequency categories for safety assessment. An appendix to this report contains repair time data to support an occupational radiation exposure assessment for test blanket module maintenance.
Date: August 1, 2007
Creator: Cadwallader, Lee C.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Comparison of Tritium Component Failure Rate Data

Description: Published failure rate values from the US Tritium Systems Test Assembly, the Japanese Tritium Process Laboratory, the German Tritium Laboratory Karlsruhe, and the Joint European Torus Active Gas Handling System have been compared. This comparison is on a limited set of components, but there is a good variety of data sets in the comparison. The data compared reasonably well. The most reasonable failure rate values are recommended for use on next generation tritium handling system components, such as those in the tritium plant systems for the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor and the tritium fuel systems of inertial fusion facilities, such as the US National Ignition Facility. These data and the comparison results are also shared with the International Energy Agency cooperative task on fusion component failure rate data.
Date: September 1, 2004
Creator: Cadwallader, Lee C.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Compressed Gas Safety for Experimental Fusion Facilities

Description: Experimental fusion facilities present a variety of hazards to the operators and staff. There are unique or specialized hazards, including magnetic fields, cryogens, radio frequency emissions, and vacuum reservoirs. There are also more general industrial hazards, such as a wide variety of electrical power, pressurized air, and cooling water systems in use, there are crane and hoist loads, working at height, and handling compressed gas cylinders. This paper outlines the projectile hazard assoicated with compressed gas cylinders and mthods of treatment to provide for compressed gas safety. This information should be of interest to personnel at both magnetic and inertial fusion experiments.
Date: September 1, 2004
Creator: Cadwallader, Lee C.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Gallium Safety in the Laboratory

Description: A university laboratory experiment for the US Department of Energy magnetic fusion research program required a simulant for liquid lithium. The simulant choices were narrowed to liquid gallium and galinstan (Ga-In-Sn) alloy. Safety information on liquid gallium and galinstan were compiled, and the choice was made to use galinstan. A laboratory safety walkthrough was performed in the fall of 2002 to support the galinstan experiment. The experiment has been operating successfully since early 2002.
Date: June 1, 2003
Creator: Cadwallader, Lee C.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

The Worker Exposure Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

Description: This paper documents the activities of the US-Japan exchange in the area of personnel safety at magnetic and laser fusion experiments. A near-miss event with a visiting scientist to the US in 1992 was the impetus for forming the Joint Working Group on Fusion Safety. This exchange has been under way for over ten years and has provided many safety insights for both US and Japanese facility personnel at national institutes and at universities. The background and activities of the Joint Working Group are described, including the facilities that have been visited for safety walkthroughs, the participants from both countries, and the main safety issues examined during visits. Based on these visits, some operational safety ideas to enhance experiment safety are given. The near-term future plans of the Safety Monitor Joint Working Group are also discussed.
Date: September 1, 2004
Creator: Cadwallader, Lee C.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Preliminary Failure Modes and Effects Analysis of the US DCLL Test Blanket Module

Description: This report presents the results of a preliminary failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) of a small tritium-breeding test blanket module design for the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor. The FMEA was quantified with “generic” component failure rate data, and the failure events are binned into postulated initiating event families and frequency categories for safety assessment. An appendix to this report contains repair time data to support an occupational radiation exposure assessment for test blanket module maintenance.
Date: June 1, 2010
Creator: Cadwallader, Lee C.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Hydrogen and Gaseous Fuel Safety and Toxicity

Description: Non-traditional motor fuels are receiving increased attention and use. This paper examines the safety of three alternative gaseous fuels plus gasoline and the advantages and disadvantages of each. The gaseous fuels are hydrogen, methane (natural gas), and propane. Qualitatively, the overall risks of the four fuels should be close. Gasoline is the most toxic. For small leaks, hydrogen has the highest ignition probability and the gaseous fuels have the highest risk of a burning jet or cloud.
Date: June 1, 2007
Creator: Cadwallader, Lee C. & Herring, J. Sephen
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Hydrogen and Oxygen Gas Monitoring System Design and Operation

Description: This paper describes pertinent design practices of selecting types of monitors, monitor unit placement, setpoint selection, and maintenance considerations for gas monitors. While hydrogen gas monitors and enriched oxygen atmosphere monitors as they would be needed for hydrogen production experiments are the primary focus of this paper, monitors for carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide are also discussed. The experiences of designing, installing, and calibrating gas monitors for a laboratory where experiments in support of the DOE Nuclear Hydrogen Initiative (NHI) are described along with codes, standards, and regulations for these monitors. Information from the literature about best operating practices is also presented. The NHI program has two types of activities. The first, near-term activity is laboratory and pilot-plant experimentation with different processes in the kilogram per day scale to select the most promising types of processes for future applications of hydrogen production. Prudent design calls for indoor gas monitors to sense any hydrogen leaks within these laboratory rooms. The second, longer-term activity is the prototype, or large-scale plants to produce tons of hydrogen per day. These large, outdoor production plants will require area (or “fencepost”) monitoring of hydrogen gas leaks. Some processes will have oxygen production with hydrogen production, and any oxygen releases are also safety concerns since oxygen gas is the strongest oxidizer. Monitoring of these gases is important for personnel safety of both indoor and outdoor experiments. There is some guidance available about proper placement of monitors. The fixed point, stationary monitor can only function if the intruding gas contacts the monitor. Therefore, monitor placement is vital to proper monitoring of the room or area. Factors in sensor location selection include: indoor or outdoor site, the location and nature of potential vapor/gas sources, chemical and physical data of the gases or vapors, liquids with volatility need sensors near ...
Date: June 1, 2007
Creator: Cadwallader, Lee C.; DeWall, Kevin G. & Herring, J. Stephen
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Radiological Dose Calculations for Fusion Facilities

Description: This report summarizes the results and rationale for radiological dose calculations for the maximally exposed individual during fusion accident conditions. Early doses per unit activity (Sieverts per TeraBecquerel) are given for 535 magnetic fusion isotopes of interest for several release scenarios. These data can be used for accident assessment calculations to determine if the accident consequences exceed Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Department of Energy evaluation guides. A generalized yearly dose estimate for routine releases, based on 1 Terabecquerel unit releases per radionuclide, has also been performed using averaged site parameters and assumed populations. These routine release data are useful for assessing designs against US Environmental Protection Agency yearly release limits.
Date: April 1, 2003
Creator: Abbott, Michael L.; Cadwallader, Lee C. & Petti, David A.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Activities of the US-Japan Safety Monitor Joint Working Group

Description: This paper documents the activities of the US-Japan exchange in the area of personnel safety at magnetic and laser fusion experiments. A near-miss event with a visiting scientist to the US in 1992 was the impetus for forming the Joint Working Group on Fusion Safety. This exchnge has been under way for over ten years and has provided many safety insights for both US and Japanese facility personnel at national institutes and at universities. The background and activities of the Joint Working Group are described, including the facilities that have been visited for safety walkthroughs, the participants from both countries, and the main safety issues examined during visits. Based on these visits, some operational safety ideas to enhance experiment safety are given. The near-term future plans of the Safety Monitor Joint Working group are also discussed.
Date: September 1, 2004
Creator: Savercool, Richard L. & Cadwallader, Lee C.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Reliability Estimates for Power Supplies

Description: Failure rates for large power supplies at a fusion facility are critical knowledge needed to estimate availability of the facility or to set priorties for repairs and spare components. A study of the "failure to operate on demand" and "failure to continue to operate" failure rates has been performed for the large power supplies at DIII-D, which provide power to the magnet coils, the neutral beam injectors, the electron cyclotron heating systems, and the fast wave systems. When one of the power supplies fails to operate, the research program has to be either temporarily changed or halted. If one of the power supplies for the toroidal or ohmic heating coils fails, the operations have to be suspended or the research is continued at de-rated parameters until a repair is completed. If one of the power supplies used in the auxiliary plasma heating systems fails the research is often temporarily changed until a repair is completed. The power supplies are operated remotely and repairs are only performed when the power supplies are off line, so that failure of a power supply does not cause any risk to personnel. The DIII-D Trouble Report database was used to determine the number of power supply faults (over 1,700 reports), and tokamak annual operations data supplied the number of shots, operating times, and power supply usage for the DIII-D operating campaigns between mid-1987 and 2004. Where possible, these power supply failure rates from DIII-D will be compared to similar work that has been performed for the Joint European Torus equipment. These independent data sets support validation of the fusion-specific failure rate values.
Date: September 1, 2005
Creator: Cadwallader, Lee C. & Petersen, Peter I.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Occupational Radiation Exposure Analysis of US ITER DCLL TBM

Description: This report documents an Occupational Radiation Exposure (ORE) analysis that was performed for the US International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) Dual Coolant Lead Lithium (DCLL) Test Blanket Module (TBM). This analysis was performed with the QADMOD dose code for anticipated maintenance activities for this TBM concept and its ancillary systems. The QADMOD code was used to model the PbLi cooling loop of this TBM concept by specifying gamma ray source terms that simulated radioactive material within the piping, valves, heat exchanger, permeator, pump, drain tank, and cold trap of this cooling system. Estimates of the maintenance tasks that will have to be performed and the time required to perform these tasks where developed based on either expert opinion or on industrial maintenance experience for similar technologies. This report details the modeling activity and the calculated doses for the maintenance activities envisioned for the US DCLL TBM.
Date: August 1, 2007
Creator: Merrill, Brad J; Cadwallader, Lee C & Dagher, Mohamad
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Status of Safety and Environmental Activities in the US Fusion Program

Description: This paper presents an overview of recent safety efforts in both magnetic and inertial fusion energy. Safety has been a part of fusion design and operations since the inception of fusion research. Safety research and safety design support have been provided for a variety of experiments in both the magnetic and inertial fusion programs. The main safety issues are reviewed, some recent safety highlights are discussed and the programmatic impacts that safety research has had are presented. Future directions in the safety and environmental area are proposed.
Date: September 1, 2004
Creator: Petti, David A.; Reyes, Susana; Cadwallader, Lee C. & Latkowski, Jeffery F.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department

Fuel Cycle Scenario Definition, Evaluation, and Trade-offs

Description: This report aims to clarify many of the issues being discussed within the AFCI program, including Inert Matrix Fuel (IMF) versus Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel, single-pass versus multi-pass recycling, thermal versus fast reactors, potential need for transmutation of technetium and iodine, and the value of separating cesium and strontium. It documents most of the work produced by INL, ANL, and SNL personnel under their Simulation, Evaluation, and Trade Study (SETS) work packages during FY2005 and the first half of FY2006. This report represents the first attempt to calculate a full range of metrics, covering all four AFCI program objectives - waste management, proliferation resistance, energy recovery, and systematic management/economics/safety - using a combination of "static" calculations and a system dynamic model, DYMOND. In many cases, we examine the same issue both dynamically and statically to determine the robustness of the observations. All analyses are for the U.S. reactor fleet. This is a technical report, not aimed at a policy-level audience. A wide range of options are studied to provide the technical basis for identifying the most attractive options and potential improvements. Option improvement could be vital to accomplish before the AFCI program publishes definitive cost estimates. Information from this report will be extracted and summarized in future policy-level reports. Many dynamic simulations of deploying those options are included. There are few "control knobs" for flying or piloting the fuel cycle system into the future, even though it is dark (uncertain) and controls are sluggish with slow time response: what types of reactors are built, what types of fuels are used, and the capacity of separation and fabrication plants. Piloting responsibilities are distributed among utilities, government, and regulators, compounding the challenge of making the entire system work and respond to changing circumstances. We identify four approaches that would increase our ability ...
Date: August 1, 2006
Creator: Piet, Steven J.; Matthern, Gretchen E.; Jacobson, Jacob J.; Laws, Christopher T.; Cadwallader, Lee C.; Yacout, Abdellatif M. et al.
Partner: UNT Libraries Government Documents Department