Congressional Research Service Reports - 371 Matching Results

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Congressional Liaison Offices of Selected Federal Agencies
This list of about 150 congressional liaison offices is intended to help congressional offices in placing telephone calls and addressing correspondence to government agencies. In each case, the information was supplied by the agency itself and is current as of the date of publication. Entries are arranged alphabetically in four sections: legislative branch; judicial branch; executive branch; and agencies, boards, and commissions.
Congressional Liaison Offices of Selected Federal Agencies
This list of about 150 congressional liaison offices is intended to help congressional offices in placing telephone calls and addressing correspondence to government agencies. In each case, the information was supplied by the agency itself and is current as of the date of publication. Entries are arranged alphabetically in four sections: legislative branch; judicial branch; executive branch; and agencies, boards, and commissions.
Congressional Liaison Offices of Selected Federal Agencies
This list of about 150 congressional liaison offices is intended to help congressional offices in placing telephone calls and addressing correspondence to government agencies. In each case, the information was supplied by the agency itself and is current as of the date of publication. Entries are arranged alphabetically in four sections: legislative branch; judicial branch; executive branch; and agencies, boards, and commissions.
Congressional Liaison Offices of Selected Federal Agencies
This list of about 150 congressional liaison offices is intended to help congressional offices in placing telephone calls and addressing correspondence to government agencies. In each case, the information was supplied by the agency itself and is current as of the date of publication. Entries are arranged alphabetically in four sections: legislative branch; judicial branch; executive branch; and agencies, boards, and commissions.
Congressional Liaison Offices of Selected Federal Agencies
This list of about 150 congressional liaison offices is intended to help congressional offices in placing telephone calls and addressing correspondence to government agencies. Entries are arranged alphabetically in four sections: legislative branch; judicial branch; executive branch; and agencies, boards, and commissions.
Congressional Liaison Offices of Selected Federal Agencies
This list of about 150 congressional liaison offices is intended to help congressional offices in placing telephone calls and addressing correspondence to government agencies. Entries are arranged alphabetically in four sections: legislative branch; judicial branch; executive branch; and agencies, boards, and commissions.
Congressional Liaison Offices of Selected Federal Agencies
This list of about 150 congressional liaison offices is intended to help congressional offices in placing telephone calls and addressing correspondence to government agencies. In each case, the information was supplied by the agency itself and is current as of the date of publication. Entries are arranged alphabetically in four sections: legislative branch; judicial branch; executive branch; and agencies, boards, and commissions.
Congressional Liaison Offices of Selected Federal Agencies
This list of about 150 congressional liaison offices is intended to help congressional offices in placing telephone calls and addressing correspondence to government agencies. In each case, the information was supplied by the agency itself and is current as of the date of publication. Entries are arranged alphabetically in four sections: legislative branch; judicial branch; executive branch; and agencies, boards, and commissions.
Congressional Liaison Offices of Selected Federal Agencies
This list of about 200 congressional liaison offices is intended to help congressional offices in placing telephone calls and addressing correspondence to government agencies. In each case, the information was supplied by the agency itself and is current as of the date of publication. Entries are arranged alphabetically in four sections: legislative branch; judicial branch; executive branch; and agencies, boards, and commissions.
Congressional Liaison Offices of Selected Federal Agencies
This list of about 150 congressional liaison offices is intended to help congressional offices in placing telephone calls and addressing correspondence to government agencies. In each case, the information was supplied by the agency itself and is current as of the date of publication. Entries are arranged alphabetically in four sections: legislative branch; judicial branch; executive branch; and agencies, boards, and commissions.
Federal Funding Gaps: A Brief Overview
This report provides background information regarding the Antideficiency Act (31 U.S.C. 1341 1342, 1511-1519) that generally bars the obligation of funds in the absence of appropriations. The report discusses the interval during the fiscal year when appropriations for a particular project or activity are not enacted into law, either in the form of a regular appropriations act or a continuing resolution (CR), which are referred to as a funding gap.
Federal Funding Gaps: A Brief Overview
This report provides background information on funding gaps since FY 1977, and it discusses the general practice of the federal government when a funding gap occurs.
2012-2013 Presidential Election Period: National Security Considerations and Options
This report discusses historical national security-related presidential transition activities, provides a representative sampling of national security issues a new Administration may encounter, and offers considerations and options relevant to each of the five phases of the presidential election period. Each phase has distinct challenges and opportunities for the incoming Administration, the outgoing Administration, and Congress. This report is intended to provide a framework for national security considerations during the current election period and will be updated to reflect the election outcome.
Regular Vetoes and Pocket Vetoes: In Brief
This report presents information on the process by which Congress can override regular vetoes, the number of vetoes by each President, and the use of vetoes in relation to appropriations acts.
Speed of Presidential and Senate Actions on Supreme Court Nominations, 1900 - 2009
This report provides information on the amount of time taken to act on all Supreme Court nominations occurring between 1900 and the present. It focuses on the actual amounts of time that Presidents and the Senate have taken to act (as opposed to the elapsed time between official points in the process). This report focuses on when the Senate became aware of the President's selection (e.g., via a public announcement by the President).
Impeachment: An Overview of Constitutional Provisions, Procedure, and Practice
On June 19, 2009, the House voted to impeach U.S. District Judge Samuel B. Kent of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The impeachment process provides a mechanism for removal of the President, Vice President, and other federal civil officers found to have engaged in "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors." This report explains the impeachment process, including its history and the process itself.
Impeachment: An Overview of Constitutional Provisions, Procedure, and Practice
On June 19, 2009, the House voted to impeach U.S. District Judge Samuel B. Kent of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The impeachment process provides a mechanism for removal of the President, Vice President, and other federal civil officers found to have engaged in "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors." This report explains the impeachment process, including its history and the process itself.
War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance
Two separate but closely related issues confront Congress each time the President introduces armed forces into a situation abroad that conceivably could lead to their involvement in hostilities. One issue concerns the division of war powers between the President and Congress, whether the use of armed forces falls within the purview of the congressional power to declare war and the War Powers Resolution. The other issue is whether or not Congress concurs in the wisdom of the action. A longer-term issue is whether the War Powers Resolution is an appropriate and effective means of assuring congressional participation in actions that might get the United States involved in war.
War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance
Two separate but closely related issues confront Congress each time the President introduces armed forces into a situation abroad that conceivably could lead to their involvement in hostilities. One issue concerns the division of war powers between the President and Congress, whether the use of armed forces falls within the purview of the congressional power to declare war and the War Powers Resolution. The other issue is whether or not Congress concurs in the wisdom of the action. A longer-term issue is whether the War Powers Resolution is an appropriate and effective means of assuring congressional participation in actions that might get the United States involved in war.
War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance
This report discusses two separate but closely-related issues regarding the introduction of U.S. armed forces abroad that conceivably could lead to their involvement in hostilities. One issue concerns the division of war powers between the President and Congress, whether the use of armed forces falls within the purview of the congressional power to declare war and the War Powers Resolution. The other issue is whether or not Congress concurs in the wisdom of the action. A longer-term issue is whether the War Powers Resolution is an appropriate and effective means of assuring congressional participation in actions that might get the United States involved in war.
War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance
Two separate but closely related issues confront Congress each time the President introduces armed forces into a situation abroad that conceivably could lead to their involvement in hostilities. One issue concerns the division of war powers between the President and Congress, whether the use of armed forces falls within the purview of the congressional power to declare war and the War Powers Resolution. The other issue is whether or not Congress concurs in the wisdom of the action. A longer-term issue is whether the War Powers Resolution is an appropriate and effective means of assuring congressional participation in actions that might get the United States involved in war.
Recess Appointments: A Legal Overview
This report provides an overview of the Recess Appointments Clause, exploring its historical application and legal interpretation by the executive branch, the courts, and the Comptroller General. Furthermore, congressional legislation designed to prevent the President's overuse or misuse of the Clause is also explored.
Recess Appointments: Frequently Asked Questions
This report supplies brief answers to some frequently asked questions regarding recess appointments. These are appointments to high-level policy-making positions in federal departments which are generally confirmed by the Senate. When the Senate is in recess, the President may make a temporary appointment, called a recess appointment, to any such position without Senate approval.
Presidential Appointee Positions Requiring Senate Confirmation and Committees Handling Nominations
Report that identifies, by Senate committee, presidentially appointed positions requiring Senate confirmation based on referrals as of the date of passage of S. 679, which became P.L. 112-166 on August 10, 2012. It begins with a brief description of the referral process and identify, for each committee to which referrals have been made, the positions that fall within the committee's jurisdiction.
Export Administration Act of 1979 Reauthorization
The Export Administration Act of 2001 was introduced on January 23, 2001. Hearings were held by the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, and the bill was reported for consideration by the full Senate by a vote of 19-1 to March 22, 2001. A companion version in the House, H.R. 2581, was introduced by Rep. Gilmanon July 20, 2001. The House International Relations Committee reported the measure with 35 amendments on August 1. The Export Administration Act of 1979 expired on August 20, 2001, however the President extended export control authority and the Export Administration Regulations by invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. During the 106th Congress, both houses held hearings on export control legislation and the Senate Banking Committee voted to adopt the Export Administration Act of 1999 (S. 1712, reported on October 8, 1999, S.Rept. 106-180).
Export Administration Act of 1979 Reauthorization
The Export Administration Act of 2001 was introduced on January 23, 2001. Hearings were held by the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, and the bill was reported for consideration by the full Senate by a vote of 19-1 to March 22, 2001. A companion version in the House, H.R. 2581, was introduced by Rep. Gilmanon July 20, 2001. The House International Relations Committee reported the measure with 35 amendments on August 1. The Export Administration Act of 1979 expired on August 20, 2001, however the President extended export control authority and the Export Administration Regulations by invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. During the 106th Congress, both houses held hearings on export control legislation and the Senate Banking Committee voted to adopt the Export Administration Act of 1999 (S. 1712, reported on October 8, 1999, S.Rept. 106-180).
Export Administration Act of 1979 Reauthorization
The Export Administration Act of 2001 was introduced on January 23, 2001. Hearings were held by the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, and the bill was reported for consideration by the full Senate by a vote of 19-1 to March 22, 2001. A companion version in the House, H.R. 2581, was introduced by Rep. Gilmanon July 20, 2001. The House International Relations Committee reported the measure with 35 amendments on August 1. The Export Administration Act of 1979 expired on August 20, 2001, however the President extended export control authority and the Export Administration Regulations by invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. During the 106th Congress, both houses held hearings on export control legislation and the Senate Banking Committee voted to adopt the Export Administration Act of 1999 (S. 1712, reported on October 8, 1999, S.Rept. 106-180).
War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance
Two separate but closely related issues confront Congress each time the President introduces armed forces into a situation abroad that conceivably could lead to their involvement in hostilities. One issue concerns the division of war powers between the President and Congress, whether the use of armed forces falls within the purview of the congressional power to declare war and the War Powers Resolution. The other issue is whether or not Congress concurs in the wisdom of the action. A longer-term issue is whether the War Powers Resolution is an appropriate and effective means of assuring congressional participation in actions that might get the United States involved in war.
Item Veto and Expanded Impoundment Proposals
In recent years conflicting budget priorities and divided political control have accentuated the institutional tensions between the executive and legislative branches inherent in the federal budget process. President Clinton, like his two predecessors, called for an item veto, or possibly expanded impoundment authority, to provide him with greater control over federal spending. This report provides a brief history of impoundment and discusses the debate surrounding the line item veto.
Item Veto and Expanded Impoundment Proposals
In recent years conflicting budget priorities and divided political control have accentuated the institutional tensions between the executive and legislative branches inherent in the federal budget process. President Clinton, like his two predecessors, called for an item veto, or possibly expanded impoundment authority, to provide him with greater control over federal spending. This report provides a brief history of impoundment and discusses the debate surrounding the line item veto.
Item Veto and Expanded Impoundment Proposals
In recent years conflicting budget priorities and divided political control have accentuated the institutional tensions between the executive and legislative branches inherent in the federal budget process. President Clinton, like his two predecessors, called for an item veto, or possibly expanded impoundment authority, to provide him with greater control over federal spending. This report provides a brief history of impoundment and discusses the debate surrounding the line item veto.
Item Veto and Expanded Impoundment Proposals
In recent years conflicting budget priorities and divided political control have accentuated the institutional tensions between the executive and legislative branches inherent in the federal budget process. President Clinton, like his two predecessors, called for an item veto, or possibly expanded impoundment authority, to provide him with greater control over federal spending. This report provides a brief history of impoundment and discusses the debate surrounding the line item veto.
Item Veto and Expanded Impoundment Proposals
In recent years conflicting budget priorities and divided political control have accentuated the institutional tensions between the executive and legislative branches inherent in the federal budget process. President Clinton, like his two predecessors, called for an item veto, or possibly expanded impoundment authority, to provide him with greater control over federal spending. This report provides a brief history of impoundment and discusses the debate surrounding the line item veto.
Item Veto and Expanded Impoundment Proposals
In recent years conflicting budget priorities and divided political control have accentuated the institutional tensions between the executive and legislative branches inherent in the federal budget process. President Clinton, like his two predecessors, called for an item veto, or possibly expanded impoundment authority, to provide him with greater control over federal spending. This report provides a brief history of impoundment and discusses the debate surrounding the line item veto.
Item Veto and Expanded Impoundment Proposals
On February 3, 2003, President Bush transmitted his budget submission for FY2004, which again contained some proposals for reform of the budget process, including a reformulated line item veto for the President. This report discusses the history of the line item veto and examines the policy debate regarding the issue.
Item Veto and Expanded Impoundment Proposals
No Description Available.
Item Veto and Expanded Impoundment Proposals
No Description Available.
Item Veto and Expanded Impoundment Proposals
In recent years conflicting budget priorities and divided political control have accentuated the institutional tensions between the executive and legislative branches inherent in the federal budget process. President Clinton, like his two predecessors, called for an item veto, or possibly expanded impoundment authority, to provide him with greater control over federal spending. This report provides a brief history of impoundment and discusses the debate surrounding the line item veto.
Item Veto and Expanded Impoundment Proposals
In recent years conflicting budget priorities and divided political control have accentuated the institutional tensions between the executive and legislative branches inherent in the federal budget process. President Bush, like his recent predecessors, has called for an item veto, or possibly expanded impoundment authority, to provide him with greater control over federal spending. This report provides a brief history of impoundment and discusses the debate surrounding the line item veto.
Item Veto and Expanded Impoundment Proposals
In recent years conflicting budget priorities and divided political control have accentuated the institutional tensions between the executive and legislative branches inherent in the federal budget process. President Clinton, like his two predecessors, called for an item veto, or possibly expanded impoundment authority, to provide him with greater control over federal spending. This report provides a brief history of impoundment and discusses the debate surrounding the line item veto.
War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance
No Description Available.
War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance
No Description Available.
War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance
No Description Available.
War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance
No Description Available.
War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance
No Description Available.
War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance
No Description Available.
War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance
No Description Available.
War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance
No Description Available.
War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance
No Description Available.
War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance
No Description Available.