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Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with Russia: Statutory Procedures for Congressional Consideration and Their Implementation
This report sketches the procedures prescribed by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) for congressional action in relation to nuclear cooperation agreements, then summarizes legislative proceedings occurring in relation to the proposed agreement with Russia, beginning with its recent submission. It also addresses several questions regarding the implementation and intent of these statutory requirements related to the proposed agreement with the Russian Federation. Special attention is given to the definition of "days of continuous session" and possible implications of this definition depending on whether or not the requisite period ends before the end of the 110th Congress.
The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions
The United States and Russia signed a new strategic arms reduction treaty - known as New START - on April 8, 2010. This treaty is designed to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START), which expired, after 15 years of implementation, on December 5, 2009. This report provides an overview of New START, including a comparison to the original START Treaty, the belief of the Obama Administration and outside analysts that New START will enhance U.S. national security, and the criticisms of those who say that New START (and, indeed, the entire issue of U.S.-Russian arms control) is a distraction from more important items on the nonproliferation agenda.
The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions
The United States and Russia signed a new strategic arms reduction treaty - known as New START - on April 8, 2010. This treaty is designed to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START), which expired, after 15 years of implementation, on December 5, 2009. This report provides an overview of New START, including a comparison to the original START Treaty, the belief of the Obama Administration and outside analysts that New START will enhance U.S. national security, and the criticisms of those who say that New START (and, indeed, the entire issue of U.S.-Russian arms control) is a distraction from more important items on the nonproliferation agenda.
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