

NORTH TEXAS STATE UNIVERSITY  
ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION  
NUMBER  
500

Interview with  
SENATOR OSCAR MAUZY  
August 2, 1979

Place of Interview: Dallas, Texas

Interviewer: Ronald E. Marcello

Terms of Use: upon my death

Approved:

Oscar T. Mauzy  
(Signature)

Date:

July 23, 1980

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Oral History Collection

Senator Oscar Mauzy

Interviewer: Ronald E. Marcello

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Dr. Marcello: This is Ron Marcello interviewing Senator Oscar Mauzy for the North Texas State University Oral History Collection. The interview is taking place on August 2, 1979, in Dallas, Texas. I'm interviewing Senator Mauzy in order to get his reminiscences and experiences and impressions while he was a member of the 66th Texas Legislature.

Senator Mauzy, let's kind of begin this interview where we left off the last time. As I recall, we had been talking about the 66th Legislature and when Attorney General Hill would be the next governor. Of course, things changed rather drastically from that last interview that we had. What was it like, and I'm sure you've been asked this many times, working with a Republican governor?

Senator Mauzy: Well, it really wasn't any different than working with other "Republican" governors in the past. The only substantive different was that this Republican governor admitted he was a Republican from the outset. But his conduct, his behavior, and his attitude in office was similar to other governors in their first term. He had to go through

the learning process. He didn't understand the legislative procedures; he didn't understand really how state government operated. I'm not being critical when I say that--it's a fact. He's acknowledged as much himself. I didn't really see any difference between him and other first-term governors who had come in from the outside, except, as I say, he admits to being a Republican. I think that's good; I believe in candor in politics.

Marcello: One of the things that struck me was that he would take a very, very strong position on a particular piece of legislation and threaten to veto it if it weren't passed in the manner in which he desired. Of course, in the process he would take some of his supporters with him, and then somewhere down the line he seemed to have to bow to legislative realities and have to back off a little bit. That had to be embarrassing at times to some of the people in the Legislature that were supporting his programs.

Mauzy: Not really because, really, all he was doing was acknowledging that he didn't understand the rules and didn't understand the ropes. He's the first to admit, as he has to me privately, that he shot off his mouth about things he didn't know anything about, and shouldn't have. I do think that it's somewhat ironic for this particular fellow to get caught that way, though, because, you know, basically he's been running against President Carter ever since he announced for governor of Texas

in the Republican primary. His main criticism of the President has been that the President's wishy-washy and waffles all the time, and I think there's some validity to that charge. Yet here he comes along, and he's going to be the strong, decisive man, the one-man show, the chief executive who's going to be the manager and get things done, and he falls into the same trap. He announces he's going to veto the usury rate increase on mortgage loans if it's passed and then three weeks later has to eat his words and back off and sign it. There were several other incidences.

Marcello: I think he had to do the same thing on the budget bill, did he not?

Mauzy: Yes. Well, there again, he didn't understand when he got into office the state budgeting process and how an appropriations bill is put together. That again is perfectly understandable to me. He didn't understand that the governor--the chief executive in Texas--does not as a practical matter propose and get adopted an executive budget. We're going to work from the Legislative Budget Board whether it's a Republican governor, a Democratic governor, or whomever. So I think that he's learned a lot in the last seven months.

Marcello: How would you compare or contrast him with his predecessor, Governor Briscoe, that is, in terms of his conception of the governor's role in the governing process?

Mauzy: I think at this point in his development he better understands

the governor's role than Briscoe ever did. I think when he started out, Briscoe had a better understanding than Clements did the first day he took the oath. The main difference I see is, first of all, that Clements is much more open--he's much more candid--than Briscoe was. He is much more accessible to the press, to the people, and to the members of the Legislature. He's a much more dynamic individual. I think he has learned now not to do a lot of the popping off that he was, I think, rightly criticized for early in his term. He still, I think, is going through that learning process, and I think he's maturing with it.

Marcello: So in essence, then, are you saying that he is a fast learner in a sense, and maybe you will see him being a little bit more practical the second time he has to deal with the Legislature?

Mauzy: Yes, I think he's a bright man. I don't think there's any question about that. I think he has the same kind of pre-arrived-at judgments, predilections, biases, and prejudices, as we all have about certain things, that he feels strongly about. He has been willing to sit down and learn.

The place I would fault him the greatest would be in the selection of his staff. I thought he could have done much better than he did in the people that he hired to run his operations for him because, again, most of them came in totally from the outside without any experience, and they

had to go through the learning process, also. Hopefully, that will improve because where you see the breakdown in state government is when a governor surrounds himself with people who are as incompetent as he is--or maybe more so--and who don't understand how to get something done, how to get things moving, how to get to the desired result. We see that right now in Clements' office, for example, in the actions he's taking on recommendations of the Board of Pardons and Paroles. He's turning down an awful lot of paroles that the Board is recommending on what I consider to be just totally unjustifiable reasons. Again, I think it's because the people he's got running that operation for him do not understand the role that the governor has to play and the role that the Board of Pardons and Paroles has to play. Hopefully, that will improve, too.

Marcello: I noticed that one of the people that he elected as a legislative liaison was a former member of the Legislature. I'm referring to Jim Kaster from El Paso.

Mauzy: He actually had three former House members, all allegedly Democrats--Kaster from El Paso; Cavness, who was in the House from Austin; and Hillery Doran, who was in the House from Del Rio. That caused some comment over on the Senate side. There's always going to be this dichotomy between the House and the Senate. It's a point of view that I don't personally happen to share but a number of my colleagues do--that a

governor is, in effect, insulting the Senate when all of his legislative liaison people are former members of the House and none of them are former members of the Senate.

But over and above that, Kaster has no respect--and never did have--in the Legislature, either on the House or the Senate side, from people who served with him. He has a tendency, and always has had, to shoot from the hip and be a little immoderate. The best example of that occurred (chuckle) the day when he was appointed by the governor. He held a press conference and said, "Well, you know, this governor's going to do well and I'm going to do well, but more importantly the people of El Paso County are going to do well now because for the first time they've got somebody down here who can get something done for them. The El Paso delegation in the House and the senator from El Paso are total nincompoops, and they couldn't pass gas!" Well, of course, that went over big with the four members of the House from El Paso County and the senator from El Paso (chuckle).

Marcello: That isn't the sort of thing the legislative liaison is supposed to say.

Mauzy: No. Then, of course, Cavness had some friends when he was in the House. I think his effectiveness was somewhat diminished by the fact that he continued to run his insurance agency while he was working for the governor.

Hillery Doran is well-liked by almost everybody in the



Legislature. I like him very much personally. I never voted the same way he did when he was in the House, but he's a likeable fellow. He'll level with you. I think Doran was the best of the three the governor picked, personally.

Marcello: Let's take a look at some of the specific pieces of legislation. I'm sure, as usual, that an inordinate amount of your time was taken up with the education bill, was it not?

Mauzy: Yes, it was but, as you know from past talks, that's a labor of love for me, and I don't consider it inordinate--whatever time it takes. This year we came out with a pretty good school finance bill, actually.

Marcello: Describe how you went about formulating the bill that you presented and why you presented that particular bill.

Mauzy: Well, of course, I had assumed as everyone else had that John Hill was going to be elected governor before the session started, and consequently my pre-election day plans got changed dramatically (chuckle). Hill was committed to declaring education the number-one legislative priority. He was going to declare it as an emergency. The net effect of that would have been that for the first time we would have passed a school finance bill before we passed an appropriations bill.

With the election of Clements, of course, that all went out the window, and it was back to business as usual, which means you pass the appropriations bill first, and then whatever's

left you try to shoehorn the needs of education into that diminished-size box.

The bill had already been drawn before the election. I went ahead and introduced it in that same way, and then we went about the business that we've had to do in the past, and that is to scale it down to resources that were available after we could see what the total cost of the appropriations bill was going to be.

Marcello: One of the figures I saw was \$1.9 billion. Is that what you originally started with? Was that the original proposal?

Mauzy: That's right. It would have required \$1.9 billion in new state money for the educational system, but let me hasten to say that about \$600 million of that was so-called tax relief for the reimbursement to the local districts. So, really and truly, the cost difference in terms of new money going into program would have been about \$1.3 billion.

Marcello: How closely would you have had to work with Senator Grant Jones in this education bill? In other words, his committee, I would assume, was handling the tax relief bill, and I guess whatever education bill you came up with would be predicated to some extent on the type of tax relief measure to come out of the Senate Finance Committee.

Mauzy: Yes. The way it worked out this time . . . because Clements would not declare education to be the priority matter, you had to work very closely in dove-tailing three bills--the general

appropriations bill, the so-called tax relief bill or House Bill 1060, and the school finance bill--because they kept playing musical chairs, swapping things around from one bill to the other. Had we been able to proceed and pass the education bill first, there would have still been some of that necessary but not nearly as much as would have been necessary.

Marcello: I think one of the difficulties between the legislative bill and what the governor wanted involved teacher salaries, isn't that correct?

Mauzy: That was one of the major differences. It certainly wasn't the only one, but it's the one that drew more public attention than anything else.

By the way, one of the interesting things occurred in the second meeting I had with Clements. He asked Hamp Atkinson, who's chairman of the House Education Committee, and the speaker and lieutenant governor and I to come meet with him and his three legislative liaison people about what we could do on teacher salaries because he had gotten his neck out early and said, "Anything more than 5.1 percent, I'm going to veto." He very candidly admitted--he and his staff--that there had been a mistake, that he shouldn't have said that, but the "fat was in the fire" and what could we do to help him, in effect. It was interesting because he acknowledged all this and then said, "Now I want to listen to you fellows as

to how you think we can pass the school finance bill that I can sign and do as much as we can for education but still not make me look bad, in effect, for looking like I'm going back on my word."

Well, Clayton spoke first and said, "Well, I think you ought to reissue your statement that you're going to veto anything over 5.1 percent," and, I mean, Hobby almost jumped out of the chair at that point. He said, "Governor, let me tell you. I don't know about other people, but I can tell you how I feel and how I think the majority of the Senate feels and, I suspect, the majority of the House. Anytime a governor starts saying, 'Veto, veto, veto,' most folks over on our side just start saying, 'Well, let's just put on our veto clothes and our override clothes, and let's just get it on!'"

Then he turned to me and asked me what I thought, and I said, "I think the lieutenant governor is giving you good advice, Governor. There's just no sense in putting people in that position because I think they'll react just the way the lieutenant governor says." Atkinson then agreed with me, and Clayton did 180 degrees.

That's the way it worked out eventually. He never issued another statement about what he would veto and what he wouldn't about education. The way we left it with him was, we were going to do better than 5.1 percent as much as we could within

the constraints we were operating under, and that we might need him at the appropriate time to issue a statement saying, "Yes, he could sign that package," whatever it came down to be on the bottom line. He agreed that he would do that. As it worked out, we didn't have to. But he was perfectly willing to do that which, again, I think is a plus to him, as far as I'm concerned, that he was willing to acknowledge his own mistake.

Marcello: Here again, you mentioned awhile ago that there were three bills that kind of dove-tailed one another. In his original appropriations bill, that is, the one that Governor Clements desired, that would have gutted teacher raises of the type that you wanted, isn't that correct?

Mauzy: Yes, it would have. As I recall, I think he even came up with a concept that Bob Davis has been pushing for some time-- putting the teacher salary schedule in the appropriations bill and not in a separate school finance bill, which seems to me to be playing Russian roulette and would have let him, of course, line-item veto all that. I'm not particularly interested in giving him or any other governor that kind of power.

Marcello: I also noticed, I think, in the education bill that the issue of equalization perhaps wasn't as great this time. At least the newspapers didn't seem to play it up as much.

Mauzy: That's not true. This school finance bill is the most equalizing

bill that we've passed since I've been there. It's better even than House Bill 1026 that we passed four years ago when we went to the single-factor formula, basically for two reasons. First, the equalization formula has been rewritten to really see that more of that money gets to the poor districts than to the average and above-average districts. Secondly, we changed the formula on compensatory education by changing from the federal Title One definition, which requires you to base it on census tracts of the 1970 census. We changed it to the March, 1979, figures for children who qualified for free or reduced school lunches. By doing so, we added 330,000 kids to the program; and by doing it that way, we in effect flow the equalization money to the individual campus. We follow the disadvantaged child to the individual campus rather than cutting it off at the district level as we always had in the past.

So although we didn't have as much money to spend on education as I would have preferred, and we did not do everything we should have done, particularly in the field of salaries and other programs, the equalization and compensatory education features of this bill are the best we've ever done.

Marcello: Maybe I didn't phrase my question right. It seemed as though there wasn't as much controversy and so on over equalization as perhaps there had been in the past.

Mauzy: Well, I think that's true. First of all, the Administrators

Association had been told to lay low by everybody, that they weren't particularly welcome in anybody's office--not just the governor but the lieutenant governor, the speaker, my office, Chairman Atkinson's office on the House side. To some extent, the TSTA crowd was told the same thing. You know, we had had them potshotting at us in the past and sometimes had followed their advice and their recommendations, and it turned out not to be the way they had represented their program to be. So all of us, I think, were operating a little freer this time. Consequently I think our individual staffs were able to do a better job, and we were able to do a better job, in actually getting to an objective bill without the extreme pressure of the organized lobby from the administrators and the TSTA or the School Board Association or any of the so-called educational groups.

Marcello: You mentioned awhile ago that the bill was not everything that you wanted. What were some of the areas where you would have liked to have seen improvements or other things added?

Mauzy: Well, I would have liked to have done away with all the hold harmless clauses that are in the present law and the new ones that were added this time. I would have liked to have put more money into the salary schedule for teachers. I would have liked to have expanded some existing programs. We did fairly well in special education this year, but we could have done better. I would have liked to have channeled more

of the funding mechanism into the weighted student approach again--the business of designing the program to meet the individual needs of the individual child and paying for it on that basis. If I had to grade this bill on the basis of one to 100, again, considering the bottom line of the number of dollars that we had for that purpose, I'd say this bill was 88 or 89 percent good.

Marcello: How much time do you as chairman of the Education Committee spend upon a bill of this nature during the session?

Mauzy: Well, first, this year I didn't really have to spend as much as I had in years past because of this new kind of freedom that we had from just constant harangue and pressure from the organized educational groups; secondly because Atkinson, the chairman on the House side, is just a much easier fellow to work with and had a better staff on the House side; third, the House Education Committee was a better committee this time, particularly with Ron Coleman from El Paso being on there. I give Ron Coleman 85 percent of the credit for the final version of the bill that we got passed. He took over that committee--in effect took it away from the chairman--and got his votes lined up every time and really turned it around. A combination of all those factors made in terms of hours spent . . . I don't think I spent more than 65 percent of the hours this time that we spent two years ago.

Marcello: Coleman evidently is one of the real up-and-coming legislators



in Austin.

Mauzy: There's no question in my mind about it. I think of all the members of the House and Senate, both, if I had to grade people in terms of competency, ability, dedication, knowing how to get the job done and then getting it done, and being on the right side of the issue, too, Coleman would be in the top three or four in both the House and the Senate.

Marcello: Awhile ago when we were talking about the education bill, we were talking about the bill concerning tax relief. This is one, of course, which was handled in Senator Jones' committee. Was there very much communication and so on between you and Senator Jones relative to what was taking place over in that committee on tax relief?

Mauzy: Yes, there was. Grant Jones, again, is an easy fellow to work with, too, as the chairman of the Finance Committee--much easier to work with than Senator Aiken was, for example.

Marcello: In what way?

Mauzy: Well, Grant is, first of all, more knowledgeable about education. He serves on the Education Committee, too, and is frankly the best member I've got on that committee in terms of really seeing through all the garbage and getting down to what the real issue is. Secondly, of course, he was very interested in helping to pass finally some form of the original Peveto Bill, which we were able to do. Hobby and Jones and I worked very closely together on fitting all these pieces together,

and we had that agreement that we would the first day of the session. I didn't anticipate that there'd be any problems between us, and there weren't.

Marcello: I assume that you and the lieutenant governor did work in a cooperative and friendly spirit right up until the time of the presidential primary bill.

Mauzy: Oh, we did after that, too. I'm not mad at Bill Hobby about the "Killer Bee" incident. He's not mad at me, I don't think. I never felt he would be. That was just another fight where some of us felt very strongly on one side, and he felt very strongly on the other side. But I did not expect and I do not expect Hobby to try to visit any kind of retribution on anyone because he's not that kind of a human being. He's not a petty or vindictive man. I've seen no evidence as to me or anyone else that he is trying to discipline anybody. I think he's too smart. I think he knows he couldn't. If he tried to get away with that, that's the one thing the Senate would unite 31-0 about.

Marcello: We'll talk more about the activities of the "Killer Bees" later on, I hope, and probably I guess near the end of this interview.

Let's talk about some of the other measures. It just struck me that, in this particular session of the Legislature, there were also quite a few bills that I would perhaps call "anti-consumer-type bills." As a trial lawyer, I would assume that you were perhaps interested in some of those and

probably opposed to most of them. Where is Bill Meier coming from?

Mauzy: Oh, I think it's obvious where Bill Meier has been, where he is, and where he's going to. Bill Meier's totally on the make to whomever can finance him for whatever particular purpose they seek to advance because he's wanting very much to run for lieutenant governor in 1982. Bill's a very capable guy. He does his homework; he's a hard worker. He suffers, in my opinion, from a personality flaw that I call the "Nazi syndrome." He won't permit anyone to question his sincerity or wisdom in certain things and really kind of talks down his nose to people when you try and point out legitimately what it is that he's trying to do in the consumer protection bill, for example. I took him on on the class action section, which I know as much about as he does--no more but I know as much as he does--and he just refused to debate the merits of the thing with me when it's obvious he had the votes and he was going to prevail. I think that's a bad legislative tactic to ever take that kind of attitude that you are not going to defend publicly the positions you're taking, especially when you've got the votes.

See, Meier made himself a very powerful and wealthy individual by serving on the Sunset Commission for the last two years. It's interesting to note that Hobby did not reappoint him to the Sunset Commission, too.

Marcello: What do you mean when you said it made him a powerful and wealthy individual?

Mauzy: Just what I said. He wound up voting with the lobby on every one of those Sunset deals, and he didn't do that for nothing! Schwartz and Snelson and Døggett, I thought, did a good job on the Senate side with the Sunset Commission, and I think the majority of the House members did, too. The Sunset Commission's reports were by and large, I thought, excellent, but in every instance where the organized lobby of that particular group was not willing to let the Sunset Commission process work, Bill Meier was their hatchet man-- whether you're talking about the State Bar or whether you're talking about the beauticians or barbers or any group you want to name. I think that was a very great disappointment to Bill Hobby, and I think that's the reason Bill Meier's not on there the next two years.

Marcello: Why was it that consumers to some extent seemed to take a beating in this legislative session? At least the consumer legislation that was passed seemed to be of the nature that was detrimental to the interests of consumers.

Mauzy: I think the main reason was because Bill Clements was elected governor. Most of that garbage that got passed and signed never would have been seriously introduced and pushed if Hill had been governor because Hill was committed to vetoing it and would have vetoed it. He wouldn't have had to veto

it because it never would have passed.

Marcello: Of course, as attorney general, he had vigorously enforced the original Consumer Protection Act of 1973, had he not?

Mauzy: Yes, he had. I thought that was one of the main reasons he won the Democratic primary and beat Briscoe, because of the record he had made as attorney general in representing the interest of defrauded people and consumers generally. So if Hill had won the election, it never would have happened.

I think what happened is, when the lobby woke up that Wednesday morning after the election and saw that Hill had lost and that Clements had won, they immediately . . . of course, they had already counted their votes, and they knew pretty well where their votes were. But they said, "My God! This removes the obstacle now." The votes in the House and the Senate didn't change all that much. We never had a majority (chuckle). We all knew that before the session started, too.

But the difference was that Bill Clements would not veto things that John Hill would. John Hill would never have permitted that documentary fee bill for car dealers to get out of committee. He'd just pass the word, you know, "If you clowns do that, man, you are dead!" And it's the same way with the Consumer "Destruction" Act, which it has been more properly been called.

A few things that we were able to kill, well, the Products

Liability Bill, for example, passed the House--with a very good amendment on it, by the way. My friend Bob Maloney, who is a Republican member from the Dallas County, put on an amendment that required insurance companies to list their investment income, which has been a pet project of mine for ten years. And for a Republican to be able to do that is really something. I was over there the night that they passed it. He put that amendment on something like 112-28, and, of course, the first thing the Senate Committee did was take it off, and when they did that effectively killed the bill. They never got it up because we were able to hold thirteen votes to not suspend the rules.

In all three of those instances, those bills would never seriously have gotten out of committee and been considered on the floor of either the House or the Senate because Hill would have just passed the word that he was going to veto them. I think, in answer to your question, the day after the election, when the lobby saw that Clements was governor, they thought, "Boy, we got us a new ballgame here!" And they were right.

Marcello: How about the bill that raised the legal interest rate?

That's kind of a little bit different matter, is it not?

Mauzy: Yes. I don't know what Hill's position would have been on that because that never was an issue during the campaign. Nobody talked about it. There are legitimate arguments that

can be made to raise the interest rate. I voted against it because in my judgment they had not carried the burden of proof. Thank goodness, the House at least put that amendment on that self-destructs in two years, so that we will get another chance to take a look at it. That bill, though, to me represents the growing-up process in Bill Clements when he let himself . . . and frankly, we're the ones that created all the heat and pressure to make him come out originally and say he was going to veto it. He bit that bait, and then he had to back up. I think he hurt himself with the people of Texas when he did, but it's the law now for at least two years.

Marcello: Let's talk a little bit more about that so-called usury bill. You mentioned that certain senators were in effect putting the heat on Governor Clements. What did you mean by that?

Mauzy: Well, we had two strategies on that particular bill. There were a number of the fellows who were committed to vote for it if it got to that point, but we all got together--nine or ten of us who were opposed to it and had decided we would never vote for it--with three or four of the other ones who were committed to vote for it if it got to that point but who didn't want to if they didn't have to. And so we developed the strategy of all of us telling the lobby the same thing, and that is, "Look, we're tired of getting cut up on everything over here. Y'all get the House to pass it first. That's

the first thing. We are not going to vote to consider a Senate bill. You're going to have to get a House bill out and pass it through the House and then get it over here before we'll even talk to you about it."

Secondly, then, we decided, well, the House wasn't going to bite that bait. So the thing for us to do is get them off the hook because the House people are telling the lobby the same thing: "You get the Senate to pass it first." You know, it's the oldest thing going down there.

So we jointly decided to tell them we're not going to vote for anything until the governor says whether he's going to veto it or sign it. If he decides he's going to veto it, there's no sense in anybody voting on it. Of course, we publicly then got him committed to veto it by sending him a lot of polls that had been taken and one thing and another that shows that the public was 84 percent against that bill, and rightly so. I can understand that, too. When you ask people, "Would you be in favor of raising what it would cost you to buy a new home over the life of mortgage by 40 percent?" or whatever it came out to be, of course, they're going to say no. That's how we did it.

Marcello: In the meantime, then, of course, the mortgage bankers and so on are putting pressure on, too, are they not?

Mauzy: Yes, but, you see, they didn't have any . . . that's the interesting thing about Clements. None of the organized lobby



had any heat to put on Clements because none of them had supported him in the general election or in the Republican primary, either. The fellow that, I think, was his finance chairman in Dallas, "Bum" Bright, who owns a mortgage company and who is either the owner or a major owner of one of the freight lines here in town . . . Clements vetoed (chuckle) a truck bill that they were interested in. I forgot whether it was a weight bill . . . no, it was the one where they get together and set their own rates, in effect, and just get the Railroad Commission to rubber-stamp them--rate bureaus, they're called. "Bum" Bright went to him and asked him to sign that trucker's bill, and he vetoed it. Then he went to him at the same time and asked him to help him on the savings and loan bill, and it came out that he was going to veto that. So here's "Bum" Bright, who was his biggest supporter, his finance director here in Dallas County, a guy who had done more for him than anybody else, getting turned down! It also, I think, tells you something about Clements' personality. I don't think he's anybody's man. I believe that.

Marcello: Okay, let's talk a little bit about the presidential primary bill and the so-called "Killer Bees." I want you to give me a blow-by-blow account of how this whole episode occurred, from the beginning right up until the time you guys showed up in the Senate again. I'll let you take it from here.

Mauzy: I'll do that, but I'm also going to send you . . . because

I taped my recollections shortly after the session was over and that I have typed now and have sent to Bob Herr, who's probably going to do a book on it along with some of the other guys. I don't have it with me right now. I've loaned my whole file to a friend of mine who's supposed to get it back to me. When I get it back, I'll just send you that and you can attach it.\*

To put the thing in perspective, first of all, the term "Killer Bee" was a term of Bill Hobby's origination, not ours. The way that came about, we were trying to kill the Consumer "Destruction" Act, and the way we were going to go about doing it--we only had nine or perhaps ten votes on our side on that bill--is the age-old classic way that we've always gone about it when we're in that position, and that is to get everybody who's opposed to it to have a legitimate amendment once the rules are suspended and the bill gets up. Each of us has an amendment that we're really interested in, that we feel deeply about, that is legitimate, and we send all those amendments up and we just worked out a little program with each other. Doggett was in charge of this. Each member agrees to talk for three or four or five hours on his amendment. You know that your time is going to be from such-and-such a time to such-and-such a time, and the other guys can go to sleep while you're talking, and they know how to stay in the building where they can be reached five minutes before you're going to sit down

\*See APPENDIX

and vote on the amendment while we go and wake them up and bring them in. That's how we set about it.

It was during my stint . . . I was on my class action amendment from, as I remember, ten o'clock or 10:30 at night until 3:30 or four o'clock in the morning. That was my time period, and I was the fifth or sixth one up.

Everything had been running on schedule, and, as I say, it was the way we always go about trying to filibuster--by amendment--which is appropriate. The Senate had never previously, however, moved the previous question during the legitimate amendment process. There were still six or eight legitimate amendments pending after mine, where the guys were committed to be there and speak on them. So it became obvious to them that that's what we were doing.

I've forgotten who preceded me, but there was some talk that they were going to try and move the previous question on him. They decided not to, and then when I got up and started talking, then they decided they really were going to do it. So about two o'clock that morning Hobby called Doggett up to the desk and said, "You know, I never know where you guys are coming from. You're like a bunch of goddamned killer bees! You're coming from all directions, and it's obvious you're using this amendment process as a mini-filibuster." Doggett said, "That's right, Governor. That's exactly what we're doing, and we're going to continue to!" Hobby said, "Well, you know,

you're entitled to run with your amendments, but you're like a bunch of damned killer bees! You're coming from all directions, and you're stinging me! You're going to kill me!" He said, "We just can't have that!" No, it was Gene Jones he told that to, and Jones then told the press. So, first of all, the term originated with Bill Hobby in April long before the presidential primary ever came along. By the way, I went ahead and talked as long as I wanted to and sat down on my amendment. We voted and then they put the previous question on the next person. They decided not to put it on me. That was all kind of done by agreement, too, like most of those things are.

Now I'll get to the presidential primary. Several of us had been concerned about this the whole session because Hobby made it his number one legislative priority for the entire session early. He first talked to me about it in January, as he did others individually. He wanted the presidential primary held in March. He wanted to move the party primaries--the nominating primaries--back until July. Both of those are concepts that I don't have any disagreement with. He wanted a presidential primary where the candidate would run, not the phony-baloney delegates like we did last time. He wanted proportionate representation. He wanted all those good things. He wanted it in March, he said, so that Texas could be more influential. I believe him; I think that's his honest opinion.

When I talked to him, I said, "Well, Bill, that's fine. You've got a program I can be with as long as you do one other thing, and that is that you leave the present law the way it is." When you vote in the primary of a party, the present law is that you shall remain a member of that party for the rest of that calendar year. He said, "Well, no, we're going to change that and make it from April 1st to April 1st." I said, "So what you're going to be doing is encouraging crossover voting. That's too heavy a price to pay. Don't include me. As a matter of fact, if you'd let me put on my party purity amendment--if you could get your folks to agree to that--then we can do business right here."

Marcello: What was your party purity amendment?

Mauzy: It's the one I run with every year. It just says that when you register to vote, you declare yourself a Democrat, a Republican, an independent, or whatever. You shall remain a member of that party and be allowed to participate only in the primary of that party--unless you change. Then you've got thirty days before a primary election to change. It's the same law that prevails in nineteen or twenty American states right now. Of course, Hobby doesn't like the party purity amendment, so we never were able to accomplish any business on that front.

As the session went along, it became more and more obvious what was really behind this. It wasn't to help John Connally.

Bill Hobby's got no interest in helping John Connally after John Connally tried his best to beat Bill Hobby's ass in '72 with his brother Wayne. So there was obviously no love lost there. But I'm convinced what was motivating Hobby was some of the more conservative members of the Senate who don't vote with Hobby, and that's what I've never understood about this deal. They convinced Hobby, and I think rightly so, that if there's a presidential primary held on the same day as the nominating primaries, they're going to get their ass beat in the primary. Those are specifically Bill Moore, Jack Ogg, Tom Creighton, Grant Jones, and Tati Santiesteban. Now of those five, the only one that Hobby can depend on almost all the time is Santiesteban. He can't depend on Moore; he can't depend on Creighton; he can't depend on Ogg. They vote against Hobby's position more often than they vote for it. Grant Jones votes with Hobby quite a lot, but he's not totally dependable, either, from Hobby's standpoint. So that's what I've never understood about this whole deal. Hobby had nothing involved personally--he's not running in 1980--so there's nothing in it for him. But he got strung out on this thing early on and went to the wall with them.

Marcello: Of course, you can take this business of the conservatives one step farther. Coming up pretty shortly--I guess in the next legislative session--will be the congressional redistricting once again, isn't that correct?

Mauzy: Well, both congressional and legislative redistricting. Of course, that's a factor, also, which is one reason we were so very vitally interested, too. You know, my side is going to be running candidates in 1980 against some incumbents both in the House and the Senate with the hope that we will elect a majority for the 1981 session, which will be the redistricting session, with the hope that we will pass a constitutional redistricting bill which will put the seats where the people are. You know, regardless of who draws the redistricting bill in '81, the elections of 1982 will result in the first urban-dominated Legislature in the history of Texas because that's where the bodies are. I don't care who draws the lines. That is going to be a fact!

I do care about who draws the lines, obviously, because while we'll have an urban majority, we can have a better urban majority if my side draws the lines because we'll quarantine the Republicans. We'll give them districts that are so "gut cinch" Republican that we'll never touch them. We'll make them 110 percent Republican. By doing that, we also change some presently marginal districts into heavy Democratic districts where we can win both the primary and the general election. Sure, that's part of it. You bet!

To get on with the "Killer Bee" incident with that background, early in the session Lloyd Doggett had had the rules amended so that anytime the chair was going to lay a

bill out, rather than require a suspension of the rules, he would have to give notice of that twenty-four hours in advance in writing. That's the smartest thing we did all year. When we adopted that rule, nobody really knew what Lloyd was up to except two or three of us because Hobby didn't object to it, and it passed.

That Thursday morning, May 17th or 18th, whatever the day it was, that notice appeared on the Intent Calendar that pursuant to that rule he hereby gives notice that this rule will be invoked..

Friday . . . well, we had an executive session that day, and during the executive session, I said, "Governor, would you mind telling me what your little note to us means here on the Intent Calendar?" He really was as haughty and as arrogant as I've ever seen Bill Hobby. He said, "Senator, it means just what it says." I said, "Well, Bill, would you mind telling us what bill you have in mind?"

Marcello: Did you have a hankering of what bill he did have in mind?

Mauzy: Oh, I knew and everybody else did, too! Hobby's usually very open and obvious with everybody. He tells you what he's up to and why he's doing what he's doing, particularly in executive session. He said, "Senator, it means just what it says." I said, "Well, fuck you, Governor!" I turned around and walked back to my desk and put my feet up on the desk.

Then Doggett tried to ask him the same thing, and he



persisted in this thing that was just as unlike Bill Hobby . . . it's not him! Schwartz asked him; two or three of the guys did. So we knew what he was going to do; we just wanted him to tell everybody.

We got out of executive session and went ahead and worked until noon. At noon we all met down in my office--eight of the group that I call the "Good Guys." We meet regularly once a week down there.

Marcello: Who are those eight?

Mauzy: Who were there? Well, let's see. It was Schwartz, myself, Parker, Clower, Doggett, Patman, Vale, Truan, I think. Some of the rest of the guys couldn't . . . no, Chet Brooks was there, too. They were kind of floating in and out a little as usual, because we all just . . . I said, "Let's just get together for five minutes down in my office. I know everybody's got to go to lunch, and you got to get back for two o'clock committees and all that."

At that point, everybody agreed: "Well, he's going to run with that phony bill tomorrow that they'll then pass it in the Senate in its present form," which was not a bad deal. But once it got to the House, of course, then they would amend it to write the split primary into it and send it back where then the motion would be to concur in House amendments which only require a simple majority, and which just blows us out of the water. That was the reason we had to kill that bill. Everyone

agreed that was what the game plan was.

See, they had gotten it up earlier that week--Tuesday-- and we talked until Tuesday midnight because the rules change at midnight on Tuesday. Monday and Tuesday are Senate bill days; Wednesday and Thursday are House bill days; Friday can be either a House or Senate bill day.

The bill was up; the rules had gotten suspended. He talked some people into voting to suspend the rules on the basis that he wasn't going to write the presidential primary into it. Then to his everlasting credit he told people that that was the plan. We talked until midnight Tuesday, and then put over until Friday morning. By giving the notice on Thursday, he couldn't legitimately under the rules lay the bill out. It was pending business. The bill would then be engrossed. The vote would have been seventeen to engross and fourteen not to engross. But then he could have laid the bill out again because it was on the third reading and did not require suspension of the rules. Therefore, it went to the head of the calendar. There were a couple of other things ahead of it, but they were minor. They would have zipped right through.

We all knew what was happening; we all knew what the rules were. It was decided there at noon that the only practical way we could kill that bill would be to bust a quorum. We tried that before since I've been there. We've done it before, but it's the hardest thing in the world to do.

Some of the younger guys, when we were talking about it that day, took particular umbrage. Schwartz and I were saying, "Now listen. If you guys are going to do this, let me tell you what it means because we've done it before. It ain't easy!" They kind of got "ticked off," you know, thinking, "Yeah, these old bastards have been around here longer than we have, and they're trying to lord it over us." I was chairing the meeting as I always do at the "Good Guys" thing, and I said, "Look, nobody's trying to tell anybody else what to do. It's just to show it to you." Clower and Parker were particularly sensitive on this issue. I said, "I'll tell you what. We'll all agree that we'll try and bust a quorum if we can. Clower, I'm putting you and Parker in charge. Y'all work out the details; you tell us what we have to do."

We had agreed that the only way it would work is if we all got together for breakfast the next morning to see if everybody who said they'd do it would still do it. We knew Brooks was going to be gone; we knew Longoria was going to be gone. The question was, would the other ten of us show up and agree to stick together. That's the way we left it.

Parker and Clower were in charge of making arrangements, first of all to all meet at one place for breakfast, and then they would be in charge of what we did thereafter. That's what happened. The way we left it, I got out the list of everybody's home phone numbers and gave it to Clower. He

and Parker split it between them. They were to call everybody at 7:30 Friday morning and tell them where to be at 8:30 for breakfast. That's what happened.

At 7:30 Friday morning my phone rang at home. Clower said, "Get your pencil out," He gave me the address of where we were to go, which turned out to be Dora McDonald's house on Bridle Path Lane over in Austin. He gave me directions on how to get there. Dora is Carl Parker's . . . she runs his office. She and her husband, Charlie, live there. They have a twenty or twenty-one-year-old daughter who lived in the garage apartment where we wound up.

We all met for breakfast. There were ten of us there. Brooks and Longoria were out of town, and everybody knew that. They were going to be excused. When the other ten of us showed up together, then it indicated to me that it might work. They might be able to pull it off.

I really didn't have any confidence that we'd be able to do it, first of all. Secondly, I thought if we did, we wouldn't have to stay out past noon Friday, that Hobby would "crater" and see . . . because when all that happened during the executive session, I walked around to the other guys . . . see, Hobby was talking about working all day Friday and working Saturday. That doesn't go over good with people.

So I walked around and got the votes committed to adjourn by two o'clock Friday afternoon until Monday to totally avoid

a Saturday session and to totally avoid an afternoon session on Friday. I had eighteen hard votes for that, including a lot of people who were against us on the split primary-- Santiesteban, for one; Bob Price, for another; and some of the other guys. I thought if we pulled it off, we wouldn't have to stay out past noon or maybe two o'clock Friday. That would be the end of it. Well, of course, what I didn't anticipate is that Hobby would really get his back up like he did on this thing.

So we were there--the ten of us--at Dora McDonald's because it was her house, and she served us breakfast. Patman's wife was there. The others, of course, were well-known--who they were. The point is, nobody knew where we were or what we had decided to do. My wife didn't know. She drove me over there and dropped me off in the car. I didn't take a toothbrush; I didn't take a razor. Nobody else did, either. Doggett brought some things with him, and Patman brought some things. But they lived right in the neighborhood, too.

When we saw it could work, we got on the phone to Hobby and told him what we were going to do. He didn't believe us. He didn't think we could do it, which I understand, too.

I called Bill Braecklein down at the Driskill Hotel and told him what we were going to do and invited him to join us. If he felt like he couldn't do that . . . and he didn't. Well, Bill had been suffering from a bad case of the gout all session,

and I said if he'd check himself in Breckenridge Hospital, it would be the same effect as hiding out with us. He felt like he couldn't do that, either. In addition to the twelve of us who were participating in this, Lindon Williams and Braecklein were both going to vote against the bill. Those were our fourteen votes. With those exceptions, nobody else knew where we were.

We were, in the meantime, back and forth in communication with Steve Oakes, who was Hobby's campaign manager and used to be secretary of state for Briscoe. He was probably the closest political friend Hobby has. Oakes agreed with us on this whole thing. He was a former county Democratic chairman in Houston, too. He was kind of our go-between.

The way we had it set up . . . Gene Jones was primarily in charge of all this. Steve was stationed outside a pay phone in the Capitol up on the third floor, and Gene would call him there and say, "Now, Steve, here's who is participating in this. This is our program, and I'm not going to tell you where we're at or anything. This is what we're going to do. You go tell Hobby that all we want from him--we'll come back in five minutes--is assurance that on the third reading, it'll require a suspension of the rules. If not, then we ain't coming back." Those negotiations went back and forth. There were three or four telephone calls from us to him because he didn't know where to reach us, either.

Finally, about 12:30 or 12:45 we talked to Oakes, and he was diligently and faithfully relaying the information from one group to the other--from Hobby to us and from us to Hobby. He said, "Hobby just says for all you guys to forget it. This is war--no negotiations, no compromise." They had already put a call on the Senate by then. He says, "He thinks he can find you. He's going to get you back here, and, by God, he's going to pass that bill if you've got to stay here all weekend!"

We said, "Well, if there's nothing to talk about, there's nothing to talk about." By then we had already moved out into the garage apartment.

Marcello: In other words, you had had breakfast in the house, and then you had moved out to the garage apartment.

Mauzy: Yes, at about eleven o'clock that morning. See, it's got a high wooden fence around it--about a six-foot-high fence--so you can't see from the street into the back yard. We could walk from the house to the garage apartment.

The garage apartment is an old two-car garage that's been converted into an apartment for Charlie's and Dora's daughter, Laura. It's fourteen-by-twenty feet. It has one walk-in closet; it has one bathroom consisting of a tub-shower and a toilet. Then in between those two is a little dressing room area where there was a washbasin. There's a double bed in there; there is a single bed in there. There is a radio; there

is a television set. That's it.

So what we had to do when we moved out there--and none of us really thought we were going to be there very long--we had to sneak in supplies. Dora brought in a double mattress and threw it on the floor, so that gave us five places for people to sleep. By then, there were nine of us. Gene Jones had gotten antsy and left about three o'clock Friday afternoon. Dora also brought in three sleeping bags that she and her family had. That was it, and we just had to go to the wall with them.

We went out there about 10:30 or eleven o'clock that Friday morning, and not one of us, with the exception of Jones leaving, not one of us set foot outside that place until two o'clock Tuesday afternoon, after we had been back in touch with Hobby by phone. We reestablished negotiations and got the deal worked out.

Marcello: What did you do in the meantime while you were there?

Mauzy: Oh, we read. Doggett had the good sense to bring a briefcase full of work with him. There were some books Dora brought us. "Babe" Schwartz managed to read The Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire while we were there, I remember. He also managed to read Barbara Jordan's book. We played cards; we watched television, the news; we listened to the radio; we played poker. We had some booze brought in. We drank some; we slept a lot; we argued a lot. Everybody got on each other's nerves



a lot. It was a pretty grimy experience.

Marcello: What kind of food were you eating?

Mauzy: Well, one night Dora and Charlie got us a bunch of boiled shrimp, and we had a great dinner that night. I liked it! I like boiled shrimp, and it had a lot of red sauce. We had some booze brought in. We had an ice chest and beer and some booze and soft drinks. I insisted on some milk every night for in the morning because I'm a big milk drinker.

With that exception, for breakfast we'd always just have some hot rolls because she did bring us in a little warming thing. They'd bring in cinnamon rolls and hot rolls, milk, coffee. The rest of the time, it was mostly cold cuts. I've eaten my last ham and cheese sandwich for some time, I can tell you.

One night we were going to send out and get a bunch of fried chicken and barbecue and stuff, but it was decided that by that time we just knew that they had to know where we were. They couldn't come get us. See, under the rules they cannot issue a search warrant to come into a private residence, and we knew that. We knew they wouldn't. Doggett had gotten some of his lawyer friends lined up in Austin, in case they went down and tried to get some judge to try and issue a search warrant, to file a motion and quash it. We went to all kinds of . . . we didn't have anything else to do for that period of time except sit around and think about what they're

going to do next and try and plan our moves to counter it,

Marcello: I guess just about every one of you were lawyers, too, weren't you?

Mauzy: Yes. Let me see. Truan's not a lawyer; Kothmann's not a lawyer. I think all the rest of us are. Parker is; I am; Schwartz, Doggett. Patman's a lawyer, but he doesn't practice law actually. Vale is a lawyer. Oh, we never had any doubt about that. That was obvious.

As I say, we got on each other's nerves a lot. There were a couple of times there were almost a couple of fistfights in there (chuckle).

Marcello: Over relatively trivial things?

Mauzy: Yes. Gene Jones suffers from claustrophobia very badly, which I did not know before. He also, just about two weeks before that, had taken an ear prick test or whatever to stop smoking. You know, they punch a hole in your ear or something. Some doctor there in Austin does this. He had quit smoking, and he was just nervous as a pregnant ape on a rotten grapevine-- just pacing inside that room, you know: "I got to get out on the streets; I was born in the streets; I grew up in the streets; I lived in the streets. I can't stand it in here!" Jones was kind of the leader at that point, you know. He was constantly on the phone to Oakes and other people. (Chuckle) He just really got antsy!

Clower had started drinking by then and kind of got to

ragging Jones, and Jones kind of took it personal. And Clower kind of meant it personal. You know, "We can't let you leave. If you leave, then everybody else is going to want to leave. Goddamn it, we can't treat you different! We had an agreement that we were all going to stick together." Jones said, "I can't stay here! I'm going crazy!" So we finally agreed to let him go, but before he did, he and Clower literally almost came to blows.

Then I think it was the next day, Saturday, Clower and Parker both got to drinking a little. Clower said something about, "I'm the 'king bee.'" Parker's got a great sense of humor and is just tough as a boot. He said he was "getting kind of goddamned tired of Clower sleeping during the day and drinking and waking up and taking charge of every goddamned thing." I grabbed Clower and Schwartz grabbed Parker, and that's the only thing that kept them apart. I'm telling you! We were fixing to go to "Fist City."

Marcello: It's hard for me to imagine Schwartz being the moderating influence (chuckle).

Mauzy: Well, you know, it's very interesting doing all this. "Babe" has got the reputation of being the big bomb-throwing liberal, and I do, too. Actually, we were the two most moderate influences in there, seriously. Truan was ready to burn the goddamned place down! So was Vale; so was Parker. It was an incredible 102 hours, I think, we figured out, continually

that we spent in there together,

Marcello: Did you have some sort of a system worked out when telephone calls occurred? Did you have some sort of a code or something like that on when to answer the phone and how people would answer when you called and so on?

Mauzy: Yes, we did. Well, first of all, the phone that's out in the garage apartment rings in the house, too. It's an extension of this one phone. They also have an intercom system where they can buzz each other from the house to the apartment and vice versa, and, also, there is a little talk deal where you can talk back and forth on the intercom.

After we got out there and got organized, we got that system set up, which was that nobody would answer the phone in the apartment because, first of all, nobody knew where we were but the nine of us. Gene Jones obviously knew where we were, and Patman's wife knew where we were because she stayed with us until about the middle of the afternoon Friday. Then we ran her off. Vale's wife knew the phone number because Friday morning, before we had breakfast, he had called Theresa in San Antonio to tell her where he was in case she needed him, and that was before we agreed that nobody would tell anybody. She didn't know where we were; she knew the phone number. Of course, Dora McDonald knew. Gene Jones knew after he left. But with that exception, nobody else knew, which was one of the toughest parts of the whole thing.

It was kind of tough to call your wife and say, "Well, I'm not going to be home tonight. I'm out with the boys, and you've just got to trust me, I can't tell you where I'm at, and I'm not going to tell you." You know, the more people that know something like that, the more likely it is to leak.

So we all took the blood oath, and everybody lived up to it. Doggett's house is only about six blocks from Dora's house, and Libby used to drive down that street going to town (chuckle). She'd drive right by, but she didn't know where we were.

The other thing we did, Doggett's staff would go down and get the tape recordings . . . you know, all the sessions of the Senate are tape-recorded after they were over with. Then she'd pick up those tapes and deliver them to Dora, and Dora would bring them to us. We had a tape recorder, and we'd play them. That's the other thing we did to keep ourselves amused--listen to those clowns bad-mouthing us.

Marcello: What was the reaction when Bill Moore was going to kill all your legislation--I'm using "your" in a collective sense--in the State Affairs Committee?

Mauzy: Oh, we laughed about it. We heard that tape. What we did to counteract it . . . I had left a bunch of signed tags before I left--to tag bills. When we heard that, I got on the phone and got a list of all those bills. I got the word to Terry in my office to fill out those tags--that I had already signed

them--and to put them on every one of our bills that he was going to kill. I know I tagged some of my own bills. Of course, Moore then refused to honor the tag. He said that wasn't my signature, the lying son-of-a-bitch! He's going to regret that the rest of his life. See, that's never happened before in the history of the Senate--that a member had refused to honor another member's tag. He knew that was my signature, and it was! They were legitimate tags. He's going to regret that one.

We managed to stay in touch with what was happening. Just like Gene Jones called (chuckle) . . . whenever the phone would ring, we wouldn't answer it. Dora would answer it inside, and if it was legitimate she'd buzz us, and we'd pick it up.

The other system we finally got to . . . when she was gone during the day, if the phone would ring, we'd pick it up on the first ring, and the person would hang up and we'd hang up. Then they'd call back. We'd pick it up on the first ring and not say anything, and then they'd identify themselves as to who it was.

Gene called us Sunday morning and told us, "You're going to hear on the radio they arrested me in Houston. They didn't; they got my brother, Clayton. I set it all up." He told us all about it, so that came as no surprise, either.

Marcello: Did you ever have any scares while you were there in terms

of thinking that somebody had finally discovered you were there?

Mauzy: Well, no, we didn't about that. Let me say this, also. We kept in touch with Longoria through his wife. He was going to have to go to Edinburg Friday morning to be in court, and we all knew that. He was excused for that day. We arranged with him before he left--Longoria was on our side in this fight--that we would keep in touch with his wife, Earlene, at his law office in Edinburg.

So we would call her. She didn't know where we were or how to reach us. Raul would check in with her after he got out of court. He went across the river. We never knew where he was. We just knew he was okay because he'd check in with her about every four hours and tell her how he was doing. Then we'd check in with her, and she kind of relayed information to us.

Chet Brooks was out, and we established contact with him through his girlfriend. My wife was in charge of that little project. She and Betty like each other, so Betty told her where they were going to be. They started out and came up here to her folks' house in Dallas and gave us that number. We got hold of Chet there. Then they went that Friday night up to Ardmore, Oklahoma, to get across the line where, if they caught him, they couldn't arrest him. We stayed in touch with him. Then he started back, and we programmed

that with him. See, Brooks was the one that established contact back with Hobby and made the first deal with him Monday night. He came in under a flag of truce and actually went in the Capitol and saw Hobby at seven o'clock Monday night. Nobody ever knew it, but we did. At that point he was bargaining for us.

Marcello: Out of curiosity, did the DPS or the Rangers put a tail on any of the wives or girlfriends?

Mauzy: Oh, yes. They tailed my wife. Let me say this: the DPS and Rangers did their job; they did what they're supposed to do. None of us were mad at them, and they weren't mad at us, either. As a matter of fact, we were in touch with the DPS office from time to time. Speir was out of town, but we talked to Gossett out there, the number two man. They weren't mad at us; we weren't mad at them.

Marcello: What would you be in touch with the DPS about?

Mauzy: Just to tell them that, you know, all these things that they were saying about them on the floor and all those outrageous remarks Hobby made . . . he wasn't speaking for us, and we weren't mad at them. We knew they were doing their job and doing the best they could but that their authority was limited.

I also wanted to tell them I appreciated the courtesy they showed my wife. They were tailing her, and we had arranged to go out to Curtis and Millie Bruner's ranch outside of San Marcos Sunday for a staff picnic. It had been set



up for a month. Of course, obviously I couldn't go. Anne went and they followed her out there, which was, again, perfectly legitimate. But they were courteous to her and nice to her, and I wanted them to know that.

As a matter of fact, one of the deals we made when we finally settled everything with Hobby was, first of all, we were only coming back if all twelve of us came together, which meant we needed some lead time to get the other guys in--Longoria was still down in the valley, and Jones was in Houston. Number two, we wanted time to shave and shower and get dressed. Number three, we wanted them to remove the call which they did. Number four, we were going to ask the DPS to escort us. We were going to meet them at a neutral spot, and they were going to escort us back. We insisted on that, and that's exactly what we did. We called the DPS and told them to meet us at the corner of Enfield and Exposition at three o'clock that afternoon. We wanted two cars to escort us back into the Capitol, that they were not to arrest us because the call had been removed, but we wanted them to do that for us because we wanted them to know we weren't mad at them. They had been made to look pretty damn bad in the press, and they weren't entitled to that kind of treatment. So that's what we did.

Marcello: After you notified the DPS on where you would meet them and so on and so forth, were there any members of the press and

so on there, or didn't you really meet them or anything until you actually got to the Capitol?

Mauzy: No, the DPS are the only people we . . . well, that's not true. My wife had come up to Dallas, and I called her up here Tuesday morning when the deal was finally cut. I said, "Get on the first plane and come back. Then when you get back, you and Millie Bruner," who ran my office, "I want you to meet me. Get in my car and meet me at the corner of Enfield and Exposition, and the DPS will be there to escort us in. We're all going in together. We're going in with our heads up. We haven't done a damn thing to be ashamed of. The DPS are going to escort us." Of course, we notified our friends so they could pack the gallery, which they did. That's what we did.

Marcello: What sort of a reception did you get from the so-called "Worker Bees" when you came back into the chamber?

Mauzy: Well, you know, it was interesting. Every one of them, without exception, except one, came up to each of us individually. I remember Traeger came up to me first. He said, "You sons-of-bitches really put the rag on the bush!" He said, "You know, the interesting thing is, y'all really have helped my legislative program by doing this because you're killing a lot of this sorry stuff that we're going to have vote for otherwise and has nothing to do with this deal."

The one guy who was negative was Bill Moore. As we walked

in, Glenn Kothmann and I walked in together just shoulder-to-shoulder. Kothmann is vice-chairman of the State Affairs Committee. He takes a lot of heat from Moore. When Moore doesn't want to be in the chair, he puts Kothmann in the chair and cuts out. Moore was drunk, and as we walked in he came over to Kothmann and said, "You goddamned son-of-a-bitch! I just want to tell you something. I've already been in touch with the lobby, and, by God, we're going to beat your ass next year!" That's the first time I ever saw Kothmann get mad at anybody. He put it on Moore like Lysol wouldn't take it off. There's another feud that has come out of all this.

I remember Peyton McKnight came up to me and patted me on the back and said, "By God, you pulled it off, baby!" Everybody in the Senate understood what was happening, and nobody was mad at anybody except for Bill Moore.

Marcello: What was Hobby's reaction and conduct to this particular situation?

Mauzy: A perfect gentleman as he always is. He had gotten over his bad feelings and his hurt feelings. It finally dawned on Hobby that he was the guy that was looking bad in this whole thing--we weren't. You know, the press was running totally against him, and should have, for the way they were conducting themselves. It was unprecedented! You know, when he calls the roll and there's not a quorum, the Senate cannot conduct business. That means he cannot recognize people, and they

cannot get up and make speeches which . . . you know, they got on that program first on Friday morning, and then they came back Friday afternoon and then Saturday morning and then Saturday afternoon and then Sunday morning and then Sunday afternoon. Of course, we were hearing all this. They were all just making absolute asses of themselves.

By the way, not all of them participated in it. Braecklein never said a word; Williams never said a word; Santiesteban never said a word. It was primarily Traeger, Ogg, Meier, Moore, Grant Jones to some extent. Well, "Ike" Harris and Betty Andujar got into it one time there, I guess. Most of the Republicans didn't. Bob Price never said a word. Of course, Bob was gone. He was one of my votes to leave there. He had to be in Pampa on Saturday. That was pretty outrageous what they did, but, you know, all's fair in love and war.

Marcello: Aside from these manipulations of the rules that Hobby was going through, the Legislature seems to have a history of these manipulative primaries whether it's for Lyndon Johnson or Lloyd Bentsen or John Connally in this latest case.

Mauzy: It's a sorry record that the Texas Legislature has of rigging the rules to help some particular individual politician in Texas. It's a disgraceful record. Maybe that's the reason they thought they could pull it off again. They always have been able to in the past.

Marcello: Well, Senator Mauzy, that exhausts my list of questions. Is

there anything else that you think we need to talk about and get in the record?

Mauzy: Yes, I want to tell you for the record one experience I had, because I think it may be helpful to future historians since none of this is going to be made public until after my death. That has to do with the first time I ever met Bill Clements. I had never met the man or laid eyes on him until he was inaugurated. Of course, I know people here in Dallas who know him and who have told me about him. But I had never met the man personally, never shook his hand, never looked him in the eye.

The first thing that caught my attention about Clements is how short a man he is. He's very short in stature; he's only about 5'7" or 5'8". I'm not a big man, but, hell, I'm taller than he is. Every picture I've ever seen of him, of course, has been taken from the bottom up, which any good politician will do because it makes you look taller than you are and therefore more masculine.

He called me--I guess this was in March--and asked me to come over to his . . . well, I need to give you a little background. Early in the session, the second or third week or something like that, I had a message that somebody in his office had called, and the governor would see me on Thursday afternoon from 2:15 to 2:30 and that the Governor's Office was located on the second floor of the Capitol just off the

rotunda halfway between the House and the Senate--as if I didn't know where the goddamned Governor's Office was! Of course, that early in the session I always leave there on the twelve o'clock flight back here, so I wasn't going to be available. I thought it was kind of arrogant to dictate to me when he wanted to see me, you know; "He will see you this day at this time." So we called back . . . I didn't call back. I got somebody else to call back to say I wasn't going to be here.

So the second time they called and said he would see me at eleven o'clock on Wednesday morning from eleven to 11:30 and that the Governor's Office was located on the second floor of the Capitol just off the rotunda halfway between the House and the Senate. I called back and said, "Well, I'm sorry about all that, but Wednesday morning is when my committee meets, and we meet from nine to eleven o'clock. Then the Senate goes into session at eleven o'clock, and we work until twelve, and I can't be there."

The third time we finally got a "go" signal (chuckle). It was the day before we were going to vote on the confirmation of a fellow from Houston that he had nominated to be judge--a fellow named "Monk" Edwards. Chet Brooks had primarily led the charge against the guy. The governor called--a meeting was set up for that Wednesday, as I remember, because we voted on Thursday on confirmations--allegedly to talk about the

education bill. Well, we got in there--just he and I and two of his legislative liaisons--and talked for a couple of minutes about a particular educational matter which I don't remember now what it was. Then he got down to what really the purpose of the meeting was all about.

First of all, the thing that strikes you about Clements is that he's a short man in stature, physically. Secondly, it's obvious from talking to him one-on-one like that that he's a guy who's used to getting his way. He has half-glasses that he stares at you over.

Marcello: He's still running Sedco, in other words.

Mauzy: Yes, and he seeks to intimidate you with all this. He's a gracious guy, I'll say that. I remember that first time I went in there. He and I sat on the couch--at opposite ends of the couch--with the coffee table in front of us, having coffee. The two staff members were sitting over by a table like this one taking notes.

He said, "I understand that you're not going to vote to confirm my man Edwards tomorrow to be judge down in Houston." I said, "That's right." He said, "Do you mind telling me why?" I said, "I don't mind telling you at all. The man is not qualified." He said, "How do you know he's not qualified? Do you know him?" I said, "I've never met the man." He said, "Have you ever talked with him?" I said, "No, I've never talked to him." He said, "Well, then how in the hell can

you sit there and tell me he's not qualified?"

I said, "Governor, that's a legitimate question for which I have a legitimate answer. I reviewed Mr. Edwards' professional resumé sheet. I've seen what he's done professionally as a lawyer since the day he got out of law school and got his license until this good day. He's been assistant general counsel of Gulf Oil Company. He may be the greatest oil and gas lawyer in the world, but you're appointing him to a civil district court where they try civil cases that involve people's lives and property. You know, they try workman's compensation cases and damage suits and product liability cases and sometimes divorce cases. Sometimes they handle children's custody and child support. Every field of civil law goes into those courts, not just oil and gas law. Now the man may be the greatest oil and gas lawyer in the world--I don't know--but I know that not one out of a thousand cases he's going to try are going to be oil and gas cases."

He said, "So what?" I said, "So for twenty-eight years I've been making my living as a lawyer trying lawsuits in the courthouse to the judges and to juries, and I think I know a little something about what kind of background it takes for a person to be a good judge, to be fair to the litigants. I ain't worried about the lawyers. I'm talking about a judge that'll give a litigant a fair trial, a good trial, a trial that'll stand up on appeal. This man just doesn't do it.



It would be like if you wanted to appoint me to the United States Tax Court, for example. I don't know a goddamned thing about tax law. That would be the worst appointment anybody could make! Not that I'm not a good lawyer--I am-- but I don't know anything about that."

He looked at me and he said, "Well, that's bullshit!" And I took that one way. You know, here's a fellow who likes to intimidate people. He stares at you over his glasses. He uses four-letter words, and that's supposed to be something. His public posture is, he's a poor kid that grew up in the Depression--in Highland Park, ha, ha, ha! And he thinks he can intimidate me by using four-letter words because he grew up in the Depression. That shows he hasn't done his homework because I'm a poor kid that grew up in the Depression . . .

Marcello: And you were in the Navy (chuckle).

Mauzy: . . . in the Fifth Ward in Houston. You know, telling me he was poor growing up in Highland Park when I grew up in that same Depression in the Fifth Ward of Houston! It's just dumb! And I've heard a few four-letter words in my life prior to that occasion, and I've used some.

So we talk on, and he says, "Well, you know, I've talked to all the judges and lawyers in Houston, and they all tell me he's a great appointment." I said, "Well, you know, Governor, obviously you think he's qualified, or you wouldn't have nominated him. I'm not arguing that. Obviously you

think he is, but let me tell you that obviously I think he's not. The point is, I vote on this. You've done everything you can do. You've nominated the man. Your responsibility ends there. My responsibility starts now, and I've made up my mind that I'm not going to vote to confirm him because he's not qualified!" He said, "Well, that's bullshit. There's only eight of you crazy motherfuckers over there who aren't going to confirm him." I said, "I don't know. I haven't polled the Senate. Senator Brooks tells me he's got twelve votes to bust him." He said, "Well, that's bullshit. There's only eight of you crazy bastards." I said, "Well, we'll know tomorrow. We're going to call the roll tomorrow. I can't speak for but one person and that's me, and I'm telling you that I'm going to vote 'no.'" But I said, "Governor, my experience has been that the members of the Senate count the Senate a little better than any governor does. That applies across the board ever since I've been here."

So I got up to leave. It was obvious my time was up. We're walking to the door, and he says, "Well, I wish you'd reconsider because I really don't think your reason's valid." I opened up the door to walk out, and I said, "Governor, that's bullshit! Fuck you!" And I walked out.

Well, the next day we called the roll, and, sure enough, there were twelve "no" votes, and the guy was busted. So I picked up the phone and called his office and asked the

girl just to give him a message. I said that the Senate had voted, and Senator Brooks could count better than he could, and I left it at that.

About two weeks later, he's over in the Senate one day. He's talking to Bill Braecklein, who sits to my immediate right, and to Glenn Kothmann, who sits just ahead of Bill. He's standing there between the two desks talking. Obviously, he wasn't talking to me, and I wasn't eavesdropping. But he was talking loud enough that I could hear him. He said, "I just wanted to come over here and tell you fellows that since y'all busted that fellow Edwards, I've done some checking up on him. You know, he was a bad appointment. You did me a great favor when you busted him. He would have been an embarrassment to me and to you all."

He looked at me, and he said, "What do you think about that, Oscar?" I said (chuckle), "Governor, I tried to tell you that at the time, but, you know, you're carrying coal to Newcastle. Kothmann and Braecklein both voted to confirm the guy! So you shouldn't be telling them. That's number one. Number two, I really wish you'd tell the press." See, the day we busted him, he issued a big statement saying it was all partisan politics and all that business.

Anyway, I just wanted to put that little episode in the record because I think it does indicate something about this particular man's personality and all. Some of the other fellows

have told me that he's tried the same intimidating kind of things with them about various things. I really think he's probably doing better about that today--August, 1979--than he was back then because I think he's learned that it doesn't work. You know, being the governor of Texas is not the same as being chairman of the board of Sedco where you own a majority of the stock and where you hire and fire and where you get to tell people, "Go do this! Go do that! Or you ain't working here tomorrow!" He can't do that. Time will tell whether he learns that lesson well or not.

Marcello: Senator Mauzy, once again I want to thank you for having participated. As usual, your comments were quite candid, and, of course, that's what we're looking for in these interviews.

Mauzy: I enjoyed it as always.

A P P E N D I X

The whole "Killer Bee" incident began on Thursday morning, May 17th, when Hobby's note appeared at the top of the Intent Calendar to the effect that he intended to give his twenty-four-hour notice of invoking Rule 91, which permits him to work from the calendar rather than having to suspend the rules to get a bill up. During the Executive Session that day, I asked him what the purpose of that notice was, and he said, "It means just what it says, senator." I said, "Do you mind telling me what bills you have reference to?" and he said, "It means just what it says, senator." So I said, "Fuck you!" and went back to my desk and sat down and put my feet up. Several of the other guys asked him the same thing during the Executive Session, and he refused to tell them.

As a result, when we took our noon break for lunch, seven of us got together in my office, namely, Doggett, Clower, Parker, Patman, myself, Longoria and Schwartz. It was decided that the only way we could be effective would be to break the quorum if we could. Longoria told us at that time--noon Thursday--that he was going to be absent Friday because he had a federal court appearance to make Friday morning. Thereafter he was going on a retreat with Judge Garza and some of his other friends, and, therefore, he could cooperate just by being absent.

As a result of that meeting at noontime, what we decided was to put Parker and Clower in charge of making arrangements, the only instructions being that Parker would find a place for us all to have breakfast at eight o'clock Friday morning. He and Clower would then call us all at home at seven o'clock Friday morning and tell us where to be for breakfast.

Sure enough, Friday morning about 7:15 I got a call from Clower telling me where to come. It turned out to be the McDonald residence on Bridle Path. I had Anne drive me over in the car and then told her to go on about her business. I told her that I would be in touch with her later in the day as to what was going to happen. It developed that ten of us showed up, namely, Gene Jones, Babe Schwartz, Carl Parker, Glenn Kothmann, Bob Vale, Carlos Truan, Ron Clower, Bill Patman, Lloyd Doggett . . . anyway, the nine who were identified as staying there, plus Gene Jones.

About 9:15 . . . no, it was about 8:45, I guess, I ran Bill Braecklein down by telephone at the Driskill Hotel and told him what we were up to. I asked him if he wanted to participate without telling him where we were or what we were going to do except that we were going to break a quorum. He said no, that he was going to vote with us against the split primary bill, but he was obligated to go down and answer the roll call Friday morning. I told him I understood perfectly. I just wanted him to know that he would be welcome to go with us if he wanted to.

Parenthetically, Thursday afternoon Parker and I cornered Lindon Williams in the Members' Lounge and told him in vague general outline of our planned exodus. Since he was against the bill, also, we invited him to come along. He said, however, that he could not do that, so we left him alone.

Also, that Friday morning--shortly before the Senate was going into session at 9:30--Gene Jones called Steve Oaks and told him what we were up to. He wanted Oaks to convey that message to Hobby and to tell him that we would come back if Hobby would agree that, after having engrossed

the bill on second reading Friday, we could be assured it would take a motion to suspend a regular order to get it up on third reading and final passage. Gene subsequently checked back with Oaks, who we had posted by a pay phone in the Capitol. Steve told us he had discussed it with Hobby and that Hobby was not interested in negotiating further. That was after the quorum had actually been broken at 9:30 and after they had put the call on at ten o'clock that morning.

Between then and twelve or one o'clock Friday afternoon, Jones had two or three other telephone conversations with Oaks--who was talking to Hobby and was acting as the intermediary--which reported no progress. Then finally about the middle of the afternoon Friday, Hobby told Oaks that he was not willing to talk with us; he was not willing to negotiate; that we had embarrassed him and the Senate by breaking the quorum; that it was just all-out war.

About ten o'clock that Friday morning, we decided we couldn't stay in Dora's house. We then decided to move into her daughter's apartment, which is an old converted garage in the backyard. We all went out there. Patman's wife was still with us, so there were the ten of us--plus Carrin Patman--there.

The place has been adequately described. It's approximately fourteen feet-by-fourteen feet with one double bed, one single bed, a walk-in closet, a washbowl, and a bathroom with a toilet and a shower. We all got in there and got comfortable--everyone was still in their coats and ties--and began playing cards, talking, various people using the phone. It was at that point that we agreed nobody would tell their staffs or wives where they were.



Parenthetically, Bob Vale had called his wife in San Antonio before we made that agreement and left the number where we were. So, at that point, the only people who knew where we actually were or how to reach us were the ten of us who were there; Patman's wife, who was with us; Vale's wife had the phone number--didn't know where it was--because he had given it to her in San Antonio; and, of course, Dora McDonald and her husband Charles and her daughter Laura. I might say at this point that that was exactly the reason we were able to pull it off--no one knew where we were.

Lloyd Doggett had earlier made arrangements with Longoria to keep in touch with him through Longoria's law office in Edinburg, where his wife Earline--who is also a lawyer--was running this operation. We checked in with her to tell her when Raul checked in with her to tell him what we had done; that Brooks was supposed to have left the state; that there were ten of us together and he made twelve; and that we hoped that he would stay out of the way because the call was on the Senate. He would from time to time check in with her. He never told her where he was or how to reach him by phone, the arrangement being that he would call her by phone every four hours, and we could relay messages back and forth that way.

Friday afternoon was pretty uneventful. It was Friday afternoon that we issued the statement through Gene Jones' office. We wrote it out ourselves, and Gene called in and dictated it to a man who works for him--"Bo" Byer's son--who was at the pay phone. The other thing we had agreed to do was that no one was to call their office in the Capitol because, of course, Centrex is the easiest type of system to wiretap. We were confident

that taps had been put on our phones, which would allow them to trace where the call was coming from. That certainly worked out to be true because of the incident Saturday afternoon when Sue Lowe called my office in the Capitol to get directions to the Bruner Ranch Sunday for the staff party we had planned for that day. Patman's wife finally left about the middle of the afternoon Friday.

There is one other thing I need to mention. Shortly after we went into hiding, we told Dora to take the three cars of the members, which were still parked out on the street by her house, and to make arrangements to have them all driven up to a shopping center there in Terrytown and parked on the parking lot. As I remember, that was Kothmann's car . . . in any event, one of them was Vale's car, which does not have SO plates, but which, of course, is registered in his name. So there were either two or three cars with SO plates, plus Vale's car. This was done and keys brought back to the various members whose cars belonged to them.

Doggett's office arranged to get tapes of all the sessions that the Senate held. Dora brought them out to us Friday afternoon when she came home from work. That was the tape of calling the Senate to session at 9:30 and no quorum being there, and then McKnight's motion at ten o'clock to put a call on the Senate and roll call vote on that. It was also the tape when they went back into session after the lodge and started their series of tirades and speeches denouncing us, all of which, of course, is completely illegal and improper inasmuch as you can only do three things when there is not a quorum present, namely, (1) adjourn, or (2) recess, or (3) put a call on. They cannot be recognized and make speeches or transact any kind of business.

As I say, we issued our statement through Jones' office on Friday afternoon and that really ticked them off. They came back later after that was released--about three o'clock or so--and held another round of speech making, which we got the tape of that night.

Friday afternoon Jones (Gene) was getting more and more nervous and claustrophobic and kept insisting that he could not stay in that room, that it was just impossible. The rest of us had agreed to plan on spending the night there. We were all going to stay together. Dora and her family had brought in sleeping bags and mattresses and whatever to try to make us as comfortable as possible. Jones and Clower really got into a cuss fight about whether he could leave or not. Finally, we agreed he was getting on all of our nerves so badly that we let him go on and go. He did. Of course, he had the phone number where we were, and he checked in with us when he got to Houston early Friday evening to tell us he had made it okay and that he would be in touch by phone.

Friday evening was rather uneventful. As I say, Dora broiled ten pounds of shrimp and brought it out, and we all ate pretty well. We also had beer and by that time, we had an ice chest moved in with ice and had beer, soft drinks, liquor. The guys by that time started playing cards. Bob Vale had been playing gin with me and with Parker, while Carrin Patman was still there. Vale and Mrs. Patman and Parker played scrabble. It was just kind of a "loosy-goosy," hang-loose deal Friday. Of course, we had the radio there where we could listen to the news on the AM station on the hour and on the FM station on the quarter hour. We also had a television where we could watch both the national and local news. As of that time--Friday--it had made local news but not national news.

Friday night everybody turned in fairly early. I think, as I remember, I was the last one to cash in. The interesting part about that is that I slept on the floor on a mattress, and, of course, anytime I sleep on the floor, I snore very badly. I disturbed everybody all night long with my snoring, the result being that I told them Saturday morning when we all got up that they needed to understand that unless I got an elevated bed to sleep on, there was nothing I could do to prevent that snoring. The result of that was I slept on one of the beds every night thereafter.

As I recall, it was Friday night that Clower got drunk--really got pretty obnoxious--and created a very stressful situation. It happened again Saturday night when he and Parker got into it, and frankly some of us had to separate the two of them because they were really giving each other a bad time. Clower finally passed out Saturday.

Friday night we had told Dora what we needed for breakfast, which she had brought in Friday night, namely, sweet rolls, donuts, coffee pot with coffee. There was also some milk and some fruit juices, as I remember. Food was relatively unimportant at this point, that being Saturday.

The other thing we did Saturday morning was to instruct her to move the cars from the parking lot at Terrytown Shopping Center out to the airport, which they did. By the way, it later developed that we could tell how effective the dragnet was out for us because the news had reported Friday night that they had located the cars parked on that parking lot and had them staked out. Dora, to my knowledge, worked with Nancy from Doggett's office in getting the cars moved. They moved them about noon Saturday.

As I understand, it went a very circuitous route out to the shopping center north of town on I-35--I think it's called Highland Mall, where the big Sears store is. Then from there they moved them over to Browning's Airport off 51st Street on the back side of the Municipal Airport in Austin. The cars were parked there about noon. The news reported in the mid-afternoon that the cars had been gone from the parking lot where they had been the day before, but they didn't know where they had gone. It was about five or six o'clock Saturday afternoon before they discovered them out at the airport. The significance of that is that that led credence to the rumors that we had planned it with the press people that we were going to charter us an airplane and fly to Mexico where they couldn't arrest us. Those cars, being seen there at Browning's Terminal where small private planes land and take off, therefore gave some credibility to that story.

It was either late Friday afternoon or Saturday morning when Hobby cut the DPS pretty bad about the fact that Spear thought it was more important for him to be in Florida than to be there looking after his duties, and the DPS had a very sorry track record because they hadn't been able to locate any of us.

Of course, the big event on Sunday was Gene Jones setting up the DPS and the Texas Rangers to pick up his brother, Clayton Jones, Sunday morning. Gene had arranged for Clayton to come over and stay at his house with him and Gloria both Friday and Saturday nights and had Clayton go out each morning to pick up the morning paper. It didn't work Saturday because they didn't have his house staked out yet. It did work Sunday. Gene called us immediately after Clayton was arrested and picked up to

tell us that we were going to be hearing reports that they had arrested him and he was on the way back. But it wasn't true; it had been his brother.

Also, on Sunday, Anne had several interesting experiences, including having the DPS come out to the house and wanting to know if I was there and she and Mildred inviting them to see that I wasn't. Then when she left the house and drove down to the Capitol to pick up the booze and some stuff for the party out at the Bruner Ranch Sunday, they followed her all the way out there. They were again looking for me--as they had Sunday morning--when they woke Lee Bruner up.

Sunday was also the day that things got tense a couple of times among the troops in the room. Everybody was getting on each other's nerves pretty much. Schwartz was constantly on the phone and wouldn't let anybody else get on it. We were checking with Brooks in Oklahoma and directing him back.

By the way, the way we handled that was, he and Betty Button were in Durant, Oklahoma, at the Holiday Inn where we kept in touch with them. They told us they were going to be driving back and where we could reach them in Dallas. They were in a rent car so we didn't have any worries about them being picked up. What finally occurred was that Parker arranged for Brooks to drive on down to Temple, Texas, and to go to John R. Bigham's law office. When he got there, he was to check in with us, which he did. We kept him constantly advised as to what was happening. He made arrangements for the two of them to stay in Bigham's apartment in Temple, where they would be only an hour away from Austin, but Brooks decided to come on into Austin Monday night, which he did.

He had been talking with Hobby by phone and arranged to go in and see Hobby at his office at the Capitol about seven o'clock Monday night to try to work out the terms of us coming back. He did and reported back to us, as well as giving a number where he could be reached in Austin. He had been promised safe conduct by Hobby, that he would not be picked up if he came in to see him.

It was largely on the basis of Brooks' conversation with Hobby Monday night and subsequent conversations Tuesday morning between Gene Jones and Hobby that the eventual deal was struck. We formalized it by having Schwartz call Hobby--pursuant to what Brooks and Gene Jones had told us to do--Tuesday morning at about eleven o'clock. That's when the final arrangements were made, namely, that all twelve of us would come in together; that we would arrive there about three o'clock that afternoon; that we would immediately . . . when we got there the Senate would have about an hour's worth of routine business to do, namely, referring bills, filing conference reports and things of that nature. So while that was going on, the twelve of us would be permitted to go back to the Governor's Committee Room and hold a press conference as to why we had done what we had done. Then we would come back out after that to vote on Senate Bill 1149, which we did and which was engrossed by a vote of 17-14, as we all knew it would be. The next move then was to vote on the products liability bill--which we failed to suspend--and the other part of the deal was that after Senate Bill 1149 was engrossed, there would be no move made to pass it on third reading without a vote on suspension of the rules. We would get that much protection.

We called Longoria to make arrangements to get him back and directed him where to come. He came out to Dora's house arriving about 2:30. Brooks and Gene Jones had arrived about two o'clock, so as soon as Longoria got there we were all set to go. I had called Anne and made arrangements for her to get in the car and for her and Millie to meet me at the corner of Infield and Exposition. We then called the Department of Public Safety and told them we wanted them to meet us at that same location and escort us in to the Capitol. We were going to go in the front entrance of the Capitol, and we wanted them to lead us in. We were going in voluntarily, and we were all going in together, which we did. There was a huge crowd, of course, at the Capitol when we got there--both outside among all the media and inside in the galleries. This pretty well covers my recollections of the events and the order in which they came.

Oscar H. Mauzy