THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: A SURVEY AND ANALYSIS OF VIEWS AND OPINIONS

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A COMPILATION OF VIEWS AND OPINIONS

FORLWORD

The end of the so-called "Vietnam era" of U.S. foreign policy has stimulated a number of thoughtful analyses of contemporary U.S. foreign policy: examinations of its basic tenets, directions, and options. This compilation attempts to bring together some of the more interesting comments on U.S. foreign policy which have appeared in the last year. The articles selected have come primarily from authors and critics outside the government, with the obvious exception of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. A number of scholars and journalists are represented, some of whom have at some time been associated with the government's foreign policy system.

Perhaps the most frequent theme running through this compilation of articles is the need for a reexamination of the central concepts which guide U.S. foreign policy. Richard Barnet argues that U.S. foreign policy is still guided by Cold War models and that a national debate on our foreign policy goals, particularly on the way in which the United States should relate to the turmoil of political and economic development in the rest of the world, is needed to restore a measure of reality to U.S. foreign policy. His argument is echoed by David Edward's statement that U.S. foreign policy must focus on the issues of interdependence rather than the issues of the Cold War.

Hans Morgenthau analyzes the factors which have limited the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy and concludes that the basic concept of national interest--avoidance of nuclear war and preparedness for conventional war, sympathy or at least indifference toward radical internal changes abroad, and support for supranational institutions to perform functions states are no longer able to perform--provides a satisfactory framework for U.S. foreign policy. After examining the pros and cons of the alternatives he considers most feasible, Donald Brandon advocates an ecletic policy for the United States which attempts to balance domestic and foreign policy objectives, and to distinguish between primary and secondary national interests.

A second major area of concern represented in these articles is the need for the United States to examine and define its commitments to other nations. A frequently noted theme is the need for unequivocal U.S. support

for democratic principles: Morgenthau, Bayless Manning, and Daniel P. Moyinhan urge the United States to ignore the factors of short term stability and to support those factions in other countries which accept the principles of political and civil liberty. George Kennan points out that U.S. support for any faction or party in a dispute must take into consideration world, or at least regional, public opinion, while Henry Kissinger and Brandon maintain that the United States must remain in close alliance with the other major democratic nations of the world, and Judith and H. Stuart Hughes urge that U.S. support must be offered only to those governments that enjoy sufficient stability and acceptance at home.

The three principal problem areas for U.S. foreign policy are generally regarded as interdependence, U.S. relations with the nations of the Third World, and U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and China. The problems of interdependence are discussed by Richard Barnet and Stanley Hoffman, the latter arguing that the international system may become manageable again only as the degree of interdependence is reduced, while Harlan Cleveland, Richard Gardner, and Joseph Nye discuss ways of reorganizing the U.S. foreign policy-making system to better cope with the problems of interdependence.

The Farer, ul Haq, and Moynihan articles are particularly concerned with the demands on U.S. foreign policy made by the developing countries. Farer theorizes that Third World unity is based on ideological rather than economic precepts, and urges the United States to adopt a policy of accommodation in order to enhance prospects for cooperation on vital global issues. Moynihan's article, written shortly before he was named

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, suggests that the United States has not been critical enough of many of the policies put forward by Third World nations. Malbub ul Haq suggests that the developing nations are calling for redistribution of the opportunities for future growth through collective bargaining, and that the developed nations should be prepared to deal with them on that basis.

As previously noted, several of the articles argue that U.S. foreign policy remains too closely tied to a Cold War mentality. However, relations with the major communist powers must be among the primary concerns of U.S. foreign policy, and the speech by Secretary of State Kissinger, as well as the Brandon and Kennan articles, examine this important aspect of U.S. foreign policy.

The articles are arranged alphabetically by author.

The Great Foreign Policy Debate We Ought to Be Having

by Richard J. Barnet

Six months after the worst defeat in American history the great debate on what went wrong in Indochina has yet to happen. Like the "bloodbath" in Vietnam, the "orgy of recrimination" in America has turned out to be official hyperbole. Instead of the "wave of McCarthyism" so widely predicted by administration officials, there is a bipartisan silence. Vietnam is "behind us," President Ford proclaims, and no one wants to look back.

In most countries a 20-year war costing over $150 billion, 55,000 battlefield deaths, and lasting damage to the economy would not be written off so easily. Ordinarily generals who lose battles are dismissed. In parliamentary democracies governments that lose wars expect to fall. In the US the architects of the final disaster are still in power. Far from reexamining the world view that led a generation of American leaders, and the rest of us with them, into the famous quagmire, they have rededicated themselves—and us—to that same world view. There is an eerie quality of *déjà vu* to the major post-Vietnam national security initiatives. Mayaguez (echoes of the Gulf of Tonkin); nuclear threats in Korea (shades of Gen. MacArthur); a proposed military spending program that locks the country into five years of escalating budgets (a replay of the Kennedy buildup of the early 1960s); renewed threats of military intervention in the Persian Gulf (memories of the Dominican Republic and Vietnam).

The official lesson of Vietnam, it seems, is that America's global defense perimeter must be redrawn, alliances cemented and the threat of American military power, including nuclear weapons, made more credible. The foreign policy debate, to the extent there is one at all, is about where to draw the new defense line and what weapons to use? Should Turkey keep its honorary membership in the free world? How much pressure should be put on Portugal? How fast should the US stand in Korea? But there is no challenge to either the vision of American or the vision of international politics that inspired five American Presidents to risk and lose in Indochina.

The discussion on foreign policy is taking place within narrow limits because the participants on all sides basically accept the same world view. There is a tacit agreement as to the goals America should be pursuing in international politics, shared assumptions about what is happening in the world, and a common faith about what American power can do.

Basically the discussion of current American foreign policy since the debate in Indochina accepts uncritically the cold war model of reality. America's goal remains as President Johnson stated it: "We are the number one nation and we are going to stay the number one nation." Despite détente, the central threat to the peace is still the Soviet Union. Soviet power must be contained by maintaining superior nuclear forces and projecting conventional military might through alliances, military aid arrangements and foreign bases. The world must be made as safe as possible for American economic growth by discouraging or aborting anti-capitalist revolutions wherever possible. American economic power must be employed to counter efforts of the nonindustrialized countries to alter the present international economic system.

The most fundamental assumptions of American foreign policy are beyond debate within government because the bureaucracies charged with making policy depend upon them for their survival. It is not for the air force to question whether "national security" requires keeping the foreign bases acquired in the 1950s or for the CIA to question whether American interests must be served by clandestine or paramilitary operations in the Third World. Bureaucracies keep doing what they do. To overcome bureaucratic inertia requires deliberate choices to move in a different direction and political support for alternative policies.

But politicians do not like to question the basic assumptions of foreign policy either. Indeed the last time the United States had a "great debate" on fundamental issues of foreign policy was the eve of World War II when the country was divided on what to do about Hitler. Henry Wallace and Robert Taft, each in his own way, tried to start a debate about America's role in shaping the postwar world, but the Truman administration and the "internationalist wing" of the Republican party fashioned a bipartisan consensus on foreign policy that held firm until the final years of the Vietnam war. Even the celebrated Great Debate of 1951 over the right of the President to station divisions in Europe in peacetime was more a debate about the limits of presidential power and the choice of military strategy (*Fortress America* v. *Forward Strategy*) than a debate about goals and purposes.

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In the years of the bipartisan consensus political leaders have avoided clear-cut debate on the most fundamental issues, preferring instead to use foreign policy as political mood music: posturing about "rolling back" Soviet power from Eastern Europe (1952); a fictitious "missile gap" (1960); Nixon's "secret plan" (1968).

The one thing on which the "best and the brightest" and their critics agree is that the disaster in Indochina was a consequence of miscalculation. The strength of the revolutionary forces in Vietnam was underestimated, the passivity of the American people was overestimated (Dean Rusk calls it a lack of patience), and the serious political and economic implications of fighting a protracted colonial war were virtually ignored. At crucial moments Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger lost touch with reality because they did not understand what was happening either in Vietnam or in the United States.

The best hope of restoring a sense of reality to foreign policy is to challenge and test official wisdom through democratic debate. In *Democracy in America* Tocqueville pinpointed the difficulties. Since the public does not like secrecy and quickly loses patience, he said, democracies are "decidedly inferior to other governments" in the conduct of their foreign relations. What he meant was that it is harder for a nation in which policy is debated to act decisively and consistently. More recently Dean Acheson lamented "the limitation imposed by democratic political practices," which makes it difficult to "conduct our foreign affairs in the national interest." Debate is supposed to embarrass the executive and hamper his style. The argument for "stopping politics at the water's edge" is that dissension exposes weakness to potential enemies. Others argue that since ordinary citizens cannot understand the subtleties of foreign policy, debate leads to jingoism. This notion flatly contradicts democratic theory, which holds that the testing of ideas in the political marketplace is the best way to avoid the catastrophic errors caused by the distorted vision of isolated leaders.

There is an obvious difficulty in carrying on a serious debate on foreign policy; the issues are complex, remote and emotionally charged. But it is doubtful that national security issues are inherently more complex than most domestic problems of advanced industrial societies. Foreign policy issues are, nevertheless, remote from most people's immediate concern. To get public attention when it is needed—it is usually not desired—statesmen resort to oversell and scare tactics, making points, in Dean Acheson's words, "clearer than truth."

Over the last generation code words have been developed that are designed to elicit an almost automatic approval of what the President wishes to do—"commitment," "credibility," "isolationist," "responsibility," and of course "national security" itself. As a first step to a more serious debate on foreign policy we should examine the extent to which we are trapped by the peculiar language George Orwell predicted would dominate 20th-century politics. A moratorium should be declared on meaningless terms like "commitment" and "credibility" and especially the incantation "national security." They could be treated as expletives and deleted from political discourse.

Commitment is a good example. What exactly did the government commit to whom? How was the commitment made? For what reason and for how long? So is "creditibility." Who should believe what about the United States, and why? Had we gotten behind the abstractions that became war cries to debate who Thieu was, who supported him, what his commitment was to his country and who the Communists were and what their commitments were, we might never have deceived ourselves into thinking that we could win the war—or should. At least the American people would have had a better idea of the price involved.

The use of historical and psychological analogies also inhibits rational debate on foreign policy. How many of the decisions that locked the US in Vietnam were made in the shadow of Munich? It is unlikely that better decisions will be made by invoking the spectre of Vietnam. The problems of one generation cannot be solved by replaying the history of another. Nor is much clarity gained by talking about nations as if they were human beings—whether pitiful helpless giants or candidates for a nervous breakdown. Metaphors from the physical world such as "power vacuum" are also deceptive. The word forecloses the whole question of imperialism by assuming a law of nature that small, weak countries must inevitably be dominated by one super power or another.

However to restore a sense of realism to the discussion of American foreign policy requires more than a reform of language. It requires examination of major national goals and evaluation of how well we have been doing in reaching them. In the nuclear age the first goal of a foreign policy is protection from nuclear attack. Since there is no defense, as Presidents and Secretaries of Defense have repeatedly told us, survival of the United States depends upon our not being involved in a nuclear war. (I am assuming that even if an American Adam and Eve were to rise from the radioactive rubble to repopulate the earth, as Sen. Richard Russell prayed at the height of the Vietnam war, that would not be viewed as a wholly satisfactory outcome by a majority of Americans.)

After spending tens of billions on nuclear weapons since 1945 the US is of course much more vulnerable than it was then. The Soviet Union is now a formidable nuclear power, and nuclear proliferation has proceeded inexorably. The latter development means that nuclear weapons are not only in many new hands but in many new disputes. Some of these, such as the Israeli-Arab and India-Pakistan conflicts involve such deep feelings

of desperation as to tempt the use of suicidal weapons. As the new commandment of the marine corps, Gen. Louis Wilson, recently remarked, it is doubtful that a general nuclear war can be averted once a tactical nuclear weapon is used on a battlefield. Thus, despite the minor arms control arrangements associated with détente, the dangers of nuclear war appear to be growing.

The United States is embarking on a massive weapons building program and has reasserted the right to use nuclear weapons first, even against non-nuclear powers. The issue is whether, given the present world environment, these policies will make the planet more dangerous or less dangerous for everybody, including the United States. We need a serious public debate on an alternative national security strategy based on de-legitimizing nuclear weapons: renunciation of first use; major diplomatic initiative for substantial cutbacks by the US and the USSR in nuclear weapons; a strong campaign to limit proliferation. At the very least the clichés of the arms race, such as "bargaining chips" (amassing new weapons for the purpose of persuading adversaries to get rid of theirs) ought to be subjected to critical debate. After a 30-year arms race, we have some experience of how nations behave in deadly competition, and the experience does not support the theory under which the US nuclear buildup is being planned. Yet, despite the grim prognosis for "stabilizing" (another favorite expletive) the arms race and avoiding nuclear war, there is no national debate that takes account of this experience.

The second most important goal of American foreign policy has been the containment of communism. But this goal has become confused over the years. The issues were clearer in the 1950s when the United States had the power to isolate the USSR and China, keep the left from taking power or sharing power in West Europe, and to destroy pro-Communist movements in the Third World. Indeed, until recently, US policy was designed to encourage a "mellowing" of the Soviet system. But the comfortable consistency of militant anti-communism is gone. The Communists in the Kremlin have become friends of the President (Brezhnev was one of Nixon's most loyal backers) and business associates of the Chase Manhattan Bank; the Communists in Chile and many other places are still targets of CIA operations.

The fundamental purpose behind the anti-Communist policy was to contain the expansion of Soviet power. That purpose has failed not because of Soviet strength but because of America's growing weakness. It is not Soviet gains but American losses that have produced a shift in the balance of power. The United States has been forced to agree to the division of Germany and to Soviet control over Eastern Europe. (There is no other meaning to the Helsinki Conference.) The left is struggling to keep power in Portugal, is gaining strength in France and Italy, and will probably play an important role in Spain. In the United Nations it is the United States, not the Soviet Union, that is becoming increasingly isolated from the majority of the members. After 30 years of the cold war the Soviet Union is stronger militarily and more active diplomatically on a world scale than ever. Although Stalin's massacres are over, the Soviet system remains essentially unchanged. (Indeed the cold war has probably produced more negative changes in American society than positive changes in Soviet society.)

During the cold war the national security bureaucracy became so fascinated with the confrontation that it forgot what it was about. To regain some clarity and sense of realism in our foreign policy, Americans need to debate the premises of anti-communism, which means, as we have seen, quite different things to different people. The basic reason for containing the Soviet Union, George Kennan argued in his famous February 1946 cable was that the men in the Kremlin believed that their own security demanded that "our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken." In short, at the most fundamental level, the cold war was fought in the name of preserving American society.

The principle issue for debate is whether strategies chosen for preserving American society have, rather, undermined it. Having analyzed the threat of communism as a military threat and invested about $1.6 trillion to counter it, the United States has systematically starved its own civil society. The fiscal crisis of the cities and the appalling physical decay in every metropolitan center are the products of a generation of neglect. There is an urgent need to debate whether the failure to reinvest adequately in American society and in the American industrial base has not weakened the foundations of American power, whether the health of the American economy has not indeed been sacrificed to "national security." To what extend are unemployment and inflation attributable to the mismanagement of our economy through distorted investment priorities? This is not a new debate. The fiscal conservatives in the Eisenhower era, like Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey, thought the Soviet strategy was to force America to spend itself into bankruptcy. With the advent of the rhetoric of omnipotence—"we shall bear any burden, pay any price"—such notions were dismissed as troglodyte. The debate should be resumed about the real meaning of "national security." Can this society be secure if it does not assure the opportunity for decent work, decent health care, decent housing and a decent diet for its citizens? Can it do this if it continues to define "national security" in primarily military terms?

When the cold war began a few voices warned of the dangers of the "garrison state," that we might lose our freedom through our efforts to defend it. Watergate

dramatized the vulnerability of our system of civil liberties and the ease with which executive tyranny can be established in the name of "national security." The attempted Nixon coup—the systematic campaign to take control of the machinery of government to harass and destroy political enemies—was narrowly averted but it illustrated how far our constitutional system had been eroded by secrecy, emergency powers, lying in the national interest, and other familiar byproducts of protracted war. The second unique source of strength, besides the extraordinary American economy is a system of constitutional liberty that has been admired around the world. It is surprising that the issues concerning the protection of those liberties are not integrally related to the debate on foreign policy. Certain kinds of foreign policies require more secrecy and more deception than others. The issues ought to be put in such a way that the American people could vote on the extent to which they are willing to sacrifice freedom for "national security." The issue is not whether the Russians might like to see our society disrupted, our traditional way of life destroyed and the international authority of our state broken, to quote Kennan again—that can be taken for granted—but whether this is more likely to come about through Soviet calculations or American miscalculations.

Much of our official anti-communism has not involved the Soviet Union directly. Well over half of the military budget is for what used to be called conventional forces (ships, planes, tanks and ground combat units) and these, along with the CIA covert action operations, have been used to bring about or prevent internal political changes in other countries, mostly in Asia, Africa and Latin America. A partial list of countries in which a US military intervention or a US-backed coup has been attempted since the end of World War II includes the Congo, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Iran, Laos, Lebanon, the Sudan, Syria and Vietnam.

The US has found itself fighting nationalist movements around the world in the name of anti-communism for three basic reasons. (Since we are likely to encounter similar nationalist movements closer to home in the next few years—Panama and Puerto Rico, for example—it is especially urgent to examine them.) We are implementing our global counterrevolutionary policy by maintaining forces not needed for the defense of the US at a cost of about $36 billion a year. What are we buying? Why are we buying it?

The first argument for fighting a nationalist, revolutionary movement led by Communists as in Vietnam, has been containment of Soviet power. From the early days of the cold war to the Johnson administration the official US belief was that insurgent movements were secret weapons of the Kremlin. Mao was Stalin's agent. Ho was a puppet on a long string from Moscow. It was legitimate and necessary to intervene internally in the affairs of other countries to forestall Russian conquest by Trojan Horse. The historical evidence suggests otherwise. Nationalist movements, whether inspired by Marxist-Leninism or not, are fiercely independent. When they succeed they do not automatically increase the power of the Soviet state. (Indeed the relations between the Kremlin and Communist regimes that have come to power independent of the Red Army—China, Albania, Cuba, Vietnam—have often been stormy.) Soviet arms shipments to North Vietnam followed massive US military intervention. It was the US that set the pace of the competitive intervention. So also in Cuba. Both the Cubans and the Vietnamese have made it clear that they would like normal, even friendly relations with the US to lessen their dependence upon the USSR. If the motive behind the counterrevolutionary policy is containment of the Soviet Union, we should consider whether a policy of competitive non-intervention would serve our purposes better. We now know that the more engaged the US has become in aiding governments threatened with insurgency, the more Russia and China have aided the revolutionaries and the more weak independence movements have fallen under their sway.

But there is a second argument for using American power to influence internal political and economic changes in other countries. There is a missionary spirit behind American imperialism. With technical aid and foreign investment we can rescue the poor countries of the Third World from the irrationalities of socialism. We can transplant the American model of development and in the process create a congenial world for the flourishing of the American economy. But there is now abundant evidence that the American model is a failure for most poor countries, that without basic structural reform for the redistribution of wealth a veneer of capitalism in feudal societies perpetuates and exacerbates poverty. True Communist approaches to development have at times been dogmatic, impractical and punitive. But if we take as the criterion of success the welfare of the majority of people—literacy, nutrition, health care, jobs—the Communist revolutions that we oppose—China, Cuba, North Vietnam—seem to do far better than the "Free World" governments we support. There should be a candid discussion about why the United States so often appears to be on "the wrong side" in revolutionary struggles. Indeed why is it in the interest of the United States to be on any side? If we do not have the answers for poor countries, why should we not encourage a variety of experiments? (The Chilean case is instructive. By helping to overthrow the Allende experiment we helped bring into power a government that is not only repressive but incompetent. Because of disastrous economic policies the position of the Chilean middle class for whose benefit the coup was supposedly carried out is much worse than it was under Allende.)

• The third argument behind global anti-communism is the threat of totalitarianism. Communist regimes do not offer freedom of the press or other democratic liberties traditional to the United States. Political repression and executions have taken place under left-oriented nationalist regimes. But the argument that the US is fighting communism in the name of freedom is wearing thin since the level of repression in such leading members of the Free World as Brazil, Iran and Indonesia is high. By ignoring repression in the countries it supports most closely, the United States has undermined whatever moral influence it might have over other countries. It is difficult after welcoming the Salazar dictatorship as an ally for over 20 years to emerge as a convincing defender of Portuguese democracy. The issue of totalitarianism is central. But the debate should focus on the extent to which the US in its present policies, particularly military aid and arms sales, is promoting and legitimizing dictatorship and the extent to which the spread of dictatorship around the world ultimately threatens the survival of democracy in America.

In short we need a debate about how the US should relate to the process of political and economic developments taking place around the world. President Ford and Secretary Kissinger repeatedly warn of a wave of "neo-isolationism" that will engulf Americans and cause them to shirk their "responsibilities." These expletives are the current official favorites. Every imperial power has asserted its responsibilities for other people and has killed a good number of them in the process. "Isolationism" had a real meaning in 1940. It was a convenient label to apply to the significant number of Americans who didn't, for a variety of reasons, want to fight Hitler. It is now used in political discourse like a Pavlovian bell. Everyone wants to fight Hitler. But the contemporary meaning of the word is hopelessly confused. (Adding a "neo" merely makes matters murkier.)

The links of interdependence between the American economy and the world economy are so pervasive that isolationism is not a possibility for the United States. The choice is not whether the United States is to be integrally involved in the international system but the terms of the involvement. This is the crux of the debate we are not having. The self-perpetuating elite that has run our foreign policy for a generation have assume that the United States cannot afford to share its power by accepting limits on its right to make crucial unilateral decisions—whether to use nuclear weapons, whether to invade other countries, whether to change the ground rules of the international monetary system. The strategy has been to perpetuate for as long as possible the preeminent military and economic position the United States enjoyed at the end of World War II. As the ruined economies of West Europe and Japan recovered and the Soviet Union became a formidable military rival, the tactics for achieving continued American preeminence have been modified. The issues concerning the management of the world economy and distribution of resources are crowding out the older issues of the cold war, many of which like Germany, Vietnam and Cuba have more or less been settled. But the resistance to sharing power remains. The hostile reaction of the Ford administration to the efforts of the poor countries to create a more equitable "new international economic order" reflects a deep-seated isolationism. We are in the unenviable position of defending privilege against the majority of people in an increasingly desperate world.

There is nothing exceptional about such a posture. Every great nation tries to hold on to what it has. But empires collapse because they lose touch with their own time and employ self-defeating strategies for maintaining their power. The issue is whether the security of Americans will be better served by trying to perpetuate the era of American hegemony after the conditions for it have passed or by taking the lead in building a more equitable international economic order and a less militarized international political order. Candor, now in vogue as a political virtue, requires a painful assessment of the real conflicts between American comfort and the survival of a majority of mankind.

One of the most deceptive words in the foreign policy lexicon is "we." Discussion of the American national interest assumes that all Americans share the same interests, that what is a good US policy for Anaconda in Chile or for Gulf Oil in Italy is necessarily a good policy for American wage earners and consumers. It has become clearer in recent months that CIA covert operations have to a significant degree been for the direct support of US-based multinational corporations. That is one example—the Soviet wheat deal is another—of a foreign policy initiative from which the benefits flow to a small group of Americans and the costs are borne by a much larger segment of society. It is by no means clear that unemployed workers in Detroit, supermarket shoppers and small businessmen have the same foreign policy interests as the largest banks and corporations. Yet it is the representatives of these institutions who continue to make policy in the name of all Americans. There can be no serious consideration of alternative goals and policies without enlarging the circle of policy makers to include representatives of many domestic interests which are vitally affected by foreign policy decisions but which now have no voice in deciding what "we" do as a nation. Until foreign policy is seen for what it is—a reflection of present domestic policy and a context for evolving domestic policy—discussions will never rise above emotionalism and abstraction. A redefinition of America's role in the world will come, if it does, only as part of a process of redefining American society.

A NEW FOREIGN POLICY FOR AMERICA

Donald Brandon

For almost a decade the United States has been without a consensus on foreign policy. Weariness with the burdens of Western leadership, Vietnam, domestic racial strife, the counterculture, Watergate, and now "stagflation" have all combined to produce a serious danger of isolationism. President Nixon and Henry Kissinger were able to take advantage of the fact that the Congress and the country were satiated with foreign policy. Like a two-man band, they orchestrated a major revision of America's role in the world without "normal" checks and balances.

Under such appealing slogans as moving "from an era of confrontations to an era of negotiations" and building a "structure of peace," the Nixon administration and now also the Ford administration have put pursuit of accommodation with adversaries ahead of relations with allies and the Third World. Kissinger has put critics of his *realpolitik* down as people who don't understand the danger of nuclear war. In a manifestation of the old "illusion of American omnipotence," Nixon and Kissinger tried to arrange a "new order" in world affairs in accordance with their preconceptions.[1] The Congress and the country were so anxious to believe that the two "traveling salesmen" were in fact "ending the Cold War" that sober analyses of the Nixon administration's efforts have been few and far between. But hardheaded assessment of the much ballyhooed detente with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China reveals that there is far less for America than meets the eye. That the Indochinese "peace settlement" and the Middle East "miracle" have been undone is apparent to all.

In the Summer of 1974 Secretary of State Kissinger attempted to set off a "great debate" on the current American policy publicly labeled "detente." Although both the Senate Foreign Relations and the House Foreign Affairs Committees held hearings, few outside the small circle of experts paid much attention. But a systematic analysis of the pros and cons of the Nixon-Kissinger-Ford "grand design"—and equally important, of alternative general options—is desperately needed. The United States remains a superpower, and simply dares not retreat from a substantial role on the world stage. Accordingly, America needs to clarify its short- and long-run interests and goals and chart a mature, steady course.

Foreign Policy Options

Perhaps the most important generally accepted "lesson" of both Vietnam and the almost generation-long containment policy is that the United States has to avoid both isolationism and globalism. In historical perspective, it appears that the United States overreacted to its isolationist 1930s' posture in the aftermath of World War II. Overconfident after its triumph in that great tragedy, America "took on the

Source: World Affairs, vol. 138, Fall 1975, pp. 83-107.

whole world" with the Truman Doctrine of March 1947. The involvement in Vietnam was partly a result of a failure to distinguish between primary, or vital, and secondary, or peripheral, interests.[2]

It can be and has been argued that neither the Truman administration nor its successors were in fact guilty of indiscriminate globalism as is now fashionably asserted.For example, John Spanier suggests that, despite the globalist rhetoric of Truman's message to the Congress, the Doctrine was intended to be and was applied in a more specific and limited manner. "American policy makers were well aware that the United States, though a Great Power, was not omnipotent; therefore, national priorities—which interests were vital and which were not—had to be decided carefully and power applied discriminately."[3]

In an essay written shortly before he went to Washington with Nixon in 1969, Henry Kissinger indicated acceptance of the by-then standard criticism of American globalism. He wrote that past administrations had been befogged by the notion that "we must resist aggression anywhere it occurs since peace is indivisible. . . ." He also said, "No country can act wisely in every part of the globe at every moment in time."[4] The fact of the matter is that there have been over fifty wars since 1945, and the United States has obviously not been involved even indirectly in most of them. It is also ironic that Kissinger complained about America's overextending its limited foreign policy wisdom, given his own overcommitted role during the last six years as "Secretary of the World," in Eric Sevareid's useful and striking phrase. Whatever the merits of the debate over alleged globalism, it is apparent that the Nixon-Ford administrations as well as the Congress and the country are through with such a role now. The key question today and in the foreseeable future is whether the United States will maintain even its present reduced role on the world stage. It can in any event be taken for granted that in the practical order of things globalism can be dropped from the list of options which require analysis.

Four other options which would have to be included in any complete list of theoretically available alternatives can also be ignored in this quest for a politically feasible as well as wise American posture. Certainly neither the leaders nor the people in this country are ready to consider surrendering to Moscow or Peking. Most citizens of the United States laugh at mere mention of the "Better Red than Dead" option. Fortress America—an occasionally discussed alternative which envisages this nation arming to the teeth while abandoning all its allies around the world as well as foregoing cooperative international trade and aid programs—is less readily dismissed by the average citizen. But surely it can be thrown out among knowledgeable leaders and observers for self-evident reasons.

The other two extreme options which will be ignored after being mentioned (on the same grounds of obvious folly) were discussed and even advocated in some circles in the late 1940s and early 1950s: "liberation" and preventive war. The latter would be clearly suicidal as well as immoral. The idea of liberating Eastern Europe was championed rhetorically by President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles

in the 1952 presidential campaign and during the first term of that administration. But the tragic Hungarian uprising in the Fall of 1956 put an end to what was clearly reckless American talk accompanied by inaction. In any event, this country and its major allies in Europe and Asia have for many years accepted the "legitimacy" of communist governments in Russia, Eastern Europe, China, and elsewhere.

Alternative Options

Having made short shrift of five options (surrender, Fortress America, globalism, liberation, and preventive war), we are now able to turn to systematic analysis of five politically feasible general alternatives: hemispheric isolation, neo-isolation, the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger posture of detente, trilateralism, and a final option which attempts to synthesize the best elements of neo-isolation, detente, and trilateralism and to link them together with the old notion of a union of the democracies as a steppingstone to an ultimate democratic, federal world government (an option I prefer for which I am anxiously seeking an accurate, short, and appealing label).

Hemispheric Isolation

It is almost certainly true that most members of the foreign policy establishment in America today would suggest that hemispheric isolation should be included with other "obviously" unacceptable options. While agreeing with this, it appears that the "signs of the times" indicate widespread popular receptivity for a "rerun" of hemispheric isolation. It does little good these days to suggest to many people that "we've tried that" and it proved disastrous. America followed this option during the 1930s and neither solved the Great Depression nor avoided getting into World War II. Surely that record should be sufficient reason to rule out hemispheric isolation as a viable alternative in the 1970s.

But a look at some recent Congressional actions and public opinion polls suggests that, however unwise it might be judged, hemispheric isolation has to be considered a politically acceptable course of action which may in fact be pursued again by the United States. Congress has been quite properly asserting its prerogative of playing a role in setting the general guidelines for American foreign policy. But it at times has gone far beyond that role and tried to set key policies on its own and to dabble in the day-to-day conduct of this country's foreign affairs. The increasingly isolationist Congressional majority has compelled the Executive to take actions in Indochina and the Eastern Mediterranean which run counter to the United States' stake in those regions.

Increasing numbers of Americans are moving in the same isolationist direction as the Congress. From shortly after World War II until 1973 public opinion polls showed that the majority of Americans believed that the United States should play a major role in world affairs. But in 1972 a poll disclosed that a majority of the people believed the nation should "stop getting involved" in international quarrels.

In 1973 another poll revealed that the only allied country outside the Western Hemisphere which a majority of Americans would support in event of a "communist threat" was the United Kingdom. Early in 1975 a poll showed that a majority strongly oppose continuation of U. S. military aid to either the Arabs or the Israelis. Another poll revealed that 65 per cent of the American people opposed military aid entirely.[5] Popular support for foreign development assistance has of course been declining ever since the Kennedy administration.

This evidence of Congressional and popular drift toward isolationism invites general statement of the pros and cons of hemispheric isolation. They can be listed in a tabular fashion for ease of analysis:

Pros

America can concentrate more on its many domestic problems.

No more Koreas and Vietnams.

Russia-China split means end of Communist threat, and anyway....

Western Europe and Japan can maintain Eurasian balance of power.

United States could develop constructive cooperation with Latin America and Canada by concentrating attention in Western Hemisphere.

Cons

As a Superpower America must play an activist role on the world stage.

Maintenance of Eurasian balance of power requires U. S. presence there.

Cons (cont'd)

Soviet Union would achieve preeminence in Europe and Middle East if America withdrew to Western Hemisphere.

China might dominate East Asia.

Western Europe and Japan lack will and military power to maintain balance of power in Eurasia.

Nuclear proliferation would be fostered by American withdrawal.

America has an obligation to assist developing countries in the Eastern Hemisphere as well as in Latin America.

Canada and Latin America would not welcome "undivided" Yankee attention.

This option failed in the 1930s and America is now even more dependent on access to raw materials and markets and on the global balance of power in the 1970s.

U. S. should throw its weight behind efforts to organize a better world order in the shrinking, interdependent "Global Village," not withdraw to Western Hemisphere.

It should be clear, to the informed at least, that hemispheric isolation would be a disastrous choice for America in the not-so-long run despite the temporary, short-run benefits of relaxed nerves, reduced involvement in world affairs, and so on. What Samuel Bemis said of the world environment of the 1930s and its implications for American diplomacy can be said also of the 1970s (substituting totalitarian Russia and China for totalitarian Germany and Japan): "A Japanese Empire, erected on the ruins of ancient China, accompanied by a German Empire built on the ruins of a conquered Europe, presaged an unbalance of power in the Old World which should have been the nightmare of every American student of international affairs."[6]

Neo-Isolation

Although hemispheric isolation seems clearly to be objectively foolish, what has been dubbed neo-isolation has been proposed by some leading members of the foreign policy elite.[7] It should be noted that the term is disliked by proponents of the posture, but has been widely used for the sake of convenience. It is taken for granted here that the label neo-isolationism is not intended to disparage the concept. Neo-isolationists begin with the assumption that America must avoid both globalism and isolationism (e. g., Fortress America, hemispheric isolation). A key to their approach lies in the above-mentioned distinction between primary, or vital, and secondary, or peripheral, interests. They generally concur in the idea that America should not have become involved in Indochina because what was happening there was not relevant to the U. S. national interest. Neo-isolationists also decry the allegedly "indiscriminate" foreign aid program since Truman's Point Four proposal.

The United States should be neither "global cop" nor "global-do-gooder" in the view of neo-isolationists. On the other hand, unlike those who champion hemispheric isolationism, the neo-isolationists believe this country does have some vital interests in certain countries and regions of the Eastern Hemisphere. There seems to be a consensus among neo-isolationists that the security and welfare of Western Europe and Japan are vital interests of America. Beyond that there is disagreement, although many neo-isolationists would probably also list Israel, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand as continuing to be "worthy" of American commitments. In the Western Hemisphere, neo-isolationists would surely agree that Central America and the Caribbean are of primary interest to the United States, as are Canada and Mexico, of course. (In the aftermath of the Indochina debacle, I think that U. S. commitments to the defense of Taiwan and the Philippines should be maintained for the foreseeable future. Some sort of "special relationship" between the United States and South America should also be established in light of their historic and present-day ties.)

The neo-isolationists stress the importance of maintaining a global balance of power, but maintain that the United States has been unnecessarily overcommitted in its pursuit. They also generally decry the importance of humanitarian as distinguished from security foreign assistance. They stress the great importance of the

Sino-Soviet split in world affairs, and argue that it enables the United States to reduce its efforts in international politics. They also believe that Western Europe and Japan can do more to help maintain the balance of power as well as to foster Third World development. Hans Morgenthau and George Kennan have proposed a greater American effort to strengthen the United Nations. Moreover, such global problems as environmental protection and population control should receive more attention by the United States. The following arguments can be mustered for and against neo-isolationism:

Pros	Cons
Strikes a better balance between domestic and foreign policy.	American reneging on present commitments to various allies would cost this country its credibility with remaining allies and invite expansion by Moscow and/or Peking.
Much more attention and resources for curing U. S. domestic ills.	Overlooks fact that Russia and China remain enemies of America as well as of each other.
No more interventions in nations of peripheral interest (Vietnam).	Overestimates will and interest of Western Europe and Japan in larger efforts on world stage.
Sino-Soviet split more intense than American-Russian rivalry and Cold War is over.	Overlooks importance of aid to India in continuing democratic vs. totalitarian match-up of India and China.
Avoids "globaloney" foreign aid misadventures.	Generally neglects "have" nations' obligation to assist "have-nots."
Aware of ecological and other needs as well as of necessity for stronger international institutions.	Turns back on South America which is of continuing concern to United States for economic and security reasons.
	No concern for Africa south of the Sahara.
	Overly optimistic on possibilities of strengthening United Nations in 1970s.
	Would foster nuclear proliferation.

One of the strongest arguments for neo-isolationism is clearly its recognition of the need for striking a better balance between domestic and foreign policy efforts. The United States has neglected pressing domestic problems and has been preoccupied with the Cold War for a generation. The neo-isolationists also have a powerful case in arguing for the distinction between primary and secondary interests, and in calling for a more selective use of foreign aid. On the other hand, the arguments listed

above against the neo-isolationist positon seem to outweigh these three "pros." Neo-isolationists have suggested several useful correctives, but have not come up with a completely acceptable alternative to the alleged globalism of recent American foreign policy and to detente.

Detente

This brings us to definition and assessment of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger option popularly known as detente. Recall that Kissinger shared the view that America had been guilty of globalism when he went to Washington in January 1969. Moreover, Richard Nixon had given an indication of his views on world affairs in an essay, "Asia after Vietnam," published in the October 1967 issue of *Foreign Affairs*. The tragedy of Vietnam, together with racial and other domestic crises, convinced the Nixon administration that America had to retreat from its overexposed global position as well as from Indochina. But the Nixon-Kissinger game plan also rested on a conviction that the post-World War II era had ended, and that new forces enabled the United States to build a "structure of peace."

President Nixon's first "State of the World" message was published in February 1970. Titled "U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace," this document suggested that three major changes had taken place on the international scene. First, the countries of Western Europe and Japan had recovered their "economic strength, their political vitality, and their national self-confidence." Second, the nations of the Third World had "a new spirit and a growing strength of independence" which nullified the fear that they would be a "battleground of cold-war rivalry and fertile ground for Communist penetration." Third, while "the power of individual Communist nations has grown . . . international Communist unity has been shattered."[8]

Given these fundamental changes on the world scene, the Nixon administration suggested that the "framework for a durable peace" consisted of partnership with allies, maintenance of sufficient American military strength to meet U. S. commitments, and a willingness to negotiate with adversaries. Marvelous rhetoric came out of the Nixon administration, such as "building a structure of peace" and moving "from an era of confrontations to an era of negotiations." The actions of Nixon and Kissinger centered on dramatic trips to Moscow and Peking in pursuit of detente and on the long, tortuous effort to extricate U. S. forces from Vietnam without sacrificing the chance of that sad country for self-determination. Pursuit of peace in the Middle East also took up much of Nixon's and Kissinger's time in the last months of the Nixon administration before the President became a "victim of Watergate." Not much attention was paid either to this country's major allies—Western Europe and Japan—or to the Third World.

A major thread in the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger posture—alongside the pursuit of accommodation with adversaries—is the notion of "peace through partnership" of the Nixon Doctrine. "Its central thesis is that the United States will participate in

the defense and development of allies and friends, but that America cannot—and will not—conceive *all* the plans, design *all* the programs, execute *all* the decisions, and undertake *all* the defense of the free nations of the world. We will help where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest."[9]

The Nixon Doctrine is a product of the understandable American desire not to get involved in any more Koreas or Vietnams. The Doctrine consists of the following: America will continue to extend its nuclear umbrella to those nations which desire it, will honor all its existing defense commitments, and will continue to supply arms and aid to allies who want them, but will not in the future intervene with U. S. troops in conventional or guerrilla wars unless the American national interest requires such action. Western Europe—the NATO commitment—is exempt from this last provision. The Ford administration's effort to get Congressional backing for further aid to South Vietnam and Cambodia was in accord with the Nixon Doctrine.

For a time Nixon and Kissinger were able to carry out their "Grand Design" virtually unchallenged with the single major exception of their Indochina policy. Most people in the Congress and the country wanted to believe that they were in fact ending the Cold War, or at least achieving detente with both Moscow and Peking, as well as extricating GI's from Indochina and temporarily alleviating the Middle East muddle. A few informed critics attacked Nixon and Kissinger's approach to Moscow and other aspects of their posture. But only in recent months have Ford and Kissinger been seriously challenged by the Congress and by some of the press, as well as by more academic experts.

Assessment of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger option must of course include the caveat that the story isn't over yet in many important respects. Nevertheless, informed analysis would have to include the following:

Pros	Cons
Better atmosphere, regular summits, some SALT and other U. S.-USSR agreements.	USSR using detente as a tactic of obtain specific goals whereas U. S. engaged in utopian pursuit of "peace." (See below for elaboration of these cons re Washington-Moscow-Peking relationships.)
Reopening of American door to China and end of Cold War Sino-American confrontations.	Peoples Republic of China using U. S. vs. USSR while U. S. again utopian re China and failing to use leverage of new Sino-American relations vs. USSR.
Extricated GI's from Indochina and thereby paved the way for domestic American recovery from bitter divisions the war produced.	Concluded direct U. S. involvement in

Pros (cont'd)	Cons (cont'd)
Reduced Arab-Israeli tensions and danger of U. S. -USSR confrontation in the Middle East.	Indochinese War in a manner which left South Vietnam and Cambodia vulnerable and also reduced American credibility with remaining allies.
Western Europe and Japan supported U. S. move from "era of confrontations to era of negotiations."	Only temporary "success" in Middle East and danger USSR leverage with Arabs greater than ever if U. S. fails to get Israelis to "deliver."
Realistic recognition of the fact that U. S. cannot be "global do-gooder" any more than it can be "global cop."	Partnership with major allies not developed, and U. S. relations with Western Europe and Japan deteriorated because of bilateral, secretive U. S. conduct of detente diplomacy with USSR and China.
Realistic awareness of limits of United Nations in age of nationalism as well as of communist and Third World influence in that organization.	"Benign neglect" toward Third World.
	Insufficient regard for and employment of United Nations.
	Fosters nuclear proliferation.

The most dramatic and most important innovation of the Nixon-Ford administrations has been their approach to Moscow and Peking. Well aware of the fact that the American people had grown weary of the burden of global leadership since Pearl Harbor as well as of the war in Indochina, and also cognizant of the necessity of greater attention to domestic problems such as racial injustice, urban blight, and so on, defenders of the "Grand Design" have argued that Nixon and Kissinger were operating from a weakened power base which dictated a strategic retreat in world affairs.[10] Moreover, the bitter Moscow-Peking split opened the door to an American dipomacy which could exploit the fact that Russia and China fear each other more than each fears the United States.

Although the importance of these factors must be granted, it is nevertheless demonstrable that the Soviet Union has benefited most from current American-Russian negotiations. Moreover, instead of using the China card against the Russians, the Nixon and Ford administrations have pursued detente with the USSR without properly employing the leverage of the new Sino-American relationship (much to the dismay and incomprehension of Mao and Chou). The concrete Soviet objectives have been listed over and over again: (1) forestall a Sino-American "Axis" aimed at the USSR; (2) obtain formal American and West European ratification of Soviet control of Eastern Europe (via West German *Ostpolitik* and the so-called Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe); (3) get American, West European, and

Japanese credits and technology to help overcome weak spots in the Soviet economic and military areas; (4) obtain at least strategic nuclear parity with the United States via SALT; (5) remove West European incentive to integrate by presenting an image of a friendly Russian bear; and (6) contribute via this chummy image to the weakening of NATO and eventual American withdrawal of its forces from Western Europe.

While the Soviet leaders have had their sights trained on these very precise objectives, designed to enhance Soviet and reduce American and West European power while neutralizing the danger of a Sino-American "Axis," the Nixon and Ford administrations have been pursuing characteristically romantic American goals (in spite of the self-styled "realism" of Nixon and Kissinger). For example, Kissinger wrote shortly before going to Washington that "the greatest need of the contemporary international system is an agreed concept of order."[11] In his view, peace is a by-product of a stable international order. Stability in world affairs requires agreement among at least the major nations on "permissible aims and methods of foreign policy."[12] Such an agreement can be arrived at only if the leading powers accept the legitimacy both of each other's political-economic systems and of the international order.

This sort of thinking reveals clearly Kissinger's propensity for trying to impose a desired state of affairs upon complex, intractable reality. For the harsh truth is that neither the Soviet Union nor the People's Republic of China has ceased being a "revolutionary state." That is, in spite of their differences with each other, both Moscow and Peking continue to claim the mantle of the genuine leader of the world communist movement. More importantly, both Russia and China continue to engage in foreign policies which, while not reckless, cannot be explained except by reference to their continued challenge to the legitimacy of both noncommunist systems and the present international system. Neither Moscow nor Peking accepts Washington's notion of what is "permissible."

Kissinger has made great claims for the so-called "Declaration of Principles" signed by Nixon and Brezhnev at the Moscow Summit of May 1972. This 12-point statement pledges the two superpowers to conduct their foreign relations on the basis of "peaceful coexistence" and to do their very best to avoid serious crises which could lead to confrontations and nuclear war. Both sides are to exercise "restraint" and other admirable qualities in their diplomacy. Although the Nixon-Ford administrations have made much of this Declaration and of the progress of detente generally, it will be recalled that only a little over a year after the 1972 Moscow Summit the United States and Russia were in a confrontation in the Middle East during the latter days of the Yom Kippur War in October 1973.

It is unfortunate that many people in the West do not know that detente means only a relaxation of tensions, not mutual good will nor accommodation, and not even a *modus vivendi* (temporary arrangement of affairs pending a final settlement). While "peaceful coexistence" means "live and let live" to a large number of people

in the West, it means something quite different to Moscow–and to Peking. A former American Ambassador to Russia, Foy D. Kohler, put the matter as follows in testimony to a House Subcommittee holding hearings on detente in 1974:

"Peaceful coexistence," as defined by Moscow, is thus a state of affairs made possible by "a shift in the correlation of forces" favorable to the Soviet Union, backed and to be made "irreversible" by the increasing "power and might" of the Soviet Union, and necessarily combined with "vigilance" at home. The Summit-related Soviet documents and commentaries hardly make the concept sound "peaceful," nor do they seem to contemplate a very protracted "coexistence" before the "triumph of the great ideas of Communism."

Far from evoking the image created by the words "peaceful coexistence" in the minds of Westerners accustomed to take their guidance from Webster or Larousse or their equivalents, the Soviet version sounds more like the Western definition of "cold war." Certainly, it does not correspond to the state of affairs a Westerner thinks he is describing when he speaks of or writes of *"detente."* This is nothing new or surprising to those of us who follow Soviet affairs; but it is surprising to us, and probably to the Russians themselves, how much confusion and misunderstanding exist in the Western world with respect to this so-called "principle of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems."[13]

In the light of both this Soviet perception of detente and "peaceful coexistence" and of Russia's specific objectives discussed above, it seems fair to conclude that:

A key question in this whole matter is then, *detente* for what? It seems, in one sense, that America and Russia have similar goals. That is to say, while both sides seek a reduced chance of military confrontation, they also seek a world organized according to their own (clashing) visions of the future. America seeks a "structure of peace" based on moderation and restraint, within a framework of a balance of power. The Soviet Union seeks a Communist world order, or at least a favorable shift in the global balance in its favor. For each side the present precarious period of *detente* is only a steppingstone toward their mutually incompatible long-range goals.[14]

Turning to the Sino-American relationship, it seems clear that the major reason for improved relations between Washington and Peking is the mutual concern about Russia. The United States desires to reduce the chance of accidental nuclear war with Russia partly through playing China against Russia, while China seeks to lessen the possibility of a deliberate Soviet nuclear strike by leaning on America. Moscow is both Washington's and Peking's major opponent at the present time. The Sino-American relationship was made possible through Nixon's effort to exploit the Moscow-Peking rift and Mao's perception of Nixon's altered view of America's role in Asia as symbolized by United States' withdrawal of its forces from Indochina. No longer fearing an American attack, Mao could revert to the classical Chinese ploy of using a "secondary" enemy (America) against a "primary" enemy (Russia). Mao also used this tactic when he worked with (as well as against) Chiang's Nationalists during the war with Japan in the 1930s and 1940s.

Nixon and Kissinger did not, of course, publicly talk in these terms about the new Sino-American relationship. They instead engaged in rhetoric about the need to "de-isolate" China and thus to expose the People's Republic to the diversity of the contemporary world, which they hoped would lead to a dampening of Peking's revolutionary ardor. They also stressed the need for China to participate in efforts to achieve nuclear arms agreements. Nixon and Kissinger tried to obtain Peking's support in obtaining an Indochinese settlement as well (with very mixed and unsatisfactory results). The Nixon and Ford administrations even engaged at times in very optimistic public relations regarding the allegedly rather benevolent character of Mao's regime in selling the new Sino-American relationship to the American people.

In contrast to this U. S. thinking and rhetoric, Mao and Chou very frankly explained their purpose in turning to the American government. An essay written by Mao in the early 1940s to explain his limited cooperation with Chiang's Nationalists against invading Japan was cited in the People's Republic press to explain Peking's flirtation with Washington. Mao no doubt appreciates Winston Churchill's explanation of the latter's warm expressions of support for Stalin's Russia when Hitler invaded the USSR in June 1941: "If Hitler invaded Hell, I would at least make a favorable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons." Unlike the Nixon-Ford administrations, Mao and Chou have not tried to gloss over the new Sino-American relationship with honeyed phrases and Utopian expectations. Whereas Henry Kissinger was quoted as saying he likes the Chinese because "they have a *Weltanschauung*—the rest of us have lost our way," Peking publicly revels in evidence it interprets to mean that America is a decadent nation.[15] China no doubt hopes that the United States will remain strong enough to deter Russia until such time as America is no longer needed for this purpose.

It is apparent on the basis of this assessment why Chou publicly said the new Sino-American relationship is both "temporary" and "superficial." It is temporary because it is only supposed to last so long as China needs America to help deter Russia; superficial, because until final communist victory over "capitalism," revolutions and wars are inevitable. Nixon's talk of a "generation of peace" was therefore foolish. Apart from the contrasting American and Chinese purposes, one must also note that, so far, Peking has benefited more than has Washington from the new relationship. While the United States obtained only the now-destroyed Indochinese settlement (partly with Chinese help) and is supposedly trying to play China against Russia, the People's Republic has obtained the following: the withdrawal of American combat forces from Indochina (and the end of a possible "second front" for China); American abandonment of its "two Chinas" policy and tacit acceptance of Taiwan's status as part of China; admission to the United Nations while Taiwan was kicked out of that organization; American acquiescence in China's use of its U. S. relationship to fend off the USSR; increasing United States trade and possibly aid as well; a swing in American opinion back toward its traditional sentimental view of

China; and, finally, a strain in American-Japanese relations resulting from the Nixon administration's altered course in East Asia.

It does not take too much imagination or knowledge to suggest that if either Moscow or Peking were in Washington's position in the triangualr relationship each would genuinely try to "collude" with the second against the third party. But the Nixon-Ford administrations, while widely hailed for being "realistic" in recognizing the Moscow-Peking split and its utility, have not in fact exploited the rift substantially. Moreover, the United States has both Western Europe and Japan—the other two of Nixon and Kissinger's five major power centers—as allies. This four-against-one situation has not been orchestrated by the United States in a manner designed to bring the Soviet Union to a more reasonable bargaining stance; in fact, the USSR has benefited most from American-Russian negotiations. Washington—to be precise, Henry Kissinger, a nonexpert on the Soviet Union—continues to woo the Kremlin almost as if the five-power situation were four-to-one in Moscow's favor.

Although Nixon and Kissinger produced much rhetoric in four annual "State of the World" messages about their goal of "genuine partnership" with both Western Europe and Japan, their actions to a large extent undermined their professed objective. They created a considerable measure of distrust in Western Europe and Japan by their secretive, bilateral negotiations with Russia and China. It is true that America's two major allies generally favored the United States' effort to improve relations with both Moscow and Peking. But American policies that have an impact on Western Europe and Japan were often initiated not only without consultation with the leaders of the allies, but at times without even advance notice to them. It is surely so obvious, at least among informed observers, as not to require evidence and argument that Nixon and Kissinger did a great deal of damage by showing more concern for relations with adversaries than for ties with America's most important and long-standing allies.

It is also even more apparent that the Nixon-Ford administrations have been following a policy of "benign neglect" or worse toward the Third World. At a time of increasing American dependency on raw materials from the developing areas and of greater need than ever among the two-thirds of the world's people who live in those regions, the United States government has all but turned its back on the Third World. It is true that Congressional and popular support for foreign aid has declined ever since Kennedy entered the White House, that some aid has been poorly used and even pocketed by leaders of developing nations, and that the special contribution of Nixon and Kissinger was to try to achieve detente with Moscow and Peking (and to extricate GIs from Indochina and to try to play an evenhanded role in the Middle East). No administration can be alert and effective regarding all the varied fronts of American diplomacy, especially when a two-man (and now only a one-man) band is doing the leading. Nevertheless, the Nixon-Ford administrations rate at best a D-minus in the Third World arena. Preoccupation with Washington-Moscow-Peking triangular diplomacy has been at the expense of the Third World and

U. S. relations with that vast region, as well as detrimental to relations with Western Europe and Japan. (It is heartening and perhaps even astonishing to note that, beginning in the Summer of 1975, Kissinger began developing a constructive attitude toward the Third World's aspirations for a new world economic order.)

A very important final comment must be made on the Nixon-Ford aministrations' posture which is related to the next option, trilateralism. Under the impact of "stagflation" in the industrialized democracies and the quadrupling of oil prices by the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), Henry Kissinger began to refer increasingly to this country's relations with Western Europe and Japan as the "cornerstones" of American foreign policy. Kissinger spoke in almost anguished terms over the loss of purpose in America and the West, and frequently uttered pessimistic prophecies unless the United States and its major allies faced up to reality.[16] It is possible—just possible—that the limitations of detente with both Moscow and Peking have become apparent to the Secretary of State, and that, under the impact of the inflation-recession-energy crises (and the Portuguese, Middle East, and Indochinese situations), he may devote more attention in 1976 to repairing damaged relations with Western Europe and Japan. Kissinger—a champion of Bismarckian *Realpolitik*—has even spoken vigorously of the need for international cooperation:

> A new world is emerging—a world whose security, well-being, and moral fulfillment demand interdependence; a world whose peoples are interlinked by technology and global communications, by the common danger of nuclear war, and by the world-wide thrusts of human needs; a world in which traditional structures and tenets of diplomacy are being overhwelmed. At the midway point between the end of the Second World War and the end of this century, we find ourselves also midway between the nation-state from which we began and the global community we must fashion.[17]

It is possible that the Nixon-Kissinger (and Willy Brandt) effort to achieve accommodation with Moscow will come to be perceived as a necessary though largely futile attempt which subsequently enabled the West (and Japan) to adopt a new position.

The present period of so-called detente is the fifth lull in the Cold War since 1945. Nixon and Kissinger—in spite of their rhetoric—were hardly the first American President and Secretary of State after World War II to attempt to improve relations with the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of Indochina, and with all the pressures to concentrate on domestic economic problems, perhaps only a sensational diplomatic effort along the lines of the Nixon-Kissinger extravaganza could have shown the American people that the burdens of Western leadership cannot be laid down. Recall the words of George Kennan that, if Roosevelt had not attempted to establish conditions for good postwar relations with the Stalinist regime, " . . . we would still be hearing reproachful voices saying: 'You claim that cooperation with Russia is not possible. How do you know? You never even tried.' "[18]

All this is not to say that America should abandon the pursuit of arms control and other agreements with Moscow and Peking, or that the attempt to exploit the Moscow-Peking rift is unwise. But the effort to arrive at accords with the leading totalitarian nations in order to try to reduce the hazard of nuclear war is not a substitute for an effort to build a genuine "structure of peace." So long as Moscow and Peking continue to proclaim the inevitability of and to pursue the establishment of a communist globe it will not be possible to build a stable and just world order. However, the United States and the other some two dozen democracies can undertake steps aimed at coordinating both their responses to their domestic problems and their policies toward the communist and Third Worlds.

Trilateralism

This brings us to the next option, so-called trilateralism. The approach of this school of thought is implicit in much of the above criticism of the Nixon-Ford posture. The trilateralists believe that priorities have been distorted in American foreign policy. Put most simply, they hold that development of cooperation among the United States, Western Europe, and Japan should have top priority; achieving a better relationship between these industrialized democracies and the Third (and Fourth) Worlds should be the second item on the agenda; and seeking to improve relations with Moscow and Peking should be the third item of major concern. Indeed the trilateral view holds that better relations with the communist giants will be possible on a lasting basis only if the West and Japan are successful in handling the first two priorities.

Robert Bowie has stated one of the trilateralist's central contentions as follows:

> The first need is to put U. S.-Soviet relations and detente into better perspective. Mr. Nixon made detente the centerpiece of his policy. With his heavy focus on summitry, he tended to personalize these relations and to overstate the achievements with claims of having radically transformed them and of creating a permanent structure of peace. . . .
>
> It is time to cut through hyperbole about detente in general and to focus more on specific interests and issues. What are Soviet interests in Europe and the Middle East, in trade and credits, in arms control, exchanges and openness, and other issues as they see them? What should be U. S. objectives in these various fields?[19]

Like other advocates of trilateralism, Bowie is skeptical about the alleged achievements of Nixon and Kissinger in improving United States' relations with Moscow (and Peking). Moreover, he thinks that pursuit of a quick easing of tensions in relations with Russia and China has been at the expense of the increased cooperation among the industrialized democracies which should be the first order of business in American foreign policy. Nixon and Kissinger were premature in their efforts to "end the Cold War."

The major trilateralist concern is the failure of the Nixon-Ford administrations to realize the necessity for the West and Japan to cooperate regarding a whole cluster of problems. The trilateralists recognize that the industrialized democracies cannot cope alone with many of today's problems. They will have to take account of the interests of other nations and regions (both communist and Third World). But as Bowie puts it,

> . . . the demands of interdependence must have much higher priority in U. S. policy. The flow of trade, money, investments, technology and people across borders has been steadily expanding. Multinational firms produce, distribute and trade on a worldwide scale. Pollution, the ocean, food, energy and resources have become global problems.
>
> These various forces are linking national economies ever more intimately and are eroding the capacity of nations to cope with their needs separately. The necessity for cooperation is especially urgent among the advanced countries of North America, Western Europe, and Japan, but it must include the developing nations as well, and the Communist states, to the extent they will join. Beyond avoiding nuclear war, the main task in foreign affairs is to develop the processes and institutions for managing this interdependence.[20]

The trilateralists want the United States government to act on the perception expressed by Kissinger in his speech cited above regarding the need to fashion the "global community" which is emerging.

One of the basic arguments against the trilateralist view is that closer cooperation among the industrialized democracies would prevent pursuit of detente with Moscow and Peking. Zbigniew Brzezinski has tried to reply to this criticism:

> . . . objections have been made that closer trilateral cooperation as the central goal of U. S. policy runs counter to the aim of improving relations with the Communist world. Yet that improvement is not likely to be attained in a setting which is unstable and thus feeds the residual revolutionary aspirations of the Communist leaders. A cooperative component, embracing the richest and the most powerful countries, seriously seeking to develop common policies designed to promote more rapid growth in the Third World, is hence more likely to develop enduring and constructive relations with the Communist states than individual policies of detente, often competitively pursued.[21]

Brzezinski argues also that the trilateralist approach would best enable the United States and mankind to move toward the creation of the "global community" which Kissinger referred to.

It is of course more difficult to appraise a proposed option for America than to analyze the existing posture of the Nixon-Ford administrations. One has to rely more on informed speculation and less on evidence based on the record. But the following arguments have been put forth for and against trilateralism:

Pros	Cons
Recognizes need for triangular cooperation among industrialized democracies to cope with whole cluster of problems.	Stress on democracies' cooperation could push Moscow and Peking back together, end communist polycentrism.
Preserves important distinction among friends, foes, and neutrals which Nixon-Ford abandoned in part.	Fails to seize opportunity to exploit Moscow-Peking split (unlike Nixon-Ford).
Stresses West-Japan aid to Third World (again unlike Nixon-Ford).	West-Japan be perceived as adversary "rich man's club" by Third World.
Understands need for balance of power and reduced "have-have not" gap in order to thwart communist giants.	Western Europe not receptive to Japan as equal and part of or adjunct to Atlantic Community.
Positive conception of how to organize emerging "global community" and to cope with interdependence.	
Forestall nuclear proliferation, at least in West and Japan.	

It is apparent that one's view of the so-called achievements of detente is a central issue in deciding on the respective merits of the Nixon-Ford administrations' posture and trilateralism. The limits of detente are more apparent today than they have ever been. And one has to trust that the American-Soviet and American-Chinese relationships will develop counter to the lessons of history in order to believe that "it will all work out well in the end." That is, the hopes for "peace through trade" and "getting to know you" via contacts and exchanges among individuals which are a key element in the Nixon-Ford approach have never in history served to bridge the gap between antagonistic nations. France and Germany had no dearth of personal contacts and trade during the long history of conflict and wars between those two countries (to cite just one example). To expect better relations through so-called establishment of "mutual vested interests" is pure utopianism.

Developments in the Middle East and Indochina provide two good examples that detente means something very different to the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China than it does to the Nixon-Ford administration and to many people in the West.[22] It is to the credit of Henry Kissinger that he has tried to conduct an "evenhanded" policy in the Middle East. The United States has been too partial to Israel, for many well-known reasons. The Arabs have their legitimate interests too. Apart from the obvious American and even greater Western European and Japanese interest in obtaining oil from the area, the Arab side has deserved more sympathetic

consideration. Whether Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy and choice of tactics were wise is another matter. But the idea of trying to strike a balance between Israeli and Arab rights and interests was long overdue. (One hopes the second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement will lead to successful resolution of the major Arab-Israeli issues. But it seems inevitable that both the USSR and some Arab lands and groups will try to destroy the Egyptian-Israeli accord and limited accommodation.)

What has been the Soviet and Chinese contribution to the pursuit of justice and peace in the Middle East? It does not have to be argued—the facts are evident—that the Russians have continued to try to exploit the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Kremlin's role in arming the Egyptians and Syrians and advocating their use of those arms before and during the October 1973 Yom Kippur War is well known.[23] It is incredible that even Kssinger at times talked and acted as if he had forgotten that there was an American-Soviet confrontation during that war. The Soviet Union wants the "no war-no peace" situation to continue in the Middle East. Either a genuine settlement in the region or the defeat of Israel would mean the end of Russian exploitation of Arab hostility toward Israel and America. China's role in the region is of far less importance, of course, but its rhetorical devotion to the cause of radical Arab groups and countries is a matter of public record.

The point is that detente has in no way deterred the Soviet Union and the People's Republic from "business as usual" in world affairs. Their performances in Indochina since "peace" was supposedly achieved there in January 1973 are further evidence of the contention of trilateralists (and others, of course) that the two communist giants will not agree to genuine "peaceful coexistence" (live and let live) so long as revolutionary situations are available in the Third World. It has been said that the Vietnam "settlement" of 1973 was the product of Washington's successful exploitation of the Moscow-Peking rift. Both Russia and China supposedly valued their "new" American relationships more than petty gains for the polycentric-riddled communist camp. But Moscow and Peking had both poured arms into North Vietnam in violation of the 1973 agreement.[24] While their effort may have been based partly on competition for influence in Hanoi, it is also apparent that the North Vietnamese takeover in Indochina constitutes a blow to American prestige and power.

It appears to be true that China doesn't want a complete American withdrawal from the Asian mainland *at this time* because of her fear of Russian encirclement. But that clearly doesn't mean that Peking is averse to a blow to Washington's prestige through the North Vietnamese victory in Indochina, provided Hanoi remains out of Russia's orbit. An essential aspect of the stories in the Middle East and Indochina is very crucial for the Nixon-Ford vs. trilateralist debate: that is, Moscow and Peking remain enemies of Washington as well as of each other. For both Russia and China, detente is a tactic designed to foster specific objectives (listed above). Only for Washington, or at least only for the Nixon-Ford administations, is detente a way station en route to a lasting "structure of peace" based on moderation and

restraint. Kissinger has been premature in attempting to obtain agreement by Moscow and Peking to "permissible aims and methods of foreign policy." For such an accord requires at least a measure of prior consensus on the nature of the international system and on mutual acceptance of the legitimacy of a world of diverse political-economic systems. Both Russia and China—while certainly not guided solely by ideology—are revolutionary as well as "traditional" states. And their ideology, in addition to being the basis of legitimacy for their totalitarian regimes, prevents Moscow and Peking from agreeing to genuine "peaceful coexistence."

If the analysis of detente in this essay is basically correct, the Nixon-Ford administrations' foreign policy stance is in need of substantial, indeed drastic, revision. And the trilateralist order of priorities seems far more in tune with reality than Henry Kissinger's "grand design." That is, the industrialized democracies should first concentrate on achieving greater cohesion; second, the West and Japan should coordinate their Third World development efforts. The pursuit of accommodation with Moscow and Peking stands third, and can best be pursued if the first two priorities are successfully managed. The malaise and serious economic-social problems within the industrialized democracies, and the misery and frustration within the Third (and Fourth) Worlds offer Moscow and Peking too many tempting targets for the latter, still partially "revolutionary" states to "settle down" in a world of diversity.

The major standard criticism of the trilateralist position is the argument that it could (or would) push Moscow and Peking back together again and end polycentrism in the world communist camp. But this view does not withstand thoughtful assessment and the record of experience. For it will be recalled that there never was a monolithic communist movement. Mao quarreled with Stalin as long ago as the 1920s. Before and after coming to power, the Chinese communists always retained a certain distance in relations with Moscow. Moreover, the public break between Moscow and Peking in the late 1950s occurred at a time of relative Western-Japanese cohesion. The many factors (nationalism, race, territory, ideological disputes, etc.) which fueled the Sino-Soviet split fifteen years ago were not offset by concern for the world communist movement's "image" and prospects. It is difficult to imagine today, with America and the West in disarray, and the Third and Fourth Worlds tempting targets, that Russia and China would be "pushed" into each other's arms by adoption of the trilateralist option.

In fact, it is likely that an effort to establish the sort of cohesive West-Japan relationship envisaged by the trilateralists, and the likelihood that the developing areas might view such an entity as a "rich man's club" are more troublesome cons of the trilateralist alternative. America and Japan, in spite of some rough spots in their relationship over the years, including the Nixon-Kissinger "shocks," have established a relatively cooperative partnership. But Western Europe lacks the contacts, understanding, and sympathetic approach to Japanese foreign policy problems which are found in the United States. Japan is viewed as a formidable trade rival in Europe. The European Community nations have clearly indicated their reluctance to include Japan as a partner or even as an equal "adjunct" to the Atlantic

Community. Similarly, Third World charges of "neo-colonialism" and so on would surely ring out loud and clear should the trilateralist notion of vigorous cooperation among the industrialized countries be adopted. A constructive development posture would have to be clearly shown to overcome Third World fears.

Union of Democracies

It is a truism of foreign policy making that options almost always have some serious disadvantages as well as some potential advantages—hence, often the necessity to "choose the lesser evil." The analysis in this essay confirms these maxims. Nevertheless, it is possible to link the strong points of neo-isolationism, detente, and trilateralism with the notion of a union of the democracies in an alternative which would constitute a new foreign policy for America. Most observers and practitioners would agree that in the United States it is vital to develop a posture which combines power and principle. To a considerable extent it seems that neo-isolationism and detente stress the former aspect while trilateralism and the concept of union of the democracies emphasize the latter.

The leading protagonist of the concept of union of the democracies is Clarence Streit. On the eve of World War II, Streit, then a *New York Times* correspondent covering the impotent League of Nations, proposed "Union Now" for the democracies of the West.[25] He hoped such a dramatic step of outright federal integration would prevent World War II. With the advent of the Cold War after the holocaust of 1939-1945, Streit argued that union of the democracies would enable the West and Japan to cope successfully with the communist and Third World challenges. In addition, Streit has always argued (as have others, of course) that such a democratic union could serve as a building block to an ultimate world federal government, with countries to be admitted as they achieve democracy. Streit has in effect argued for almost forty years that democracy (not Nazism, Fascism, or Communism) is the "wave of the future."

The United States and the other democracies desperately need a "conceptual breakthrough." Or perhaps it is closer to the truth to say the democracies need to recover their confidence in the validity of their ideals and political systems. Before World War I, most people in the Western world took it for granted that democracy, scientific and economic progress, and international cooperation and peace were the "wave of the future." But the Great War of 1914-1918, the emergence of Communist, Fascist, and Nazi totalitarian systems, the Great Depression, the "Greater War" of 1939-1945, and the failure of democracy to take root in most of the nations of the Third World have combined to shatter the old optimism.

One hopes the democracies can establish a positive realism which will sustain them for the long pull ahead, for, with all their shortcomings, democracies have outperformed both authoritarian and totalitarian systems in terms of material welfare and liberty alike. A better perspective than the one which prevailed in the overly optimistic pre-1914 era is required. Although it was patently premature to have anticipated the triumph of democracy, peace, and progress in the 20th century, it is

surely permissible (and necessary) to hope and work for the realization of such a world in the long run. Not only is democracy preferable as an internal political system, it is a fact that no democracies have gone to war with each other in the 20th century. While this is no guarantee of "perpetual peace" should the world (or most of it) "go democratic" at some point in the future, it is surely a positive note which augurs well should a world federal government one day be achieved. Streit goes the trilateralists two better: not only does he advocate union as distinguished from greater democratic cooperation, he also envisages federal organization of the "global community." Provided the idea of union of the democracies is viewed as a long-, not a short-run component of a new American foreign policy, it adds a viable and necessary dimension of principle and vision. For the short run it is, of course, accepted by advocates of neo-isolationism, detente, and trilateralism alike that a "world of diversity" is acceptable, and indeed necessary in an age of nuclear weapons.

A New Foreign Policy

Having stated the essential nature of the concept of a union of the democracies, and placed it in perspective, it is now possible to propose a new foreign policy for America. It combines some of the key provisions of all of the "reasonable" options defined and analyzed above. The neo-isolationist emphasis on the necessity for more attention to domestic problems and for a balance between domestic and foreign policy concerns and efforts is accepted as fundamental. In addition, the distinction made by neo-isolationists between primary and secondary national interests is incorporated, along with recognition of the need for a better organization of the "global community" (which all the above options accept). The Nixon-Ford administrations' opening of the door to China and recognition of the limits of the United Nations are also part of the new foreign policy for America. However, adopting the trilateralist order of priorities means that pursuit of accommodation with Moscow and Peking comes after the quests for cohesion among the industrialized democracies and better relations between the latter and the Third World. On the other hand, it is surely conceivable that Peking could be played off against Moscow more effectively, while still allowing for the USSR's fear of "encirclement" by the other four power centers of the Nixon-Kissinger multipolar scheme. Finally, the concept of union of the democracies and world federalism provides a long-run dimension to American purposes and policy.

A central weakness of both the containment posture and the Nixon-Ford policy of detente which has partially succeeded it is their lack of a positive, long-run goal other than a striving to achieve genuine "peaceful coexistence" with the communist giants. The pursuit of "Atlantic partnership" and development assistance and military interventions in the Third World were essentially triggered by fear of communism, or more precisely, of the power and expansionism of some communist states. America and the other industrialized democracies have been in the unenviable position of appearing (and to some extent correctly so) to be merely defenders of an unjust global *status quo*. This defensive posture has permitted Moscow and Peking and other smaller communist centers to appear as the champions of the two-thirds

of mankind who constitute the "have nots" of the contemporary world.[26] The largely negative character of U. S. policy since World War II has also failed to inspire the peoples in the democracies. Especially in the Nixon-Ford years, America has seemed to promise mostly short-term *realpolitik*.

This is not to say that the United States should or will be able to put aside pragmatic negotiations with Moscow and Peking. The threat of nuclear war alone justifies continued pursuit of arms control and other agreements with both Russia and China. Moreover, it can be hoped (although it should not be counted on) that various contacts between America and other democracies on the one hand and Moscow and Peking on the other will contribute to accommodation now and "liberalization" of the Soviet and Chinese regimes later. However, it should be clear that the idea held by many in the West that communist totalitarianism will inevitably mellow in time is as unwarranted as the Marxist idea that communism will surely triumph. Much depends on whether or not the industrialized democracies respond creatively to their own internal problems and to the communist and Third World challenges. The long-run goal of a democratic world order of course presupposes "liberalization" of the leading communist regimes. Such an order requires that at least superpowers and major powers be democratic.

In the light of the fact that Moscow and Peking remain enemies of the West as well as of each other, America will have to continue being allied with some right-wing authoritarian regimes (as well as with democracies) in order to maintain a balance of power. In the aftermath of Vietnam, many critics in the U. S. attack this aspect of American foreign policy. They are apparently unaware of the fact that a balance of power could not be maintained if the United States were to be allied only with democracies. There aren't enough democracies in the world to be able to enjoy such a luxury of choice in allies, for only about 25 of the 150 nations in the world today have democratic political systems. It is well understood among practitioners and observers of foreign policy that alliance does not signify approval of the internal regime of other nations. It simply rests upon a mutual interest in deterring a potential foe. It goes without saying that discrimination should be exercised in choosing authoritarian allies. It is very interesting that the loudest critics of American alliance with right-wing regimes do not attack U. S. alliance with left-wing totalitarian regimes (U. S.-USSR during World War II) or current American dalliance with Moscow and Peking under the rubric of detente.

The proposed new foreign policy for America would be a highly complicated mix of pragmatism and vision, power and principle. This is surely appropriate to the very complex world in which U. S. decision makers have to operate. The old posture of containment and the Nixon-Kissinger pursuit of detente were both simplistic. Moreover, American policy has suffered from failure to distinguish adequately between short- and long-run objectives and interests. That the United States' posture since 1945 (and before) has also been victimized by impatience should be self-evident. George Kennan suggested 10 or 15 years of containment would possibly lead to a mellowing if not indeed a breakup of the Soviet system.[27] Nixon and Kissinger seem

to have been sincere in their quest for a "generation of peace" and accommodation "in our time."

But the shape of the globe since World War II has not been conducive to such grandiose expectations. Nor does it seem likely to become so in the last decades of the 20th century. Fundamental aspects of the contemporary world suggest the dimensions of the problems. I have summarized these characteristics of the 1970s and compared and contrasted them with those of the 1930s as follows:[28]

1930s	1970s
Seven great powers.	Two superpowers, three great powers.
Global Great Depression.	Western, communist, Third World economic ills.
Democracies deeply fearful of war and fail to maintain balance of power.	Democracies refuse to "think about the unthinkable," may not maintain balance of power.
No consensus on international system.	No consensus on international system.
No moral-intellectual consensus.	No moral-intellectual consensus.
International law and League weak.	International law and UN weak.
Universal pursuit of national interests.	Universal pursuit of nation interests.
Germany, Italy, and Japan reckless.	Russia and China both cautious.
No monolithic Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis, but great threat to democracies, USSR, and China.	No monolithic communist bloc; indeed bitter Moscow-Peking rift.
Military developments not major barrier to war.	Nuclear weapons major deterrent to total war, but limited conflicts continue.

While there are hopeful aspects, such as the caution of both Russia and China in world affairs, most of the characteristics of the contemporary international system add up to continuing serious trouble for American foreign policy and the world community alike.

Summary

In the short and long run, the United States should give more attention to domestic problems, and achieve a better balance between domestic and foreign policy. It should also incorporate the distinction between primary and secondary national interests into its attitudes and actions. At present, the United States should continue to try to exploit the Moscow-Peking rift through utilization of the reopened door to China. America must also accept the inherent limitations of the United Nations, without turning her back on that organization. For both the short and long haul the trilateralist's order of priorities should be adopted; i. e., cooperation among industrialized democracies and establishment of a better relationship between the

West and Japan, on the one hand, and the Third and Fourth Worlds, on the other, should come ahead of pursuit of accommodation with Moscow and Peking. For the long run, the United States should do what it can to obtain acceptance of the need to move beyond cooperation to ultimate union among the democracies of the world (including Israel and India). Finally, while doing what little can be done now to foster a stronger international law and United Nations, the United States should sponsor the goal of an ultimate world democratic government as the maximum end of its foreign policy effort.

This proposed new posture for the United States obviously requires acceptance of the need for a continuing participation in world affairs. It does not promise "liberalization" of communist totalitarian regimes within any time frame, much less "peace in our time" and the end of struggle and trials. It rejects both isolationism and globalism as viable options for the 1970s and beyond. It incorporates the best elements of the leading "reasonable" schools of thought in a consistent manner. In one sense it asks Americans to bring the qualities of pragmatism and principle which they espouse and more or less live up to in domestic political affairs to bear on foreign policy questions. It calls for a mature, steady conduct of U. S. diplomacy commensurate with America's responsibilities as a superpower. Surely such a sober course commends itself to reason and experience more than either the utopian or *realpolitik* approaches which are being so widely championed on the eve of the bicentennial of the United States. It is truly long past time for America to come of age in world affairs.

Notes

1. See D. W. Brogan's classic essay, "The Illusion of American Omnipotence," *Harper's*, December 1952.
2. See Hans Morgenthau, *A New Foreign Policy for the United States* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), pp. 15-18.
3. John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy since World War II*, Sixth Edition (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1973), pp. 43-44.
4. Henry Kissinger, "Central Issues of American Foreign Policy," reprinted in his *American Foreign Policy*, Expanded Edition (New York: W. W. Norton, 1974), p. 92.
5. See the Gallup Poll cited in Ronald Inglehart, "Americans Turn Inward," *European Community*, August-September 1973; Louis Harris Poll, *San Francisco Examiner*, March 26, 1973; a Gallup Poll cited in "Kissinger's Chances of Another 'Miracle,'" *U. S. News and World Report*, February 24, 1975; and a Louis Harris Poll carried in the *San Francisco Examiner*, March 11, 1975. Fortunately, seven of eight public opinion pollsters thought in September 1975 that Americans generally support a major U. S. role in world affairs. Their views were given to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the start of that Committee's 10-months-long reexamination of American foreign policy slated to end in July 1976.
6. Samuel Bemis, *A Short History of American Foreign Policy and Diplomacy* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1959), p. 473.
7. For examples of the neo-isolationist position, see Morgenthau's *A New Foreign Policy for the United States, op. cit.*, and George Kennan, "After the Cold War: American Foreign Policy in the 1970's," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1972.
8. Richard Nixon, "U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace," The Department of State *Bulletin*, March 9, 1970, p. 274.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 276.

10. See, for example, Henry Brandon, *The Retreat of American Power* (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1973).

11. Kissinger, "Central Issues . . . ," *op. cit.*, p. 57.

12. Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), p. 1.

13. See *Detente:* Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 69-70.

14. See Donald Brandon, "Dr. Kissinger's 'Grand Design,' " *America*, March 9, 1974, p. 168. For a more detailed analysis, see Leo Labedz, et al., "Detente: An Evaluation," *International Review*, No. 1, Spring 1974. For general appraisals of the Nixon-Ford administrations' posture, see also the following: Hans Morgenthau, "The Danger of Detente," *New Leader*, October 1, 1973; Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Deceptive Structure of Peace," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1974; Dev Murarka, "Kissinger Theory Blasted in USSR," *Christian Science Monitor*, December 20, 1974; Robert Osgood, et al., *Retreat from Empire?* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); and Alan M. Jones, Jr., ed., *U. S. Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (New York: David McKay Co., 1973).

15. See Thomas Robinson, "China in 1973," *Asian Survey*, January 1974. For an informed and debunking look at the rash of sentimental and often masochistic American writing on the new and old–Sino-American relationship, see Sheila K. Johnson, "To China, With Love," *Commentary*, June 1973. See also Osgood, et al., *op. cit.*, and Jones, *op. cit.*, which have sections on the Sino-American relationship.

16. See James Reston's interview of Kissinger in the *New York Times*, October 13, 1974.

17. Quoted from Kissinger's speech at the annual Alfred E. Smith memorial dinner in New York City, October 16, 1974.

18. See George Kennan, *American Diplomacy: 1900-1950* (New York: The New American Library, 1952), p. 75.

19. Robert Bowie, "Foreign Policy under Ford," *The Christian Science Monitor*, August 10, 1974. For lengthier introductions to the trilateralist point of view, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, "U. S. Foreign Policy: The Search for Focus," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1973; and Henry Owen, ed., *The Next Phase in Foreign Policy* (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1973).

20. Bowie, *op. cit.*

21. See Brzezinski, "U. S. Foreign Policy . . . ," *op. cit.*, p. 727.

22. The Soviet role in Portugal is, of course, also evidence that detente is only a Russian ploy.

23. See Foy Kohler, Leon Goure, and Mose L. Harvey, *The Soviet Union and the October 1973 Middle East War* (Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1974).

24. The State Department's "Special Report" on "Vietnam: January 1975," conceded this point: "U. S. military aid to the Republic of Vietnam has not even approached the one-for-one, piece-for-piece replacement level authorized by the agreement [of January 1973], while Russian and Chinese military aid to North Vietnam has remained at roughly the same level for the past 5 years (except for very large deliveries in 1972, the major invasion year) and has permitted a major buildup of North Vietnamese inventories in the South since the agreement." In a speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 17, 1975, during the debacle, Kissinger publicly rebuked Moscow and Peking for the first time since he went to Washington in January 1969. He said: "We shall not forget who supplied the arms which North Vietnam used to make a mockery of its signature on the Paris accords." But it must be noted that the Secretary of State also asserted in this speech that the basic "design" of the Nixon-Ford foreign policy remains valid.

25. See the revised version of *Freedom's Frontier: Atlantic Union Now* (Washington, D.C.: Freedom and Union Press and Harper Brothers, 1961).

26. See Donald Brandon, "Failures of Containment: Negative Foreign Policy," *The Commonweal*, August 1, 1958.

27. George Kennan (Mr. X), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1947.

28. See Donald Brandon, "The Last Time We had a Multipolar World Things Didn't Work Out Very Well," *Worldview*, March 1974.

Our Coming Foreign-Policy Crisis

Two-thirds of the world wants a fairer shake in the distribution of material riches. Will America react with sympathy or truculence?

by Harlan Cleveland

For Americans the autumn of 1975 will be a momentous season of choice—between an imaginary independence and an imaginative interdependence, between past ideas and future needs, between opting out of or dealing into a new planetary bargain. It will also be the time for a second major Kissinger contribution to world order—or for the beginning of an American post-Kissinger foreign policy.

The growing insistence on a new international economic order amounts to no less than a budding global fairness revolution. That revolution, with its crescendo of Third World complaint voiced at meetings in New York, Geneva, Bucharest, Rome, Dakar, Algiers, Lima, and Mexico City, may well reach a climactic spasm at this month's Seventh Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly.

The session's announced purpose: "to examine the political implications of world development and international cooperation." The probable scenario: a replay of charges that the affluent are wasting food and energy and countercharges that the poor have too many babies. The plausible nightmare: that the Arabs and others will (for example, by excluding Israel) persuade the United States that the United Nations is irretrievably a Third World lobby and not a One World organization. The outside chance: that a growing number of moderates from many countries, "developing" and "developed," will get beyond rhetoric to commence a practical process of planetary bargaining about human needs and the resources to meet them. The crucial uncertainty: whether the Americans will "hunker down" and "stonewall" or move into active negotiations to substitute a workable system for the non-working non-system we now call the international economic order.

A U.S. willingness to negotiate for real about fairness does not automatically get the world community down to business: too many of the radical Third Worlders, and the big Communist powers for differing reasons, have a heavy investment in continued confrontation. But there is no chance of a bargain beyond the rhetoric until the United States is ready to deal.

BARRING SOME CATACLYSM, the centerpiece of international politics during the next few years will be how to manage resources (of which it now appears there can be enough) with the imagination and leadership (which are demonstrably in short supply) to meet basic human needs. Our American litany aspires to "liberty and justice for all." The order of those familiar words is suggestive: first liberty, then justice, and only then for all.

For some decades past, world politics has centered on achieving a liberated world in which no race or nation or grand alliance calls the tune for mankind. Americans played a leading part in defeating Nazi pretensions, frustrating Communist ambitions, and hastening colonial independence, and after World War II consciously tried to build up the strength of other nations. If we now face a world in which power is diffused and centers of decision are plural, it is useful to remind ourselves that we really didn't want to take all the world's problems on our shoulders—and we didn't want them on any other one nation's shoulders, either.

But the politics of national independence, in an interdependent yet leaderless world, obviously worked out better for the strong than for the weak. Free trade profited the biggest traders. Free movement of capital kept the door open for one-crop plantations and colonial economics. Freedom of communication meant that the most vigorous communicators talked (mostly about their own dreams and doings) while the rest of the world listened. Freedom of the seas worked especially well for those with merchant marines, fishing fleets, spy vessels, and navies to protect them. The leaders of liberated nations called sovereign found that they were dependent on others for markets, matériel, machines, manpower, and money. Providing capital-intensive, urban-oriented technologies to overpopulated, rural societies tended to maintain colonial economic patterns even after political colonialism had passed from the scene.

In sum, those with less resources and know-how found that they were, in consequence, less free. That is why the new phase of world politics features demands for fairness and equity, for redistributive justice, for trade discrimination in favor of the less developed, for regulation of investment, and for national control of drilling, mining, and fishing.

Nor did freedom for nations lead directly to freedom for individuals. Colonial rule was often supplanted by military rule, Czars were succeeded by commissars, white domination gave way to black dictatorships, extraterritoriality was pushed out by totalitarianism.

Both among and within the nation-states of the twentieth century, then, the old French warning retained its relevance: *Entre le fort et le faible, c'est la liberté qui opprime et la loi qui affranchit.* "In relations between the strong and the weak, it's freedom that oppresses and law that liberates."

The argument now is about what kind of law liberates. The kind we have had, the law that was written by the big brothers in the brotherhood of man—sanctity of contract, property rights, non-discriminatory trade, freedom to exploit the international commons—is being shredded

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by non-observance. Reiteration of these principles is about as operational as a revival of Prohibition would be.

What has happened is an ironic extension of another traditional Western legal doctrine—*rebus sic stantibus*, the notion that a change in conditions justifies a fresh shuffle and a new deal. The most important condition that has changed is the state of mind of planners and politicians in the developing countries. They simply do not believe what the U.S. Secretary of State said on May 13 of this year, in a speech in Kansas City: "The present international economic system has served the world well." Not *their* world, they now say out loud. And they have a new confidence that if they stick together, they can insist on rewriting, in their favor, the rules of the international game. They have even prepared a draft, a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, first floated by President Echeverría of Mexico. A gloomy American analyst captured its spirit: "It's a charter of their rights and our duties."

The euphoria of developing nations' solidarity has certainly produced some wild rhetoric and some weird reasoning. Watching the world's greatest technological power retreating from Vietnam, its strategy confounded and its superweapons unusable, some strong leaders of weak countries have too quickly concluded that the United States could be counted on not to use its strength. They underestimate the influence of backlash in American politics.

The power of petroleum is also the subject of illusory extrapolation. The Arab oil embargo and the big price hike by the OPEC cartel has led to much loose talk about other opportunities to hold the industrialized world at ransom for lack of commodities from bananas to zinc. Yet it seems clear enough now that petroleum is unique; it is the only commodity that cannot be replaced or forgone in the rather short run. As long as the developing countries work together and OPEC nations are willing to use oil as a club in getting the Western mule's attention for wider Third World demands, and as long as the industrialized nations lack their own vigorous programs of energy conservation and substitution, oil will continue to be an effective economic weapon. But apart from oil, direct economic action will likely be, as the Chinese say, "Big Noise on Stairs Nobody Coming Down."

A militant, united, frustrated Third World, unable to budge the mule and resorting to desperate measures, would find its bid for serious bargaining more deeply rooted in more subtle forms of power. If two-thirds of the world simply failed to cooperate in international arrangements that require general consent —nuclear safeguards, weather watch, crop forecasting, public health, narcotics control, environmental monitoring, and measures against hijacking and terrorism—everybody would lose, but the world powers would likely lose the most. Cleaning up the Mediterranean is going to require the cooperation of all the nations that are now polluting it; two or three non-cooperators could ruin that international lake for all. Moreover, the fragile complexity of interdependence makes many kinds of international operations extremely vulnerable to deliberate disruption: air traffic, pipelines, electronic communications, business arrangements, and the passage of vessels through narrow places (Malacca, Gibraltar, and Panama, to name only the most obvious examples), all are heavily dependent on a pervasive passive acquiescence that can no longer be taken for granted.

And beyond these newly important pressure points is the power of poverty itself: the widespread opinion in Europe, Japan, and North America that, much as the radical rhetoric is resented, the politics of human needs has equity—and time —on its side.

THE NOTION that the world community should so arrange its affairs that every man, woman, and child at least has life, if not instant liberty and happiness, is consonant with the declared values of nearly every society; that notion comes close to being the minimum essential of civilization itself. Every industrial nation and some developing countries have government-sponsored standards of "enough"—expressed as guaranteed income, minimum wages, a poverty line, job tenure, unemployment compensation, health and medical benefits, housing preferences, and the like. But so far, this sort of thing has been strictly "internal affairs." What's new, because trickle-down international aid programs have so often failed to deal with poverty, is the growing conviction that a direct attack on poverty should be a responsibility of, and a matter for, negotiation among nations and action by the world community.

The international politics of redistributive justice is bound to probe deeply into the domestic maldistribution of

wealth and opportunity inside each country. If the more affluent peoples are asked to modify their living standards and rearrange their priorities, which for most of them may require important changes in life-styles and work ways, their peoples and especially their political leaders will want to know that the changes are worthwhile, that they give promise of meeting the basic needs of the needy—rather than of speculators, brokers, feudal chieftains, and military governors. At the same time in the poorer countries, the political courage and administrative drive to be self-reliant (getting population growth under control, maximizing food production, extending education, assuring employment) will also depend on the larger bargain—on assurance that the "advanced" nations are not advancing past the limits of environmental prudence and on large and automatic transfers of resources and technology. The planetary bargain will be a trade-off between self-reliance and self-restraint.

Can basic human requirements be met, on a world scale, over time? The currently popular way to avoid facing this question is to speak loftily of lifeboats and to refer regretfully to Thomas Malthus. But some work we have recently sponsored at the Aspen Institute—especially a remarkable study of "Human Requirements, Supply Levels, and Outer Bounds" by John and Magda McHale—suggests a different, cautiously upbeat conclusion: that we the people of the biosphere can lay our hands on more than enough of the relevant resources to enable all members of a growing but manageable world population to maintain a minimum standard of life without threatening the "outer limits" of an astonishingly rich and adaptable environment.

We *can*. Whether we *will* in fact use our imagination for the equitable management of interdependence, whether we can conserve and recycle and rationalize our resources, whether new styles of bargaining and cooperative leadership will develop fast enough to govern a post-exploitative, post-trickle-down, post-patronizing world, are the central issues now and for the future. But at least they are riddles for the human race, not for nature or the gods, to decipher.

THE UNITED STATES of America is not yet ready for planet-sized bargaining about human needs and resources. Nor are most other nations, but our unreadiness counts for more because, as the cards are reshuffled, Americans still hold more chips than anyone else does.

For six and a half years, U.S. foreign policy has been focused on bilateral arrangements with other big powers to establish and maintain a stalemate named détente. The timing and tactics were sometimes clumsy—the "Nixon shock" to Japan, the pretense that South Vietnam could survive our "peace-with-honor" withdrawal, the personalization of our mediation between Israel and the Arabs. But the Kissinger strategy was basically sound. The long freeze-out of China had to be thawed, while we temporized about Taiwan. The talks with the Soviet Union on strategic arms limitation had to be pushed. (SALT I ratified deterrence; SALT II is confirming equality; we have not yet reached the subject of disarmament.) NATO had to be maintained as an incentive to mutual force reduction in Europe and as a Western caucus on the way to make peace with the Russians. The war in Vietnam, or at least its Americanization, had to be turned off. Peace had to be promoted, and the Soviets kept at arm's length, in the Middle East.

It has been—most of it still is—a busy diplomatic agenda. Little room has been left in Washington's span of attention for serious consultations or innovative policymaking about Africa, Latin America, the rest of Asia, the United Nations, or the interrelated issues of food, population, energy, raw materials, ocean law, the global environment, development, trade, investment, and money.

That these important issues have been neglected for so long is no accident. It's not only that Henry Kissinger was heavily engaged in personal diplomacy and Richard Nixon was preoccupied with his corruptive reach for power. It is partly a system fault: the U.S. government is not yet organized to operate in a world where every domestic issue is partly international and every international issue is partly domestic. Strange but still true, the only official hired by the Executive Branch to coordinate domestic and foreign affairs is the President of the United States. To paraphrase Gilbert and Sullivan, every matter of government concern is born a little "domestic policy" or a little "foreign policy"—and is so treated from then on. Thus, when the government, through its Department of Agriculture, suddenly decided to limit the export of soybeans (we grow nearly three-fourths of the world's supply), the shock in Tokyo was matched in Washington by the surprise of the State Department.

The effort to manage the world monetary system through the Federal Reserve system, with the dollar as the key currency, had to be abandoned when our domestic management of the dollar broke down in 1971. The growing traffic in "conventional" (but increasingly powerful and sophisticated) arms is still treated as a way of improving our balance of payments, rather than as a dangerous world problem in itself. Planning for major world conferences (Stockholm on environment, Bucharest on population, Rome on food, Mexico City on women, and now the Special U.N. Assembly) requires U.S. positions to be developed on subjects that deeply affect "domestic" attitudes and policies; the planning is typically late and ragged. Last November the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Agriculture turned up in Rome for the World Food Conference with quite different policies; when asked why at a press conference, Secretary Kissinger, before making his formal reply, was understood to say, under his breath, "I cleared my speech with Jerry Ford. I don't know who he cleared his with."

HENRY KISSINGER'S former academic colleagues say that he has long been allergic to economics and uninterested in international institutions. The charge is a serious one; practitioners of the new politics of fairness will need a deep understanding of the world economy and a lively interest in inventing ways for nations to work together. But if all we had to worry about was whether our Secretary of State is brainy enough to understand interdependence and devise machinery to cope with it, we could relax and enjoy another show of diplomatic virtuosity.

There is, in fact, every evidence that over the past year Secretary Kissinger has focused his good mind on coping with interdependence. In clear and thoughtful prose, he has used policy speeches in Chicago, Rome, Paris, Kansas City, Milwaukee, and Minneapolis to draft a sense of direction. The "new global environment," he said in Milwaukee, is "a world of many centers of power, of persistent ideological differences clouded by nuclear peril and struggling for economic maturity and advance. The central focus of U.S. foreign policy is to help shape from this environment a new international structure, based on equilibrium rather than confrontation, linking nations to each other by practices of cooperation that reflect the reality of global interdependence." The trouble is, the Secretary of

State doesn't have a government behind him. Back when the present world system was being invented, mostly in the late Forties, the decisions about U.S. policy could be taken by a few government leaders, in the Executive Branch and in Congress, if they worked with each other (as Sen. Arthur Vandenberg did with President Harry Truman and Secretaries George Marshall and Dean Acheson). The American people at large didn't need to do anything except applaud and pay their taxes.

But today it's more like wartime policymaking. Until and unless we have a national energy policy—and millions of Americans are reaching for their thermostats, buying smaller cars, and producing substitutes for oil—the U.S. Secretary of State doesn't have an international energy policy, no matter what conferences are attended or speeches made. American leadership on world food requires a domestic farm policy geared to world needs, including a global grain reserve, and that implies a wholesale shift in farmers' attitudes, from fearing to favoring the surpluses such a policy would produce.

Such a foreign policy cannot be another *tour de force* by a brilliant professor-turned-diplomat, as Dr. Kissinger well knows. It requires what we don't have—a world-minded Secretary of Agriculture, an internationalist Secretary of the Treasury, a farsighted Congress, and, in the White House, a wide and visionary leader, confident of his mandate and unafraid to strike the international bargains a workable world community will require.

However, one piece of business is primarily in the jurisdiction of the Secretary of State. That is the tactics of dealing with and in the United Nations. The fate of the United Nations should not be confused with the future of the international economic order. One way or another, the world community will have to fashion institutions to do many things that simply cannot be done by individual nations. The tasks in question form a lengthening list—fielding peace forces, monitoring the environment, issuing international money, regulating international business, managing bargains in a dozen major economic fields, administering deep-ocean resources, and developing the analytical capacity to anticipate new kinds of conflict and cooperation. The question is not whether these tasks will have to be performed; on *that* the rich and the poor, the Socialists and the capitalists, the strong and the weak, have a choice of international instruments, but they do not have the option of isolationship. The question is, this very year, whether these functions will develop inside or outside the charter and organization called the United Nations.

The choice is not wholly, or even mainly, ours. The Third World, by pursuing confrontation tactics, can make the United Nations untenable as a world organization. Ejection of the Israelis, followed by a predictable American backlash, is a proximate possibility. It was not so much threat as analysis when Secretary Kissinger, in a sentence left out of his spoken address, said in the prepared text of his Milwaukee speech (July 14, 1975) that "those who seek to manipulate U.N. membership by procedural abuse may well inherit an empty shell." The Third World is like any other bloc: it can break, but it cannot make, the United Nations.

BUT ANALYSIS AND ADMONITIONS are no substitute for policy, and the U.S. government has long lacked a policy for revising the international economic system, focusing the management of resources on the meeting of human needs, and restructuring the United Nations.

Rather than waiting to see how radical the developing-nation caucus turns out to be this fall, the United States (and the Europeans and Japanese, who have even more to lose than Americans from confrontation) would be well advised to take the lead in proposing a practical beyond-the-rhetoric program of negotiating about real issues of mutual concern—energy, food, development strategies, resource transfers, environmental protection.

We can cheerfully agree to the obvious—that the present international economic system isn't working very well for any of us. The next step is not to sharpen the political repartee for home consumption—the United Nations has had a generation of that already—but to move (by consensus, not by pseudo-parliamentary voting) toward a new planetary bargain.

The elements of the new bargain are much clearer now than they were: a serious push to meet minimum human needs worldwide, a new spirit of self-reliance in the developing countries and self-restraint by the industrial countries, a rewriting of economic "rules of the game" to achieve greater fairness and also to achieve greater predictability in doing international business, and a reorganization of world institutions to widen participation and strengthen their capacity to act in the public interest of mankind.

With such an initiative on the table from the very beginning of the September U.N. session, all members would have something to lose by tactics bound to cause the withdrawal of the U.S. initiative and likely to accelerate an American search for alternatives to the United Nations.

This game is too important for the United States to sit it out or snipe from the sidelines or pander to the backlash in our own backyard. If we don't negotiate seriously with the global fairness revolution, and soon, we will see the tides of expectation and resentment rise up around us as more and more educated, self-reliant, non-affluent non-whites insist on the kind of international law that brings justice in the wake of national liberation.

If we react with truculence to those who now embarrassingly espouse "liberty and justice for all," we who once presumed to be lawgivers to the world will thoroughly deserve that devastatingly snide comment of Giraudoux: "The privilege of the great is to watch catastrophe from a terrace." □

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FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, before the Nation can settle upon a foreign policy geared to its interests in the world and to the realities of a new era, it must realize that it has no foreign policy—little except habit, impulse, and the adventures of its Secretary of State to guide the conduct of its affairs everywhere in this interdependent and restless world. That point about the absence of principle and purpose to guide and inform our discussion of foreign policy, and its formulation, is made in an article entitled "Is This a Foreign Policy" by David Edwards in the March 8 issue of the Nation.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE FIREFIGHTER'S DÉTENTE: IS THIS A FOREIGN POLICY?

(By David V. Edwards)

The United States desperately needs a foreign policy—not a *new* foreign policy, *a* foreign policy. The recent brouhaha over the possible use of force in the Middle East to guarantee oil for the West, the fascination with Henry Kissinger's inner drives, the rush to condemn or defend our meddling in Allende's Chile, the moral exhaustion over our role in Indochina that seems unending—all these media phenomena and cocktail circuit topics seem to have prevented us from realizing that the United States no longer has a foreign policy.

In recent years, there has been growing criticism of American foreign policy—as if we had one. It is not, as some say, that American policy is bankrupt—there are no real assets left at all, but only liabilities masquerading as pieces of policy.

The responsibility lies first, of course, with the Secretary of State. But the important thing is not, as growing numbers suspect and as Richard Nixon is now reported by Charles Colson to have said in 1973, that Kissinger "really is unstable at times." The important thing is that, despite a stunning array of books produced before he took office and the "State of the World" reports he wrote for several years thereafter, Kissinger is a man singularly without the temperament and imagination required to develop a policy sufficiently comprehensive and venturesome to restore to America a world role commensurate with its resources and with the deep concerns of its people. Kissinger is essentially a fireman, unfortunately put in total charge not only of fire fighting but also of fire prevention, law and order, public welfare and the exchequer.

This understood, it is not surprising that the Nixon-Kissinger-Ford "policy" of "a generation of peace" consists almost entirely of periodic pronouncements, exclusive interviews, jet-powered fire-fighting expeditions to the Middle East, hastily drafted arms "control" *aides-mémoires* subject to no reassuring interpretation, and high-level intercontinental visitation. The only thing missing from this panoply is policy. Some have in the past celebrated American improvisation as pragmatic, undogmatic, unideological and constructive, arguing that the nature, the national character, of the United States is such that it couldn't or shouldn't, have a general, over-arching policy. But that view, popular though it has been, is a misreading of American history from the days of the founding fathers, as well as a misunderstanding of the requirements of the emerging world situation and a misperception of the concerns of the American people.

Just as the founding fathers had a foreign policy of avoiding "entangling alliances," so that the New World could develop its strength and set a moral example for

corrupt old Europe, so the fathers of the cold war in America—such bold and imaginative men as Marshall, Forrestal, Acheson and Dulles—developed a policy of entangling alliances to encircle any and all Communist states and to organize military resistance to changes in the *status quo* that might threaten the safety and prosperity of American capitalism around the world. However misguided all of those involved may now seem to many of us, there can be no doubt that America had and sustained a viable foreign policy in those years—with considerable assistance from the Kremlin and the domestic subversion hunters.

The cold war was socially created and maintained by the United States and the Soviet Union, sometimes through cooperative intransigence, at other times through inadvertence. But the usefulness of the cold war to the superpowers for reasons of domestic politics and economic interests eventually waned, and the emergence of independent Third World countries, destined to entice close-range superpower confrontation and ultimately nuclear proliferation, undermined the shared American-Soviet world view that was the keystone of the cold war. And so the cold war crumbled.

With it degenerated American foreign policy. But both pundits and policy makers were slow to notice this, for the *appearance* of policy survived the disappearance of the cold war, primarily for two important reasons.

First, American policy had long since taken on a *territorial* focus. What had originated as end-goals or process-goals — primarily strengthening anti-Communist regimes and teaching lessons to international aggressors—became transmuted into territorial goals: defending each and every border that marked off states having Communist regimes and "drawing lines" to establish the precise points for resistance to aggression. And this territorial mentality survived the cold war around the world, but most flagrantly in that least appropriate, least territorially boundaried region, Indochina.

The second reason for the persistence of the appearance of policy where in fact there was none was the obsession with *means*—meeting military force with military force, military aid with military aid, Sputnik with Sputnik, high school science with high school science. These means overwhelmed and often themselves defeated the ends they were to serve, not only in the world but in our minds as well. Nonetheless, the American experience in Vietnam—the nonterritorial venture that so discredited the efficacy of American military force—ended even that residual appearance of policy.

The only available surrogate for the vanishing cold-war policy of forceful resolve was the crippled orphan named "détente." The opening to China, the SALT accords and the Mideast mediation became the communal fathers of détente, not only in Washington but in Moscow, where the absence of policy was, if anything, even more characteristic.

In the despairing aftermath of Vietnam, when everyone wanted to avoid the anguish that would accompany recrimination, it is not surprising that everyone from Kissinger through Fulbright to the liberal press and public adopted the orphan. Nor that so few recognized and fewer still reported that the orphan, like the cold-war emperor, was naked.

What Kissinger has sought but cannot possibly achieve is détente without entente—relaxation without the basic understanding that must undergird any successful effort to reconstruct superpower relations on any basis other than cold-war hostility. The changes built on détente without entente can prove only evanescent and misunderstood—as has already happened in Vietnam, the Mideast and SALT.

The cold ware *was*, despite its apparent virulence, a kind of condominium in which the superpowers controlled the conflict between them and supervised that involving their allies. That era is gone now, a casualty of successful postwar reconstruction and decolonization. No comparable condominium could be achieved now, even were Air Force One to be constantly airborne. Just as Air Force One and "Western civilization" require fuel, so does détente require entente.

And the entente now required is not simply a shared superpower understanding, a modernized "sphere-of-influence" arrangement, but a cooperatively developed new basis for relations among all four worlds and the concomitant domestic understandings that will allow for bigger gambles, greater benevolence and occasional failures.

The present détente is obviously besieged in both capitals by the military chieftains and the Senator Jacksons, for whom sincere conviction and political opportunity have fortuitously coincided to inspire what one hopes will eventually prove largely purposeless domestic quarrels, but which surface successfully and even glamorously in the policy vacuum and intellectual bankruptcy that still pervade Washington and, apparently, Moscow.

This pervasive bankruptcy and the domestic opposition to détente can be traced to the unquestioned, fundamental consensus among policy makers, politicians and pundits on the necessary role of military force as arbiter of world affairs. Kissinger and Jackson, the generals and the columnists, Brezhnev and Ford, all are at root Realists—self-pronounced and capitalized—sharing the old cold-war theory of world politics as a struggle of military force and will, in which the only hope for peace is an accommodation between two armed camps.

But the world has changed so drastically from the era when that seemed possible—what with the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons, the liberation and assertiveness of new states both rich and poor in commodities and natural resources, the emergence of nonstate—even anti-state—actors such as multinational financial and industrial enterprises, the opportunities seized by revolutionary terrorists—the list could go on and on.

Moreover, when we try to face new issues—the survival of the global ecosystem and the reconstruction of the global political economy—in a world of new actors, we still face them with old means: force, threats, deals, alliances, cartels. And many of the emerging actors naturally adopt our means exactly as they emulate our *bricolage*—the "fix-it" improvisation of Western civilization's head handyman, Henry Kissinger. For if it is astonishing that we no longer have real ends, it is not astonishing that the lesser states in the Third and Fourth Worlds tend to imitate us.

The lesson of this is that those who expect the newer states to fashion images of a new world order and to lead the older states of the First and Second Worlds on the path to redemption deceive themselves. The new states can upset the existing order, forcing reconsideration of unquestioned premises in the older states, but if there is to be a new world politics, it must be engineered by the major states; they have the resources and position to foster it. And since there is little reason to expect the required imagination and initiative to emerge from Moscow, the burden and the opportunity must fall predominantly on the United States.

Thus the United States must have a foreign policy—a policy not constructed in patchwork fashion from the fragments of the cold-war condominium and an admixture of deference to movements for national liberation and ecosystemic protection. A new American policy must be based upon a fresh examination of underlying realities of resources and actors, and upon an imaginative development of effective means and defensible ends.

The real politics, the determinant politics, of the era now emerging, not only in the world but in the nation, are the politics of energy—of human energy from food and of industrial energy from petroleum, the atom and the sun. The politics of military force and even those of economic arrangements pale in the face of strains on the food and fuel essential to the survival of men and machines, and even more vital to the survival of human hope and material progress on which empires and individual careers rise and fall.

These new concerns and currencies of politics at home and abroad have already generated new actors who challenge the supremacy of the nation-state, and who in coming decades may even threaten its very survival. Our world of nation-states composed of loyal citizens is increasingly being challenged by cross-cutting pressures from multinational enterprises with opportunistic careerist employees and transnational organizations with nonnational bureaucrats, as well as anti-national terrorist organizations. Furthermore, those citizens of leading states who are not also members of multinationals or transnationals are increasingly awakening to global perspectives on the energy, human and industrial, that is the lifeblood of the states, and on the dangers of ecological rapacity and pollution. The emergent concept of territory, like the last frontier, is now global.

The net result of these new institutions and attitudes, still difficult to perceive without looking carefully, is major challenges to the allegiance of individuals. No state can long rule is people—let alone others—without the unquestioning allegiance of most of its citizens. Compulsion is no longer an option in the major states of what Kissinger terms "Western civilization," and will become increasingly difficult for the others as well.

In this context, if the nation-state is to survive the new challenges within and across its borders, it must again engender the confidence and commitment of its residents that once derived from its capacity to provide an autarkic security now no longer possible. Such popular confidence and commitment now depend more on economics than politics, more on resources than weapons. There will be no alternative to redistribution of the world's resources—a redistribution that will make the recent shift achieved by the OPEC countries seem trivial by comparison.

These energy resources and the requisite technology will be the major means of any new American foreign policy. But means without ends will be ineffectual and, still worse, uncompelling to the populace that will be called upon to sacrifice. Thus it is to ends that immediate attention must be given. For only enticing ends can engender the popular support for policy that détente without entente has been unable to muster. And ends can engender support only if they have a basis in ethics.

What then of ends? Many now argue that we need *an ethics of interdependence*—an ethics grounded in the proposition that if we are not our brothers' keepers our brothers will be our executioners. But for Cain and Abel we can substitute American democracy and Soviet communism and we are back in the global cold war of fraternal enemies. The

ineluctable problem with an ethics of interdependence is that it derives its motivation from fear and is built upon an assessment of human nature as being self-centered and selfish—an assessment that appeals to, exploits, and engenders the worst in the ambivalent creatures we all are.

People are less likely to be good when informed or reminded that others are bad and so threaten them. They are more likely to be good if they are reminded of the constructive human impulses that are every bit as central to their natures. And the same is true of states. The more we emphasize the threats of our health and welfare posed by others, the more we sicken our own selves, warp our impulses, and render self-fulfilling our distorted images of men and nations.

Such assertion may sound unrealistic to those of us so conditioned by war, hot and cold. But it is only out of sorts with the presuppositions that undergird our policy in the era of the cold war and our lack of policy today. If we cannot appeal to and strengthen the nobler virtues of people at a time when our states and, *pace* Kissinger, our civilization, will indeed be strangled—by our own hand. When one thinks of the ready critiques of such efforts at reconstruction by self-pronounced realists of good will and earnest intent, one is reminded of Bertolt Brecht's remark about the vitriolic Viennese social critic Karl Kraus: "When the age came to die by its own hand, he was that hand."

Many of the best-willed critics of proposals for reconstruction share with the earnest advocates of interdependence a negative cast, a reliance on threats to our future, that will no longer allow us the imagination and beneficence that alone could promise not just preservation but improvement of the human condition on planet earth.

Most arguments for redistribution of the world's resources toward the needy appeal to desperation—fear that if we do not surrender some of our surplus now, the poor and hungry will soon seize much more, or else destroy it all. The point is not at all that these projections are not real prospects. Rather, the point is that our reliance on arguments from interdependence, far from ennobling us and our cause, will prevent us from moving toward the fundamental bases for constructive relations among people and between states.

In the longer run, internationally as locally, interdependence is not enough as a basis for a satisfactory global society, true though it be ecosystemically. As we know from our own experience, the only adequate basis for good relations is the exchange of nondependent things, of goods, deeds and words that one could otherwise obtain or achieve by oneself. In interpersonal relations, it is the good-will gift, the bonus, friendly word, courtesy and kind deed, that make the difference between correct formal relations based on reciprocal need or even fear, and friendly constructive relations. The same will prove true in relations among states.

And if we do not soon move, in international relations, beyond the realm of correct relations governed by the fear of what we can do to one another, into the realm of creative social relations among peoples and between states, the fabric of world affairs will not become strong enough to survive the wrenching redistributions, the military threats and the diplomatic failures that are inevitable in the impending age of states and anti-states, of ecosysemic reconstruction, of economic redistribution, and of newly mobilized and less state-oriented populations.

Such new patterns of relations are difficult to envisage while Indochina and the Middle East fester, weapons systems proliferate, economic structures falter and people lose faith. But these very conditions define the time when movement toward new ends and means is perhaps at last possible.

The new means must be increasingly directed toward individuals rather than bureaucracies. An example of both what is needed and what must be combated can be found in reaction to last year's hurricane in Honduras. Upon reports of devastation, citizens of Louisiana immediately gathered relief items, for they knew what it was to be devastated by a hurricane. The relief provisions were loaded upon National Guard airplanes for shipment to the people of Honduras. But the planes were not allowed to take off because the Pentagon refused permission, allegedly, it was reported, because it did not want to encourage in the Honduran people expectations of further American aid. And, when finally they were allowed to leave, the Honduran military commandeered the cargo and sold it on the black market.

The problems of bureaucracy and rapacity are as clear in such an event as the feelings of good will and empathy of ordinary people—citizens, really, of the world. Common instances like that, along with evidence that at a time of widespread economic privation American giving to charitable organizations hit an all-time high last year, and that public opinion polls express widespread concern for and desire to help the hungry abroad even though it raises the price of food at home, indicate that the will is still present in the American people. They are concerned and generous beyond their government's apparent wishes.

In these circumstances, it is time that our government, and the other governments of the world, take major steps to de-construct their feuds and reconstruct their relations. President Eisenhower once remarked that the people of the world wanted peace, and that it was time the governments recognized this and gave it to them. He might have added that if they don't the people will take over and obtain that peace themselves, or bring the entire fragile structure of counterpoised war machines and dueling diplomats crashing down in their efforts to get it.

That is a price we need not pay. But the only alternative to it—the only alternative left to the Fords and the Kissingers, the Brezhnevs and the Kosygins—is a foreign policy that abandons our ritual dance of death for a recognition of our interdependence, and then goes beyond that to a program devoted to constructing a fabric woven of cooperative development of food and fuel as human and industrial energy, a redistribution of wealth, a renunciation of force, and encouragement of full relations, not just among policy bureaucracies but among peoples. That is now the only alternative to the "generation of wars and pillage" that seems the inevitable chaotic result of the present lack of an American foreign policy.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE THIRD WORLD: A BASIS FOR ACCOMMODATION

By Tom J. Farer

THE United States has passed in the last decade from the United Nation's most influential state into a position of accelerating isolation as it confronts a very large proportion of the member states over a long agenda of contemporary issues. This is a truly novel development, one which threatens to poison international relations at a time that shrieks with the need for uniquely broad essays in international cooperation.

Three issues shape what may be called the North-South confrontation. One is the question of how global income and wealth and decision-making authority with respect to international economic problems should be distributed. A second issue is the attitude of the United States toward the two white-supremacist regimes in Southern Africa. And the third is the U.S. role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although each issue represents a distinct axis of confrontation, they are linked by a single world view, a kind of ideology, which imparts to them an intense emotional coherence. That ideology is not, as suggested recently by Ambassador Moynihan, "socialist," unless one follows Durkheim in defining socialism not as a political program but rather as "a cry of pain." It does indeed incorporate certain themes which recur in British socialist thought, just as it patches in a number of conventionally liberal ideals such as self-determination. But socialist and liberal fragments are reshaped by a special historical experience to produce in practice a distinct amalgam which can most usefully be described as the developing states in fact describe it: "anticolonialism."

II

The paramount objective of the anticolonialist amalgam is the eradication of all the conditions and insignia of inequality and humiliation associated in the minds of the Southern elites with the epoch of European domination. This objective guides Southern positions across a broad spectrum of contemporary issues.

One vivid illustration of the adaptation of a Western liberal theme to the felt exigencies of anticolonialism is the contrasting attitude toward inequality and the deprivation of human rights in the white enclaves of Southern Africa, on the one hand, and various Third World states on the other. While the government of Burundi, for instance, was busily exterminating the entire elite of that country's

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majority tribe, its President received a message from the Council of Ministers of the Organization for African Unity stating that: "Thanks to your saving action, peace will be rapidly reestablished, national unity will be consolidated, and territorial integrity will be preserved." Uganda and Bangladesh could be added to the list of massacres ignored by all but a handful of Third World leaders.

The causes of immutable antagonism to South Africa and Rhodesia are evident: those societies are the residue of the European migrations which occurred during the colonial epoch, and they exemplify the racial subordination which added a special edge to colonial domination. Hence Africans everywhere participate vicariously in the travail of the suppressed black populations.

Sympathetic involvement naturally attenuates where the persecutors, as well as the victims, are non-white. But that in itself does not explain the resolute determination of the Southern bloc to ignore barbarous delinquencies committed by certain of its member governments. Something more positive than indifference is at work here. These delinquencies are, in the first place, an enormous embarrassment and a serious wound to the anticolonial movement because they seem to confirm the propaganda claims of the white racist regimes about the consequences of the loss of white supremacy. Although the wiser tactic might be to assume the lead in condemning the barbarity and proposing remedial measures, the evident instinct is to pretend it is not happening.

Perhaps that reaction stems in large measure from an inability to intervene to terminate the delinquency. Since developing states cannot intervene themselves, a call for remedial action must be addressed to the West, the homeland of colonialism. That alternative is intolerable, first for psychological reasons and secondly for the very practical one of avoiding any erosion of the barriers against intervention which the Third World has been busily constructing for the past fifteen years. The Southern elites have not forgotten that "humanitarian intervention" has been one of the favored legal and rhetorical justifications for Western interventions in the Southern Hemisphere in defense of political and economic interests. It was, for instance, one of the announced justifications for U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic.

Fearing intervention in its own vulnerable polities, yet wanting it in South Africa, the Southern bloc has relentlessly deployed its legal and rhetorical ingenuity to impose a unique status on the southern African cases and thus to isolate the resulting precedents. Consistent with this effort was the refusal, prior to 1971, to expand the General Assembly's list of national liberation movements beyond those at

work in South Africa, Rhodesia, and the Portuguese Territories.

Burgeoning support in the Third World for the Arab states and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in their struggle with Israel also owes much to the anticolonialist world view. Yasir Arafat's address to the General Assembly a year ago culminated an accelerating shift in moral perception confirmed two years before by General Assembly Resolution 2787 (XVII) which for the first time included the "Palestinian people" in an authoritative enumeration of national liberation movements: i.e., those struggling "for . . . liberation from colonial and foreign domination and alien subjugation."

The PLO's legitimation could not have been accomplished without the support of the African caucus. To believe that its support for the PLO reflects simply a desperate need for petrodollars rather than any sense of moral solidarity is to practice self-deception. For some African leaders, need or greed would be enough. But not for all, not for men of such fierce moral commitment as Kaunda of Zambia and Nyerere of Tanzania.

Not many years ago, most African states, including Tanzania, enjoyed distinctly cordial relations with Israel. Israeli agricultural advisers surveyed the possibility of adapting the kibbutz to the necessities of Tanzania's rural development program. Its military advisers trained counterinsurgency forces in Ethiopia and elite paratroop units in Zaïre. Trade missions proliferated. Today, the missions and advisers, even the thinnest diplomatic relations, all are gone.

What, other than the pull of petrodollars, can explain this *volte face*? In part, there is here a certain guilt by association. At the same time that the gradual movement of European states, especially France, toward neutrality was leaving the United States as almost the only sure source of Israeli support, the United States was shuffling ostentatiously closer to colonialism and apartheid in South Africa. In this way, the issues became linked in the African mind. The Arab bloc helped along that linkage by offering heightened support for the struggle against the white regimes, a matter which, until 1973, had evoked its yawning indifference.

But that is only part of the explanation. The shift in African attitudes toward the Middle East conflict also arises, on the one hand, from the evolution of a coherent political-military organization able to incarnate a Palestinian identity and, on the other, the determined denial of that identity by Israeli officials, most notoriously by Golda Meir. This forged a second perceived link between the Israeli and South African cases. Much as South Africa sought to enhance its claims and fragment its indigenous opposition by describing its non-

white population as a collection of separate nationalities, Israeli rhetoric tended to impose on the Palestinians the nationalities of the various states of their Diaspora.

Before the rise of the PLO, most non-Arab governments saw the Arab-Israeli issue as a problem of interstate relations with a refugee dimension. But after 1967, when the PLO ceased to be a passive instrument of one or another Arab state, Palestinians generally began to think of themselves as a nation rather than simply the former inhabitants of Haifa or Jerusalem or some obscure village from which they or their parents had fled years ago; then they assumed the familiar characteristics of a true national independence movement.

One of those characteristics is a distinct territory to which the PLO can lay claim. Most non-Arab states were not disposed to challenge the legitimacy of the frontiers carved out by the Israelis in 1948 in defense of rights accorded to them by the United Nations. So as long as the remainder of the West Bank of Mandate Palestine was seen to be part of Jordan, the Palestinians had difficulty associating themselves with a territory widely perceived to be legitimately theirs. Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the justifications announced by some authoritative Israelis for keeping at least a part of the seized territory helped to expose the tenuous moral and legal basis for Jordanian suzerainty. The net result was to make the occupied territory seem available for appropriation by Arab Palestinians. Thus the Palestinian people, having acquired almost simultaneously both a recognizable political personality and a potential territorial base, could be integrated into the anticolonial honor roll.

Taken seriously, anticolonialism helps to explain the moral double standard, the obsessive concern with developments in the white enclaves of Southern Africa, and the crystallization of a politicized sympathy among many Southern Hemisphere elites for non-Jewish Palestinians. But as a key to understanding it is even more useful in the economic realm which is today the main battleground for the United States and the Third World. Most dramatically, it is this sentiment that has helped greatly to glue together a solid front of Third World support for the exercise of monopoly power by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). In comparison with its destructive impact on the majority of non-Arab developing states, the stratospheric leap of oil prices is little more than a minor inconvenience to the West. Yet when Westerners speak of military intervention to lower the price for *all* users, or even of concentrated economic pressures to that end, one listens in vain for any sign of Southern support.

The silence of some oil-poor countries may be attributable to their hope of participating in an effective producer's cartel for another Southern product. But there are at least several dozen states which have not the slightest hope of exploiting the OPEC precedent, and there are many others for whom the prospect of an effective cartel is decidedly remote. Then why the deep reservoir of sympathy for OPEC?

By describing North-South disputes concerning economic issues as a struggle over the distribution of wealth, Northern analysts assimilate them into a familiar form of social conflict. But if nothing more were at stake, one would anticipate defections from the Southern bloc particularly on an issue like oil prices. If, however, one returns to the conception of anticolonialism as an elite's deeply emotional response to a sense of humiliation, then solidarity ceases to be surprising, or at least no more surprising in its way than solidarity among classes in Western states during the two world wars. Perhaps it should be even less surprising, because while a member of the English working class could attribute particular privations to the policies of the upper classes—at a minimum, the bloody suppression of his strikes—the life-style of elites in oil-poor states is largely unaffected by the price of oil. Only the masses suffer and they do not make or seriously influence foreign policy.

It is far less surprising for yet another reason. The average Englishman had never met a Hun. His animosity was entirely vicarious. But all Southern elites have experienced immediately one or more facets of colonial behavior, if not outright domination then at least a searing patronization. They are the leaders of countries once alleged by Western scholars and diplomats to be incapable of participating in the international legal system because they were not "civilized states." They spring from peoples to whom the Laws of War did not apply according to the diktat of the West. They and their countrymen have been and remain to this day objects of study by the cultural institutions of the West. For hundreds of years they have been people to whom things happen. And that is in significant measure why all cheer when a few of their number find the strength to stand up and lash out at the source of their historical torment.

In this respect, close-to universal Southern support for OPEC is only one sign of the subordination of economic interests to ideological preoccupations. A second is the incessant campaign against the obligation, enshrined in the classical system of international law, to compensate the alien owners of expropriated property.

The very fact that most Western scholars and diplomats speak of

the obligation as if its existence were unquestioned is a sign of an earlier epoch's ethnocentrism. Latin American governments and scholars consistently urged the view that international law required nothing more than equality of treatment for indigenous and foreign investors. Yet, although they pulled all the right buttons on the international legal console and pedaled vigorously, they might as well have been silent for all the effect they had on the views expounded in Western universities and chancelleries or, for that matter, on the gunboats and marines dispatched periodically to enforce the "law."

Recent changes in both theory and behavior, centering particularly on methods for evaluating expropriated enterprises, have opened the door to compromise. So far, no one has walked in. As evidenced in the debate over the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, adopted in December 1974 by the U.N. General Assembly, the Southern bloc continues to demand Western acknowledgment of the death of the international standard. One is reminded of the old Welsh proverb: "The dumb will wait a long time at the door of the deaf."

George Lichtheim was right when he wrote: "No ruling class can function without a creed." One facet of the creed of the ruling class in the West is the sanctity of property. Third World elites know that. Hence they must be fairly confident that they will not secure the acknowledgment they seek. Moreover, even if through some accelerated atrophy of will the United States made the demanded concession, so far as the North-South transfer of wealth is concerned little if anything would have been gained.

What, after all, are the main restraints on confiscation? Clearly not the threat of force. That option was interred in 1956 when the Anglo-French entente flinched at Suez. Nor, in most cases, is it the threatened loss of bilateral economic assistance, the proportions of which have shrunk to the edge of insignificance for most Southern nations. Rather it is the threatened loss of private credit and private investment. And that risk cannot be affected by a formally recognized change in the legal standard. Whatever the standard, private capital will not flow to states ruled by regimes with a penchant for confiscation.

If, as suggested, the issue of compensation is at best marginally relevant to the distribution of wealth and, in any event, the Southern bloc is waging a campaign which it cannot hope to win unequivocally, its furious persistence must reflect something more than a set of shrewdly calculated economic claims. What it does reflect, I would submit, is the claim to autonomy, to insulation from appraisal, let alone intervention, by the governments of Western capitalist states. It is, in short, a collective cry of defiance.

III

Are there positions available to the United States within the confines defined by its history, its ideology and its domestic politics which, if adopted, would moderate its acerb dialogue with the developing states and thus enhance the prospects for cooperation on the global issues which will not submit to unilateral or even regional manipulation?

If anticolonialism, as defined above, is in fact the paramount source of cohesion in the Third World, one necessary consequence is the intense links it forges among all the issues which it touches. Hence, the successful accommodation of U.S.-Third World differences on some issues would necessarily enhance the prospects for accommodation all along the line. A second corollary of the main proposition is the importance of gestures. It is not only what the United States does that matters; what it says also counts. After all, some of the most damaging humiliations of the colonial relationship were a function of Western rhetoric and the patronizing and contemptuous attitudes which it embodied and to a not inconsiderable extent continues to embody. It is, for instance, still commonplace for Anglo-American "experts" on the Arab world to refer to the "Arab mind" as if it were an unchanging and slightly bizarre object of disinterested study. Yet, as Arab intellectuals wryly note, if one were to speak of a "Jewish mind" there would be an immediate outcry from organs of respectable opinion against the sort of crude stereotyping which the term implies.

The single issue most readily susceptible to accommodation is U.S. policy toward the white-supremacist regimes of Southern Africa. By its consistent behavior, the United States has managed in two decades to transform its image from that of Black Africa's best friend in the West to its most dangerous adversary. Most of the hard work was accomplished during the national stewardship of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger.

Early evidence of their tilt toward increased cooperation with the triumvirate of South Africa, pre-1974 Portugal and the illegal Smith regime in Rhodesia was the failure to mobilize effective opposition to the chrome amendment, which opened the doors of the U.S. economy to the full range of Rhodesian mineral exports in clear violation of our obligations under the U.N. Charter. Another piece of hard evidence was Washington's loosening of the ban on the sale of military hardware to the Portuguese and the South Africans. Items clearly susceptible to military applications, including computers (for many years banned for security reasons from East-West trade), light planes,

and helicopters, were treated as civilian products. In addition, large commercial planes were sold to the Portuguese with no restriction on their use as troop carriers and with the expectation that they would in fact be used for that purpose.

The tilt was magnified by the strident, largely isolated position hacked out by the United States in response to a series of General Assembly resolutions on the situation in Southern Africa. For instance, in 1973, at the 28th session of the Assembly, the Afro-Asian bloc introduced a resolution calling for the formation of a commission of inquiry concerning the reported massacres in Mozambique carried out by the Portuguese army (Res. 3114). It was passed by a vote of 104 to 4 with 12 abstentions. The United States joined Portugal, South Africa, and Spain in casting the four negative votes.

During the same session, the Afro-Asian bloc introduced three resolutions on the Rhodesian situation. The United States opposed all three, including one condemning South Africa and Portugal for violating sanctions imposed by the Security Council—violations established by incontestable evidence—and calling on all states to comply strictly with the economic embargo. On one vote it was joined by Portugal, South Africa, and the United Kingdom; on another, this group was swelled by the addition of France. And on the third, the United States could muster no company other than the pariahs of prerevolutionary Portugal and South Africa.

The following year, with South Africa out of action and Portugal rehabilitated, the United States found itself utterly alone when it voted against a toughened iteration of the Assembly's earlier request for a comprehensive embargo on arms for South Africa (Res. 3324, Para. B). Even a plea for the release of political prisoners in South Africa could not summon U.S. support. The vote was 118 to 0, with two abstentions—the United States and Malawi (Res. 3324, Para. C).

Accommodation is possible here because Black African leaders ask so little of the United States. And much of that little is essentially rhetorical. So modest a gesture as endorsing the view championed by Kaunda and Nyerere that when all peaceful means have been exhausted, any oppressed people may turn legitimately to violence as a last recourse would transform the tone of our relations with the African caucus. And what is such a statement other than a reaffirmation of the Declaration of Independence? Yet the U.S. government continues to insist on a "peaceful solution" in such a way as to imply hostility to violence under any circumstances, thus distorting its own historical traditions while contributing nothing to the "peaceful solution."

Another modest gesture, one even more clearly within the bounds of domestic political realities, would be a determined effort by the Administration to secure repeal of the chrome amendment and to prosecute energetically any U.S.-related companies and individuals who conspire to evade the economic sanctions mandated by the Security Council. The failure of the U.S. government to meet its treaty commitments in this regard makes a mockery of its critique of procedural irregularities at the United Nations. Not only would this return to legality assuage African bitterness, but it would have the additional merit of fortifying respect for the sanctity of international agreements, a matter of some considerable importance to a powerful state preferring order over change.

There are an array of other low-cost measures available to an American Administration which placed significant value on the amelioration of its relations with the Third World. On the material side, it could widen the ban on the sale of military goods to South Africa; this could be accomplished by employing definitions of strategic goods used in the past to restrict sales to China and the Soviet Union. It could also follow the British lead in using the country's foreign intelligence apparatus to detect violations of Rhodesian sanctions by the nationals of other states. And it could initiate special educational programs openly designed to prepare black Rhodesians, Namibians and South Africans for the assumption of political, administrative, and highly skilled technical roles in societies purged of white-supremacist conceits.

On the symbolic side, it could agree to join the United Nations Council on Namibia, it could declare its opposition to any South African-imposed solution for the Namibian problem which would fragment the country and concentrate its natural resources in minority hands, and it could not merely support but actively sponsor resolutions in the political organs of the United Nations calling on South Africa for the release of political prisoners and the progressive elimination of racial criteria for the enjoyment of social, economic, and cultural rights.

These modest steps would not commit us to a particular political solution. Nor would they be inconsistent with frank acknowledgment that the unique historical circumstances of South Africa make it difficult to safeguard the rights of all its peoples within the context of a single centralized state. We would simply be taking a stand on behalf of a fair division of that tragic country's vast resources, a result which might be achieved by a variety of electoral mechanisms and an equitable allocation of territory. Since opposition to ethnic and racial dis-

crimination flows directly, albeit sporadically, from our central moral tradition, it should command the support of authentic conservatives as well as liberals.

Right now the question of the Palestinians stands at the other end of the spectrum of tractability. The Israeli government and almost surely a large majority of its electorate are convinced that a wholly independent Palestinian presence on the West Bank represents an intolerable threat to the security of the Israeli state.

Many Israelis cite declarations of the PLO to prove that the Palestinians categorically reject coexistence. Yet many of the same Israelis deride the PLO's claim to represent the Palestinian people. One cannot have it both ways, particularly when one has done everything in one's power to prevent the Palestinians from acquiring a political form in which they could at least speak for themselves. The Israelis some years ago dismantled an Arab nationalist party within their own state and have effectively suppressed political activities on the West Bank since the beginning of the occupation.

There is, moreover, the question of mutual recognition. While the rudimentary organs of self-expression now possessed by the Palestinians withhold recognition of Israel, their mirror image is the government of Israel which, since the failure of partition, has generally denied that the Palestinians are a distinct people with a peculiar historical attachment to the villages and towns and cities of Mandate Palestine rather than an essentially indistinguishable part of the surrounding Arab world.

In private, Palestinian intellectuals often insist that official Israeli recognition that non-Jewish Palestinians also have legitimate territorial claims on the West Bank would open the door to genuine reconciliation. Yet one cannot fault the Israelis for hesitating. They accepted the original United Nations decision to divide the land. They were compelled to fight in defense of the land ceded to them. And to this day even the ablest and most morally sensitive Arabs, after alleging their grudging acceptance of Israel as an immutable fact, in the next breath wistfully imagine the ultimate "peaceful" assimilation of Israel into a larger state system in which Judaism would lose its political form.

There is every reason to take seriously the stated determination of Israel to fight yet a fifth war rather than concede on issues deemed fundamental to its long-term security. The present Israeli government may be erroneously calculating the risks of negotiating directly with the Palestinians or of recognizing in any other way their right to self-determination in the West Bank occupied territories. But so

long as it hews to the view that such recognition threatens vital security interests, the ability of the United States to remove the issue of the Palestinians from its confrontation agenda with the Third World is powerfully circumscribed. Domestic political realities, moral commitments, international credibility, and the threat to Western interests immanent in any outbreak of conflict in the Middle East—all preclude the theoretical option of abandonment.

On the other hand, the United States need not act as if it were completely paralyzed by Israeli immobility. In the end, the Arab-Israeli conflict can be resolved peacefully only by agreement over the repartition of Palestine. Suppose the United States were openly to characterize the conflict in these terms while coincidentally announcing its resolve not to exercise leverage on behalf of partition until the Arabs demonstrate that they are at last reconciled to it. Such a gesture might simultaneously strengthen our relations with the major Arab states while bolstering those political forces within Israel willing, for moral and practical reasons, to explore the grounds for compromise with their fellow Palestinians. But its main virtue would be to soften our image as an intractable opponent of change by indicating that whatever we may think of their present set of leaders, we are not deaf to the appeals of the Palestinian people.

IV

There are few more contentious questions in American public life today than the possibility and desirability of accommodation with the Third World on so-called economic issues.

The anti-accommodationists, exemplified in the writings of Patrick Moynihan and Irving Kristol, argue along the following lines: The Third World is attempting to extort—through economic blackmail, moral bullying, and outright theft—a portion of the West's legitimately acquired wealth. The declared justification for redistributive claims, compensation for colonial and neocolonial exploitation, has no basis in fact. As Kristol, echoing Moynihan, has declared, Third World "economies do less well than they ought: . . . the difference is of their own making and no one else's, and no claim on anyone else arises in consequence." The West's failure to reject this justification simply encourages ever more arrogant, extortionate demands. Gestures of accommodation, both rhetorical and substantive, are construed by the Third World as evidence of a loss of will. Which, in fact, they are. And so the demands, by their nature insatiable for there is no practical limit to the "reparations" which can be justified under the theory of compensation, can only grow.

While rhetorical accommodation is said to sap our will while bolstering theirs, substantive accommodation is said to have still more serious consequences. A "New International Economic Order" designed to equalize rather than to produce wealth will undermine the incentives to efficiency, rationality, fiscal discipline and hard work which lie at the root of the First World's productivity and hence of its wealth. In absolute terms, the economic decline of the West is detrimental to the Third World as well. But that will not affect the views of Third World elites because they are essentially disinterested in productivity. What matters to them are relative shares. Now is the time to take a stand, it is claimed. If we consent to new structures which simultaneously shrink the economic pie and leave a smaller percentage in the hands of the West, it will be progressively more difficult to resist at a later date.

Implicit, sometimes explicit, in this line of argument is the claim that the developed states still deploy sufficient power to resist the Third World's redistributive efforts. The latter is portrayed largely as a paper tiger, faking it with éclat, to be sure, but still faking it. Precisely why we should regard the Southern bloc in this light has yet to be adequately explained. In the writings of Kristol and Moynihan and other such neo-conservatives one looks in vain for a serious effort to project the costs of the coercive measures required to assure continuing access to the resources and growing markets of the Third World. Seemingly buried in their subconscious is the idea that colonial rule was relinquished as an act of grace. In fact, as John Strachey and other students of imperialism have demonstrated, the colonial retreat was a grudging concession that once the Third World became infected with the virus of self-determination, the price of domination became intolerable.

For decades, France occupied Vietnam with an army of less than 20,000 men. But once the dormant idea of national independence came round again, the United States could not hold half of the country with 500,000 men and a million native auxiliaries. The proliferation of modern weapons in the Third World can only increase the costs of coercion. Moreover, the level of destruction required to reassert a Northern imperium would in many instances jeopardize the very economic ends for which the effort would be made.

Much anti-accommodationist rhetoric is unremarkably reminiscent of the haute bourgeoisie's response to working-class demands during the ascendancy of laissez-faire economics. The poor were deservedly so, the rich as well. The distribution of wealth was determined by the free market which in turn reflected an individual's net contribution to

productivity. The poor were profligate, incapable of postponing consumption. Any effort to tamper with the workings of the market would reduce the wealth of the nation without any corresponding benefit to the poor who would only dissipate it in reckless consumption. To compromise with these basic principles was to threaten the whole structure of legitimacy, including private property and democratic liberties. (That the men propounding these views were often hard at work substituting their hands for the invisible one of the market seems to have affected the intensity of their belief not at all.)

The profound fear that accommodation would topple the whole structure, that concessions would simply feed an insatiable appetite, helps to explain the animosity generated by that arch American accommodationist, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Wildly vilified as a traitor to his class, F.D.R., the supreme pragmatist, contemptuous of ideology, set about saving that class. In retrospect he seems a human analogue to Irving Kristol's vision of the State Department recently set forth in the columns of *The Wall Street Journal:* a "non-ideological institution which never fully appreciates the ways in which words and ideas ultimately shape world politics and always prefers negotiation to confrontation."

What in fact happened to mitigate the class conflict which in the early decades of this century threatened to tear apart the national societies of the West and undoubtedly played a major role in the rise of fascism? What, in essence, did accommodation involve? It had, it seems to me, several elements. There was the creaming off and cooptation of the natural elite of the working class. Some members were drawn off early by opening the channels to higher education. Those who rose within the institutions of the working class, the trade unions, were welcomed into the establishment.

Their followers were pacified in very small measure by vicarious participation in the structure of power and in very large measure by receipt of slightly increased shares of a very rapidly growing pie. There is no evidence that any existing wealth was redistributed; but there was some redistribution, albeit modest, of shares in the large increments which Western economies began to produce after World War II. In addition, Western governments increased the security of the workers with measures that cushioned temporary setbacks in particular industrial sectors and in the economy as a whole.

Governmental policies effecting modest redistribution of the incremental shares and increasing security of expectation were not uniformly successful in the United States in giving the working class a vested interest in the basic institutions and ideology of the capitalist

society. A quarter or more of the lower classes were left far behind the rest. In effect, those policies succeeded in creating two classes with sharply divergent interests. Members of the lower classes who worked in the key industrial and service sectors acquired a bourgeois outlook; they came to identify more closely with the upper classes than with those who were left behind.

Is the present struggle between the classes of nation-states not susceptible to mitigation by the employment of an analogous strategy of accommodation?

Some may cite the embittering experience of colonial and racial domination as a differentiating factor. For all the residual force of that experience, there is reason to question that it has been much more searing than the experience of Western working classes before they organized effectively for the ascent to political power. It is not only a question of parallel physical privation, but of humiliation. Conor Cruise O'Brien called attention some years ago to the striking similarity between racist apologetics for colonialism and the degrading descriptions of the English working class found in nineteenth-century tracts commissioned by the paladins of industry. In both cases, the exploited object is characterized as a repulsive, lower order of humanity.

In many respects, indeed, the strategy of accommodation might in fact be easier to implement in the present case than in its predecessor. Our conflict is not with huge, anonymous masses whose demands have to be aggregated through fairly uncertain representational arrangements. For the most part, Third World elites are even less committed to human equality as a general condition of humanity than are we. They are talking about greater equality between states. And in their largely authoritarian systems, the state is they.

What contemporary Brazilian statesman deplores the fact that the wealthiest 20 percent of his country's population receives over 60 percent of the national income while the lowest scrapes together three? Is there any record of a parliamentarian in the former French territories of West Africa returning part of his monthly pay because it was the equivalent of what a peasant would earn through 35 years of incessant labor, in the unexpected event that he lived so long? The central fact is that the overall number of people who have to be given a stake in the essential structures of the existing international economic system is relatively small.

That is one factor which makes accommodation seem potentially easier or at a minimum not more difficult on balance than in the prior case of class confrontation. A second is the existence of articulate,

well organized representatives with whom to negotiate: the bureaucrats and political leaders of the 100-odd states which aggregate the demands of the Third World elite. There is, moreover, no reason to doubt whether the negotiators can deliver their constituents. For unlike nouveau-riches labor leaders separated from their followers by the sheer fact of becoming negotiators, the Third World's representatives are an animate expression of the yearnings and aspirations of the elite which for the indefinite future will dominate most of the states with whom we must negotiate.

Of course the tenure of these specific negotiators may be transient. But the stability of new agreements forged in the spirit of accommodation will rest not on personal commitments but rather on their ability to reflect the class interests of which these leaders and their successors in the game of Third World musical chairs are a continuing embodiment.

A third factor facilitating accommodation is the very small number of representatives that have to be co-opted into senior decision-making roles in the management structure of the international economy. In Africa, only Nigeria. In Latin America, Brazil and Venezuela, perhaps Mexico. In the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Iran. And in Asia, India and Indonesia.

V

If one is persuaded by the overall analogy, what programmatic conclusions might follow? What must be defended? And what can be conceded without threatening the fundamental arrangements which an accommodationist policy, as much as the hard line, is calculated to preserve?

What must be defended in the large is an economic system which rewards the capitalist virtues of investment, innovation, hard work, and sensitivity to the shifting needs and preferences of consumers. As Lincoln Gordon recently noted, this is one of the reasons why a comprehensive system of "price indexation" should be unacceptable: "If world demand is shifting away from a given commodity, . . . what is needed is a structural shift in . . . production and exports to items in stronger demand." Preservation of the incentives to practice those virtues is essential because without them the world's product will shrink. That is bad for the North, worse for the South, and absolutely destructive of any possibility of accommodation. For if anything is clear it is that the electorates of the First World will not support revisions in the economic order which intensify the transfer of *existing* wealth. It is with respect to the distribution of new increments of

wealth that the "Haves" may be prepared to concede larger shares to the "Have-Nots." Hence, accommodationists must take a hard line against proposals which would reduce the prospects for growth in the global product.

Ironically, preservation of the principled foundations of the existing international capitalist system—an assemblage of values and institutions designed to reveal comparative advantage and reward economic efficiency—actually requires some practical concessions from the North rather than the South. A central plank of the latter's platform is removal of the various tariff and nontariff barriers to its present and potential exports. As investment in Southern infrastructure comes to fruition, comparative advantage in labor-intensive products shifts progressively away from the developed states. Volkswagens can already be produced more cheaply in Brazil than in Germany. For many textiles, the South's advantage has long been apparent. In addition, certain raw materials can now be refined with equal or great efficiency at their Southern sources.

So in this area, at least, all the South must yield is its rhetoric—the claim for reparations. It is we who must yield the tangibles: higher tariffs on refined raw materials, coerced textile agreements and the various other gimmicks—including restraints on the export of capital and related jobs from sectors of Northern industry that have lost their competitive edge—with which we cheat or might soon like to cheat on our own ideals.

This will be painful. If it were not, the North would have done it long ago simply in order to maximize its own growth. But if we cannot accommodate where we are asked only to bring practice into line with economic ideals, it is hard to foresee any option other than the barricades.

Consistent with its bedrock objective, the North also can respond affirmatively to Southern demands for tariff preferences in cases where they rest on a plausible claim to infant industry status rather than a mere appeal to equity. Nor is there any systemic objection to an affirmative response on the issue of more stable commodity prices. The North's record of economic dynamism since World War II suggests that public intervention in the market to prevent radical oscillations is perfectly compatible with and probably contributes heavily to economic growth, as well as social peace. What we cannot do, however, is guarantee a price level for any commodity in long-term opposition to powerful trends. On the other hand, following the domestic analogy, there is ample justification for accumulating funds to ease the transition out of declining economic activities.

The nub of the matter is that a considerable measure of economic security is thoroughly compatible with economic progress. That has become Holy Writ in the national societies of the North. To the extent that the South now seeks to extend the venue of this once radical notion, I see no principled grounds for resistance.

VI

Petroleum earnings have already given one bloc of Third World states a considerable material interest in preserving the basic features of the international economic system, including the prosperity of the First World. Reduced barriers to Third World exports, transitional preferences for new industries, and the unimpeded flow of capital and technology will enhance that stake and extend it to other countries that have sufficient assets and organization to grasp the resulting opportunities for accelerated growth. In theory, then, one might expect the large number of Third World countries that could benefit from such pragmatic changes to adopt in time a sort of middle-class outlook of their own and to dissociate themselves from a rhetoric of revolution and revenge. Yet even with these countries the answer will not be as easy as that, for reasons related to our earlier analysis of the attitudes that bind together all the Third World countries.

Let us look again at our recent behavior. In the first place, the transfer of wealth effected by the oil-producing OPEC states has not gone unchallenged. Official references to military action in case of "strangulation" and a drumbeat of unofficial calls for recourse to force or an economic blockade simply to roll back prices do not inspire confidence in the West's acceptance of the newly rich. Fearing an effort to reverse their gains, the oil producers naturally seek allies among the class of disadvantaged states from which they have sprung.

Secondly, given the rancorous response to this initial loss of unquestioned economic dominance, the OPEC states and others in the economic vanguard of the Third World can hardly assume that the reforms required to consolidate and expand their beachhead in the international economy will be conceded without additional struggle. The solid front and the radical rhetoric are in part designed as instruments of effective bargaining with what is seen as a tough and thoroughly unsentimental adversary. The protagonists of a hard line may convince themselves that the liberals' guilt has cost the West its will, but to the presumed beneficiaries of that loss of will it is not the "liberal" but the rigid reaction that comes across as dominant.

The radical rhetoric is not, of course, simply a bargaining ploy. It also functions to hold together the alliance of traditional "Have-

Nots." There is yet another reason for the harshness of Third World rhetoric. To return to our original theme, more, much more, than economics is at stake. There is the question of dignity and respect, the redress of profound humiliations. Those humiliations continue.

Calls for action to dam the outward flow of petrodollars are often linked with vilification and crudely bigoted stereotyping of the Arab recipients. Economic coercion, so long a powerful weapon in the foreign policy armory of the United States, is transformed into "blackmail" when employed to advance the interest of other states. The clear implication is that only we have the decency of motive, the loftiness of purpose, to be entrusted with power.

The often unconscious bias which infects so much of our own rhetoric about the Third World resonates against a background of subordination to the West. Through our language, the transparent skin of our thought, we succeed only in raising the emotional barriers to pragmatic accommodation. A change in tone, possibly foreshadowed by Secretary Kissinger's more recent comments on international economic issues, is a good way to begin the process of lowering them. The small gestures enumerated earlier in our discussion of the political axes of confrontation will help. So will a formal reception of the Third World's leading states into the management group of the international economic system. Countries such as Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico, Iran, Nigeria and at least one of the major Arab states might, for instance, be invited to join the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and other organs of developed-country consultation.

The advocates of confrontation claim that no useful overall bargain can be struck because as soon as the Third World has devoured its benefits new demands will be made. Support for a policy of accommodation, however, does not imply support for a grand compact. Indeed, the notion of a grand compact is an illusion. The stunning diversity of problems and parties converging in this period of accelerating change simply do not admit of a single or final solution. There must be many bargains, not all of them among precisely the same parties. Some bargains will wholly resolve the issues to which they are addressed. Others will be stopgaps. Still others may prove so asymmetrical because of developments which the parties could not foresee that, just as in domestic society, the parties will have to renegotiate. No bargain is forever.

And there will remain desperately serious problems with the so-called Fourth World, for they, like the lower classes in American society, are disabled by a congeries of historical and natural forces

from exploiting the opportunities for more effective participation in the competitive system. One cannot yet visualize the combination of self-help and external effort that may in time improve the lot of these poor countries. Neither the amelioration of their present agony nor the beginnings of rehabilitation can be accomplished without joint effort, free of rancor, on the part of the West *and* the more advanced Third World countries.

VII

In the years of bitter class conflict between capital and labor, before the ameliorations and compromises of the welfare state, many advocates of a hard line against the demands of labor invoked the alleged insatiability of those demands in support of a confrontational strategy. In one sense they were right, even trite. Once the myth of divinely authored shares in the social pie is fractured, no group settles willingly for less when it can, without risk, have more. Competition and struggle over the allocation of wealth and power seem endemic. But so, too, may be cooperation, which grows both out of fear of loss and the desire for absolute as well as relative gains.

One of the potential strengths of the present international system is the reality of national interdependence which creates an objective need for cooperation and consequently for accepting sharp restraints on the competitive aspects of interstate relations. The principal danger is an irrational assessment of risks and opportunities. Nothing is better calculated to promote miscalculation than the pretense that the equilibrium of power has not shifted, that we can continue to dictate to the Third World on the terms which sufficed in the epoch of the Western imperium.

Although the confrontationists indict advocates of accommodation for discounting our still-great strength, in fact, as is so often the case with those who extoll coercion, it is they who seem infected with a debilitating insecurity. To accommodate sensibly to real changes and legitimate demands is not the sign of a weak will. It is rather the essence of statesmanship.

Part I

FOREIGN POLICY MAKING IN A NEW ERA

THE CHALLENGE OF MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY

RICHARD N. GARDNER

THERE ARE many possible ways to organize the United States government for the conduct of foreign policy. The choice between them will be influenced by the personalities of the President and his principal collaborators, but it should also reflect the nation's basic foreign policy priorities.

The ultimate objective of United States foreign policy is to promote the "life, liberty and pursuit of happiness" of the American people. It is increasingly clear that this objective can only be achieved in an international environment congenial to American interests. At the end of the Second World War the United States sought to promote such an environment by creating an institutionalized world order based on the United Nations, the Bretton Woods organizations and GATT. With the onset of the Cold War, the focus of American foreign policy became the creation of a new balance of power to contain the Soviet Union and Communist China. In the thirty years since World War II, "balance of power politics" and "world order politics" have contended for supremacy in US foreign policy-making, with the former steadily gaining ground over the latter.

The capacity of the United States government to promote the "life, liberty and pursuit of happiness" of the American people still requires the maintenance of a power balance. But the greatest threat to our future security and welfare lies in the disintegration of the international order. We talk of a "structure of peace," yet seldom in history have so many existing structures fallen apart. The United Nations system of collective security has broken down, the Bretton Woods financial system has broken down, the GATT system of open and non-discriminatory trade has broken down, the established arrangements for supplying the world's food and energy needs have broken down, the traditional law of the sea has broken down, and essential arrangements for population control and environmental protection have yet to be created.

As the world enters the last quarter of the 20th century, it is more than ever necessary for the United States to re-examine its foreign policy priorities. In this decisive quarter century, the survival of human civilization as we have known it will depend on mankind's capacity to fashion a new international order—specifically, on improved international arrangements to cope with such interrelated problems as population, food, environment, energy, mass poverty, unemployment, inflation and depression, social and political instability, proliferating nuclear and conventional weapons and escalating terrorism and international conflict.

The collapse of the international order cannot be blamed on the United States or any single nation or group of nations. The clash of ideologies, the multiplication of sovereign states, the intensification of nationalism, the drastic changes in the economic balance, the revolutionary changes in science and technology—these developments have combined to shatter the old order before we have been able to build a new one. The United States has been neglectful of "world order politics," but the record of most other countries has been as bad or worse.

Yet the responsibility of the United States is a special one. Vietnam and "covert operations" notwithstanding, the concept of a community of nations working within a framework of law to promote security, welfare and human rights is an important part of the American tradition. The US contribution—political, economic, scientific and managerial—remains absolutely essential to the building of a global order. The creation of new international structures to replace the collapsing old ones will be impossible in the absence of United States leadership.

The recommendations that follow are based on the premise that the central preoccupation of United States foreign policy from now on must be the building of effective international machinery to manage mankind's common problems. Unfortunately, in a divided world of competitive nation-states, we cannot dispense entirely with "balance of power politics" in favor of "world order politics." But we will need to demonstrate the same degree of commitment to "world order politics" that we have demonstrated to "balance of power politics" if we are to have any hope that the latter will one day prove unnecessary.

A commitment of this kind has been notably lacking in recent Administrations, both Republican and Democratic, despite much use of "world order" rhetoric. US foreign

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. . . it concentrated vast power in the White House in the hands of one individual, limited the accountability to Congress of key foreign policy decision-makers, and undermined the effectiveness of the Department of State.

policy has favored short-term considerations over long-term interests, bilateral diplomacy over multilateral institution-building, and political and military responses over economic and functional cooperation. To mention but one example of distorted priorities, we spent thousands of lives and billions of dollars in defense of "national security" in Vietnam, while neglecting the much greater threat to national security from our growing dependence on Middle East oil.

The suggestions in this paper for reforming Executive Branch foreign policy-making arrangements are designed for a new era of international institution-building to give mankind a safe passage into the 21st century. In this new era the President, the Secretary of State and the heads of the major executive departments will need to give continuing attention to a range of neglected institutional questions:

- What international problems (e.g., access to supplies, inflation/depression, the spread of nuclear capabilities, direct broadcasting from satellites) require new or strengthened international rules and institutions?
- In developing such rules and institutions, which countries are the appropriate participants (e.g., how do we strike a balance between universality and effectiveness)?
- What voting and other decision-making arrangements are needed to take account of national sovereignty and of the differing capabilities of members to implement decisions?
- What are the best methods for creating and revising international rules (e.g., can we make greater use of independent experts in place of highly politicized international conferences)?
- What are the best arrangements for interpreting the international rules (ICJ, specialized tribunals, mediation, fact-finding, etc.)?
- What rewards and punishments can be used to secure compliance from parties to international agreements and to encourage necessary cooperation from non-parties?
- How do we assure a better coordination of the proliferating number of regional and functional bodies?
- What can be done to improve the administration of international institutions and enhance the efficiency and independence of the international staff?
- How can the United States concert its policy more effectively on multilateral issues with its Atlantic and Pacific allies, with its former enemies in Moscow and Peking, with the new financial powers in the OPEC group, and with the countries of the developing world?

The proposals in this paper are based on the assumption that the President, the Secretary of State and the heads of the main executive departments will regard these as important questions the solution of which is vital to the survival of the United States. If that assumption is correct, the recommendations that follow can make a difference; if it is not, they will be quite irrelevant.

Basic Elements in Executive Branch Leadership

Since the Second World War, the United States has tried three main approaches to organizing the Executive Branch for the making of foreign policy:

- One approach has been to put the main responsibility for the making of foreign policy in the hands of the President's National Security Adviser. This system, employed from 1969 to 1973, facilitated some significant breakthroughs in bilateral diplomacy. But it concentrated vast power in the White House in the hands of one individual, limited the accountability to Congress of key foreign policy decision-makers, and undermined the effectiveness of the Department of State. It seems particularly inappropriate for an era in which economic and functional questions will share the center of the diplomatic stage with political and security questions. No one individual can handle all of these questions and assure a fair balancing of the viewpoints of all interested Executive agencies and domestic interest groups.
- A second approach has been to combine in one man the offices of Secretary of State and National Security Adviser. This arrangement, as we are currently witnessing, has the advantage of giving the State Department a powerful leadership role and of assuring accountability to Congress. But it concentrates even more power in one person. It may be imperfectly suited to an era of multilateral diplomacy, when the President will need strong inputs from other Executive Departments, particularly on economic and functional questions.
- A third approach has been to combine a strong Secretary of State with one or more individuals in the White House performing tasks of interdepartmental coordination. This system, employed during the Truman and Eisenhower Adminis-

trations, may avoid the pitfalls of the other two, but it carries the risk of conflict between the White House staff and the State Department and uncertainty as to the respective functions of both.

Looking toward the future, and bearing in mind that these arrangements must inevitably be tailored to the President's personality and operating style, the following may be a useful compromise between the second and third approaches:

1. Continue the present system under which the Secretary of State serves also as the President's National Security Adviser, but restrict the scope of the NSC to political-military issues.

2. For all other aspects of foreign policy, employ a series of *ad hoc* groups chaired by the Secretary of State, with responsibility for relating these groups to one another and to relevant aspects of "domestic" policy vested in a senior member of the White House staff outside the NSC mechanism.

There are signs that the Executive Branch may already be moving in the direction of such a compromise arrangement. In contrast to several years ago, the NSC is no longer used for the coordination of policy in economic and functional areas. The Council for International Economic Policy, established in 1971, has fallen into disuse, for the very good reason that different issues in foreign economic policy require different groups of people to deal with them. What we now see emerging are a number of interdepartmental groups to deal with specific questions—an "international energy review group," and "international food review group," etc.

For this system to work effectively, there should be a senior member of the White House staff with responsibility for relating these international functional activities both to one another and to United States domestic policies. In effect, this position would be the counterpart to the National Security Adviser, and might be called Assistant to the President for Economic and Multilateral Affairs. It would not be desirable to have this function performed by the Secretary of the Treasury, as was the case in the early 1970s, or by any other cabinet officer; that would "tilt" policy too much in the direction of an executive department with strong domestic interests. The individual should have an exclusively White House role so that he can serve as a disinterested coordinator of the *ad hoc* international groups with the interdepartmental councils outside the NSC (Economic Policy Council, Domestic Council, etc.).

The compromise proposed above is designed to establish the Department of State as the "lead" agency for the making and execution of foreign policy, while recognizing that "foreign policy" today has many functional components (e.g., energy, food, money) which are inextricably bound up with domestic policy. That is why it gives the Secretary of State control of the NSC machinery but restricts that machinery to political and security matters. Other foreign policy questions would be dealt with by interdepartmental groups chaired by the Secretary of State and coordinated by a senior White House assistant with responsibilities in the domestic area.

Three Special Problems

Three special problems arise in any attempt to assert the State Department's role as the "lead" agency in the field of foreign economic policy—the State-Treasury relationship, the Agency for International Development (AID), and the Office of the President's Special Trade Representative (STR).

Close and harmonious relations between State and Treasury are clearly essential. In addition, the time has come for one admittedly controversial change in their respective responsibilities. The Treasury Department is not only in charge of United States participation in the International Monetary Fund, but also of United States participation in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association, and other international development institutions such as the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. Recently, the Treasury took the initiative in creating a new IMF/IBRD Development Committee composed of 20 Finance Ministers. Given the central importance of economic development to United States foreign policy, it would seem more appropriate to confine the Treasury's role to participation in the IMF, transferring to State the responsibility for managing United States participation in all institutions concerned with economic development assistance, including the IBRD and the new Development Committee.

A further step in the centralization of responsibility for multilateral development activity would be the abolition of the Agency for International Development. The maintenance of AID as a separate entity within the Executive Branch could be justified at a time when the United States was carrying on a substantial bilateral aid program backed by strong Congressional and public support. That time has obviously passed, and there are powerful international as well as domestic reasons for transferring all US development assistance through multilateral institutions. To the extent that the United States maintains a bilateral aid program for political and security reasons, it can best be administered by those parts of the government responsible for the promotion of those interests. If AID were abolished, its responsibilities for bilateral aid could be transferred to the regional bureaus of the Department of State, and its backstopping of OECD/DAC and of UN technical aid programs could be transferred to State's Bureau of International Organization Affairs, as suggested in the following section.

A case can also be made for transferring from STR to State the responsibility for managing US trade negotiations and participation in GATT. However, the Congress has repeatedly made it clear that it does not trust the Department of State to carry on trade negotiations. The maintenance of STR is a better option than vesting this responsibility in Commerce or Treasury, since these agencies would tend to conduct negotiations with primary regard to domestic concerns and with inadequate attention to US interests in the development of strong international trade institutions. A more effective State-STR partnership could be established, however, through some of the recommendations which follow relating to the Geneva Mission and a new personnel system.

The Department of State

At the risk of repetition, it should be emphasized again that the new kind of foreign policy called for at the beginning of this paper requires a strong Secretary of State who considers the building of multilateral machinery for the management of global problems a central task of US foreign policy. Without a leader totally committed to multilateralism in deed as well as word, willing to delegate complex tasks of institution-building to outstanding subordinates, the Department of State will not be able to play its proper role as the lead agency for the US government in the construction of a better world order.

If this condition is fulfilled, there are a number of organizational changes that could substantially improve the performance of the Department of State. Of all these changes the most important is to create a better arrangement for the direction of multilateral policy-making on the seventh floor of the Department. The Secretary of State, however committed he may be to the multilateral approach, will have to spend much of his time on crisis management and on relations with Congress and the press. The Deputy Secretary will bear a heavy burden of managing the Department. What is needed, therefore, is sustained leadership for "world order business" at the Under Secretary level.

To achieve this leadership, some have proposed the creation of an Under Secretary of State for Multilateral Affairs to work on the seventh floor alongside the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. This proposal has the merit of simplicity, but it runs counter to the central objective of building multilateralism into the political and economic arms of US foreign policy. Much of our international political effort is, and more of it ought to be, carried out through multilateral institutions such as NATO, OAS and the UN. Much of our foreign economic policy is, and more of it ought to be, carried out through multilateral institutions such as OECD, GATT and the agencies of the UN system. An Under Secretary for Multilateral Affairs would be outside the central stream of decision-making supervised by the other Under Secretaries. Given the close relation between bilateral and multilateral affairs, he would be constantly involved in insoluble jurisdictional disputes.

A better way of achieving leadership at the Under Secretary level would be to assign responsibility for multilateral political and military affairs to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and responsibility for all the rest of multilateral activity to the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. It may be argued that existing arrangements tend to approximate this objective, but this is really not the case. The political Under Secretary does not have responsibility for developing an overall US strategy toward conflict management through NATO, OAS, and the UN. The economic Under Secretary does not have responsibility for all the multilateral economic areas (development aid as well as finance and trade) or for all the related multilateral functional areas (energy, food, environment, population, oceans, science and technology).

What is here proposed, therefore, is that the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, in addition to his existing responsibilities, should have an explicit mandate to oversee and coordinate the work of the multilateral political divisions of the Department (IO/UNP, EUR/RPM, and ARA/USOAS), while the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, in addition to supervising the work of the EB bureau, should have explicit authority to oversee and coordinate all the other work of IO, of EUR/RPE, of ARA/ECP, and of the new Bureau of Oceans, Environment and Science (OES). In addition, and this is of central importance, the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs would inherit the responsibilities of the Administrator of AID.

It must be admitted that this proposal concentrates enormous power and responsibility in the economic Under Secretary, but this seems unavoidable if the Department of State, and the whole United States Government, is to develop a coherent policy in all the different functional areas which are increasingly linked in international negotiations. The issues of money, trade, investment and development are increasingly related to one another and are now related in turn to those of food, energy, environment, oceans, science and technology. This seems obvious enough to be a cliché—yet it is not yet reflected in US policy-making. To take two recent examples, the US delegation to the Bucharest Conference was not well prepared to deal with population in its larger development context, and the US positions in the Law of the Sea Conference do not take sufficient account of the enormous significance that revenue-sharing from seabed exploitation of oil and hard minerals could have for the future of the international development system.

To exercise the new responsibilities here proposed, the political and economic Under Secretaries should each have a special assistant for multilateral affairs with the responsibility for insuring that the substantive policies and institutional arrangements proposed by the various State Department bureaus and by other federal agencies are mutually consistent and serving a coherent long-term strategy for international order.

The political and economic Under Secretaries should be invested with the further responsibility of serving as the *alter egos* of the Secretary of State in dealing with other federal agencies in the multilateral as well as the bilateral areas of their respective concern. Where necessary they would chair the NSC and other mechanisms for the coordination of Executive Branch policy in place of the Secretary of State and they would be encouraged to deal directly with the President in place of the Secretary of State when he was unavailable. A formal Executive Order, coupled with an appropriate White House announcement, would help dramatize this new commitment to multilateralism and would make these senior positions more attractive for men of outstanding talent.

Finally, as part of these new "seventh floor" arrangements, it would be desirable to change the name of the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs to Under Secretary of State for Economic and Multilateral Affairs, in recognition of his new and broader responsibilities for subjects like energy, food, environment, population, oceans and science. It would help the new Under Secretary to

discharge these varied responsibilities with other government departments if he were elevated to the number three position in the Department of State ahead of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs who now outranks him. It may seem a small point, but the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs was the third-ranking officer of the Department for most of the postwar period until very recently. The elevation of the new Under Secretary for Economic and Multilateral Affairs to third place in the Department's hierarchy would help to manifest our new concern with this vital area of international affairs.

The Bureau of International Organization Affairs

These new arrangements at the Under Secretary level would not in any way reduce the importance of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. Quite the contrary, IO's position has deteriorated over the years partly because it has not had the political "clout" to assert the multilateral interest at the highest levels of decision-making. Under the arrangements here proposed, it would have two "champions" on the seventh floor who could work for better multilateral policies not only in the State Department but throughout the Federal Government.

To be sure, some foreign governments manage to dispense with any equivalent of our Bureau of International Organization Affairs, but these are mostly governments that tend to view multilateral institutions as having little importance—as marginal adjuncts to bilateral diplomacy. The weight of these countries in international institutions is not as great as that of the United States, whose political, economic, scientific and intellectual input is usually crucial for the success of any multilateral enterprise. Nor do these countries have any real commitment to make "world order business" a central element in their foreign policy.

Given the special place of the United States in the international institutional system, there is need of a central place in the Department of State which can (1) determine, in cooperation with other appropriate bureaus and agencies, the day-to-day US policies in international institutions (outside the special regional institutions within the purview of EUR and ARA); (2) decide upon US participation in international programs and conferences and on the level of US contributions; (3) assure that US foreign policy is conducted in harmony with the requirements of the UN Charter and other multilateral commitments and programs; (4) review and evaluate the effectivness of international organizations and develop a coherent long-term US strategy for strengthening them; and (5) serve as a focal point for communicating with US delegations to international organizations and conferences and assure that the US government speaks in them with one voice. Without a Bureau of International Organization Affairs, it is hard to see how these essential functions could be effectively performed.

One obstacle to the effective performance of IO's role at the present time is the dispersal of authority between IO and AID for US participation in the multilateral development activities of the UN system. With the abolition of AID, responsibility for multilateral development programs would be transferred to IO and responsibility for bilateral aid to the regional bureaus. If, as suggested earlier, State were also to assume Treasury's responsibilities for managing US participation in the IBRD/IDA and the Regional Development Banks, IO would be the logical place to exercise these functions, working in close cooperation with EB and the regional bureaus. At last there would be one central place in the US Government where policy could be shaped on all varieties of multilateral development assistance—technical aid, pre-investment aid and the transfer of capital on concessional terms. The function of coordinating US policy in international development institutions, which the Congress assigned last year to AID, would henceforth be performed in IO.

In recent years, it must be admitted, IO has had a declining role in the shaping of policy on substantive issues. On the majority of items at issue in the UN system—whether disarmament, the Middle East, trade, development, food, environment, population or oceans—IO has become mainly a procedural channel to communicate policies established elsewhere. This is in contrast to the situation that existed at key periods in the '40s, '50s and '60s, when the Bureau was able to shape US policy with special regard to US interests in international institution-building.

Clearly IO must look to the regional and functional bureaus of the State Department and to other Executive agencies for the primary input into most of the items that come before the General Assembly, the Security Council, ECOSOC, the Specialized Agencies, and other parts of the UN system. What IO can and should do, however, is to review and adapt these policies in the light of overall US interests in the development of more effective international institutions.

The decision made several years ago to establish Agency Directorates in IO for specialized areas of UN activity was a step toward more effective policy-making, since it did away with the artificial separation that previously existed between responsibility for UN agency programs in the Office of Economic and Social Affairs (OES) and responsibility for UN agency budgets in the Office of International Administration (OIA). But for the system of Agency Directorates to work effectively, these key positions must be filled by people who combine technical competence in the specialized area with an understanding of multilateral diplomacy. The practice of seconding people from other Executive Departments for these positions satisfies the former requirement, but only rarely the latter. Foreign Service officers, on the other hand, are rarely suitable for these assignments—even if they are skilled in multilateral diplomacy, they seldom have the required expertise in agriculture, health, narcotics, science, etc. The more rational organizational structure which IO now has needs to be complemented by a much more fundamental reform to provide personnel with both specialized knowledge and multilateral competence. A proposal to this end is presented in the last section of this paper.

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Foreign Policy Making in a New Era.

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Developing a Long-Term Strategy for Multilateral Institutions

Long-term planning on the kind of institutional questions identified in the introduction of this paper is not now taking place anywhere in the United States Government. Institution-building is approached *ad hoc* in each functional or regional context, with little regard to possible interrelationships. The organizational breakthrough represented by the new International Energy Agency could have important implications for other international agencies, but these are not being seriously examined in IO. The Inter-Agency Task Force on the Law of the Sea spent months considering rules of procedure for the Law of the Sea Conference that might put a brake on the automatic majority of the "77" until someone recalled the "conciliation" formula developed at UNCTAD I. Without some central place for the accumulation of experience and wisdom on multilateral procedures and institutions, those preparing for each specialized event are likely to go on "re-inventing the wheel."

To perform the necessary long-term planning and overview function for the development of international institutions, there should be a small group of highly qualified specialists working together in the Policy Planning Staff (S/P) and IO. Since the necessary competence in international organization affairs will seldom be found within the Foreign Service, outstanding experts in this area from the academic and professional communities should be brought to S/P and IO on two to four year assignments. In addition, the Department should be given funds to contract out for research in this area to universities and research centers. It is absurd that the Defense Department should be able to spend vast sums for research on weapons systems and strategic problems while the Department of State has virtually no money for research on the organization of peace and the management of interdependence.

Greater use should also be made of part-time consultants, but not through the traditional device of appointing an Advisory Panel on International Organizations. Such standing groups tend to be easy targets for political patronage. Moreover, no one group is likely to be adequate for all the different problem areas. The Department should mobilize one team of outside experts to help it prepare for the September 1975 General Assembly reviewing UN economic institutions; another for the reform of GATT in connection with the new trade negotiations; still another to consider the appropriate structure of an International Seabed Authority. The necessary continuity and coordination of policy among the various consulting groups can be assured by the full-time specialists in S/P and IO who ought to be collaborating with all of them.

to be continued in July

Next month Professor Gardner will advance basic improvements in the operation of US missions to international organizations and the handling of multilateral issues by US country missions.

Part II

FOREIGN POLICY MAKING IN A NEW ERA

UNITED STATES MISSIONS AND CONFERENCES

RICHARD N. GARDNER

In Part I, Professor Gardner proposed organizational changes to improve the performance of the Department of State in the field of multilateral diplomacy. The article is adapted from a report written at the request of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy.

United States Missions and Conferences

Whatever reforms are carried out in Washington, the United States Government will not be meeting the challenges of multilateral diplomacy unless it makes some basic improvements in the "delivery system"—US missions to international organizations, US delegations to international conferences, and the handling of multilateral issues by US country missions.

Missions to International Organizations

The most important of all the US multilateral missions is the United States Mission to the United Nations. Little more than a decade ago, the five Ambassadorial posts at USUN were occupied by Adlai Stevenson, Francis Plimpton, Charles Yost, Philip Klutznick and Jonathan Bingham. Stevenson, of course, was a man of world stature, but it is also significant that all four of his top associates brought exceptional professional qualifications to their assignments. It is no reflection on those who have occupied these posts in subsequent years to state the simple fact that a similar concentration of talent has not been assembled since.

One frequently debated question is whether or not the United States Ambassador to the United Nations should be a national political figure. A good case can be made on both sides of this argument. There are undoubted advantages in having a UN Ambassador who can telephone the President at will, command headlines with his statements on world affairs, and force the reconsideration of major policies by the threat of resignation. On the other hand, someone with his own national constituency may be tempted to run "a second State Department" in New York and to ignore or even sabotage policy directives emanating from Washington.

It is doubtful that this question can be answered in the abstract. It will certainly help if the Ambassador to the United Nations has "political clout," but it is even more important that he be a solid professional with substantive knowledge in the main areas of UN activity. A US Ambassador who has to turn to a staff member for advice before he can respond to an argument made during a Washington policy conference, a visit with a foreign diplomat, or an attack on US policy in a UN debate, will not be able to provide the kind of leadership in support of stronger multilateral institutions that is now required. Moreover, whatever the background of the US Ambassador to the United Nations, he must be willing to serve as a loyal member of the United States Government team—fighting hard if necessary to shape or change his instructions but prepared to carry them out when a policy decision goes against him.

One of the most serious deficiencies of the United States Mission to the United Nations is its lack of competence in economics and other important specialized areas. It is paradoxical that these "non-political" subjects now account for half the items before the General Assembly, most of the items before subordinate UN bodies and a preponderance of the work of the Secretariat, yet of the five Ambassadorial appointees at the US Mission there has seldom been more than one at any given time with a solid academic background or practical experience in these subjects—and sometimes there has been none at all. In view of the increasing prominence of economic and functional issues in the work of the United Nations, this kind of competence should be a major factor in the

Source: Foreign Service Journal, Vol. 52 No. 7, July, 1975. pp. 8-11.

choice of the United States Permanent Representative and the other four Ambassadorial appointees.

What has just been said about professional qualifications at the top level of USUN also applies at the staff level. In recent years men who had spent ten years or more specializing in UN work have left the Mission, to be replaced by Foreign Service officers on two to four year assignments. With a few notable exceptions, the decline in competence and commitment at USUN has been alarming. Service with the Mission is rarely an asset in the career of a Foreign Service officer, and the expense of living in New York imposes a heavy financial burden (though this has been somewhat eased by the recent decision to grant housing allowances). To make matters worse, USUN has been obliged to reduce its staff in response to budgetary economies at a time when the variety and complexity of the items on the UN agenda are greater than ever.

To give just one example of what the present staffing pattern means, USUN now has only four officers assisting the Ambassador to the Economic and Social Council to cover trade, development, food, energy, environment, population, the law of the sea, science and technology, and US interests in the UNDP and other voluntary funds to which the United States makes major contributions. These officers spend much of their time trying to satisfy the General Accounting Office that US contributions to the UN are well spent.

With the decline in both the quality and quantity of personnel at USUN, it is not surprising that the Mission has made a smaller and smaller contribution to the making of policy. In matters as diverse as disarmament, outer space, environment, and the law of the sea, USUN has been reduced to a transmission belt for decisions made in Washington.

The situation is even more discouraging at the United States Mission to the European headquarters of the United Nations in Geneva. For years the Geneva Mission has been treated as a second-rate Foreign Service assignment, or, even worse, as a resting ground for the politically deserving. Yet more and more parts of the UN Secretariat have been located in Geneva and the conference schedule there is even more crowded than the one in New York.

With the passage of the Trade Act of 1974, attention is now being given to establishing another US Ambassador in Geneva to handle the multilateral trade negotiations following the practice that was employed during the Kennedy Round. But creating a separate Mission in Geneva to deal with trade negotiations will only make it harder to build up the quality of the regular Geneva Mission. It will also create serious jurisdictional conflicts, for the regular Geneva Mission is supposed to deal with UNCTAD and ECE, as well as ongoing GATT problems. The next round of trade negotiations will cover a much broader field than the trade negotiations of the past, ranging broadly beyond tariffs into non-tariff barriers, commodity problems and access to supplies. This will make it even harder to separate the activities of the Mission in charge of trade negotiations from those of the regular Mission responsible for the UN economic agencies. For all these reasons the United States would do well to follow the practice of most major foreign governments, who head their Geneva Missions with men of substantive competence and employ them both for trade negotiations and general UN business.

Special importance should also be attached to strengthening the United States Mission to the OECD in Paris and the United States Mission to the European Communities in Brussels. The Paris post is now more important than ever, in view of the initiatives recently undertaken among the industrialized countries to deal with the energy crisis.

It is sometimes argued that US missions to international organizations are unimportant because significant business is handled by high-level officials from Washington and other capitals. There is no doubt that international organizations tend to be more effective when they bring together the people in national governments who have the power to take policy decisions and see that they are carried out. Nevertheless, it would be a serious mistake to treat the heads of US missions to multilateral agencies as glorified hotel-keepers and airport-greeters. The national interest in multilateral diplomacy requires that we have outstanding representatives maintaining good relations with other delegations and with the international Secretariat. This is essential if the high-level meetings of people from capitals are to be well-prepared and effectively followed up.

One vitally important area in which US missions to international agencies are not adequately performing their tasks is the recruitment of qualified people for the international Secretariat. Time after time US interests have suffered as a result of unfortunate personnel decisions by the UN Secretary-General on programs of major interest to the United States. Much more attention needs to be paid to personnel questions by our Ambassadors in New York and Geneva and by senior officials in the Department of State. The issue is not just one of promoting qualified Americans for international posts, but of working with other governments to see that better candidates from all countries are made available so that the management of essential multilateral programs is put in capable hands.

In view of the national interest in more effective international institutions, a much more systematic effort is needed to identify key positions in the Secretariats where vacancies will occur—and the qualified persons from the academic, scientific, professional and business worlds who can step into these assignments. Preparations for filling vacancies should be made months and even years in advance. Otherwise the United States will become more and more dependent on Foreign Service officers to fill such posts. There is a particular need to attract more qualified young people and women into UN service. An important step forward would be the creation of a UN Fellowship Program, in which a small number of outstanding young people could be recruited by worldwide competitive examination.

Another notable failure in US multilateral diplomacy is reflected in the disarray of the non-Communist industrialized nations in the United Nations on issues such as the Middle East and the

New International Economic Order. To be sure, the North Atlantic nations and Japan frequently perceive their national interests on these subjects differently; nevertheless, more could be done in forums like NATO and OECD to harmonize positions in the global forums, both on matters of substance and on administrative and budgetary questions. It is a sad state of affairs that the twenty countries accounting for two-thirds of the world's GNP and two-thirds of the UN's budget should so often act at cross-purposes while the nearly 100 developing countries work together as a potent bloc.

Delegations to International Conferences

Also neglected in the "delivery system" for multilateral diplomacy are the US delegations to international conferences. Given the importance of the global agenda and the difficulty of mobilizing support for US positions, every delegation member should be able to function effectively as a member of the US team. Yet this is seldom the case. In recent years, for example, the public members of US delegations to the United Nations General Assembly have often lacked professional qualifications or have been absent for much of the session. United States representation on the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the General Assembly has been a notable victim of this practice—we repeat our commitment to the "rule of law," yet there has hardly been a General Assembly in the last twenty years in which the United States has been represented by a distinguished jurist. Under both parties, the White House has used delegations for easy political rewards. This has hampered the US performance, not only in the General Assembly, but in meetings of the Specialized Agencies and in specialized UN conferences like the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment.

If we are serious about our commitment to the strengthening of multilateral institutions, the President should appoint the public members of delegations on a merit basis. Nominations should be made by the Department of State in consultation with other executive agencies and, where appropriate, with business, labor, scientific and academic groups. Members of the delegation to the UN General Assembly should be named three to six months in advance of each Assembly, so that they can prepare themselves with the help of USUN and the Department of State. In some years, public members have been appointed only a few days before the opening of an Assembly—in one case an appointment was actually made after an Assembly was already underway.

United States Country Missions

United States policy in multilateral institutions cannot be effective unless US country missions are able to deal effectively on multilateral issues with other governments. Reflecting the change in the nature of modern diplomacy, issues before multilateral forums now account for as much of the work of our country missions as traditional bilateral questions. But this fact is not yet adequately reflected in the way US missions are organized and staffed.

The failure of US country missions to give adequate priority to multilateral issues can prove extremely costly to the national interest. For example, in the 1960 Geneva Conference, the United States lost by one vote in its effort to achieve a six-mile territorial sea with an additional six-mile fishing zone. The day after the voting took place, the representatives of several developing countries indicated that they would have voted with the United States, had their instructions arrived in time. It was subsequently learned that the United States Ambassadors in these countries had not considered the law of the sea as a subject important enough to take up on a priority basis at a high level of the host government. As a result, the world community was left without any agreement on the territorial sea and fishing limits, a vacuum which has led to unilateral claims of up to 200 miles. Had our country missions done their job in 1960, the United States would now be negotiating in the Law of the Sea Conference from a far stronger legal and political position.

The ability of our country missions to perform effectively on multilateral issues is not much better today than it was fifteen years ago. During recent State Department-sponsored tours of Africa and Asia, the writer was repeatedly asked by the personnel of US Embassies to explain US positions on specialized questions ranging from the law of the sea to UN peacekeeping procedures and international monetary reform. This is not intended as a criticism of the officers involved—they had carefully read the telegrams of instructions and other material forwarded by the Department. But they simply did not have the necessary specialized background to understand the significance of the material and to present it convincingly to experts in the host government.

To be sure, the major United States Embassies have Treasury or Agriculture representatives and personnel from other Executive departments to perform certain specialized functions. But most United States Embassies do not. Moreover, such representatives owe their first allegiance to the Executive departments which control their careers; they tend to reflect the Treasury or Agriculture view. Finally, the system of seconding from Executive departments often leaves important gaps in the expertise of the country missions—such as oceans, environment, population, and the whole array of constitutional and procedural matters arising in the UN system.

It is time to reorganize the US missions to all but the very smallest countries with which we have relations to reflect the new importance of multilateral diplomacy. In line with the changes suggested earlier in the Department of State, the Ambassador in each mission should be supported by a senior political aide and a senior aide for economic and multilateral affairs. The former would be responsible for the multilateral and bilateral aspects of political-military affairs; the latter would supervise not just bilateral economic affairs but all multilateral economic and functional questions. In the major Embassies, the senior aide of the Ambassador for economic and multilateral affairs would carry the rank of Minister and might have as many as three or four staff members to deal with multilateral issues like oceans, energy, environment, and population.

A New Personnel System: An Essential Reform

It is frequently acknowledged in theory, but not always reflected in practice, that people are more important than tables of organization. If the basic ideas emphasized thus far are to be translated into action—giving central priority in US foreign policy to multilateral diplomacy, developing a more coherent interdepartmental effort within the Executive Branch, giving the State Department a new leadership role, improving the "delivery system" for the conduct of multilateral diplomacy—then there will have to be a new personnel system in the Executive Branch.

To begin with the most obvious point, the Department of State does not have the specialized competence in either economic or other multilateral affairs to enable it to assert its leadership in relation to other parts of the government, such as Treasury, Agriculture or Commerce. The "Wristonization" program of the 1950s destroyed the critical mass of economic and international organization experts which the State Department had built up during the wartime and early postwar years. Although the Foreign Service has recently put emphasis on the need for economists and other specialists, its system of recruitment and career development works against this objective. The nation's top graduate students in economics, business, law and other relevant specialties for the new diplomacy are only rarely attracted to a Foreign Service career, because this means a succession of foreign assignments mostly unrelated to their fields of specialization. With a few notable exceptions, outstanding specialists who join the Foreign Service find their specialty an obstacle in career development. Country ambassadorships tend to be reserved to Foreign Service officers specializing in the particular region, while the few ambassadorships to multilateral institutions are usually awarded to political appointees.

In addition to crippling the State Department's potential as a lead agency for multilateral diplomacy, the present personnel system reinforces the separatist tendencies of the different Executive agencies. Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture Labor, the Federal Reserve Board, the Environmental Protection Administration, etc., have their own career services with their own departmental loyalties and perspectives. This makes it even harder to achieve a coherent US government policy in multilateral diplomacy and helps explain why our system of "portfolio government" is so often exported into the system of international institutions.

It is recommended, therefore, as an essential element in the package of reforms advocated in this paper, that there be created a new career service for economic and multilateral affairs. This new service would take its place alongside the Foreign Service as a second "track" for careers in the Department of State. It would also provide personnel for the international divisions of other executive agencies. In contrast to Foreign Service personnel, officers in the new service would spend at least half of their careers in Washington, could look forward to a series of jobs making full use of their professional specialties, would be able to stay in assignments longer than the two to four years that is standard in Foreign Service careers, and would be free to move back and forth between the State Department and international work in other Federal agencies. The members of this new career service would serve at USUN and other US missions to multilateral organizations. They would also serve with US country missions in assignments in economic and multilateral affairs. The new career service would encourage lateral entry of distinguished persons from the private sector and grant liberal leaves of absence for career personnel to take positions in private business, law and the academic world.

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The new service in economic and multilateral affairs would aim to develop the kind of prestige that has been acquired by the French "inspecteurs des finances." It would be an elite service with entry restricted to approximately 100 persons per year based on competitive examination, academic records and professional experience. Members of the service could look forward to a much broader range of career possibilities than are available to economists and other specialists now in the Foreign Service—they would move into senior assignments throughout the Executive Branch and leading positions in the private sector. Corporations, law firms and universities would regard this elite service as a prime source of top level personnel.

The new career service would bring together economists (including experts in international trade, international finance and international development) and also specialists in international law, international organization, energy, agriculture, population, environment, oceans, and relevant areas of science and technology. A young expert concerned with the world food problem could move from back-stopping FAO in the State Department's IO Bureau to a related assignment with the Department of Agriculture to the United States Mission to the FAO in Rome and perhaps also to a period of service with the FAO or the new World Food Council. Similarly, a specialist in environmental matters could move from the State Department's Bureau of Oceans, Environment and Science to the Environment Protection Administration to the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency and perhaps to service with the United Nations Environment Program.

The new career service would provide a natural channel for the recruitment of outstanding talent for the international agencies. By facilitating movement back and forth between the Federal Government, the international institutions and the private sector, the career service could promote better communication and cooperation between three essential elements of the international system. ■

Negotiating a New Bargain with the Rich Countries

Mahbub ul Haq

If history is to be our guide, the world may well be on the threshold of a historical turning point. On the national level, such a turning point was reached in the United States in the 1930s, when the New Deal elevated the working classes to partners in development and accepted them as an essential part of the consuming society. At the international level, we still have not arrived at that philosophic breakthrough when the development of the poor nations is considered an essential element in the sustained development of the rich nations and when the interests of both rich and poor nations are regarded as complementary and compatible rather than conflicting and irreconcilable. And yet we may be nearing that philosophic bridge.

However, if we are to cross this bridge, the rich nations must place the current demands of the Third World in their proper historical perspective, agree on a strategy of serious negotiations, help crystallize certain negotiating areas and principles, and determine the negotiating forums where mutually beneficial agreements can be thrashed out. It is in this spirit that the following few concrete suggestions are offered.

Perspective

It is important that the current demands of the developing countries for a New International Economic Order be perceived in correct perspective.

NOTE: This paper is based on remarks made by the author at a Conference on New Structures for Economic Interdependence (co-sponsored by the Institute on Man and Science and the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, the Overseas Development Council, and the Charles F. Kettering Foundation) held at the United Nations and at the Institute for Man and Science, Rensselaerville, New York, May 15-18, 1975. For the report of that conference, see *New Structures for Economic Interdependence* (Rensselaerville, New York: Institute on Man and Science, August 1975).

Source: Erb, Guy F., and Valeriana Kallab. Beyond Dependency: The Developing World Speaks Out. Overseas Development Council, Washington, D.C., September, 1975. pp. 157-162.

First, the basic objective of the emerging trade union of the poor nations is to negotiate a new deal with the rich nations through the instrument of collective bargaining. The essence of this new deal lies in the objective of the developing countries to obtain greater equality of opportunity and to secure the right to sit as equals around the bargaining tables of the world. No massive redistribution of past income and wealth is being demanded: in fact, even if all the demands are added up, they do not exceed about 1 per cent of the GNP of the rich nations. What is really required, however, is a redistribution of future growth opportunities.

Second, the demand for a New International Economic Order should be regarded as a movement—as part of a historical process to be achieved over time rather than in any single negotiation. Like the political liberation movement of the 1940s and the 1950s, the movement for a new economic deal is likely to dominate the next few decades and cannot be dismissed casually by the rich nations.

Third, whatever deals are eventually negotiated must balance the interests of both the rich and the poor nations. The rich nations have to carefully weigh the costs of disruption against the costs of accommodation and to consider the fact that any conceivable cost of a new deal would amount to a very small proportion of their future growth in an orderly, cooperative framework. The poor nations have to recognize that, in an interdependent world, they cannot hurt the growth prospects of the rich nations without hurting their own chances of negotiating a better deal.

Strategy

The international community must also move quickly to develop a negotiating strategy with a view to:

(a) Reaching agreement that serious negotiations are acceptable on all elements of a New International Economic Order. The rich nations should declare their willingness to enter into such negotiations within the U.N. framework, and the poor nations should accept the fact, in turn, that the meetings of 1975 have merely begun the process of negotiation;

(b) Narrowing down the areas of negotiation to manageable proportions in the first instance and selecting the priorities fairly carefully so that the dialogue can move from the least divisive issues to the more difficult ones in a step-by-step approach. Conferences can seldom produce decisions unless agreement has been reached quietly in advance. At present, such quiet efforts are needed to reach preliminary understandings and a political consensus on the nature and form of the negotiations between the rich and the poor nations;

(c) Developing and agreeing on certain negotiating principles as an umbrella for future discussions. While detailed negotiations may have

to proceed on a case-by-case basis, negotiation of an overall umbrella is absolutely essential in the first instance if the advantage of collective bargaining is to be retained;

(d) Formulating specific proposals for implementation. These proposals should bring out various alternatives and their implications for each side; and

(e) Determining the negotiating forums through which agreements can be reached on these proposals in a specified period of time.

Negotiating Principles

It may be useful to focus on a few critical areas to illustrate how the international community can move toward the formulation of certain negotiating principles.

International Trade. What is really wrong with the present economic order from the point of view of the poor nations? First, the exports of about twelve major primary commodities (excluding oil) account for about 80 per cent of the total export earnings of the developing countries. The final consumers pay over $200 billion for these commodities and their products while the primary producers obtain only about $30 billion—with the middlemen enjoying most of the difference. Second, the export earnings from these commodities fluctuate violently at times. Third, the purchasing power of these primary exports keeps declining in terms of manufactured imports. Fourth, the manufactured exports of the developing countries often face tariffs and quotas in the industrialized countries and constitute only about 7 per cent of world manufactured exports.

In order to improve this situation, at least certain negotiating principles can be articulated in the first instance:

(a) Producing countries must get a higher proportion of the final consumer price for their primary commodities. The present marketing and price structure should be examined to determine whether a better return to producers can be ensured by further processing of primary commodities, reduction of present imperfections in the commodity markets, squeezing of middlemen's profits, and organization by the producing countries of their own credit and distribution services;

(b) A better deal on primary commodities must be obtained *before* efforts are made at price stabilization or indexing—as in the case of oil—since stabilization of present low earnings will not achieve much. Possibilities of establishing an international commodity bank should be considered, both to improve present earnings and then to stabilize them;

(c) The consuming countries must be given long-term assurances of the security of supplies, without any deliberate interruptions or embargoes;

(d) Producers' associations in primary commodities should be accepted as legitimate instruments of collective bargaining to offset the present considerable concentration of economic power at the buying end; and,

(e) Present restrictions in the industrialized countries against the manufactured exports of the developing countries should be relaxed, and intra-developing-country trade in these manufactures expanded with a view to increasing the present share of the developing countries in world manufactured exports.

International Monetary System. Let us survey the situation in yet another key area—the present monetary system—from the point of view of the developing countries.

As Professor Triffin has convincingly argued, international liquidity is largely created by the national decisions of the richest industrialized nations as their national reserve currencies (e.g., dollars, sterling) are in international circulation.[1] During 1970–1974, international decisions on special drawing rights (SDRs) accounted for only 9 per cent of the total international reserve creation: even these decisions are primarily dictated by the needs of the rich nations. Not surprisingly, the developing countries obtained very little benefit from the creation of international liquidity: out of $102 billion of international reserves created during 1970–1974, the developing countries received $3.7 billion, or less than 4 per cent. As in any banking system, the poor get little credit.

As such, negotiating principles in this area will have to include the following:

(a) national reserve currencies should be gradually phased out and replaced by the creation of a truly international currency—like the SDRs—through the deliberate decisions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF);

(b) the volume of this international liquidity should be regulated by the IMF in line with the growth requirements in world trade and production, particularly to facilitate such growth in the developing countries;

(c) the distribution of this international liquidity should be adjusted so as to benefit the poorest countries, especially by establishing a link between the creation of international liquidity (SDRs) and long-term assistance; and

(d) in order to carry out these reforms, the present voting strength in the IMF should be changed to establish a near parity between the developing and the developed countries.

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[1]See Robert Triffin, "The International Monetary System," in *New Structures for Economic Interdependence* (Rensselaerville, New York: The Institute on Man and Science, August 1975). Proceedings of a conference co-sponsored by the Institute on Man and Science and The Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, the Overseas Development Council, and the Charles F. Kettering Foundation.

International Resource Transfers. Another area of constant controversy between the rich and the poor nations—the present "aid order"—can serve as a final example. What is really wrong with it from the point of view of the developing countries? First, the present resource transfers from the rich to the poor nations are totally voluntary, dependent only on the fluctuating political will of the rich nations. Second, although a kind of international "deal" was made by the rich nations in accepting a target of 1 per cent of GNP, with 0.7 per cent in Official Development Assistance (ODA), to be transferred annually to the poor countries, in actual practice, ODA has declined in 1975 to 0.3 per cent for all member countries of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and to 0.2 per cent in the case of the United States. Third, not enough attention has been paid to the terms of international resource transfers, so that the developing countries have accumulated over $120 billion in financial debt whose servicing takes away about one half of new assistance every year.

If a negotiated framework for international resource transfers is to emerge, a fresh start needs to be made on a number of fronts:

(a) An element of automaticity must gradually be built into the international resource transfer system—e.g., through an SDR link with aid, certain sources of international financing such as royalties from seabed mining, and a tax on nonrenewable resources—so that these transfers become less than voluntary over time;

(b) The focus of international concessional assistance must shift to the poorest countries, and, within them, to the poorest segments of the population. As such, this assistance should be mainly in the form of grants, without creating a reverse obligation of mounting debt liability at a low level of poverty;

(c) International assistance should be linked in some measure to national programs aimed at satisfying minimum human needs. Such a target for the removal of poverty can be easily understood in the rich nations; it can be the basis of a shared effort between the national governments and the international community; it provides an allocative formula for concessional assistance; and it establishes a specific time period over which the task should be accomplished;

(d) One possible formula for international burden sharing could be to combine an expanding volume of financial funds at commercial rates from the liquidity-surplus members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) with subsidy funds made available by the industrialized countries and the richest OPEC countries. Such a formula is likely to provide resources on intermediate terms, with a grant element of about 50 to 60 per cent;

(e) Multilateral channels should be used for directing this assistance in preference to bilateral channels, since this will be consistent with greater automaticity of transfers, allocations based on poverty and

need rather than on special relationships, and a more orderly system of burden sharing; and

(f) Arrangements must be made to provide a negotiating forum for an orderly settlement of past debts, possibly by convening a conference of principal creditors and debtors.

Conclusion

It is not the intention of this paper to attempt to prepare a concrete blueprint of a new "planetary bargain" that the poor nations seem to be seeking at present—a task that in any case would be impossible in the time available—but rather merely to illustrate a more positive approach toward reaching such a bargain. The report of the Group of Experts on the Structure of the United Nations System is aimed at providing sensible negotiating forums within the U.N. framework for an orderly dialogue on the elements of a New International Economic Order.[2] Technocratic proposals are easy to formulate. But what is really required for the success of the deliberations between rich and poor nations is political vision of an unprecedented nature that is inspired by the promise of the future, not clouded by the controversies of the past nor mired in the short-run problems of the present.

[2]Report of the Group of Experts on the Structure of the United Nations System, *A New United Nations Structure for Global Economic Cooperation*, U.N. Doc. No. E/AC.62/9 (New York: United Nations, 1975).

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GROPING TOWARD A NEW WORLD ORDER

Mr. MONTOYA. Mr. President, there appeared in the Sunday, January 11, 1976, issue of the New York Times an article by Stanley Hoffmann entitled, "Groping Toward a New World Order."

I commend the article to my colleagues because it is one of the most succinct and clear-headed statements I have seen in recent months describing the new conditions prevailing in international affairs.

Professor Hoffmann of Harvard believes that the world order tomorrow will require almost the opposite of world politics of yesterday.

Hoffmann says that the domination of our international system by strategic concerns must give way to equally important new concerns of trade, energy, food, raw materials, and an international monetary system.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Jan. 11, 1975]

GROPING TOWARD A NEW WORLD ORDER

(By Stanley Hoffmann)

An unmanageable world?

The last two years have been discouraging for all those, statesmen and observers, who had hoped that the long era of the cold war would be followed by the kind of moderate world order which Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger had called for in his first "State of the World" messages.

Mr. Kissinger relied heavily on détente between the two superpowers to curb the arms race and to dampen not only direct conflicts between them but also third-party disputes. Instead, the future of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks is in doubt, the battle for Angola recalls the struggle for the ex-Belgian Congo 15 years ago, and the Soviet policy line after Helsinki interprets peaceful coexistence as militantly as ever.

Economic cooperation between capitalist states and the Soviet Union has grown, but it can be argued that it has primarily saved the Soviet Union from having to divert resources from its military build-up to its civilian sector.

The delicate balance of power among Washington, Moscow and Peking, which Mr. Kissinger saw as a way of regulating the behavior of the two Communist powers, has been affected both by China's shrill attacks on détente and by the succession troubles in all three capitals which have weakened their statesmen and unsteadied their policies.

The most spectacular recent assault on Mr. Kissinger's hope for world order has been the self-assertion of the developing nations. Thanks to successes of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, these nations have discovered how to use their natural resources, indispensable to the industrial powers, to upset the world economic order which the industrial countries, led by the United States, established after World War II.

THE ECONOMIC GRIEVANCES

The developing nations have been able to hitch their economic grievances to the oil and energy negotiations, despite strong initial resistance from the United States. (Ironically, the United States two-and-a-half years ago was trying to use its military assets to force its reluctant West European partners to link economic, financial and security issues.)

The Arab nations have successfully exploited their new wealth to win support for their anti-Israel cause. Thus where a careful fragmentation of conflicts and separation of issues seemed to be one condition of moderation in the world, the world seems to have returned, at least in north-south relations, to the politics of universal linkage that had been the essence of the cold war between East and West.

The United States has in effect been served notice that the developing nations—for reasons in which economic resentment, considerations of skin color, and desires for political and cultural autonomy all play a part—will no longer accept solutions prepared without their full participation. While the American economy remains the strongest in the world, Washington's inability to impose its global writ comes when the Keynesian wisdom seems to be collapsing and when the capitalist economies suffer their worst recession in 40 years.

Demoralized by Vietnam and Watergate, Americans appear to others without will or rudder. The new team of potential policymakers seems divided between nostalgia for the simplicities of the cold war and the rather negative and somewhat Utopian aspiration to a world without Vietnams, without secrecy and dirty tricks—a world of "open covenants openly arrived at."

These developments reflect fundamental and lasting changes in international relations. World politics today is a mix of the very old and the very new—and both are full of perils. The old competition between separate players ready to use force to fulfill their needs or ambitions is as fierce as ever. It has been lessened by the fear of nuclear war, but the spread of nuclear weapons to India and possibly others and the increase in conventional arms purchases, in such volatile areas as the Middle East and Persian Gulf, risks destroying the restraints previously observed by the superpowers and even in such conflicts as the Arab-Israeli wars. But, despite the obvious peril, the great powers, whose primordial interest is not to be dragged against their will into third-party conflicts, keep pushing the sale of weapons or nuclear reactors for economic reasons.

A great increase in the number of new groups, such as regional or world organizations or multinational enterprises, complicates the game and entails a dispersion of power. Each party, however small, has some asset it can exploit.

There is no longer a single international system dominated by strategic concerns. Military security remains an important issue but the new concerns of world trade, energy, food, raw materials, the world monetary system—each one with its own power hierarchy—have arisen. Foreign policy is no longer a specialized art performed by professionals. It is the projection of domestic economic and social drives. It is therefore the concern of every bureaucratic agency, pressure group or faction. Next to the old-type military alliances against a well-defined enemy there are new fluid functional bargaining coalitions in which the participants try to increase their fragmented power.

There has been a radical transformation of power. In traditional conflicts, states were like boiled eggs: War—the minute of truth—would reveal whether they were hard or soft. Today interdependence breaks all national eggs into a vast omelet. Power is more difficult to measure than ever before because it is largely made of intangibles: internal strength, reputation, skill, or derived from shifting assets which outside or internal events can wipe out.

There is a new uncertainty in world affairs which gets added to traditional physical insecurity: I don't know where my power ends and yours begins, since my power is partly your hostage and vice versa, and the more I try to force you to depend on me, the more I depend on you. World politics now becomes a test of vulnerability, and degrees of vulnerability are not identical with quantities of power. This explains why the United States, even though it is on top of almost every hierarchy of power (military, economic, monetary, etc.) remains a tied Gulliver, not a master with free hands.

There is also a contradiction between the structure of world politics and the new necessities. World politics involves participants who recognize no central power, no world government over them. But the new issues that must be resolved call for global planning and joint management. However, the new issues reach the world's agenda only through

the international equivalent of a domestic coup de'état: when a nation or group of nations is powerful enough to create an international crisis—as the United States did when it made the dollar inconvertible in 1971, and as did the oil nations at the end of 1973—or else when a threat to peace becomes more serious, as is happening with the rise in the number of plutonium reactors and with development of new methods of uranium enrichment.

In the past, the chief techniques for maintaining world stability in the strategic and diplomatic realm were the balance of power among the strong and the decisive superiority of the strong over the weak. In the world economy, the technique was the enlightened hegemony of one nation, serving as the guardian of a global system that ran to its advantage: Britain before World War I, the United States after 1945. But today there are too many local balances for the great powers, singly or jointly, to be able to control them all, as was shown in Southeast Asia. Even when there exists a balance of military might, as there is in Europe, it can be upset from within, for instance by domestic upheavals such as those now affecting Mediterranean Europe. The Soviet Union can try to influence such events, but even its grip over foreign Communist parties is weakening.

If the traditional techniques do not work in what can we put our hopes? Obviously the world is not ready for supranational management. Americans often fail to grasp the intensity of the new nations' desire for independence, a desire heightened by their awareness of interdependence. These nations see talk of supranational solutions as a sly device of the rich and the mighty. Nor does the "free market" offer a solution to world economic problems. To many new nations, eager for purely national answers to their troubles, the free market is the problem, not the solution. Even for nations attracted to an open world economy, the free market is unacceptable because it often works against them.

Thus there is no substitute for global bargaining—issue by issue, deal by deal—for a colossal expansion of diplomacy, resembling the constant maneuvering and coalition-building of domestic politics. But three gloomy warnings are necessary.

The New Mobility

First there is a major difference between internal bargains and international ones. Domestic controls last because they are backed by the power of the state: groups wheel and deal under the law and the threat of sanctions. How long, if interests change (as they always do), can international compacts last? If in domestic societies the battles against inequality and injustice have often been partly won it is because of the power of the ballot and of the mobility of industrial workers and capital. Mobility on the scale now considered normal has never existed in global society.

Second, global bargaining will lead to a jointly managed and moderate world order only if coherent solutions are found to the global issues. But there is a double risk of incoherence. At the national level (especially in the big countries) foreign policy making becomes the plaything of too many bureaus and interests, it covers too many issues to be easily centralized in one department or even in the head of one leader; and therefore the gap between domestic demands and external necessities deepens. At the international level there are too many games, chessboards, overlapping coalitions and contradictory grievances, power is too unevenly split between participants and between issues for instant coherence. There is no invisible hand guiding the parties toward wisdom.

Finally the world may well end up being manageable only if the degree of interdependence is reduced. Neither nations nor individuals can be totally enmeshed with one another without breakdowns—physical or mental. This means that one objective in world economic affairs ought to provide as many nations or regions as possible with a modicum of self-sufficiency, especially in agriculture and in basic industries. It also means that ways will have to be found to keep violence localized. Nobody now seems to know how to cope with international terrorism. Even partial success would require drastic changes in behavior, in economic structure, in social policy, among advanced as well as developing countries.

There are therefore no reasons for easy optimism. A prerequisite to any kind of success is an awareness of the new conditions of international affairs, of the fact that world order tomorrow will require almost the opposite of world politics in the past. It will require a willingness to limit national freedom of action, to remove opportunities for blackmail, to accept greater institutionalization. This raises the issue of the citizens' and of the leaders' education. In what country are they really prepared for such realities and such imperatives, where are they willing to stop listening to familiar clichés, fixed ideologies, self-boosting delusions or self-righteous harangues?

NEW ASSUMPTIONS, NEW PROBLEMS

NOTES FOR A FOREIGN POLICY

JUDITH M. HUGHES & H. STUART HUGHES

1

Current Perplexities. The collapse of Saigon, the blatant failure of Vietnamization, the inability of the Thieu regime to defend itself unaided, quite naturally have raised questions about the nature of our country's commitments abroad. But President Ford's definition of those responsibilities in his address to the Congress found little echo either there or in the public at large. After two decades in Southeast Asia, with nothing to show for the billions of dollars spent and the tens of thousands of lives lost, Americans seem far more inclined to re-examine the assumptions that led to such colossal waste than to support further and comparable salvage operations.

This, then, is a good time for those who gave early warning of our country's folly to restate long-standing convictions. Yet this new-old formulation of foreign policy goals cannot pretend to simplify the task of American diplomacy. Far from providing a solution to current difficulties, it can attempt only the more modest task of defining priorities—it can show what the dilemmas are and, more particularly, where material and moral concerns cut across each other.

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2

American Foreign Policy, 1945-75. For thirty years after World War II, U.S. policy abroad rested on a world pre-

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ponderance of power, both military and economic. In recent years, Russia has built up a nuclear arsenal that is for all practical purposes equivalent to our own, but for most of the past generation the two superpowers were unevenly matched. And in the economic sphere the American lead was even greater.

Our country's overwhelming physical presence in nations with which it traditionally had close cultural ties made it incumbent on the United States to participate actively in the reconstruction of Europe, but our involvement in East Asia derived from no such clear call. It arose rather from a universal meddlesomeness particularly associated with the diplomacy of John Foster Dulles. Since the other powers hesitated to block our way, one commitment led to another, although the logic of the chain of guarantees was far from evident. By the time of President Kennedy's inaugural address, the whole ramifying network was in place, ready to be extolled in quotable prose.

It is a sign of the bipartisan nature of this policy of commitments that another Republican Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, should have carried it to its zenith. At the same time Kissinger has converted it into something highly personal. He has transformed foreign affairs into a sphere in which nothing significant can happen without his direct participation. The American Secretary of State apparently views the world as a vast stage provided for him to demonstrate his indispensability; his ego is totally involved in the enterprise. In this sense his performance recalls Bismarck far more than Metternich.

3

A Redefinition of Assumptions. If it is now apparent that the United States never had a good reason to become involved in Southeast Asia, the question arises: where *should* it intervene? Surprisingly enough, the elements of a sensible answer have come from as unlikely a person as Secretary of Defense Schlesinger. In a pointed rebuttal to Kennedy's blanket offer of military aid, Schlesinger has set definite limits to what our country is ready to do. "Tell them in other lands," he has declared, "not that the United States is prepared to go anywhere or to pay any price in supporting others, but that the United States will continue to play its proper role in the support of other nations, when those countries effectively demonstrate both a will and a capacity for self-help." To be sure, the Secretary's remarks are set in a Nixonian framework; he still seems inclined to endorse foreign governments primarily on the basis of their military might; he makes no reference to the *quality* of such governments. And it is precisely on this last point that the foreign policy criticisms of a decade or two ago have lost none of their relevance.

The governments deserving our support are not merely those militarily capable of taking care of themselves. They are those that enjoy sufficient acceptance at home so that a call for sacrifice in a defensive effort can convince both their people and ours that such a sacrifice is worthwhile. Since few of the world's present regimes fall into this category, in most places most of the time an American position of nonintervention makes sense. Indeed, under the conditions of the 1970s, where we *have* intervened—or are still muttering about possible intervention—we have almost always made matters worse.

Chile comes immediately to mind. While the Allende government could be criticized for certain infringements of civil liberties, the Chilean people certainly did not deserve what they got in its place. Moreover, there was something peculiarly sinister about a deliberate clandestine undermining of another nation's economy. Will Portugal be the next candidate for such treatment? And—if the local Communists achieve the sharing of power they seek—will Italy come after that? To ask these questions is to demonstrate the absurdity and inhumanity of the reasoning behind a "Chilean" type of intervention. The result of trying to stop a turn toward the Left has been, in the immediate past and is likely to be in the future, a regime more oppressive and less responsive to the desires of its people than the one it overthrew.

Our countrymen are today losing their hard-won ability to evaluate Communist activities in a variety of national contexts. It may be only natural that the successive collapse of two anti-Communist governments in Southeast Asia should once again make Americans nervous about the spread of Communist influence elsewhere. And it is similarly understandable that southern Europe should be the current focus of concern. But legitimate worry of this sort is no excuse for returning to the rhetoric of the early 1950s. With world communism no longer a monolith, with disputes among individual Communist parties a common occurrence, it is patently wrong to suggest that every victory of any such party automatically represents an extension of Soviet influence. It is true that the Portuguese Communist leadership (which showed little strength in the recent elections) is closely allied to the Russian; it is also true that the Italian leadership is not. Still more, the Italian Communists are far from happy about what is going on in Portugal; they fear that the way their Portuguese counterparts seek to gain power in the wake of the military may reduce their own credibility as public-spirited moderates prepared to share in governmental responsibility. Should Americans fail to recognize discriminations of this sort, a panic reaction could well ensue.

4

The Erosion of American Military Preponderance. Both the advocates and the opponents of the interventionist policy of the last thirty years would do well to recognize the extent to which the protracted, tragic and eventually unpopular war in Vietnam has shaken one of the twin bases of our country's mid-century predominance. This is not a matter of materiel: America's military chiefs are as eager as ever to spend a staggering total of billions on bigger and better nuclear hardware. It is rather a change in moral attitude. When one listens to young people today, one soon realizes that they can foresee no possible war in which their personal participation would be justified. In short, in terms of the morale of American youth—and probably of the population at large—armed intervention overseas has now become impracticable. When we talk of defending liberty (and in a few—a very few—potential conflicts, it is still proper to do so), we are speaking of situations in which our own soldiers will not do the fighting. This psychological mood at home has become a fact with which American foreign policy makers must reckon.

One should not, however, overestimate the importance

of the change. To take two utterly different recent examples: Chile was subverted without the use of American troops; Israel, whatever its dependence on the United States, does not want them.

5

The Erosion of American Economic Preponderance. Far more serious from the standpoint of a coherent foreign policy are the constraints imposed by economic difficulties and in particular by the aftermath of the Mideast oil crisis. Of the two major events that opened and closed the year 1973—the "official" end of the war in Vietnam and the

Margulies

Arab oil embargo—the latter had infinitely graver consequences. It was the brutal revelation of the Western world's economic vulnerability that really shook the old assumptions about American foreign policy. The *de facto* admission of failure in Vietnam might rank as a humiliation, but it had little effect on our basic commitments to Western Europe and Israel. The need to reckon with the new power of the petroleum exporting countries was more than humiliating; it meant that the United States was obliged to balance off (and, if possible, harmonize) conflicting pressures from nations to which it had the closest cultural and ideological ties. The rift between Israel and Western Europe has presented our country with its most painful foreign policy choice. That is the nub of the problem.

6

Oil and the Conflicting Claims of Western Europe and Israel. From one standpoint the oil crisis strengthened the United States vis-à-vis its West European allies. Since our country's economy depended less than theirs on imports of oil, we found ourselves able to speak with greater authority on questions of economic policy than had been true at the turn of the decade. In this sense, we are currently in a better position to induce the West Europeans to coordinate their economic policies with ours. But it could turn out that Israel pays the price of such coordination. Most Europeans and a great many Americans (particularly the executives of the oil companies) believed a year ago, and still seem to believe, that Western relations with the petroleum exporting countries will automatically improve if only the Israelis can be forced to do what the Arabs demand.

That is a dangerous quarter-truth. The Arab-Israeli conflict is not coterminous with the oil question. A number of the petroleum exporting nations—for example, a very powerful one like Iran—have only a peripheral interest in that dispute. An agreement (however unlikely) between the Arabs and the Israelis would not end the oil producers' temptation once again to blackmail the Western industrial world. If the European allies would only recognize that throwing Israel to the wolves would not secure their own economic salvation, they might come to a better understanding of Washington's commitment to Jerusalem—and thereby mitigate the moral dilemma our country confronts.

7

The Nature of Our Commitments to Western Europe. Thus the economic or material facts of life in the Western industrial world undercut the moral solidarity of that world. How are we to bring the two together again? Initially, perhaps, by reminding the West Europeans of where and how our concern for them began. It was not their position as *industrial* powers that originally bound the United States to them. It was the cultural and ideological heritage they shared with America—and subsequently with Israel. Japan may be a great industrial power, but its ties to our country are less compelling than Europe's. Israel may be of minor economic importance, but its preservation ranks as our country's most urgent commitment abroad. Viewed from the perspective of cultural values, Western Europe and Israel have more in common than either seems to realize.

Cultural eminence or cultural solidarity, however, is a fragile prop to lean on unless it is buttressed by a strong economy. The example of Weimar Germany should have taught us that. What we most cherish in the Western heritage is currently threatened by long-term economic instability. We do not have to take Secretary Kissinger's gloomy Spenglerian musings at their face value in order to recognize that a protracted cycle of economic insecurity such as the major industrial nations are now traversing could lead in sober truth to a "decline of the West." A healthy economy—whether capitalist or Socialist or a mixture of the two—can alone sustain a free political and a vital cultural life. And by "healthy" one means an economy in which special-interest groups are not allowed to run rampant and in which the contracts between labor and management that increasingly govern other people's lives reflect both mutual respect and a concern for the welfare of all.

8

Is This a Solution? Obviously not. It is simply an effort to begin thinking about foreign affairs in terms of the primacy of economics that recent events have forced upon our attention. It is based on the conviction that humane and rational economic goals at home are the prerequisite for a coherent policy abroad. By the same token, they are the only reliable guarantees against succumbing to panic or to blackmail. □

Containment of the Kremlin

A response by George F. Kennan to Secretary of State Kissinger's speech of February 3, 1976.

Secretary of State Kissinger's thoughtful and statesmanlike speech represents a welcome and useful contribution from the official side to a public discussion of problems of foreign policy which has long lacked just this sort of steadying.

He pointed to some very real and important differences between the situation that confronted this country in its relation to the Soviet Union in 1947, when the term "containment" first came into use, and the situation that confronts it today. The reference to the greatly increased military strength, particularly naval and amphibious strength, of the Soviet Union can be readily accepted even allowing for the measure of exaggeration which always seems to creep into American statements of this nature. It is also perfectly true that the Soviet Union has a far greater capacity for making this strength felt in regions far from its own shores than was the case 30 years ago. Nothing, finally, could be more true than that Washington, as well as Moscow, must find means of dealing with individual conflicts of interest between the two peoples by means short of all-out war, or even of the serious risk of war.

Nevertheless, when it comes to this complicated problem of Soviet expansionism, or the appearance of it, there are certain nuances and reservations that could usefully be added to what Dr. Kissinger had to say.

First of all, it is important to recognize that not all places and regions are of equal importance from this standpoint. There are some, such as Korea and Cuba, that are of high strategic importance in the sense that they affect the interests of this country and other great powers in an intimate and sensitive way. There are others which have what might be called a local strategic importance, especially from the standpoint of their immediate neighbors, but are of minor significance from the standpoint of the world balance of power. The two must not be equated.

Second, one is obliged to consider the nature of such gains as a great power—in this instance, the Soviet Union—might hope to make through an attempt to establish influence in a region far from its shores. There are many variations of the colonial and neo-colonial relationship —and not all of them are greatly advantageous to the dominant external power. Short of total occupation of the territory and suppression of the indigenous government, the attempt to turn the resources of that territory to the exclusive benefit of the outside power is subject to a host of complications. Available evidence suggests that Cuba, for example, has been for years a financial stone around the Soviet neck. While it is certainly important to prevent the Soviet Union or any other great power from gaining positions on other continents from which world peace could be threatened or world stability seriously impaired, there is no reason the United States should feel itself obliged to protect any other power from the assumption of responsibilities that are going to be an awkward burden to it.

Third, most careful attention has to be given to the nature of the tools or the allies we have to work with. What happens if direct intervention is barred and our efforts are restricted to the attempt to assist an existing political faction in a foreign territory? The limits of the quality of that faction as a military and political competitor within the territory affected become the limits of the effectiveness of our own action. If there is any one factor, the ignoring of which has gone farthest to frustrate previous efforts of this sort on our part, it is this. It is not everyone who can be made successful, even with the greatest effort of outside aid.

Finally, there is the recognition that what we wish will not, in many instances, be anything we can hope to achieve with our efforts alone. For this, we will need the support of world, or at least regional, opinion; and we must be careful not to forfeit this by casting ourselves in the same light as our opponents. People are of course sensitive to the show of strength; but they are sensitive to other things, too.

These observations are offered not by way of rebuttal to the very solid appreciations brought forward in the Secretary's speech but to emphasize the point that, even departing from these sound insights, this government has still to evolve principles and methods for asserting its influence in overseas territories which would save it from the sort of failures it has experienced in the past—not just in Vietnam but elsewhere as well.

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SECRETARY KISSINGER'S VIEW OF THE NATION'S FOREIGN POLICY CHOICES FOR THE NEXT DECADE

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, today Secretary of State Henry Kissinger appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to discuss his view of the Nation's foreign policy choices for the next decade.

The hearing was one of our continuing series "Foreign Policy Choices for the 1970's and 1980's." The course he charted for us was full and illuminating.

I think it would be of interest to Members of Congress unable to attend. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that his compete statement be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE BICENTENNIAL HEARINGS, MARCH 16, 1976

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: There could be no better moment for the "dispassionate public discussion and national self-examination" in foreign policy for which you, Mr. Chairman, have called these hearings.

The moment is propitious not primarily because of the numerical happenstance of our 200th year, or of the political milestone of this Presidential election campaign, but because of the era we have entered in international affairs. It is a moment to take stock of our country's record and consider our future course to reflect about the transformations of the international order which we can perceive from this vantage point—some already completed and some still in train—that have altered many of the circumstances in which American foreign policy is conducted.

Today I want to focus on what lies ahead of us—the international issues that will confront the American public, the President and the Congress, regardless of party, as we enter our third century. For we must remember, amid all our debates, that this nation has permanent interests and concerns in the world that must be preserved through and beyond this election year. This nation faces objective conditions in the world that are not the result of the machinations of personalities nor even, often, the product of our national decisions. They are realities brought by the ebb and flow of history. The issues they raise must be addressed with seriousness, understanding and objectivity if we as a people are to remain masters of events and of our own destiny.

As President Ford has said, "America has had a unique role in the world since the day of our independence 200 years ago. And ever since the end of World War II has borne successfully a heavy responsibility for insuring a stable world order and hope for human progress." That responsibility continues—not only as a task we shoulder for others or in fulfillment of our ideals, but as a responsibility to ourselves—to create a world environment in which America and its values can thrive.

Mr. Chairman, in foreign policy we stand on the firm ground of American strength and clear purpose. We face the future with confidence. We have made considerable progress in strengthening partnership with our allies, in managing the global issues of peace and security, and in beginning a new era of cooperation on the global problems of interdependence. The potential for further advance is great.

But today the world looks anxiously to America to gauge whether we will choose to build upon this progress. They ask whether America will use its strength to respond to today's challenges. One of the greatest factors of uncertainty in the world today is concern about America's will and constancy. These doubts are not caused by statements made in the heat of a political campaign but rather by a decade of convulsions culminating in a serious question as to the basic direction of American foreign policy. These doubts must be dispelled. I am convinced that they will be dispelled—not by public statements, but by demonstrations of the purposefulness of national policy, the vigor of the American economy, and the renewed unity of the American people on which all else depends. We are going through a period of adjustment and reappraisal. We must all work together, so that we are the stronger for it when it is completed.

The American people, and the Congress as their elected representatives, have a central part to play in the enterprise of national reaffirmation. Their contribution is essential as a matter of constitutional principle in the making of foreign policy, and as a matter of practical necessity in the implementation of any successful long-term course. As Senator Case has pointed out, "Congress has an important role in helping voters make known their concerns and to guide the Executive Branch in its conduct of foreign policy. A democracy such as ours cannot hope to successfully carry out for any length of time a foreign policy which does not have firm domestic roots."

These hearings have already provided much insight into the American public's perceptions of foreign policy, which we have found extremely useful.

THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Through most of our history, Mr. Chairman, our peace and security were provided for us. The successful growth of our democratic society at home, and the absence of direct threat from abroad, nourished our sense of uniqueness and the belief that it was our own choice whether and when we would participate in the world. We entered wars only when overwhelming danger threatened. We identified exertion in foreign affairs as a temporary interruption of our domestic tranquility. Once aroused, we were implacable, fighting "the war to end all wars," or until "unconditional surrender."

We had margin for error. Our history, except for the Civil War was without tragedy, and our resources and good fortune left us without the sense of external limits that so colored the experience of almost every other nation. Our successes seemed to teach us that any problem could be solved—once and for all—by determined effort. The qualities on which all other nations in history depended to ensure their survival in a hostile or ambiguous environment—subtlety, maneuver, imagination, consistency—were disparaged in America as cynical or immoral. The equilibrium of power which kept the peace for long periods in the turbulent history of Europe was denounced in this country as a preoccupation with power at the expense of moral principle.

Even in the first 25 years after World War II—an era of great creativity and unprecedented American engagement in foreign affairs—we acted as if the world's security and economic development could be conclusively ensured by the commitment of American resources, know-how and effort. We were encouraged—even impelled—to act as we did by our unprecedented predominance in a world shattered by war and the collapse of the great colonial empires.

At the same time, the central character of moral values in American life always made us acutely sensitive to the purity of means—and when we disposed of overwhelming power we had a great luxury of choice. Our moral certainty made compromise difficult; our preponderance often made it seem unnecessary.

Today, power takes many forms and our circumstances are more complex. In military power, while we still have massive strength, we no longer enjoy meaningful nuclear supremacy. In economic terms we remain the world's most productive economy, but we must now share leadership with Western Europe, Canada, and Japan; we must deal with the newly wealthy and developing nations; and we must make new choices regarding our economic relations with the Communist countries. Our moral influence, our democratic principles, are still far more valued by the world's millions than we realize, but we must compete with ideologies which assert progressive goals but pursue them by oppressive methods.

All Americans have a right to be proud of what this nation accomplished in our past thirty years of world leadership. We assisted European and Japanese recovery; we built indispensable alliances; we established an international economic system—and we sustained global peace and global progress for a generation.

We have great things yet to do, requiring our unity, our dedication and our strength. For we live, and our children will live in a more complex time:

First, we face the necessity of drawing on the new strength and vitality of our allies and friends to intensify our partnership with them. They have become, again, major centers of power and initiative. This is a lasting

success of our foreign policy. And today, our unity with the great industrial democracies is fundamental to all we seek to accomplish in the world.

It is we who maintain the global balance of power that keeps the peace. And it is our unmatched economic dynamism that is the best hope for a world of widening prosperity. Above all, our moral unity and commitment to the values of democracy are crucial to the fulfillment of our own dreams as well as to the creative use of man's energies in solving the problems of the future. In a complex world—of equilibrium and coexistence, of competition and interdependence— it is our ideals that give meaning and purpose to our endeavors.

For we face, secondly, the ago-old challenge of maintaining peace, but in the unprecedented dimension of an age of thermonuclear weapons. The Soviet Union, after sixty years of economic and industrial growth, has— inevitably—reached the status of a superpower. As a result, we must conduct a dual policy. We and our allies must restrain Soviet power and prevent its use to upset global stability. At the same time, our generation faces the long-term challenge of putting the U.S.-Soviet relationship on a more secure, constructive, and durable basis.

We must, as well, continue the progress we have made in fashioning a new relationship with the People's Republic of China. We consider the opening to the People's Republic of China one of the key elements of our foreign policy.

Beyond this, global security presents other permanent necessities. There is the continuing need to moderate and resolve regional conflicts which threaten global economic or political stability. And there is the urgent and growing challenge of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which gravely increases the risks of nuclear holocaust.

The third central challenge is to build a wider world community out of the turbulent environment of today's nearly 150 independent nations. Two world wars in this century and the process of decolonization have broken down the international order of previous centuries. For the first time in history the international community has become truly global. The new nations make insistent demands on the global system, testing their new economic power and seeking a greater role and more equitable share in the world's prosperity. A new pattern of relationships must be fashioned out of cooperation for mutual benefit, impelled by the reality of our global interdependence.

Our friendships with nations in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, on the basis of mutual respect and practical cooperation, take on a new importance as the building blocks of world community. We must recognize that no world order will be stable over the last quarter of this century unless all its participants consider that they have a stake in it and that it is legitimate and just.

These are the basic challenges facing this nation as we enter our third century.

In such a world, Mr. Chairman, this country can no longer choose whether or not it is involved in international affairs. On a shrinking planet, there is no hiding place. There are no simple answers. This nation cannot afford to swing recklessly between abdication and confrontation; we must pursue a long-term course. Although we are stronger than any other, we cannot operate primarily by throwing our weight around. Lasting peace is not achievable without an international consensus. We must learn to conduct foreign policy as other nations have had to conduct it for many centuries, without escape and without respite. We must learn patience, precision, perspective—knowing that what is attainable falls short of the ideal, mindful of the necessities of self-preservation, deriving from our moral conviction the courage to persevere. For America finds itself, for the first time in its history, irrevocably and permanently involved in international affairs.

The world needs desperately our strength and our purpose. Without American strength there can be no security; without American convictions here can be no progress.

Americans have always regarded challenges as a test, not an obstacle. We have great opportunities for creative diplomacy, to shape from this turbulence and complexity a world community of greater stability and hope. We, more than any other country, are in a position to determine—or have a decisive impact upon—the evolution of the global order.

Forty years ago when the forces of democracy faced a great threat, the United States was waiting in the wings to come to Europe's rescue. Today there is no one waiting in the wings to come to *our* rescue.

Let me discuss at greater length some of the basic long-term challenges we face.

THE UNITY OF THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES

The cornerstone of our foreign policy is—as it has been for a generation—our partnership with our principal allies in the Atlantic Community and Japan. These partnerships began three decades ago as a means of collective security against aggression, and of cooperation for economic recovery from the devastation of World War II. In the succeeding period our alliances have been the bulwark of the global balance of power. Our cooperation with the great industrial democracies has been the underpinning of the world economic system which has sustained global prosperity and spread it to the far corners of the earth.

Rarely in history have alliances survived as ours have survived, and indeed flourished, through so many vast changes in the international environment. And in the last few years, we and our allies have not only continued to strengthen our common defenses; we have extended our collaboration successfully into new dimensions of common endeavor—in improved political consultation, in coordinating our approaches to negotiations with the Communist countries, in developing a common energy policy and strategy, in reinforcing our respective economic policies for recovery from recession, in environmental cooperation, and in fashioning common approaches for the dialogue with the developing countries.

All these efforts to build peace and promote progress reflect our common belief in freedom and our common hope of a better future for all mankind. These are permanent values of this nation, and therefore our alliances and friendships that are based on them and designed to further them are permanent interests of the United States.

Our cohesion has a more than technical significance. While foreign policy is unthinkable without pragmatism, pragmatism without moral purpose is like a rudderless ship.

Our ties with the great democracies are thus not an alliance of convenience, but a union of principle, in defense of democratic values and our way of life. " is our ideals that inspire not only our self-defense, but all else that we do. And the resilience of our countries in responding to all our modern challenges is a testimony to the spirit and moral strength of our free peoples.

As we look to the future, there is no higher priority in our foreign policy than sustaining the vitality of democracy and the unity of democracies. The world will become more, not less, complex; our power will grow more, not less, interwoven with others; our values will be more, not les challenged. In such a world, the solidarity of our relations with those who share our heritage, our way of life, our ideals, takes on more, and not less, importance, for as far ahead as we can see.

Our responsibilities are, first, our common defense. The closeness of our collaboration on defense matters is greater today than anytime in the past decade. We must maintain it because it is the stability of he military balance tha has brought about whatever hope there is of easing tensions in Europe and in Asia.

There is greater sharing of responsibility in North Atlantic defense today. The President has taken the initiative in promoting such improvements as improved standardization of equipment and more effective force structuring. But the United States must remain conscious of its own special responsibility in the Alliance—to maintain the strategic balance, and to contribute its crucial share to maintaining the conventional balance in Europe and Mediterranean and more generally.

Our security is a precondition of all else that we do. Of this foundation, we will face over the coming period a broad range of tasks beyond the traditional enterprise of collective defense.

We will continue to seek to enhance our security and general peace through arms control and negotiation of political conflicts. We hope to see programs in the talks on Mutual and Balance Force Reductions in Europe. We expect that the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement in Berlin, which ended a chronic crisis of more than two decades, foreshadows an era of enhanced security in Central Europe.

In the coming decade, the collaboration of the industrial democracies can be the dynamic force in the building of a more secure and progressive international order. We have made a remarkable beginning. New steps have been taken in the last few years, and further will be taken, to strengthen European unity; this has the strong support of the United States. The new institutions and programs of our collective energy strategy are in place. We have discussed and developed common approaches to the new dialogue with the developing nations. The passage of the Trade Act of 1974 enabled this country to enter into a new round of trade negotiations with Europe and Japan to make basic improvements in the world trading system. In recent months, the Rambouillet Economic Summit and the Jamaica reform of the international monetary system demonstrate that the future of our cooperation among the industrial democracies will be as fruitful as the past.

In this regard, I want to mention an important item of business before this Commitite—approval of our participation in the OECD Financial Support Fund. This is the contingency mechanism, proposed by the United States, to ensure mutual support among the industrial nations in the face of financial disruptions or pressures by actions of the oil cartel. At little cost, this mechanism will provide a financial safety net, combat protectionism, and promote our cooperation on energy policy. It is vital for the industrial nation's independence. Seven other OECD members have ratified it and the rest are expected to do so by the middle of this year. I hope the Congress will move quickly to do the same, to reinforce the solidarity of the industrial democracies.

It is our belief that in an era when our democratic values are under challenge in the world and our societies have been buffeted by economic difficulties at home, the solidarity and cooperation of the great democracies are of crucial importance for giving impetus to all our efforts. We have proved what we can do—and vindicated the faith of our people in the values and future of our societies. We have proved that our unity can be as dynamic a force for building a new international order today as it was thirty years ago.

The new solidarity we are building can draw its inspiration from our hopes and

ideals, rather than merely our common dangers. A thriving Europe and Japan and North America will not only be secure and prosperous, but a magnet to the Communist countries and to the developing world. And so we can enter the last quarter of this century confident that we are masters of our own destiny—and making a decisive contribution to the world's destiny.

PEACE AND EQUILIBRIUM

Of the challenges that the democracies face, none are more fundamental than the issues of peace and war. These issues—the traditional foreign policy agenda—take on in this era an unprecedented dimension.

There are three principal aspects to this problem of peace:

Relations with the major Communist powers;

The effort to resolve regional conflicts and disputes peacefully;

And the increasing danger of nuclear weapons proliferation.

We live in a world in which this country must now deal with a country of roughly equal power. This is not a familiar world for modern Americans. Yet it is the kind of world in which we will live for the rest of this century and beyond—no matter what we do in the military field.

Thirty years ago, the United States, alone among the major nations of the world, emerged from the Second World War with its economy and society undamaged by war. We enjoyed a tremendous preponderance in economic power, and a monopoly on nuclear weapons. This great physical strength gave impetus to the willingness of the American people to take responsibility for helping to shape a better postwar international order. The creativity and generosity that this nation displayed in that period are a lasting tribute to the American spirit.

Today, because of the inevitable recovery and growth of our allies—and our adversaries—the United States now finds itself in a world of relative kinds of equilibrium. In strategic military power, the world is still bipolar. Economic power is more widely dispersed among many major nations, including the wealthier of the developing nations. In moral and ideological influence, many nations and philosophies contend. The task of consolidating peace thus presents itself in this era as a far more complex problem than ever before, both practically and morally.

With our allies, we have learned to share responsibility and leadership, and this has enhanced our collaboration in every dimension of common endeavor. But with our adversaries, we face the imperative of coexistence in an age of thermonuclear weapons and strategic parity. We must defend our interests, our principles and our allies, while ensuring at all times that international conflict does not degenerate into cataclysm. We must resist expansionism and pressures, but we must on this foundation seek to build habits of restraint that will over the long term lead to a reliable reduction of tensions.

This Government has therefore moved with energy and purpose over the last several years, and in concert with our allies, to consolidate and transform our *relationships with the major Communist powers*, for a new era and for our long-term future.

We have established a new and durable and hopeful relationship with the People's Republic of China, a nation comprising nearly one-quarter of mankind. This new relationship has made an important contribution to peace in Asia and in the world. President Ford is committed to continue the process of nomalization of our relations in accordance with the principles of the Shanghai Communique.

And this country in the last several years has opened up positive relations with countries in Eastern Europe. Two American Presidents have visited Poland, Yugoslavia, and Romania, to demonstrate that in our view, European security and relaxation of tensions apply to Eastern as well as Western Europe. This remains, and must remain, a basic principle of American policy.

In an age when two nations have the power to visit utter destruction on the whole planet in hours, there can be no greater imperative than assuring a rational and secure relationship between the nuclear superpowers. This is a chaleinge without precedent. Historically a conflict of ideology and geopolitical interest such as now characterizes the international scene has almost invariably led to war. But in the age of strategic equality, humanity could not survive such a repetition of history. War would mean mutual suicide.

Therefore, with respect to the Soviet Union, the United States faces the necessity of a dual policy. We must preserve stability, but not rest upon it. We must firmly resist and deter adventurism. But at the same time, we must keep open the possibility of more constructive relations between the United States and the Soviet Union—resolving political disputes by negotiation, such as Berlin; working out stable agreements to limit strategic arms on both sides, as in the SALT I agreements and the accord at Vladivostok; and—when political conditions permit it—developing our bilateral cooperation in economic and other fields to give both sides a vested interest in continuing and improving political relations.

We have an obligation to mankind to work for a more secure world. We have an obligation to the American people to ensure that a crisis, if it is imposed upon us does not result from any lack of vision of the United States.

We face a long-term problem, and we must fashion and maintain a long-term policy. An equilibrium of power is indispensable to any hope of peace. But a balance of power constantly contested is too precarious a foundation for our long-term future. So this country, in its third century, must avoid the twin temptations of provocation and escapism. We must maintain a steady and confident course; it must be a policy that our adversaries respect, our allies support, and our people believe in and sustain.

By whatever name we call it, the U.S.-Soviet relationship must be founded on certain fundamental principles, which this country has affirmed consistently for the last seven years:

First, we will maintain our military *strength*. The United States must maintain an equilibrium of power through a strong national and allied defense. The United States will do what is necessary to maintain the balance in all significant categories of military strength—including conventional as well as strategic forces.

Secondly, this country is prepared to *negotiate solutions* to political problems. The 1971 agreement on Berlin is an example. And both superpowers share a basic responsibility to ensure that the world is spared the holocaust of a nuclear war. Strategic arms limitation is therefore a permanent, mutual, and fundamental interest. At Vladivostok in 1974, President Ford reached agreement on the outline of a comprehensive agreement putting an equal ceiling on strategic forces on both sides for a ten-year period. The issues that remain in completing that agreement are soluble. An agreement on the basis of strict reciprocity is attainable.

Both sides have vital interests, but have an overriding interest in avoidance of major conflict. Therefore long-term peace can only be founded on the practice and habit of *restraint*. Exploiting local crises for unilateral gain is not acceptable. This nation will not seek confrontations lightly, but we are determined to defend peace by systematic resistance to pressures and irresponsible actions. The growth of Soviet economic and military power could not have been prevented; what can be prevented is the use of that power to upset the global balance. Without restraint there is no possibility of a meaningful relaxation of tensions.

If we preserve security on this basis, opportunities exist for creative diplomacy to engage the Soviet Union more firmly in constructive participation to the international system. We are prepared to hold out the prospect of increasing *bilateral cooperation* in the economic, technical, and other fields, to give both sides an increasing stake in positive political relations. Over the long-term we have it within our capacity to make our coexistence durable and secure, and to turn it into cooperation.

This is the broad agenda for the future of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. More specifically:

We cannot prevent the growth of Soviet power, but we can prevent its use for unilateral advantage and political expansion.

We must accept the reality that sovereign states, especially ones of roughly equal power, cannot impose unacceptable conditions on each other, and ultimately and inevitably must proceed by compromise.

The United States will never stand for violation of a solemn treaty or agreement.

We can never tolerate a shift in the strategic balance against us, either in unsatisfactory agreements, violations of agreements, or by neglect of our own defense requirements.

We are determined to pursue the effort to negotiate a saner and more secure strategic balance on equitable terms, because it is in our interest and in the interest of world peace.

Any Administration conscious of the long-term requirements of peace will find itself implementing the same dual approach of firmness in the face of pressure, and readiness to work for a more cooperative world. Of course, differences are inevitable as to the practical application of these principles. But, as President Kennedy said, "In the final analysis our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."

As the United States and Soviet Union have taken important steps toward regulating their own competition, *the problem of local conflicts* persists and indeed to some extent increases. The world begins to take for granted the invulnerability of global stability to local disturbances. The world has permitted too many of the underlying causes of regional conflicts to continue unattended, until the parties came to believe their only recourse was to war. And because each crisis ultimately has been contained, the world has remained complacent. We cannot forget the ominous lesson of 1914. Tolerance of local conflicts tempts world holocaust. We have no guarantee that some local crisis will not explode beyond control. We have a responsibility to prevent such crises.

This must be a permanent preoccupation of statesmen who are concerned for the preservation of peace over the next decades. In the modern era, global communications have shrunk our planet and created a global consciousness. Nations and peoples are increasingly sensitive to events and issues in other parts o fthe globe. Our moral principle extends our concern for the fate of our fellowmen. Ideological conflict respects no boundaries and calls into question even the legitimacy of domestic structures.

We cannot expect stability to continue indefinitely unless determined efforts are made to moderate and resolve local political conflicts peacefully.

The United States is not the world's policeman. But we have learned from bitter experience—as recently as 1973—that conflicts can erupt and spread and directly touch the interests and wellbeing of this country. Helping

to settle disputes is a longstanding American tradition, in our interest and the world interest.

Nowhere is there greater urgency than in the Middle East. The agreements negotiated between the parties over the past few years, in accordance with Resolutions 242 and 338, are unprecedented steps toward an ultimate peace. These efforts must and will continue. Both sides must contribute to the process; the United States remains committed to assist. The elements for further progress toward peace exist. Stagnation runs a grave risk of further upheaval, of benefit to neither side, and of grave implications for the peace and economic wellbeing of the world.

Proliferation of nuclear weapons technology could add a more ominous dimension to a world in which regional political conflicts persist. The dangers so long predicted may be coming closer at hand. As I said to the United Nations General Assembly in September, 1974: "The world has grown so accustomed to the existence of nuclear weapons that it assumes they will never be used. . . . In a world where many nations possess nuclear weapons, dangers would be vastly compounded. It would be infinitely more difficult, if not impossible, to maintain stability among a large number of nuclear powers. Local wars would take on a new dimension. Nuclear weapons would be introduced into regions where political conflict remains intense and the parties consider their vital interests overwhelmingly involved. There would, as well, be a vastly heightened risk of direct involvement of the major nuclear powers."

Therefore, halting proliferation is a major foreign policy objective of this Administration as it has been for all previous Administrations since the dawn of the nuclear age. As I explained to your colleagues on the Senate Government Operations Committee just a week ago, we have intensified our efforts—in international bodies, with other nations who are principal exporters of nuclear materials, with potential nuclear powers—and with the Congress—to ensure that the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy can be spread widely without at the same time spreading the perils of holocaust. It is a challenge to statesmanship to see beyond the immediate economic gains from unrestrained competition in nuclear exports and to act to halt a mushrooming danger.

SHAPING A WORLD COMMUNITY

The upheavals of the Twentieth Century have bequeathed to us another fundamental task—to adapt the international structure to the new realities of our time. We must fashion constructive long-term relationships between the industrial and developing nations, rich and poor, North and South; we must adapt and reinvigorate our friendships in Latin America, Asia and Africa, taking into account their new role and importance on the world scene; and together with all nations we must address the new problems of an interdependent world which can only be solved through multilateral cooperation.

A central issue of foreign policy over the next generation will be the relationship between the industrial and developing nations. Decolonization and the expansion of the world economy have given birth to new countries and new centers of power and initiative. The world environment of the next decades can be the seedbed of political instability, ideological confrontation and economic warfare—or it can become a community marked by international collaboration on an unprecedented scale. The interdependence of nations—the indivisibility of our security and our prosperity—can accelerate our common progress or our common decline.

Therefore, just as we must go beyond maintaining equilibrium if we are to ensure peace, so must we transcend tests of strength in North-South relations and seek to build a true world community. In international forums, the United States will resist pressure tactics, one-way morality, and propagandistic assaults on our dignity and on common sense. We will defend our interests and beliefs without apology. We will resist attempts at blackmail or extortion.

We know that world order depends ultimately on cooperative efforts and concrete solutions to the problems in our relations. The price and supply of energy, the conditions of trade, the expansion of world food production, the technological bases for economic development, the protection of the world environment, the rules of law that govern the world's oceans and outer space—these are concerns that affect all nations and that can be satisfactorily addressed only on the basis of mutual respect and in a framework of international collaboration. This is the agenda of an interdependent world.

We have much reason for confidence. It is the West—and overwhelmingly this country—that has the resources, the technology, the skills, the organizational ability and the goodwill that are the key to the success of these international efforts. In the global dialogue among the industrial and developing worlds, the Communist nations are conspicious by their absence, and indeed, by their irrelevance.

Therefore, we have begun the dialogue with the developing nations. At the World Food Conference in 1974, which was called at our initiative, and at the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly last September, and in the Conference on Economic Cooperation now underway in Paris, the United States has taken the role of leadership. We have undertaken it with a strong contribution from the Congress, and in the spirit of the highest ideals of the American people. This must continue.

The United States has presented a wide range of proposals for practical cooperation that could shape a constructive long-term economic relationship between the developed and developing countries—to safeguard export earnings against economic cycles and natural disasters, to accelerate growth and agricultural production, to improve conditions of trade and investment in key commodities, and to address the urgent needs of the poorest countries. In every area of concern we have proposed methods of cooperation among all countries, including the other industrial countries, the newly-wealthy oil producers, and the developing countries. Many of our proposals of last September have already been implemented. More can be done. If we are met in a constructive spirit, we will respond. There is a full agenda before us, implementing proposals that have already been made, and going beyond.

The United States has long-standing friendships on a bilateral basis with the nations of *Latin America, Asia and Africa* which we seek to adapt, improve, and build upon.

Latin America, which I have recently visited, is for the United States a region of special ties and special interest. It is as well a continent in a process of transition. Hemispheric relationships—bilateral, regional, multilateral and global—are in flux. An earlier community of the Americas bounded by exclusivity has given way to a more open relationship which turns not on convention, but on mutual respect, common interests, and cooperative problem-solving, and a more active role in the events outside the region. At the same time, the importance of Latin America to the United States is steadily increasing—as elements of the global economy, as participants in the world's political forums, and in their new role as the most developed of the developing nations. The United States must adapt to these changing realities, and it has begun to do so. Equally, we maintain our conviction that the Americas must not reject, but build upon, the precious heritage of our tradition of cooperation. This is the formula for our future progress. The great issues of global interdependence are before us; with this special advantage, and on the basis of respect and sovereign equality, we here in this Hemisphere can cooperate to find mutually beneficial solutions. If we succeed, our collaboration can be a model for the wider world community that we seek.

Our relations with Asia are crucial as well, for in Asia the interest of all the major powers in the world intersect. The stability of the region will be central to world peace over the coming decades as it has been in past decades. President Ford's trip to Asia in December both reaffirmed America's fundamental stake in Asia and opend a fresh chapter in our relations with the nations of the region. He set forth the premises of our country's future approach to Asia:

That American strength is basic to any stable balance of power in the Pacific and, therefore, to global stability;

That partnership with Japan is a pillor of our Asia policy;

That the process of normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China is indispensable. America's ties with one-quarter of mankind are inevitably of crucial importance to the world of the future;

That we have a continuing stake in stability and security in Southeast Asia, an area of great dynamism and promise;

That peace in Asia depends upon the resolution of outstanding political conflicts, most prominently that of the Korean peninsula;

And that economic cooperation among the peoples of the Pacific basin is essential to fulfilling the aspirations of the peoples of the region for a better future.

And very soon I will visit another area of great change and importance—Africa. The dramatic spread of national independence in Africa has had a major impact on world institutions and on the scope of international affairs. Africa's economic importance, and its economic relations with other continents, are growing. And America's traditional concern for the cause of independence and self-determination and racial justice, and the identification of many Americans with their African heritage, have given a more profound dimension to our interest in the continent's future.

Our African policy over the coming decade will be guided by these principles and concerns:

We want to see Africa attain prosperity for its people and become a major participant in the international economic system.

We support the desire of African nations to chart their own course in domestic, regional, and international affairs—to choose their own social system and a nonaligned foreign policy.

We want to see self-determination, racial justice, and human rights spread throughout Africa. As President Ford has recently made clear again, majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia is the unequivocal commitment of the United States.

We want to see the African continent be free of great power rivalry or conflict. We have our own interest in seeing that local conflicts there not be exploited and exacerbated by outside forces intervening for unilateral advantage.

A broader range of issues facing this country in the coming years has to do with the multilateral challenges of an era of increasing *global interdependence*.

There are many urgent and unprecedented issues that can be addressed only on a global basis and whose resolution will fundamentally shape the future of this planet. A cen-

tral example is the Conference on the Law of the Sea, which resumes its work this week in New York. In this unprecedented negotiation, over 100 nations are seeking to write new rules of law governing the use of the world's oceans. The implications for international security, for the use of vast resources, for scientific research, and for the protection of the environment are vast. The United States will continue its work with others to assure that the oceans become an arena of global cooperation and enrichment, rather than global conflict.

Also of great importance is the use of outer space, which presents us as well with the potential for conflict or the possibility of collaboration. We have the opportunity to substitute international law for power competition in the formative stage of an important international activity.

The modern age has not only given us the benefits of technology; it has also spawned the plagues of aircraft hijacking, international terrorism, and new techniques of warfare. The international community must stand together against these affronts to mankind. The United States has and must continue to promote the strengthening of international organizations and international law to deal with these issues.

Compassion for our fellowman requires that we mobilize international resources to combat the age-old scourages of disease, famine and natural disaster. And concern for basic human rights calls upon the international community to oppose violations to individual dignity wherever and by whomever they are practiced. The practice of torture must be discredited and banished. Human rights must be cherished and promoted regardless of race, sex, religion or political belief.

We must extend the scope and reach of international institutions for cooperation. The United Nations, an organization in which the American people have invested great hopes, must be a mechanism of practical collaboration instead of an arena of rhetorical confrontation, if it is to fulfill the mission of its Charter and its responsibilities for peace in the modern era. Procedural abuses and onesided resolutions cannot be accepted. The value of this Organization, if properly used, remains considerable—in peacekeeping, dispute settlement, and promoting cooperation for economic development and health and scores of other endeavors.

Only through a pattern of international cooperation can all these problems be successfully addressed. And only in a structure of global peace can the insecurity of nations, out of which so much conflict arises, be eased, and habits of compromise and accommodation be nurtured. Social progress, justice, and human rights can thrive only in an atmosphere of stability and reduced international tension.

OUR DEBATE AT HOME

This, then, is the design of our foreign policy:

To promote, together with our allies, the strength and ideals of freedom and democracy in a turbulent world;

To master the traditional challenges of peace and war, to maintain an equilibrium of strength, but to go beyond balance to a more positive future;

To shape a long-term relationship of mutual benefit with the developing countries, and to turn all the issues of inter-dependence into the cement of a new global community.

These are the challenges of our third century.

Since this nation was born in struggle 200 years ago, Americans have never shrunk from challenge. We have never regarded the problems we face as cause for pessimism or despair. **On the contrary, America's traditional spirit and optimism have always given millions around the world the hope that the** complex issues of today can and will be solved. The world knows full well that no solutions are possible without the active participation and commitment of a united American people. To describe the complex and long-term tasks we face is therefore the greatest expression of confidence in America.

We remain the world's greatest democracy; we are the engine of the global economy; we have been for thirty years the bulwark of the balance of power, and the beacon of freedom. The physical strength, the organizational skill, the creative genius of this country makes us—as we have always been since our Revolution—the hope of mankind.

What we face today is not a test of our physical strength, which is unparalleled, but a qualitative challenge, unlike anything we have ever faced before. It is a challenge to our will and courage and sense of responsibility. We are tested to show whether we understand what a world of complexity and ambiguity requires of us. It is not every generation that is given the opportunity to shape a new international order. If the opportunity is missed, we shall live in a world of increasing chaos and danger. If it is realized, we shall have begun an era of greater peace and progress and justice.

A heavy responsibility lies with us here in Washington. The Congress and the Executive owe the American people an end to the divisions of the past decade. The divisive issues are no longer with us. The tasks ahead of us are not partisan or ideological issues; they are great tasks for America in a new century, in a new world that, more than ever, impinges upon our lives and cries out for our leadership. Even more than our resources, the creative vitality of this nation has been a tremendous force for good, and continues to be so.

We can accomplish great things—but we can do so only as a united people. Beyond all the special concerns and special interests lies the national interest. Congress and the Executive, Republicans and Democrats, have a common stake in the effectiveness and success of American foreign policy. Most of the major initiatives this Government has taken on fundamental issues—with our allies, with the People's Republic of China, with the Soviet Union, with the developing nations, in the Middle East—have had broad and deep support in the Congress and in the country.

Therefore, just as we have the capacity to build a more durable international structure, so we have the capacity and opportunity to rebuild the consensus among the Executive and Legislative branches and among our people that will give new impetus to our responsible leadership in the world in our third century. This is the deepest desire of the President and the strongest commitment of all his Administration.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I hope that this discussion of what we see as the issues of the future will be helpful in the building of such a consensus. The issues are complex; the degree of public understanding required to deal with them is higher than at any time in our historical experience. And even if we can reach a consensus on objectives and priorities, our resources and options are limited and we cannot hope always to prevail, or to be right.

These hearings are a wise and welcome step in promoting the understanding and consensus that are required. Our gift as a people is problem-solving and harnessing the capacities of widely diverse groups of people in large-scale common endeavor. This is exactly what is required of us, both in building a new international structure and in developing the public support needed to sustain our participation in it over the long term.

In the last analysis, we must come together because the world needs us, because the horizons that beckon us in the decades to come are as near, or as far, as we have the courage to seek them.

GOALS, IDEOLOGY AND FOREIGN POLICY

By Bayless Manning

A COMMONLY heard comment about American foreign policy these days is that the nation has lost its earlier sense of national goals and ideological objectives and that we should, as a nation, settle upon a new consensus as to our global moral objectives. This is a difficult subject, and, in my view, much of the discussion of it is made up of half-perceptions and half-truths.

In the first place, it is clearly true that there is less consensus today among Americans on foreign policy issues than was the case from about 1940 until about 1965. This is in no way surprising. The goals of World War II were simple and clear: the utter extermination of Hitlerian nazism and its Japanese counterpart. At the end of World War II, the United States developed a grand global vision grounded in traditional American liberal economics, free trade, anticolonialism and parliamentarianism. That vision inspired American leadership in the construction of the major world institutions that came into being at the end of World War II—the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the United Nations.

Very shortly, however, as the outlines of the cold war crystallized, the dominant drive of U.S. foreign policy increasingly became anticommunism and global Soviet containment; a secondary theme was the desire to help develop a united, democratic Europe that would forever preclude another European-centered world war; and a third motif was decolonization and, somewhat less wholeheartedly, assistance in the untried experiment of bringing modern economic development to the unindustrialized world.

The Nazis are now gone. The restoration of Europe and Japan has long since been completed. The colonial empires have been wholly dismantled. The global institutions built at the end of World War II are now demonstrably inadequate to the problems of today. The cold war (at least in its original form) is now history. The comparative moral, political and economic power of the United States has been measurably reduced. The trauma of Vietnam has intervened, bringing with it for a time a major schism in U.S. public opinion. Basic changes have also taken place in domestic social

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attitudes. Politically and psychologically, we are in a time of regeneration, in part stunned by the Vietnam debacle and in part fumbling in a dim recognition that world conditions have changed and that old problems have given way to new ones.

On the other hand, despite these developments, the decline of consensus should not be overstated. Public consensus continues to support a number of elements of U.S. foreign policy—and they are the central ones on the basis of which most of our foreign policy rests.

The nation's resolution to defend itself against attack remains unimpaired. Similarly, a direct Soviet military assault on Western Europe, Japan or Canada would be met with American military retaliation. No conceivable U.S. foreign policy program would contain as a component the territorial expansion of the United States. The United States will, like all other countries, devote a substantial portion of its international energies to enhance the economic interests of the American people, but the nation will at the same time continue to respond sympathetically to the humanitarian needs of others. The nation's ideological preference remains in favor of parliamentarianism and free market economics. European unity still enlists U.S. support.

Other such continuing components of our international position could be cited. In fact, with the Vietnam issue behind us, the major changes that distinguish U.S. policy today from the continuity of yesterday are seen on reflection to be essentially two: a lowering of the intensity of our cold-war fears and our communist containment policy, and a heightening of our recognition that it will not be feasible to remake the world in our own image.

Indeed, on further reflection, it becomes apparent that our main problem in shaping our foreign policy in the last decade was not that we lost our consensus, but that we too long retained a consensus as to our perception of reality into a new era in which the reality itself had radically changed.

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It is easy to make up a roster of things it would be nice to have—like peace and health and open opportunity and an end to poverty—and to describe these as the nation's "goals." But they do not provide much headway toward developing public policy or public support for them. In real-life situations, the problem of the policy-maker is usually how to choose between two or more results that are all desirable but conflict with one another; or how to choose between two or more results, all of which are undesirable; or how to move

toward the desired result where one has little or no leverage on the situation; or, if something must be traded off, how to see to it that that which is sacrificed is the least valued—that the most favorable mix of costs and benefits is achieved.

A real-world issue of U.S. foreign policy does not give rise to a single question of "policy" but rather provokes a whole series of subdebates, of which the following are only the most obvious:

Facts: What are the facts? What will they be tomorrow?

Stakes: Who has what kind of stake in the outcome, and how much? The United States, generally conceived? Various domestic interest groups in the United States? Who cares about the outcome, why, and with what intensity? What outcome is more compatible with general ideological preferences of the United States? Economic? Strategic? What is the balance between the short-run and the long-run interests of the nation? What are the risks of action? Of inaction?

Management and tactics: To what extent can the United States affect the situation? Assuming some leverage, what is the most effective tactic for using it? Should the United States act in the matter unilaterally, or multilaterally? Who will be in charge of implementing the steps decided upon?

Costs, priorities and trade-offs: What will it cost to achieve the desired results? As compared with other desired objectives, how important is it that the desired outcome be achieved at this time? Pursuit of any policy line inevitably means that other desired policy lines will have to be given up or postponed: what trade-offs and other costs will be entailed in pursuing the particular objective? And what are the priorities?

Resources to be committed: How much of the nation's limited economic, military and political capital should be committed to the particular objective? With what intensity should the desired outcome be sought?

A list of generalized national foreign policy objectives proves to be of little or no assistance in working through such a typical matrix of questions, disputes and considerations.

Under our form of government, policy decisions on particular matters are hammered out through a pluralistic process that combines elements of official leadership, interest groups, public debate and various forms of power leverage. Every contesting participant in that process is able to invoke in support of his own position—and

he invariably does invoke—one or more of the national "goals" that would appear on anybody's abstract list of objectives of the United States. Such "goals" often provide the vocabulary of public policy debate; they usually do little to resolve real problems of policy choice.

III

Despite the example of the Holy Alliance, in the nineteenth century it had not yet become fashionable to consider that every nation's foreign policy should have an ideological component. Although the United States stood far in the vanguard of representative democracy and individual liberty, the nation did not feel obliged to seek to export its governmental forms or ideals. The primary objectives of U.S. policy were to stay out of European politics, to extend U.S. trade, and to keep the seas open for American ships; we carried out those policies very well.

The twentieth century, however, has seen the emergence of titanic international struggles among a variety of competing secular ideologies. "Isms," great and small, fight for control of men's minds and institutions of power. Future historians of foreign affairs will see our era as made up of a mix of two classical elements (balance-of-power struggles and competition for national economic return) and one new element that is remarkably akin to older wars of religion —an ideological struggle over the "right" principles that "ought" to govern patterns of economic distribution among men in society and define the proper relationship between the individual and the collectivity, the state.

The ideological stance of the United States is clear enough. Indeed it is remarkably so, and it has been extraordinarily stable. The nation has a preference for a relatively free-market economy where feasible, and a preference for the individualistic libertarian tenets set out in the Constitution in 1789, as expanded in the years since to bring more domestic groups into full political participation. A major question for debate today is whether and to what extent these ideological preferences should be given weight in determining the nation's posture on foreign policy issues.[1]

Critics who contend for a "higher ideological content" in our

[1] Whether these traditional national ideological preferences themselves should be abandoned in favor of others is an entirely separate issue—the issue that is pressed by political elements that are for that reason properly denominated "radical," whether of the unreconstructed right or of the unconstructed left. Sometimes persons who argue that our foreign policy has "insufficient ideological content" will be found in reality to be arguing that their own idiosyncratic brand of ideology should be adopted by the nation—quite a different point.

For a recent contribution to aspects of the debate, see William P. Bundy, "Dictatorships and American Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1975.

foreign policy usually point out, quite correctly, that the nation performs at its best when welded together in a common ideological endeavor. They recall the enthusiasm in World War I for making the world safe for democracy, they point to the public ideological commitment of World War II and the generation following, and they detect a messianic streak in the American people—a latent propensity to go forth to save the world. When that psychological resource is tapped there is almost nothing the United States cannot accomplish; when that resource is not invoked, goes the argument, the American public loses interest in international affairs, tends to withdraw, and U.S. foreign policy wilts. As these analysts see it, therefore, for the United States to have a strong and effective foreign policy over a period of time, our leaders must serve up, and the public must, after debate, accept some large-scale targeted goal, something which the United States is setting out to do. In this view of the matter, the American public should settle upon some long-term ideological objectives: to achieve political or religious liberty for all; or to put a floor under global poverty and redistribute wealth among all nations and peoples; or to stamp out totalitarianism; or to commit its armed forces to enforce world peace; or to assure free speech and free movement of persons around the world; or to establish a free market economy everywhere; or to eliminate racial prejudice; or something of the sort. Then the U.S. government, supported by such a consensus, should press steadily toward that ultimate goal.

There is something to be said for this perspective. If the American people could be unified by some broad humanitarian theme it would doubtless make the conduct of American foreign policy easier. Depending on the theme chosen, such a course would also have the power to attract some admiration and support in other countries around the world. And there is no doubt that the American people are capable of a kind of exaltation when the right leader sets the right moral target at the right time. But, granting these general points, the argument for a high-intensity ideological foreign policy suffers from a number of defects.

No person can make any decision without some reference to his underlying philosophic preferences and value system. Equally inevitably, foreign policy outcomes perceived by the United States as preferred will in some degree reflect ideological preferences of the public and of government officials. For example, our military alliance commitments to Western Europe, Canada and Japan are in large part based upon a recognition that our own national security and defense posture are inextricably commingled with theirs, but the alliance also

obviously expresses our ideological preference for liberal democracy and a free-market economy.

Further, it is evident that tomorrow's international agenda will repeatedly put to us in one form or another at least four basic questions that contain an unavoidable ethical or ideological component. What will be the American attitude regarding the poor two-thirds of the world? What will be the American attitude regarding persons in other countries whose individual political rights are being suppressed? What will be the American attitude toward such global problems as environmental protection and the use of the world's air space and seabeds? And what will be the American attitude toward the development of new multilateral international institutions that will entail some sacrifice of national freedom of unilateral action? It will require political leadership of the highest order to explain these broad issues to the American public and to work out responsive U.S. foreign policy positions that are compatible with the ethical and ideological predispositions of a majority of the American people.

The question is thus not whether there should be *some* ideological component in foreign policy, but whether that ideological component should be greatly enlarged or made predominant.

IV

In assessing that question, it must first be recognized that even a high degree of ideological content in our foreign policy will not produce consensus, eliminate debate, or provide answers to foreign policy problems. If Nation X decides on ideological grounds to impose economic sanctions against Country Y, that step does not predetermine whether the government of Nation X would also be willing to go to war with Country Y on the same ideological grounds. Regardless of the ideological target, the costs and benefits of each new policy decision must be weighed anew, and the issue decided pragmatically on its own footing as it arises.

The answer arrived at will, of course, vary in accordance as the ideological factor (or any other factor) is differently weighted, but the *process* of decision-making is not altered by changes in the weighting of the factors. Thus, while one may argue that this or that ideological consideration should be given more weight in foreign policy decision-making, one cannot eliminate the necessity for the weighing process itself.

A high ideological content has not historically been an indispensable element in the successful conduct of U.S. foreign policy, as the experience of the nineteenth century showed. Some of the nation's

less appealing chapters of history coincided with a high fervor of self-righteousness, notably the Mexican War, the Spanish-American War, and our adventure with old-time imperialism at the turn of the century. Then too, there appear to be hangover costs; when the nation has experienced an ideological "high" in foreign policy, it has tended to be followed by a later "low" and a propensity to withdraw from the world, as the United States did in rejecting the League of Nations, and as many fear the American public may be doing today.

In present-day circumstances it is far from apparent *what* ideological bugle call would arouse a consensus among the U.S. public and spark a moral crusade. The point is not merely that no such consensus of enthusiasm exists at present; it is, rather, that the domestic atmosphere at this time of post-Vietnam and post-U.S. *imperium* is not propitious for a remobilization of the moral energies of the nation for a major overseas initiative. Any effort to embark upon a new ideological push at this time would sharply divide, rather than unify, the American people.

Then there are the special dangers that crusades always bring. Once launched, the *jihad,* the holy war, is the least manageable of all forms of human dispute. For man's greatest suffering at the hands of man we can thank the ideologues and the religious zealots of history—those arrested personalities who cannot live with uncertainty, cannot tolerate difference, are divinely (or atheistically) certain of their own rightness and are ready—eager—to impose their views on others.

The foreign policy history of the twentieth century has been heavily freighted with that sort of thinking, some of it (though by comparison only a small part of it) contributed by the United States. The costs to mankind of this attitude have been unimaginably great. Western Europe, Japan, the Soviet Union, China and the United States all seem to have concluded of late that they have had enough of high ideologies in their foreign policy for a while, and all are moving toward the conference table as a preferred alternative to mutual destruction over ideological issues that are, by definition, irresolvable.

It is the Third World today which has entered upon a period of intense ideological excitation, inspired in part by a new and fevered nationalism in each country and in part by a sense of community directed against the industrialized powers. In these circumstances, even if it were possible to muster a domestic consensus in the United States for some sort of ideological offensive, it is difficult to believe that such an offensive could do other than to isolate the United States further, and further disrupt the fragile international order that now exists.

Finally, it is now commonplace to observe that the agenda of inter-

national affairs is today expanding beyond the traditional issues of security and balance of power to include complex issues of economic interdependence, resource management and global preservation. Issues like these by their nature require multilateral negotiatory treatment, and simply cannot be dealt with on an ideological basis.

For these reasons, and others as well, another call to ideological arms does not at this time offer a promising basis upon which to build U.S. foreign policy for the last quarter of this century. The relationship between a foreign policy that contains some component of ideological preference and a foreign policy that is heavily ideologized is the relationship between normal cell activity and cancerous cell activity. For a complex nation in a complex world, single-minded pursuit of some fixed ideological objective will not only deprive that nation of gains that might otherwise have been made in the direction of multiple objectives that are important to it; will not only guarantee a continuously dangerous condition of crisis and confrontation with others; will not only lead to misassessments of objective realities and the nation's capacity to change them; but will also lead to division and self-destructive tendencies within the body politic itself—all as we have recently experienced in our Vietnam involvement.

V

And yet there remains an important moral role for the United States to play in the world.

As the world's preeminent military power, we can expect to produce in others some fear and also some awe. As the world's most efficient producer we can expect to excite criticism and also some admiration. As the world's richest nation we can expect to generate in others some envy and also some esteem. But we cannot expect to achieve the inspiration of others except through spiritual leadership. The United States has in the past provided that inspiration to the world. It is not doing it now. But it can, one day, do it again.

No contemporary American can be unaware of the deficiencies, shortcomings and blind spots that still mar the social landscape of the United States today, and the painful slowness with which we have sometimes moved to correct these failings. But many Americans, especially younger ones, do need to remind themselves that, for all its blemishes, the United States stands in the forefront of the world in its commitment to the proposition that the individual human being should be free—free to think what he wants, write what he wishes, assemble as he will, read as his curiosity leads him, paint as his eye uniquely sees, worship as to him seems right, and espouse whatsoever

political position he finds congenial, so long only as he accords those same privileges to his fellow citizens.

The United States has been imbued with this spirit of individual liberty since its founding, and its institutions are imbued with it today. There is no doubt whatsoever in my mind that this urge for individual self-expression has ever been the ultimate revolutionary aspiration and always will be. In this sense, the United States remains the most progressive revolutionary society in the world.

We are, however, living in a transitory period in which the vocabulary of revolutionary aspirations is turned upside-down; today's revolutionary voices have little or no interest in, or are actively opposed to, the ideal of individual expression. The reasons are not hard to find. Over the course of this century, the unindustrialized former colonies of the world, the backward fastnesses of Russia, and the traditionalist frozen-in-amber static society of China have all grimly determined that they will somehow, at whatever cost, make the twentieth century the era in which they asserted their full nationhood, garnered for themselves the bounty of modern technology, and shattered the atavistic social, political, and wealth structures they had inherited from the past. Future historians will see this century as a period of the most extraordinary achievement for these countries, as they set out to try to bring themselves abreast of the industrialized West and as they are, in varying degrees, making progress in so doing.

The United States has in the main misunderstood the process that is taking place in the unindustrialized countries in this century. In some degree we have grasped that economic modernization is being pursued and in some degree we have sought to assist in that regard. To a degree we have understood that basic human social services are needed in the developing countries and, again, we have done something to try to help with programs for schools, medical care and the like. But we have had little or no understanding of the demand for change in the ancient social orders of these countries or the demand for national self-expression. We have, as a result, for the most part comported ourselves toward these countries so as to appear to be (and sometimes clearly have been) opposed to their internal forces of modernization and in league with their domestic forces seeking to maintain the status quo.

In some instances we have been negative toward these new societies because our democratic preferences—especially those of our liberal ideologues—have been repelled by the authoritarian character of their new governments. Sometimes we have been negative toward them because our free market preferences—especially those of our

conservative ideologues—have been repelled by the planned economy preference of some of the new governments. Sometimes we have been negative because some private U.S. economic interest groups stood to suffer immediate losses from a change in the status quo and succeeded in harnessing Washington to their narrow interests. Sometimes the leaders that have arisen in the nonindustrialized countries have seemed to us to be demagogues, or worse. Sometimes we have been negative because the economic policies pursued by the new regimes have been not only harmful to U.S. interests, but downright suicidal for themselves. But most often the issues of U.S. attitude toward a newly developing country became wholly confounded with and dominated by the global confrontation of the cold war; we thought it necessary to support the forces of the status quo because the alternative seemed to be an extension of dangerous Russian global influence, "the spread of communism."

In many of the emerging countries there has been some validity in one or a number of these U.S. perspectives. But the ultimate underlying truth was that the time had come for the industrially backward people of the world to move into the twentieth century, and move they have. More often than not, the United States has wound up on the wrong side of that historic evolution. As a result, the United States stands today in deep disfavor among many of the developing countries, and is portrayed as the main external adversary opposing their national development, internal modernization, and economic advancement.[2]

In a similar way, other programs and institutions affiliated with the United States have become suspect or villains in the view of many in the Third World. The CIA is, of course, the most virulently attacked. Ironically, AID—born as a beneficent program for the express purpose of assisting the Third World development process—is calumniated only a little less. And in the eyes of many developing countries, foreign-controlled multinational corporate enterprises—many of which are based in the United States—have come to be identified with the old imperialistic economic order.

As a result, increased taxation, expropriation, and, of late, kidnapping and terrorism have been directed against such companies.

[2] We thus left the door open—we threw the door open—to the Soviet Union to declare itself as friend of the forces of modernization in these countries. As it has turned out, however, the Russians have done little with this opportunity. Despite the openings offered them, they have conducted themselves in such a ham-handed manner that they have been thrown out after having been invited in (as in Ghana, Sudan, Egypt, and Indonesia), and have been able to hang on only where their troops are stationed in active occupation or where, as in Cuba, they support a regime by direct subvention. The "spread of communism" has not gone quite as easily in Third World countries as Soviet planners hoped, or American planners feared.

Popular attitudes in these countries toward such treatment of multinational companies are evocative of our own dim recollections of Saxon Robin Hood, living dispossessed in his own country and penniless in the woods, and making occasional retributory forays against rich, fat bishops and the symbols of outlander Norman authority—a dangerous legend for the world's richest country to perpetuate. Many (not all) of the charges made in the Third World against the multinational companies are unfair, and the companies have frequently brought employment and other advantages to other countries where they have invested. But though the Normans, too, brought many advanced and elevated benefits to rustic, backward England, it took a very long time for the men in Sherwood Forest to see it that way.

More generally, these attitudes, coupled with precarious economic conditions in much of the Third World, have produced heavy political pressures in the United Nations and other forums for a so-called "new international economic order" and other proposals for major wealth transfers by the industrialized West to the Third World, backed up by efforts to organize raw materials cartels and threats to resort to boycotts and other forms of arm twisting. These efforts at pressure may or may not prove ultimately effective, but they have already introduced new heat, strain and danger into the world's international political relations and will doubtless continue to do so.

It is now obvious to all that our Vietnam policy was a blunder; one cannot help but wonder, too, how different and better a world it would be for the United States today—and for everybody else—if we had worked more actively for the last 30 years to assist the forces for change in the Third World. Given the tensions of the cold war, the U.S. misperception of the Third World's historical situation, and the economic interests of significant elements of the United States, it is probably true that we could not have done significantly better than we did. In any case, we did not do so, and we shall now for a time have to live with the consequences.

And we must look to the future. In part, what happened during the post-World War II era was that the United States completely misunderstood what revolution we were witnessing in the emerging post-colonial countries. Naïvely, though understandably enough, we thought our own history would be relived by these new nations. In keeping with our anti-colonial traditions, our position immediately following World War II was strongly in favor of granting prompt independence to the colonies of England, France, Holland, and Belgium—much to the annoyance of those wartime allies. So far, so good.

But we then expected the newly independent countries to start at

once to behave politically like the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in 1776—complete with parliaments, voting, free press, private entrepreneurship, and the like. We based our policy on that premise—and were promptly disappointed, as in almost no case did the emerging countries follow those expectations. Circumstances in the new unindustrialized countries of this century were wholly different from ours in 1776, and it was not yet time for our kind of revolution. It was time instead for the pursuit of three great goals "at whatever cost"—the building of nationhood, economic modernization, and internal social restructuring.

In those three efforts, some (not all) of the new societies have made extraordinary progress. But they have had to pay a large price for that progress. The price has been paid largely in regimentation, submergence of the individual, suppression of dissent, discouragement of inquiry, public misinformation, and imposed conformity. They have become conscript societies. It will be long debated whether up to now it has been necessary to become a conscript society in order to achieve the goals that were set. But now, as collective social progress has been made, the time is coming, so far most noticeably in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, when the seeds of individual expression are stirring and seeking an outlet to sprout. The rustlings of personal expression will not be confined there.

It is not a credible proposition, for example, that the magnificently civilized, creative, colorful and sophisticated Chinese people will for long be content to be compelled to look at only the same eight politically authorized operas, and to spend their lives in gray formations doing responsive readings in unison. Throughout the authoritarian world, the stage is slowly being set for the next evolutionary if not revolutionary move forward, the resumption of the ancient craving for individual liberty. No amount of internal secret police work will stop it. And bit by bit, whatever totalitarian communism or totalitarian neo-Peronism may achieve today in the realm of forced-draft social modernization, tomorrow's reformers will see the political structures of these conscript societies for what they are—authoritarian and repressive.

Revolutionary movements of the past century have all begun as movements toward idealized collective economic and social systems. But once installed in power they have become primarily distinguished by, and are likely to be most remembered for, their innovative and unique systems of rigid political control.[8] When eventually the counterpressure to these repressive systems mounts, the thrust will not be

[8] Their origins as conspiratorial semi-military undergrounds may account for a part of this.

toward new social and economic ends, but toward the ancient goals of political freedom and individual self-expression.

Marx, it will be recalled, paid tribute to the rise of the capitalist bourgeoisie as the modernizing agent that swept away the rotting social castle of aristocracy and feudalism in Western Europe and substituted a better, more efficient, more productive and widely sharing society. In the Marxist view, however, the new post-feudal system bore within itself the seeds of its own destruction and will in time be swept into the dustbin of history as it is replaced by the new order of socialism. Socialism will then build upon the social gains that were made during the capitalist era.

This historical prognosis is parallel to the point argued here. In some backward countries during the twentieth century, totalitarian regimes, some of them communist, are acting as the modernizing agent to sweep away the rotting manor house of aristocracy and colonialism and substitute a better, more efficient, more productive and widely sharing society. But these new regimes bear within themselves the seeds of their own destruction, for they can allow no significant room for the expression of the individual human spirit. As the latent drives for personal liberation again become active, the authoritarian regimes of today—musty, ossified, and profoundly reactionary—will be themselves swept into the dustbin of history. The new progressive elements will not then reinstate the earlier pre-industrial order that was but will proceed to build upon the social and economic gains made during the era of conscript modernization.[4]

The time will come—in some countries soon—when the triple tasks of nation-building, modernization, and social restructuring by authoritarian means will be largely completed, or become too costly to be pursued single-mindedly further. When that time comes, if the United States has maintained vital and active the traditions of its own revolution and Constitution, then the banners for the next round of progressive change will be rediscovered safe in Philadelphia.

Whatever policy the United States may follow in economic matters, it is debatable whether the developing nations that have adopted central economic planning systems will ever welcome the return of fully free-market forces to their economies.[5] But if American preserves at home its steadfast stand in favor of the claim of the free individual, and also continues to make progress in dealing with its own internal social inequities, the United States will eventually regain its moral

[4] Though it is fascinating to note that a reinstatement of the ancient order seems to be what Solzhenitsyn would envision for Russia.

[5] On the other hand, who 300 years ago would have predicted the retreat of centrally planned mercantilism?

leadership among the nations of the world—not by force of its economic power and its arms but by virtue of its ideological example as a society of free men.

In the long view, the surest way for the United States to influence for the better the ideological future of mankind everywhere is by being sure that we present an unwavering example of commitment to our principles at home. And that *is* an ideological target that can be —has been—set for all Americans.

In the meantime, in the United Nations and other forums, the United States should do what it can to train the spotlight of international public attention upon the openness of its own society and upon the oppressive closedness of authoritarian regimes, of the right or the left. Such steps by the United States will not be widely welcomed for some time to come. They will not be welcomed because human liberties are never a favorite topic of restrictive regimes, because most developing countries see the present era as the epoch for industrial and social development and consider the time to be premature for serious concern about the individual, and because the United States is today viewed negatively in many parts of the world. Nevertheless, the United States should continuously speak out internationally to reassert its ideological stance on individual freedom and expression. In time, the audience of the world will once more listen and respond.

Explaining the Failures of US Foreign Policy

Three Paradoxes

by Hans J. Morgenthau

A strange and ominous apathy appears to separate the American people from the lively concern with public affairs without which democracy itself loses its vitality and tends to become a ritual devoid of political meaning. As far as the public attitude toward foreign policy is concerned, the reason for this apathy is to be found in three paradoxes that have obscured the nature of our foreign policy and the factors responsible for its failures and defeats: the paradox of ineffective brilliance, the paradox of impotent power, the paradox of destructive idealism.

The foreign policy of the United States has under Mr. Kissinger's stewardship suffered a number of spectacular defeats: Southeast Asia, Greece, Turkey, the German-Brazilian treaty opening the door to nuclear proliferation and for this reason opposed by the United States are cases in point. The prestige of the United States for power, virtue and wisdom has markedly declined among friends and foes alike. The United States carries today less weight in the councils of the nations than it did a decade ago. Yet this general decline and these particular failures have been presided over by, if they have not resulted from the policies of, a Secretary of State who is so amply endowed with a theoretical understanding of foreign policy and the practical ability to conduct it that I still consider him to be the best Secretary of State since Dean Acheson and one of the six or so best we have had throughout our history. How is this contrast between the personal qualities of the Secretary of State and the quality of his policies to be explained?

First of all the Secretary of State is exposed, as are all men, to the contingencies of history. He does not know everything, and he does not control everything he knows. Thus he cannot escape accidents that may play havoc with his best laid plans. More particularly the chickens hatched by his predecessors might choose to come home to roost at a time and under circumstances especially inconvenient. A statesman may be as unlucky as another may be lucky, and he may take credit or have to take the blame by dint of the accident that a certain event occurred while he was guiding the ship of state. However the course the American ship of state has steered not only in recent years but during the whole post-World War II period made it particularly vulnerable to, and actually invited, the kind of accidents that have shaken it in recent years.

Since the outbreak of the Cold War, American foreign policy has assumed the identity of the policies pursued by the government of the Soviet Union and those of the Communist governments and movements throughout the world. Our intervention in the Korean war was based upon that assumption and so were our interventions in Indochina and our policies toward Cuba. Similarly we tended to assume that our interests and those of our allies were identical and to consider national deviations from the course the United States had taken, such as the Gaullist ones, at best as a nuisance regrettably to be tolerated.

It is to the credit of Mr. Kissinger to have made an end to these simplistic identifications, which, if consistently adhered to, precluded foreign policy altogether and allowed only for moral crusades fought preferably with the weapons of rhetoric and subversion but, if need be, also with the full plethora of conventional weapons. Mr. Kissinger has had the courage to deal consistently rather than sporadically, as his predecessors did, with the Soviet Union in a businesslike manner, appearing at times to lean over backward in minimizing its Communist character as a factor in its foreign policy. After a number of false starts, especially with regard to Japan, he has also shown respect for the separate interests of our allies, regardless of his ideological preferences. Mr. Kissinger has also had the courage and ability to begin the normalization of our relations with mainland China while leaving the issue of Taiwan in abeyance. This ideological decontamination of our relations with the two major Communist powers has provided Mr. Kissinger with an admittedly very limited freedom of maneuver, which he used in different phases of the liquidation of the Indochina war on behalf of his policies.

Yet while in the arena of macro-politics, that is, in America's relations with the major Communist powers, the United States has pursued a pragmatic policy that rather underplayed the ideological component of foreign policy, the United States has continued that ideological orientation in its dealings with local Communist governments and movements. The considerations that provided the rationale for our policies in Southeast Asia, for the support of a military dictatorship in Greece, for our participation in the overthrow of

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the Allende government in Chile, have been ideological: to stop communism by whatever means short of nuclear war wherever it threatens to extend its control. How can these two types of policy—ideological tolerance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and mainland China, ideological combativeness against local communisms—mutually exclusive on the face of them, be reconciled? How can the Secretary of State proclaim détente with the Soviet Union, the fountainhead of Communist ideology and supporter of Communist causes, and fight communism to the death in Chile and Indochina?

These questions are answered by the fundamental principle by which all our major foreign policies since the end of World War II have been inspired: stability. What we wanted to emerge from the Second World War was a stable world order, dominated by two self-contained and cooperating superpowers. The existence of these two superpowers, containing each other, was itself a token of stability, for short of nuclear war or destabilizing actions of one of the superpowers' satellites or allies, nothing could have threatened the stability of relations between the two superpowers for 30 years. Yet that stability could indeed be put in jeopardy, so the argument runs, if a minor nation were to change its ideological allegiance and thereby add to the strength of one or the other of the superpowers. Thus the United States can afford to play down ideological differences in its relations with the major Communist powers, for these differences do not affect the overall world balance of power. But it must take ideological advances and retreats at the confines of the two empires with utmost seriousness; for they will, at least cumulatively, affect the distribution of power in the world. Hence the particular American concern with stability in the outlying political areas.

Yet this concern with stability is up against the fact that typically the kind of instability that threatens the American interest in the status quo is not artificially induced by Communist subversion but results from profound popular dissatisfaction with the social, economic and political status quo. Communism contributes to this dissatisfaction organization, ideology and politically oriented militancy. In other words communism may be the beneficiary and the instrument of instability, but it is generally not the cause. Thus by fighting communism it is possible to deprive instability of its most effective expression, but it is not possible to eliminate it. Since the causes and effects of instability persist, a policy committed to stability and identifying instability with communism is compelled by the logic of its interpretation of reality to suppress in the name of anti-communism all manifestations of popular discontent and stifle the aspirations for reform. Thus in an essentially unstable world, tyranny becomes the last resort of a policy committed to stability as its ultimate standard.

The stability thus achieved is apparent rather than real, for the policy seeking it concerns itself with one particular manifestation of instability rather than with its causes. What it is really concerned with is not instability as such but that instability that threatens the social, economic and political status quo. Thus it must prefer the short-run stability and long-run instability of tyrannical rule to the short-run instability and long-run stability of revolution and radical reform. For it is exactly in order to forestall the transformations that revolution and radical reform might bring today that American policy has consistently taken the side of repression on behalf of an unpopular social, economic and political status quo.

Thus the United States has found itself consistently on the wrong side of the great issues, which in retrospect will appear to have put their stamp upon the present period of history. It is this wrong philosophic orientation on behalf of an unviable status quo that has defeated the brilliance of the Secretary of State. He has put his extraordinary gifts at the service of lost causes. Manifestly destined to succeed, more often than not he has failed. His failures have by and large not been the result of specific weaknesses in the conception and execution of American foreign policy. Rather they have derived from the Secretary of State's overall perception of the world as it exists and his conception of the world to be created by his foreign policy.

The paradox of failing brilliance shares responsibility

The pragmatist

for the failures of American foreign policy with the paradox of impotent power. The object lesson of that paradox is the Vietnam war. The most powerful nation on earth, although for a decade it brought to bear all conventional weapons known to man, was unable to impose its will upon the truncated part of a small and technologically backward country. That failure raises two questions: why was American conventional power ineffective, and why did the United States not resort to nuclear weapons?

Military power, as all power, is a means to the end of subjecting the will of the opponent to one's own. Military power, as all power, is maintained to teach the opponent the lesson that he is better off yielding to it than continuing his opposition. Both in the mercenary wars of a distant past and the recent national wars of Europe, there was a point at which one or the other or both sides would conclude that it was preferable to desist rather than to continue the war. The heroic example of exceptional individuals or small groups of individuals who will risk death rather than give in confirms the rule. The Vietnam war is one of the few exceptions to that rule. For here a whole people preferred fighting against obviously insuperable odds, risking death, to surrender. They did so because they saw themselves as the fighting vanguard of a national and social revolution that was sweeping the world. One of the few architects of our Vietnam policy who has not jumped off the sinking ship has repeatedly expressed his amazement at the tenacity of the Viet Cong and answered his question as to why they "kept coming" with the explanation that they were encouraged by the domestic American opposition to the war. It is closer to the truth to point to the ultimate commitment to national and social revolution that has inspired other nations of the Third World as well. Against this ultimate commitment conventional weapons are of no avail, for their psychological effect depends upon the effect of the threat of death. Conventional weapons are ineffective in the measure that the threat of death has lost its effectiveness.

Military power is here ineffective because the object, preferring death to the status quo, is inured to its threat. The functional relationship between the magnitude of military power and the compliant behavior of the object is here destroyed by the latter. That relationship can also be destroyed by the wielder of superior military power. Military power in its nuclear form is so immense that it is out of all proportion to any possible target. Because of their magnitude, nuclear weapons are instruments of total destruction rather than politically usable devices for bending the object's mind to the will of the nuclear power. The United States is obviously infinitely more powerful than Turkey because it has nuclear weapons. But since it cannot use them for any political purpose short of total destruction, since, in other words, they cannot be used at all for a political purpose, the power equation must discount them.

Thus the effective power that the United States can put into the scales of its foreign policy is far inferior to the sum total of its power. By failing to distinguish between usable and nonusable power and emphasizing in theory and practice the latter over the former, the United States has maintained its appearance as the most powerful nation on earth, but has weakened the substance of its power in a dual sense. It has poured a disproportionate fraction of its resources into unusable instruments of power and has thereby drastically limited its capacity for waging conventional war. It has limited that capacity even more by never ceasing to search for ways of blurring the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons, that is, to use nuclear weapons as though they were conventional ones.

Thus if one adds it all up, one must conclude that the United States is not only the most powerful nation on earth but also the most powerful nation ever to exist; for there has never been a nation that had it in its power to destroy life on earth altogether. But on the other hand that very same nation finds itself rather hard put to make effective use of its power when it comes to dealing with North Korea or North Vietnam or one or another of its recalcitrant allies. With its gaze fixed upon its nuclear armory, it has a way of using either too much or too little of that conventional power which is alone susceptible to support the day-to-day movements of our diplomacy.

Yet aside from the uselessness of nuclear weapons as instruments of foreign policy, the military weakness of the most powerful nation on earth has been glaringly revealed in the relations between the United States and the oil-producing nations. On one side there is the United States and its allies presenting an unprecedented accumulation of military power. On the other side, there are congeries of militarily impotent nations, many of which can be called nations only out of semantic courtesy. Yet the former are reduced to reacting helplessly to the policies of the latter. Their military preponderance is of no avail. This is so for three interconnected reasons.

The moral climate permeating the age of decolonization is hostile to attempts at the revival of open colonial relationships, however much of them may have

survived under the cover of emancipation and national independence. Furthermore this moral climate favors guerrilla wars on behalf of decolonization, making military measures by consumer nations hazardous. Finally given the interconnectedness of interests in contemporary world politics, especially between super- and great powers on the one hand, and former colonies on the other, the military issues in which one or the other of the nuclear powers is involved run a more or less immediate risk of being countered by another of the nuclear powers—and a conventional military confrontation by the nuclear powers cannot be completely insulated from the ability to wage nuclear war and their willingness to do so if the stakes appear to be sufficiently high. Consequently the politically disadvantaged consumer nations have refrained from resorting to what was once considered the *ultima ratio regum:* military force.

Since the United States entered the international arena as a world power, it has felt the urge, in contrast to other nations, to justify its actions in moral terms, transcending the national interest narrowly construed. What is the purpose of our foreign policy? What good do we seek to achieve through it? What kind of international order are we aiming at? It is as though we had some moral qualms about being actively involved in this questionable business of foreign policy, which needs to be cleansed of its moral taint by serving some transcendent ideal. We expect to be redeemed from the evils of power politics by waging the war to end wars, by waging the war to make the world safe for democracy, by wiping totalitarian tyranny from the face of the earth, by creating a new world order in the form of the United Nations, by building a nation in Southeast Asia.

None of the idealistic purposes the United States actively pursued in its foreign policy and for which it went to war in this century were achieved, and the United States could blame the wickedness of the world or of some particular nation or some accidental personal or collective shortcomings for the failure. The sole exception is Vietnam. That failure is all our own. If we could have claimed all the credit had we succeeded, so we must take all the blame for the failure. And the failure could not have been avoided by changes in personnel and strategy and tactics. We failed because our conception of foreign policy as a noble crusade on behalf of some transcendent purpose clashed with the reality of things that not only refused to be transformed by our good intentions but in turn corrupted our purpose. The purpose, far from ennobling our actions, became itself the source of unspeakable evil.

The diverse purposes that have been assigned, simultaneously and successively, to our intervention in Southeast Asia partake of an element of altruism. When one pointed to the lack of American national interest in Southeast Asia one was reminded, frequently with pride, that we were there not for narrow selfish reasons but for the sake of the indigenous peoples: to save them from a fate worse than death and to enable them to build a nation of their own, free from foreign interference. What we achieved was the utter destruction of their freedom, the devastation of their countries, death on an enormous scale inflicted with barbaric means, and the corruption of the survivors, ourselves included. Purpose and achievement were almost grotesquely at odds. We achieved what we wanted to prevent, and the evil we wanted to prevent was like nothing compared with the evil we left behind.

That experience, unique in the history of America, not only demonstrated the defects of our policies in Southeast Asia but also put into question the presumed causal relationship between good intentions and noble purposes, on the one hand, and successful policies, on the other. However that is not the issue actually raised. It is a testimony to the persistence of common error hallowed by tradition that the popular mind, remaining within that tradition, looks for another purpose, perhaps less ambitious, that could give direction to a new American foreign policy. What people really mean when they say we have no foreign policy is that American foreign policy had lost its purpose when it was defeated in Southeast Asia and that without such a purpose there was really nothing to debate.

These three paradoxes are both the result of intellectual errors and the cause of political failures. These failures ought to have stimulated our thinking to correct the intellectual errors from which they stem. The experiences of the 20th century, from World War I to Vietnam, ought to have taught us that a great power has discharged its duty toward itself and mankind when it seeks through its foreign policy to protect its territory and its institutions. This concept of the national interest, realistically defined in view of contemporary threats, implies three concrete purposes: the avoidance of nuclear war concomitant with preparedness for conventional war; at best sympathy for, and at worst indifference to, the radical domestic changes that nations are undergoing throughout the world; the support of supranational institutions and procedures capable of performing the functions that in view of modern technological developments the individual nation states are no longer able to perform.

This concept of the national interest, as applied specifically to the United States, requires drastic changes in the conduct of our domestic affairs. Throughout American history the United States has been looked upon by other nations, and has looked upon itself, as an example for other nations to emulate. The Vietnam war and Watergate have put into question the validity of that claim. Without the restoration of that validity through drastic domestic reforms in thought and action, American foreign policy will continue to stumble under the burden of the three paradoxes that have frustrated it in its past.

The United States in Opposition

Daniel P. Moynihan

"WE ARE far from living in a single world community," writes Edward Shils, "but the rudiments of a world society do exist." Among those rudiments, perhaps the most conspicuous, if least remarked, are the emerging views as to what kind of society it is. A measure of self-awareness has appeared, much as it did for smaller polities in earlier times. These assessments tend at the international level to be as diverse as those commonly encountered concerning national societies, or local ones. Some will think the society is good and getting better; others will see it as bad and getting worse. Some want change; some fear it. Where one sees justice, another sees wrong.

The notion of a world society is nothing new to Americans. It dominated the rhetoric of World War II, of the founding of the United Nations, of much of the cold war. It is now a received idea, and its impress may be measured by the success with which advocates have found audiences for issues defined in international terms: the world environmental problem; the world population problem; the world food problem. Not a generation ago, these were national issues at most.

Much of this internationalist rhetoric is based on things real enough. There *is* a world ecology; there *is* a world economy; and some measures important to individual countries can only be obtained through international accord. Thus the concept of interdependence has become perhaps the main element of the new consciousness of a world society. This is a valid basis on which to posit the existence of a society; it is almost a precondition of a society's coming into being.

Yet societies rarely stop at the acknowledgment of the need for cooperation which is implied by the term interdependence. The image of a society as a family is a common one, and with reason, for in both cases the idea of cooperation is frequently supplemented or even supplanted by the idea of obligation. What does one member *owe* another? This is something new in international pronouncements. If one were to characterize the discomfiture and distress with which Americans responded to the events of the 29th General Assembly of the United Nations in 1974, some measure would have to be attributed to the discovery that a vast majority of the nations of the world feel there are claims which can be made on the wealth of individual nations that are both considerable and threatening—in any event threatening to countries such as the United States which regularly finds itself in a minority (often a minority of one or two or at most a half-dozen) in an assembly of 138 members.

The tyranny of the UN's "new majority" has accordingly been deplored, and there has been much comment that whereas opposition to the United Nations was once a position of "conservatives" in the United States, it is increasingly one of "liberals" also. Yet while there have been some calls to boycott the General Assembly, or not to vote in it, there have been but few calls for withdrawal from the United Nations. It is almost as if American opinion now acknowledged that there was no escaping involvement in the emergent world society. All the more reason, then, for seeking to understand what has been going on.

I

NOW, of course, a lot is going on, and no single element dominates. Yet it may be argued that what happened in the early 1970's is that for the first time the world felt the impact of what for lack of a better term I shall call the British revolution. That is the revolution which began in 1947 with the granting by socialist Britain of independence to socialist India. In slow, then rapid, order the great empires of the world—with the single major exception of the Czarist empire—broke up into independent states; the original membership of the United Nations of 51 grew to 138. These new nations naturally varied in terms of size, population, and resources. But in one respect they hardly varied at all. To a quite astonishing degree they were ideologically uniform, having fashioned their polities in terms derived from the general corpus of British socialist opinion as it developed in the period roughly

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1890-1950. The Englishmen and Irishmen, Scotsmen and Welsh, who created this body of doctrine and espoused it with such enterprise—nay, genius—thought they were making a social revolution in Britain. And they were. But the spread of their ideology to the furthest reaches of the globe, with its ascent to dominance in the highest national councils everywhere, gives to the British revolution the kind of worldwide significance which the American and French, and then the Russian, revolutions possessed in earlier times.*

From the perspective of their impact on others, the American and French revolutions can be treated as a single event. They were not of course identical in themselves, and profoundly important distinctions can be made between them. But these distinctions were little noted in the political rhetoric of the century that followed, or in the forms of government fashioned in the likeness of this rhetoric, or in the goals of governments so fashioned. Men sought a constitutional regime which disestablished ancient privilege, guaranteed liberties, and promoted the general welfare through what came to be known as liberal social policies. Liberalism was at first characterized by the opposition to state intervention in economic affairs, and later by the advocacy of such intervention, but the intervention in question was a fairly mild business, it being no liberal's view that the state was an especially trustworthy servant of the citizen. The citizen, as liberals viewed the world, was a very important person, especially perhaps if he tended to clean linen.

The Russian revolution of 1917 brought into existence a regime even more dramatically different from its predecessors than had the liberal regimes of a century earlier been from theirs. Everything, it was understood, had changed. Those who would change everything, or who believed that, like it or not, everything was going to change, rallied to this rhetoric. As for the rest of the world, it came soon enough to know that a wholly extraordinary event had occurred, even that the future had occurred. For three decades, culminating in the triumph of Communist arms in China in 1948, this was quite the most vivid, and the most attended to, movement in the world.

The British revolution of the second quarter of the 20th century attracted no such attention. Everyone certainly recognized that new states were coming into existence out of former European, and indeed mostly British, colonies, but the tendency was to see them as candidates for incorporation into one or the other of the older revolutionary traditions then dominant elsewhere in the world. It was not generally perceived that they were in a sense already spoken for—that they came to independence with a preexisting, coherent, and surprisingly stable ideological base which, while related to both the earlier traditions, was distinct from both. This most likely accounts for the almost incurious initial reaction in what would soon be known as the First and Second Worlds. In the Republic of India the United States could see democracy; the Soviets could see socialism. In truth, a certain Hegelian synthesis had occurred. On the one hand, the Minimal State of the American revolution; in response, the Total State of the Russian revolution; in synthesis, the Welfare State of the British revolution.

SAMUEL H. BEER describes the doctrine of British socialism as follows:

> . . . it is especially the socialist's commitment to "fellowship" that fundamentally distinguishes his approach. . . . For private ownership he would substitute public ownership; for production for profit, production for use; for competition, cooperation. A cultural and ethical revolution would also take place, and motives that had aimed at individual benefit would now aim at common benefits. Industry, which had been governed by individual decisions within the competitive system, would be subject to collective and democratic control. . . . Government would consist in comprehensive and continuous planning and administration.

Two general points may be made about this British doctrine. First, it contained a suspicion of, almost a bias against, economic development which carried over into those parts of the world where British culture held sway. The fundamental assertion of the age of the Diamond Jubilee was that there was plenty of wealth to go 'round if only it were fairly distributed. No matter what more thoughtful socialist analysts might urge, redistribution, not production, remained central to the ethos of British socialism. Profit became synonymous with exploitation. That profit might be something conceptually elegant—least-cost production—made scarcely any impress. "Production for profit" became a formulation for all that was wrong in the old ways, and Tories half-agreed. (For it was the Liberals and the Radicals who

* The term British revolution is open to objection as seeming to exclude the influence of continental socialism on the new nations, and indeed a good case could be made for calling the phenomenon I am trying to describe the revolution of the Second International. But the term British can be justified by the fact that of the 87 states to have joined the UN since its founding, more than half—47—had been part of the British empire. Even apart from the empire, British culture was in the first half of this century incomparably the most influential in the world, and that culture was increasingly suffused with socialist ideas and attitudes. I anticipate and hope for a rigorous critique of the arguments of this paper, but I also hope it will not be too much distracted by the difficulties of finding a concise term to describe what was on the whole a concise phenomenon; the development of socialist doctrine and the formation of socialist parties in Western Europe at this time. I should also note that the political ideology in the new states of the Third World of which I will be speaking was best described by the late George Lichtheim as "national socialism." This term has, of course, acquired an altogether unacceptable connotation.

were being repudiated by such doctrine, and it was the Liberal party that went under.) This, too, was passed on. When Sir Arthur Lewis in 1974 gave the Tata lectures in India and found himself pleading, as a socialist and as a man of the Third World, but also as an economist, that profit was not a concept public-sector enterprise could afford to ignore, no less a personage than the head of the Indian Planning Commission felt called upon to rebut him.

To be sure, much of this redistributionist bias was simply innocent. British socialists, for example, proved in office to know almost nothing about how actually to redistribute income, and British income has not been significantly redistributed. Coming to power just after World War II, the socialists appeared to think they had abolished wealth by imposing a top income-tax rate of nineteen shillings six pence in the twenty-shilling pound, which is to say confiscating the rich man's pay envelope. Few seemed to note that capital gains remained exempt from income tax altogether, so that in large measure thereafter only those with property could acquire property: the very antithesis of the social condition socialism sought. (This detail perhaps did not escape the well-to-do of the developing nations when the prospect of socialism on the British model first appeared there.)

THE second general point about socialist doctrine as it developed in Britain was that it was anti-American. More anti-American, surely, than it was ever anti-Soviet. The reasons for this are not that obscure. The British were not overmuch admiring of Americans in that era, nor we of them. In part their attitude began as aristocratical disdain. (An intimate of Pandit Nehru's describes once asking India's first Prime Minister why he was so anti-American. This was in 1961. Nehru's first reaction was a rather huffy denial of any such predisposition, but he then became reflective and after a moment admitted that, yes, it was true, and that probably it all dated back to his days at Harrow. There was one American boy there at the time: filthy rich, and much too pushy.) But more importantly, of course, America was seen as quintessentially capitalist.

With the Russian revolution, and then especially with the world depression of the 1930's and the onset of popular-front movements in Europe, a considerable number of British socialists, despite their party's fundamental and central attachment to democratic processes, became supporters of the Soviet regime. Russia was the future. America was the past. With the coming of the cold war this attitude became institutionalized and almost compulsory on the British Left. The *New Statesman*, a journal which tended to follow Asian and African graduates after they had left Britain and returned home, became near Stalinist in its attachment to Soviet ways with the world and its pervasive antagonism to things American.

And yet the *New Statesman* was never Communist, and neither, save in small proportion, were its readers. They were British socialists, part of a movement of opinion which spread in the course of the first half of the 20th century to the whole of the British empire, a domain which covered one-quarter of the earth's surface, and which an inspired cartographic convention had long ago decreed be colored pink. It was British civil servants who took the doctrine to the colonies. (How curious, in retrospect, are the agonizings of Harold Laski and others as to whether the civil service would carry out the policies of a socialist government. What more congenial task for persons whose status comes from the power and prestige of government? But in the Britain of that era it could be thought that class origin would somehow overcome occupational interest.)

What the civil service began, British education completed. Has there ever been a conversion as complete as that of the Malay, the Ibo, the Gujarati, the Jamaican, the Australian, the Cypriot, the Guyanan, the Yemenite, the Yoruban, the sabra, the felaheen to this distant creed? The London School of Economics, Shils notes, was often said to be the most important institution of higher education in Asia and Africa. In her autobiography, Beatrice Webb wrote that she and her husband felt "assured that with the School [LSE] as the teaching body, the Fabian Society as a propagandist organization, the LCC [London County Council] as object lesson in electoral success, our books as the only elaborate original work in economic fact and theory, no young man or woman who is anxious to study or to work in public affairs can fail to come under our influence." For reasons that are understandable, this was true most particularly for young men and women coming from abroad in that long and incongruously optimistic intellectual age that began amid late Victorian plumpness and ended with the austerity of postwar Britain. In 1950 the conservative Michael Oakeshott succeeded to the Fabian Harold Laski's chair in political theory at LSE and in a sense *that* party was over. But by then not Communists but Fabians could claim that the largest portion of the world's population lived in regimes of their fashioning. Before very long, the arithmetical majority and the ideological coherence of those new nations brought them to dominance in the United Nations and, indeed, in any world forum characterized by universal membership.

BUT if the new nations absorbed ideas about others from the doctrines of British socialism, they also absorbed ideas about themselves. The master concept, of course, is that they had the right to independence. This idea

goes back to the American revolution, and even beyond to the Glorious Revolution in 17th-century Britain, but British socialism readily incorporated and even appropriated it. As the 20th century wore on and the issue of independence arose with respect to these specific peoples and places, it was most often the socialists who became the principal *political* sponsors of independence. It was a Labour government which in 1947 granted independence to India and formally commenced the vast, peaceful revolution that followed. The Indian Congress party had been founded in 1883 by a British civil servant, Alan Octavian Hume, whose politics were essentially Liberal. But by the time of independence, it was a matter to be taken for granted that the Congress was socialist and that its leaders, Gandhi and then Nehru, were socialists too.

Two further concepts triangulate and fix the imported political culture of these new nations. The first is the belief—often, of course, justified—that they have been subject to economic exploitation, exactly as the working class is said in socialist theory to have been exploited under capitalism. The second is the belief—also, of course, often justified—that they have been subject to ethnic discrimination corresponding to class distinctions in industrial society. As with the belief in the right to independence, these concepts, which now seem wholly natural, rarely occur in nature. They are learned ideas, and they were learned by the new nations mostly where they mostly originated, in the intellectual and political circles of Britain of the late 19th and early 20th century. Gandhi greatly elucidated the moral dimensions of exploitation and discrimination, but he did so in the context of a worldwide political movement that was more than receptive to his ideas, a political movement of which he was a part. At root, the ideas of exploitation and discrimination represent a transfer to colonial populations of the fundamental socialist assertions with respect to the condition of the European working class, just as the idea of independence parallels the demand that the working class break out of bondage and rise to power.

Now it is possible to imagine a country, or collection of countries, with a background similar to that of the British colonies, attaining independence and then letting bygones be bygones. The Americans did that: our political culture did not suggest any alternative. International life was thought to operate in Wordsworth's terms:

> The good old rule
> . . . The simple plan
> That they should take, who have the power.
> And they should keep who can.

So in their own terms might Marxists judge the aftermath of Marxist triumph: history was working its ineluctable way; there would be no point, no logic, in holding the past to account. Not so the heirs of the British revolution. British socialism is, was, and remains a highly moral creed. It is not a politics of revenge; it is too civil for that. But reparations? Yes: reparations. This idea was fundamental to the social hope of a movement which, it must ever be recalled, rested on the assumption that there existed vast stores of unethically accumulated wealth. On the edges of the movement there were those who saw the future not just in terms of redistribution, but of something ominously close to looting. In any event, the past was by no means to be judged over and done with. There were scores to be settled. Internally and internationally.

A final distinctive character of the British revolution concerns procedure. Wrongs are to be righted by legislation. The movement was fundamentally parliamentarian. The Labour party came to power through the ballot, and proceeded to change society by statute. This was dramatically so with respect to the empire. For the first time in the history of mankind a vast empire dismantled itself, piece by piece, of its own systematic accord. A third of the nations of the world today owe their existence to a statute of Westminister. What more profound experience could there be of the potency of parliamentary majorities in distant places, and of their enactments?

Plainly, not all the new nations of the postwar world were formerly British. There were French colonies. Belgian. Dutch. Portuguese. Political traditions in each case were different from the British. But only *slightly* different: viewed from Mars, London, Paris, and The Hague are not widely separated or disparate places. By the time of the granting of independence, all were democratic with a socialist intelligentsia and often as not a socialist government. With the exception of Algeria—which is marked by the exception—the former French and Dutch colonies came into being in very much the manner the British had laid down. For a prolonged initial period the former British possessions had pride of place in the ex-colonial world—they speak English at the UN, not American—and pretty much set the style of politics which has become steadily more conspicuous in international affairs.

Nor everyone has noticed this. Indeed, there is scarcely yet a vocabulary in which to describe it. In part, this is because the event is recent; but also because it was incomplete. As with the liberal revolution which came out of America, and the Communist revolution which came out of Russia, this socialist revolution coming mainly out of Britain carred only so much of the world in its initial period of expansion. The liberal revolution of America was not exactly a spent force by the mid-20th century, but (*pace* the Mekong Delta Development Plan) there was never any great prospect of its expanding to new

territories. On the other hand, the heirs of the Russian revolution did capture China, the greatest of all the prizes, in 1948, and at least part of Indochina a bit later. But in the main the Communist revolution stopped right there, and the two older revolutions now hold sway within fairly well-defined boundaries. Since 1950 it has been not they but the heirs of the British revolution who have been expanding.

Almost the first international political act of the new states was to form the nonaligned bloc, distinguishing themselves—partially—from the two blocs into which the immediate postwar world had formed. From politics the emphasis shifted to economic affairs. In 1968 these countries, meeting at Algiers, formed the Group of 77 as a formal economic bloc. Their Joint Statement described the group as "comprising the vast majority of the human race"—and indeed it did. The B's in the list of members gave a sense of the range of nations and peoples involved: Bahrain, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi. And yet there was—now somewhat hidden—unity to the list. Of these eight countries, five were formerly British-governed or British-directed. At its second Ministerial Meeting in Lima in 1971, the group (now numbering 96) drew up an Action Program which stated, *inter alia*, that developing countries should

> encourage and promote appropriate commodity action and, particularly, the protection of the interests of primary producers of the region through intensive consultations among producer countries in order to encourage appropriate policies, leading to the establishment of producers' associations and understandings. . . .

This was represented in the press as a major gain for the black African states who carried the point over objections from Latin Americans accustomed to working out raw-material and commodity arrangements with the United States. But the idea was fundamentally a heritage of the British revolution, and if the black Africans took the lead in proclaiming it, there is no reason to think it was any less familiar to Arabs. They had all gone to the same schools. Was it not right for those who have only their labor to sell, or only the products of their soil, to organize to confront capital? Had they not been exploited?

II

How has the United States dealt with these new nations and their distinctive ideology? Clearly we have not dealt very successfully. This past year, in the 29th General Assembly, we were frequently reduced to a voting bloc which, with variations, consisted of ourselves, Chile, and the Dominican Republic. As this "historic session" closed, the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations declared: "The activities of the Soviet delegation at the session showed once again that the Soviet Union deeply understands and shares the aspirations of the Third World." This was not Krishna Menon, but a balanced and considerate Asian diplomat. If no equivalent pronouncement on China comes immediately to hand, this may be because the Chinese feel free to identify themselves as members of the Third World. As such, at the end of 1974 they declared that the new majority had written a "brilliant chapter" during the twelve months previous, that it was "sweeping ahead full sail as the boat of imperialism [the United States] and hegemonism [the Soviet Union] founders." "These days," the Chinese statement continued, "the United Nations often takes on the appearance of an international court with the Third World pressing the charges and conducting the trial." A statement to which many could subscribe. But no such statement could come from an American statesman, no such praise would be accorded American policy. Clearly at some level—we all but *started* the United Nations—there has been a massive failure of American diplomacy.

But why? Why has the United States dealt so unsuccessfully with these nations and their distinct ideology? A first thought is that we have not seen the ideology as distinctive. Not recognizing it, we have made no sustained effort to relate ourselves to it. The totalitarian states, from their point of view, did. They recognize ideologies. By 1971 it was clear enough that the Third World—a few exceptions here and there—was not going Communist. But it was nevertheless possible to encourage it in directions that veered very considerably from any tendency the bloc might have to establish fruitful relations with the West; and this was done. It was done, moreover, with the blind acquiescence and even agreement of the United States which kept endorsing principles for whose logical outcome it was wholly unprepared and with which it could never actually go along.

A relatively small but revealing example of this process may be seen in the development of the World Social Report, a document of the Economic and Social Council. The first volume, covering the year 1963, was directed almost exclusively to problems of the developing countries, and the United States took its advent as a promising event. The 1965 report, concentrating on "practical methods of promoting social change," might have caused some to take note, but American officials were entirely unwary: this was, after all, a report designed to help the developing world. In actual fact, it was becoming a document based on the veritably totalitarian idea that social justice means social stability and that social stability means the absence of social protest. Thus by 1970, the Soviet Union—

not much social protest there!—emerges as the very embodiment of the just state, while the United States is a nation in near turmoil from the injustices it wreaks upon the poor and the protests these injustices have provoked. And Western Europe hardly comes off any better.

What happened here was that a "Finlandized" Secretariat (the official in charge of preparing the document was indeed a Finn) found that the developing countries and the Communist countries had an easy common interest in portraying their own progress, justifying the effective suppression of dissent, and in the process deprecating and indicting the seeming progress of Western societies. It is easy enough to see that this would be in the interest of the Soviet bloc. (The Chinese did not participate in the debate.) But why the developing world? First, the developing nations could ally with the totalitarians in depicting social reality in this way, in part because so many, having edged toward authoritarian regimes, faced the same problems the Communists would have encountered with a liberal analysis of civil liberties. Secondly, the developing nations had an interest in deprecating the economic achievements of capitalism, since almost none of their own managed economies was doing well. To deplore, to deride, the social effects of affluence in the United States is scarcely a recent invention. For a generation the British Left has held the patent. Further, there is an almost automatic interest on the Left in delegitimating wealth—prior to redistributing it—much as the opposite interest exists on the Right.

Small wonder that officials could describe the Social Report as the most popular document in the UN series, a statement intended as more than faint praise. Yet it has been more representative than otherwise. There are hundreds like it, suffused with a neo-totalitarian, anti-American bias.

American protests at the 26th General Assembly have evidently influenced the most recent Social Report, submitted to the 29th, but here the significant fact is that this protest—entered at the very last moment, when the document was being presented for pro-forma approval—was the first of its kind, or one of the first. In fact the United States until then did not protest. To the contrary, the United States actively participated in preparing this sustained assault on American institutions. The 1970 Social Report had been three years in the making. During those three years it made its way through layers of bureaucracies, all manner of meetings. Americans were always present, and Americans always approved. This was, after all, a Third World document; it was to be treated with tolerance and understanding. Complacency of this order could only arise from the failure to perceive that a distinctive ideology was at work, and that skill and intelligence were required to deal with it successfully.

THE blindness of American diplomacy to the process persists. Two large events occurred in 1971, and a series of smaller ones were set in motion. China entered the United Nations, an event the Third World representatives saw as a decisive shift of power to their camp. In that same year the Lima conference established the nonaligned as an economic bloc intent on producer cartels. Less noticed, but perhaps no less important in its implications, a distinctive radicalization began in what might as well be termed world social policy.

This radicalization was first clearly evidenced at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held at Stockholm in 1972, or more precisely at the 26th General Assembly, which was finally to authorize the conference. The conference was in considerable measure an American initiative, and while American negotiators were primarily concerned with ways to get the Russians to join (which in the end they did not), the Brazilians suddenly stormed onto the scene to denounce the whole enterprise as a conspiracy of the haves to keep the have-nots down and out. The argument was that the rich had got rich by polluting their environments and now proposed to stay that way by preventing anyone else from polluting theirs. This, among other things, would insure that the rich would continue their monopoly on the use of the raw materials of the poor. Thus was it asserted that matters originally put forward as soluble in the context of existing economic and political relations were nothing of the sort. To the contrary, they were symptomatic of economic and political exploitation and injustice which could only be resolved by the most profound transformation: to expropriate the expropriators.

At Stockholm itself, this quickly became the dominant theme—espoused by a dominant majority. "Are not poverty and need the greatest pollutors?" Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India asked. "There are grave misgivings," she continued, "that the discussion of ecology may be designed to distract attention from the problems of war and poverty." She was wrong in this. They were not so designed. But at Stockholm the nations who feared they might be took control of the agenda. The conference declared as its first principle:

> Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality, and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality which permits a life of dignity and well being, and bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations. In this respect, policies promoting or perpetuating apartheid, racial segregation, discrimination, colonial and other forms of oppression and foreign domination stand condemned and must be eliminated.

The American delegates routinely voted for this

resolution. It was, after all, language the new countries wanted. What wholly unwelcome meanings might be attached to "other forms of oppression and foreign domination" which stood "condemned" and had to be "eliminated" was a thought scarcely in keeping with the spirit of the occasion.

THE Stockholm Conference had been turbulent. The United Nations World Population Conference, held nearly two years later, in August 1974, had an air of insurrection. This conference too was largely an American initiative, the culmination of years of State Department effort to put population on the agenda of world social policy. The Secretary General of the United Nations proclaimed the gathering would be "a turning point in the history of mankind." The centerpiece was a Draft World Population Plan of Action, which in essence set 1985 as the year crude birth rates in developing countries would be reduced to 30 per thousand (as against an anticipated 34) and when "the necessary information and education about family planning and means to practice family planning" would be available "to all persons who so desire. . . ." There can be no doubt of the social change implicit in such a conference's even meeting: in most industrialized countries, family planning has only just achieved the status of an accepted social value deserving of public support. Yet neither should there be any doubt that a disaster overtook the American position in the course of the conference, and that this disaster was wholly predictable.

To begin with, the conference was thought up by Americans to deal with a problem we consider that other people have. (In fairness, not long ago the United States itself was thought to have a problem of population size, while the provision of family-planning services is an issue of social equity as well as of population growth.) Specifically, it was considered a problem of the developing countries: countries, that is, of the British revolution who are animated by the liveliest sense that their troubles originate in capitalist and imperialist systems of which the United States all but offered itself as an exemplar. Further, the conference met in Bucharest, capital of a Communist country. At one level no great imagination would have been required to anticipate the outcome. President Nicolae Ceausescu opened the conference by declaring that "The division of the world into developed and underdeveloped countries is a result of historical evolution, and is a direct consequence of the imperialist, colonialist, and neo-colonialist policies of exploitation of many peoples." He called for "a new international economic order" and condemned "a pessimistic outlook" on population growth.

But if this was to be expected, few could have anticipated the wild energy of the Chinese assault on the Western position. China has the strictest of all population-control programs. Yet the Chinese arrived in Rumania to assail with unprecedented fury and devastating zeal the very idea of population control as fundamentally subversive of the future of the Third World. The future, the Chinese proclaimed, is infinitely bright. Only the imperialists and the hegemonists could spoil it, and population control was to be their wrecking device. A theory of "consumerism" emerged: it was excessive consumption in the developed economies which was the true source of the problems of the underdeveloped nations and not the size of the latter's population. None dared oppose the thesis. The Indians, who are thought to have a population problem, went to the conference rather disposed to endorse a Plan of Action. But they did nothing of the sort. Instead, the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, who headed the Indian delegation, found himself denouncing "colonial denudation" of the East, and the "vulgar affluence" of the West. The scene grew orgiastic.

In the end, a doctrine emerged which is almost certainly more true than otherwise, namely that social and economic change is the fundamental determinant of fertility change, compared with which family planning as such has at most a residual role. There need be no difficulty with this assertion. The difficulty comes with the conclusion said to follow: that economic growth in the West should cease and the wealth of the world be redistributed. We are back to Keir Hardie, expropriating the expropriators. Not to produce wealth, but to redistribute it. As with the environment conference, the population conference turned into another occasion for reminding the West of its alleged crimes and unresolved obligations.

THIS tone attained to manic proportions in Population Tribune, an unofficial, American-financed parallel conference of a form that first appeared in Stockholm. Ritual recantation became the order of the day as one notable after another confessed to a class-bound past which had blinded him to the infinitely bright future. Most of the recanters were American, but it was Professor René Dumont of France who epitomized the argument in a statement, "Population and Cannibals," which was subsequently given the full front page of *Development Forum*, an official, five-language, UN publication. Professor Dumont—blaming the "Plunderers of the Third World" for world conditions—"They . . . 'under-pay' for the rare raw materials of the Third World and then squander them"—put the case with some vivacity:

> *Eating little children.* I have already had occasion to show that the rich white man, with his overconsumption of meat and his lack of generosity toward poor populations, acts like a true cannibal, albeit indirect. Last year, in over-

consuming meat which wasted the cereals which could have saved them, we ate the little children of the Sahel, of Ethiopia, and of Bangladesh. And this year, we are continuing to do the same thing, with the same appetite.

Dr. Han Suyin, a sympathetic commentator on Chinese Communist affairs, summed up for others:

> You cannot cut off any talk about population, about people, from economics and politics. You cannot put in a vacuum any talk about population and world resources without relation to the present as it exists. I admire people who can talk about a noble future where there will be an equal society and where resources will be controlled by all. But, forgive me for saying so, if this is to be done, then we have to begin by sharing now everything and that would mean that a lot of people who have a lot of private property, for instance, should divest themselves immediately of it in favor of the poor. It means that at this very moment we should start to implement a very simple thing—something which we heard . . . at the United Nations at the sixth special session of the United Nations where the voice of the Third World—the majority of the world—at last formulated their demand for more equitable terms of trade, and for an end to exploitation, for an end to the real cause of poverty and backwardness, which is not population, but which is injustice and exploitation. The Third World has a word for it, it calls it imperialism and hegemony.

And the American delegation? The official view, flashed to diplomatic posts around the world, was as uncomplicated at the end as it had been at the outset: "ALL BASIC U.S. OBJECTIVES WERE ACHIEVED AND U.S. ACCOMPLISHMENTS WERE MANY. . . . U.S. DELEGATION UNANIMOUSLY PLEASED WITH FINAL RESULT."

THE World Food Conference which followed in Rome in November was even more explicitly an American initiative, Yet as the American delegation somewhat sadly noted, the plenary forum was used to the fullest by LDC's (Less Developed Countries) to excoriate the United States and other developed nations as responsible for the current food crisis and the generally depressed state of their part of the world, calling for "radical adjustment in the current economic order and, in effect, reparations from developed countries" to the less developed. Such negotiations as took place were somewhat more sober since something immediately of value —wheat—was at stake and obviously only the United States and a few such countries were prepared to part with any. Even so, by the time the conference was concluded, one of the great, and truly liberal, innovations of world social policy—the American-led assertion that the hungry of the world should be fed by transfers of resources—had been utterly deprecated. Thus the Indian Food Minister's statement with respect to the needs of the developing countries:

> It is obvious that the developed nations can be held responsible for their [the developing nations'] present plight. Developed nations, therefore, have a duty to help them. Whatever help is rendered to them now should not be regarded as charity but deferred compensation for what has been done to them in the past by the developed countries.

The UN General Assembly pursued this theme with notable persistence throughout 1974, commencing with a special session in the spring which dealt with the economic crises of the underdeveloped in just such terms. Occasioned as much as anything by the devastating impact of oil price increases, the special session dwelt on every conceivable abuse of economic power save that one. At the end of the regular autumn session, the General Assembly solemnly adopted a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States which accords to each state the right freely to exercise full permanent sovereignty over its wealth and natural resources, to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments, and to nationalize, expropriate, or transfer ownership of foreign property pretty much at will. The vote was 120 to 6—the United States, Belgium, Denmark, West Germany, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom. What was being asserted was a radical discontinuity with the original, essentially liberal vision of the United Nations as a regime of international law and practice which acknowledges all manner of claims, but claims that move in all directions. Now they moved in one direction only.

In general a rhetoric of expropriation became routine. At year's end, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, opening the 56th Conference of the International Law Association meeting in New Delhi, declared:

> Laws designed to protect the political or economic power of a few against the rights of the many, must . . . yield place to laws which enlarge the area of equality, and . . . law itself should be an ally and instrument of change.

She spoke a now-common language of resentment over population issues:

> Is it not a new form of arrogance for affluent nations to regard the poorer nations as an improvident species whose numbers are a threat to their own standard of living?

She suggested a reversal of roles had taken place as between the new nations and the old:

> An obligation rests on the haves to generate confidence among the have-nots. . . . A new approach to foreign investments is indicated, in which investments abroad are regarded more as a service to the recipient community than as an enterprise where profits and their repatriation must be secured at all cost.

Now there is nothing unfamiliar in this language:

only the setting is new. It is the language of British socialism applied to the international scene. American diplomacy has yet to recognize this fact and, failing to recognize it, has failed even to begin dealing intelligently with it.

III

But if the beginning of wisdom in dealing with the nations of the Third World is to recognize their essential ideological coherence, the next step is to recognize that there is every reason to welcome this ideology, and to welcome the coherence also. Because of the British revolution and its heritage, the prospect now is that the world will not go totalitarian. In the Christian sense, has there been such political "good news" in our time? But there is bad news also. The great darkness could yet consume us. The potential for absorption of these states into the totalitarian camp is there and will continue to be there. This is perhaps especially true where one-party states have been established, but even where multi-party democracy flourishes the tug of the "socialist countries," to use the UN term, persists.

The outcome will almost certainly turn on whether or not these nations, individually and in groups, succeed in establishing sufficiently productive economies. If they do not, if instead they become permanently dependent on outside assistance, that assistance is likely more and more to come from the totalitarian nations, and with it the price of internal political influence from the totalitarian camp through the local pro-Moscow, or pro-Peking, Communist party. For everywhere there are such parties. They appear able to go on indefinitely in a dormant state, and can be awakened pretty much at will. India, with a population equal to that of the whole of Africa and South America combined, is the best current example. Parliamentary democracy is vigorous enough there, but economic incompetence on its part and diplomatic blunders on ours have led to an increasing dependence on Soviet support, which in the space of three years has brought about an open electoral alliance between the Congress party and the Moscow-oriented Communists, an alliance we would have thought worth fighting a war to prevent two decades ago, but which we scarcely notice today.

This alliance would not have come about save for the failure of the Indian economy to prosper and the success—typical—of the argument that the cure for the damage done by leftist policies is even more leftist policies, which in practice translates into dependence on the Soviets and alliances with their internal allies. And here is the nub of the bad news: for all the attractions of this variety of socialist politics, it has proved, in almost all its versions, almost the world over, to be a distinctly poor means of producing wealth. Sharing wealth—perhaps. But not producing wealth. Who, having read British political journals over the past quarter-century, would be surprised to find that during this period (1950-73) the United Kingdom's share of the "Planetary Product" has been reduced from 5.8 to 3.1 per cent? Why then be surprised that those who have made British socialism their model have trouble taking off in the opposite direction? Yet even so, one must be surprised at the decline of economies such as those of Burma and Sri Lanka: immensely productive places not a generation ago. Sri Lanka, for example, having first got to the point where it was importing potatoes from Poland, has now got to the further point where it can no longer afford to do so. A recent survey of the Ceylonese economy in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* was entitled: "Conspiracy or Catastrophe?" For what else could explain such failure?

What else, that is, to those experiencing it (with all that implies for political instability)? The outsider can indulge a more relaxed view. The fault lies in ideas, not persons. Americans—Westerners—do not have any claim to superior wisdom on the subject of these economies. Starting in the 1950's a large number of first-rate economists began working on theories of economic growth designed to get the LDC's on a path of self-sustained growth. "To be perfectly brutal about it," Jesse Burkhead recently stated, "it hasn't worked." And yet there is no need to stand mute. Two assertions may be reasonably put forth, of which the first is that to say these economies haven't worked as well as hoped is not to say that none has worked at all. There *has* been growth. In the main, things are better than they were. For every Argentina—that "miracle" of economic non-growth—there is a Brazil. For Ghana, Nigeria. For Calcutta, Singapore. The second assertion is that relative failure is particularly to be encountered in economies most heavily influenced by that version of late Fabian economics which compounded the Edwardian view that there was plenty to go around if justly distributed with the 1930's view that capitalism could never produce enough to go around regardless of distributive principles.*

Still, there are gains in the relative loss of income associated with the managed economies of the Third World which need to be appreciated. An Asian economist has said of his own country, plaintively yet not without a certain defiance: "We are socialists, so we do not

* This latter idea is very much alive. On leaving my post as United States Ambassador to India, I gave a press conference in which *inter alia* I touched upon the failure of India to achieve a productive economy. The *National Herald*, the Nehru family newspaper, commented in an editorial: "Mr. Moynihan may be justified in some of his criticism of the state of the Indian economy, but what he is trying to sell is the capitalist system which can only impoverish India's millions further."

believe in capitalism. We are democrats, so we do not believe in terror. What, then, is our alternative save one per cent a year?" There *is* a welfare state of sorts; there is protection of industrial labor; and in some countries, at least, there is freedom to protest.

But the most distinctive gain and the least noted is that in the course of its outward journey, the managed economy was transmuted from an instrument of economic rationality to an instrument of political rationality. It is sometimes difficult to recall, but early socialist theory expounded the greater *efficiency* of production for use rather than for capital, and put much stress on capitalist wastefulness. In practice, however, the real attraction of the managed economy has been the means it provides to collect enough political power at the center to maintain national unity—almost everywhere a chancy thing in these generally multi-ethnic states.

One must still conclude, however, that these political gains are purchased at the expense of even more conspicuous economic losses. India will serve for a final example. In the year of its independence, 1947, India produced 1.2 million tons of steel and Japan only 900,000 tons. A quarter-century later, in 1972, India produced 6.8 million tons and Japan 106.8. These outcomes are the result of decisions made by the ruling party of each nation, and only an innocent could continue to accept Indian protestations that the results were unexpected. The break in Indian growth came precisely in 1962 when the United States, which had been about to finance its largest aid project ever, a steel complex at Bokharo in Eastern India, insisted that it be managed privately. India insisted on a public-sector plant, for which read a plant that would do what the Prime Minister of India wanted done. In the manner of the Aswan Dam (and with as much political impact), the Russians stepped in to finance the public-sector plant. By 1974 this plant had yet to produce sheet steel. For the period 1962-72 Indian steel production grew by a bare 1.8 per cent, while Japanese grew 13.4 per cent.

There is no serious way to deny that India has in a very real sense desired this outcome, just as there is no way to deny that high living standards in the modern world are associated with relatively free market economies and with liberalist international trade policies. Granted that much economic policy does not have high living standards as its true objective, but is rather concerned with political stability, and granted that such a concern may be wholly legitimate in a new nation —in any event it is not anyone else's business—it nevertheless remains the case that the relative economic failure accompanying political success in regimes such as that of India sooner or later begins to undermine that very success. Promises are made and political stability, especially in the more democratic regimes, requires some measure of performance. When it is not forthcoming, regimes change. They become less democratic. They become less independent.

Neither of these developments can be welcomed by the United States. The United States in the past may have cared about the course of political events in these nations, but only in the most abstract terms. (Consider the casualness with which we armed Pakistan and incurred the bitter and enduring hostility of India, the second most populous nation in the world.) But India has now exploded a nuclear device. *That* may well prove the most important event of the turbulent year 1974. Other Third World nations are likely to follow. Hence political stability in the Third World acquires a meaning it simply has never in the past had for American strategic thinking, as well as our general view of world politics.

IV

WHAT then is to be done? We are witnessing the emergence of a world order dominated arithmetically by the countries of the Third World. This order is already much too developed for the United States or any other nation to think of opting out. It can't be done. One may become a delinquent in this nascent world society. An outcast in it. But one remains "in" it. There is no escape from a definition of nationhood which derives primarily from the new international reality. Nor does this reality respond much to the kind of paintully impotent threats which are sometimes heard of America's "pulling out." Anyone who doubts that Dubai can pay for UNESCO, knows little of UNESCO, less of what the United States pays, and nothing whatever of Dubai.

In any event, matters of this sort aside, world society and world organization have evolved to the point where palpable interests are disposed in international forums to a degree without precedent. Witness, as an instance, the decisions of the World Court allocating the oil fields of the North Sea among the various littoral states in distinctly weighted (but no doubt proper) manner. Witness the current negotiations at the Law of the Sea Conference. Two-thirds of the world is covered by the sea, and the United Nations claims the seabed. That seabed, especially in the region around Hawaii, is rich in so-called "manganese nodules"—concentrations of ore which American technology is now able to exploit, or will be sooner than anyone else. At this moment we have, arguably, complete and perfect freedom to commence industrial use of the high seas. This freedom is being challenged, however, and almost certainly some form of international regime is about to be established. It can be a regime that permits American technology to go forward on some kind of license-and-royalties basis. Or it can assert exclusive "internationalized" rights to exploitation

in an international public corporation. The stakes are considerable. They are enormous.

And then, of course, there remains the overriding interest, a true international interest, in arms control, and here true international government has emerged in a most impressive manner. If we were to ask who is the most important international official, a persuasive case could be made for choosing the Inspector General of the International Atomic Energy Authority, the man who supervises the safeguard agreements of the world's atomic reactors. Few would know the name of this unobtrusive Swiss chemist; few, perhaps, need to. But more than a few do need to know that the post is there and that its viability derives ultimately from the international system of which it is a part. For the moment, American security derives primarily from our own armaments, and our strategic agreements with the Soviet Union and a few other powers. But the international regime of arms control is already important and certain to become more so.

If, that is, it does not go down in the general wreckage of the world system embodied now in the United Nations. But assuming that the new majority will not destroy the regime through actions that drive nations like the United States away, is it not reasonable to anticipate a quasi-parliamentary situation at the international level —the General Assembly and a dozen such forums —in which a nominally radical majority sets about legislating its presumed advantage in a world which has just come into its hands? The qualification "quasi-parliamentary" is necessary, for in fact the pronouncements of these assemblies have but limited force. So did the pronouncements of the Continental Congress. They are not on that ground to be ignored. What then does the United States do?

The United States goes into opposition. This is our circumstance. We are a minority. We are outvoted. This is neither an unprecedented nor an intolerable situation. The question is what do we make of it. So far we have made little—nothing—of what is in fact an opportunity. We go about dazed that the world has changed. We toy with the idea of stopping it and getting off. We rebound with the thought that if only we are more reasonable perhaps "they" will be. (Almost to the end, dominant opinion in the U.S. Mission to the United Nations was that the United States could not vote against the "have-nots" by opposing the Charter on the Rights and Duties of States—all rights for the Group of 77 and no duties.) But "they" do not grow reasonable. Instead, we grow unreasonable. A sterile enterprise which awaits total redefinition.

Going into opposition requires first of all that we recognize that there is a distinctive ideology at work in the Third World, and that it has a distinctive history and logic. To repeat the point once again, we have not done this, tending to see these new political cultures in our own image, or in that of the totalitarians, with a steady shift in the general perception from the former to the latter. But once we perceive the coherence in the majority, we will be in a position to reach for a certain coherence of opposition.

Three central issues commend themselves as points of systematic attack: first, the condition of international liberalism; second, the world economy; third, the state of political and civil liberties and of the general welfare. The rudiments of these arguments need only be sketched.

It is the peculiar function of "radical" political demands, such as those most recently heard in the international forums, that they bring about an exceptional deprecation of the achievements of liberal processes. Even when the radicalism is ultimately rejected, this is rarely from a sense that established processes do better and promise more. American liberalism experienced this deprecation in the 1960's; international liberalism is undergoing it in the 1970's. But the truth is that international liberalism and its processes have enormous recent achievements to their credit. It is time for the United States to start saying so.

One example is the multinational corporation which, combining modern management with liberal trade policies, is arguably the most creative international institution of the 20th century. A less controversial example is the World Health Organization. In 1966 it set out to abolish smallpox, and by the time this article is read, the job will more than likely have been successfully completed—in very significant measure with the techniques and participation of American epidemiologists. While not many Americans have been getting smallpox of late, the United States has been spending $140 million a year to keep it that way. Savings in that proportion and more will immediately follow. Here, as in a very long list, a liberal world policy has made national sense.

We should resist the temptation to designate agreeable policies as liberal merely on grounds of agreeableness. There are harder criteria. Liberal policies are limited in their undertakings, concrete in their means, representative in their mode of adoption, and definable in terms of results. These are surely the techniques appropriate to a still tentative, still emergent world society. It is time for the United States, as the new society's loyal opposition, to say this directly, loudly, forcefully.

THE economic argument—which will appear inconsistent only to those who have never been much in politics—is that the world economy is not nearly bad enough to justify the measures proposed by the majority, and yet is much worse than it would otherwise be in consequence of measures the majority has al-

ready taken. The first half of this formulation will require a considerable shift in the government mind, and possibly even some movement in American elite opinion also, for we have become great producers and distributors of crisis. The world environment crisis, the world population crisis, the world food crisis are in the main American discoveries—or inventions, opinions differ. Yet the simple and direct fact is that any crisis the United States takes to an international forum in the foreseeable future will be decided to the disadvantage of the United States. (Let us hope arms control is an exception.) Ergo: skepticism, challenge.

The world economy is the most inviting case for skepticism, although it will be difficult to persuade many Americans of this during an American recession, and although the rise in oil prices is now creating a crisis in the Third World which is neither of American contrivance nor of American discovery nor of American invention. But until the dislocations caused by OPEC, things were simply not as bad as they were typically portrayed. *Things were better than they had been.* Almost everywhere. In many places things were very good indeed. Sir Arthur Lewis summed up the evidence admirably:

> We have now had nearly three decades of rapid economic growth. . . . Output per head has been growing in the developed world twice as fast as at any time within the preceding century. In the LDC world, output per head is not growing as fast as in the developed world, but is growing faster than the developed world used to grow.

The data can be quite startling. In 1973, as Sir Arthur was speaking, the "Planetary Product," as estimated by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, grew at a real rate of 6.8 per cent, an astonishing figure. The Third World product expanded by 5.75 per cent, no less astonishing.

Simultaneously it is to be asserted that these economies do less well than they ought: that the difference is of their own making and no one else's, and no claim on anyone else arises in consequence. This will be hard for us to do, but it is time we did it. It is time we commenced citing men such as Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Professor of Economics at MIT, an Indian by birth, who stated in the Lal Bahadur Shastri lectures in India in 1973:

> In the 1950's our economic programs were considered by the progressive and democratic opinion abroad to be a model of what other developing countries might aspire to and emulate. Today, many of us spend our time trying desperately to convince others that *somehow* all the success stories elsewhere are special cases and that our performance is not as unsatisfactory as it appears. And yet, we must confront the fact that, in the ultimate analysis, despite our socialist patter and our planning efforts, we have managed to show neither rapid growth nor significant reduction of income inequality and poverty.

It is time we asserted, with Sir Arthur—a socialist, a man of the Third World—that economic growth is governed not by Western or American conspiracies, but by its own laws and that it "is not an egalitarian process. It is bound to be more vigorous in some professions, or sectors, or geographical regions than in others, and even to cause some impoverishment."

A commentator in *The Statesman*, Calcutta's century-old and most prestigious journal, recently warned:

> It would be unwise for policy planners in the developing world to dismiss too easily . . . the basic premise of a society that worships success: if you are poor, you have only yourself to blame. Development is a matter of hard work and discipline. So if you are not developing fast, it is not because the rules of the game are stacked against you or that structural changes are never easy to bring about, but because you are lazy and indisciplined. The general disenchantment with economic aid flows from this. It is difficult for Americans to understand why such substantial flows of food and money have made so little impact.

Well, the time may have come when it is necessary for Americans to say, "Yes, it *is* difficult to understand that." Not least because some Third World economies have done so very well. For if Calcutta has the lowest urban standard of living in the world, Singapore has in some ways the highest. It is time we asserted that inequalities in the world may be not so much a matter of condition as of performance. The Brazilians do well. The Israelis. The Nigerians. The Taiwanese. It is a good argument. Far better, surely, than the repeated plea of *nolo contendere* which we have entered, standing accused and abased before the Tribune of the People.

CATALOGUING the economic failings of other countries is something to be done out of necessity, not choice. But speaking for political and civil liberty, and doing so in detail and in concrete particulars, is something that can surely be undertaken by Americans with enthusiasm and zeal. Surely it is not beyond us, when the next Social Report comes along, to ask about conditions and events in many countries of the Third World of which almost everyone knows, but few have thought it politic to speak. The AFL-CIO does it. Freedom House does it. Amnesty International does it. *American* socialists do it. The time has come for the spokesmen of the United States to do it too.

It is time, that is, that the American spokesman came to be feared in international forums for the truths he might tell. Mexico, which has

grown increasingly competitive in Third World affairs, which took the lead in the Declaration of the Economic Rights and Duties, preaches international equity. Yet it preaches domestic equity also. It could not without some cost expose itself to a repeated inquiry as to the extent of equity within its own borders. Nor would a good many other Third World countries welcome a sustained comparison between the liberties they provide their own peoples with those which are common and taken for granted in the United States.

For the United States to go into opposition in this manner not only requires a recognition of the ideology of the Third World, but a reversal of roles for American spokesmen as well. As if to compensate for its aggressiveness about what might be termed Security Council affairs, the United States has chosen at the UN to be extraordinarily passive, even compliant, about the endless goings-on in the Commissions and Divisions and Centers and suchlike elusive enterprises associated with the Economic and Social Council. Men and women were assigned to these missions, but have rarely been given much support, or even much scrutiny. Rather, the scrutiny has been of just the wrong kind, ever alert to deviation from the formula platitudes of UN debate, and hopelessly insensitive to the history of political struggles of the 20th century.

In Washington, three decades of habit and incentive have created patterns of appeasement so profound as to seem wholly normal. Delegations to international conferences return from devastating defeats proclaiming victory. In truth, these have never been thought especially important. Taking seriously a Third World speech about, say, the right of commodity producers to market their products in concert and to raise their prices in the process, would have been the mark of the quixotic or the failed. To consider the intellectual antecedents of such propositions would not have occurred to anyone, for they were not thought to have any.

And yet how interesting the results might be. The results, say, of observing the occasion of an Algerian's assuming the Presidency of the General Assembly with an informed tribute to the career of the liberator Ben Bella, still presumedly rotting in an Algerian prison cell. The results of a discourse on the disparities between the (1973) per-capita GNP in Abu Dhabi of $43,000 and that of its neighbor, the Democratic People's Republic of Yemen, with one-thousandth that. Again, this need not be a uniformly scornful exercise; anything but. The Third World has more than its share of attractive regimes, and some attractive indeed—Costa Rica, Gambia, Malaysia, to name but three. Half the people in the world who live under a regime of civil liberties live in India. The point is to differentiate, and to turn their own standards against regimes for the moment too much preoccupied with causing difficulties for others, mainly the United States. If this has been in order for some time, the oil price increase—devastating to the development hopes of half-a-hundred Asian and African and Latin American countries—makes it urgent and opportune in a way it has never been.

Such a reversal of roles would be painful to American spokesmen, but it could be liberating also. It is past time we ceased to apologize for an imperfect democracy. Find its equal. It is time we grew out of our initial—not a little condescending—supersensitivity about the feelings of new nations. It is time we commenced to treat them as equals, a respect to which they are entitled.

The case is formidable that there is nothing the Third World needs less—especially now that the United States has so much withdrawn—than to lapse into a kind of cargo cult designed to bring about our return through imprecation and threat rather than the usual invocations. The Third World has achieved independence, and it needs to assert it in a genuine manner. The condition of the developing countries is in significant measure an imported condition. In the main a distinctive body of European ideas has taken hold, not everywhere in the same measure. Sri Lanka will be more cerebrate in its socialism than will, say, Iraq, Brazil more given to actual economic expansion than Syria or Egypt, Algeria considerably less libertarian than Nigeria. Still, there is a recognizable pattern to the economic and political postures of these countries, of which the central reality is that their anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist ideologies are in fact themselves the last stage of colonialism. These are imported ideas every bit as much as the capitalist and imperialist ideas to which they are opposed. The sooner they are succeeded by truly indigenous ideas, the better off all the former colonies will be, the United States included.

The Third World must feed itself, for example, and this will not be done by suggesting that Americans eat too much. It is one thing to stress what is consumed in the West, another to note what is produced there. In 1973, 17.8 per cent of the world's population produced 64.3 per cent of its product—and not just from taking advantage of cheap raw materials.

In the same way, the Third World has almost everywhere a constitutional heritage of individual liberty, and it needs to be as jealous of that heritage as of the heritage of national independence. It should be a source of renown that India, for one, has done that, and of infamy that so many others have not.

Not long ago, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, speaking of the case of a Soviet dissident who had been detained in a mental hospital, asked whether world opinion would ever permit South Africa to detain a black African leader in this fashion.

Answering his own question, he said, "The storm of worldwide rage would have long ago swept the roof from that prison!" His point is very like the one Stephen Spender came to in the course of the Spanish Civil War. Visiting Spain, he encountered atrocities of the Right, and atrocities of the Left. But only those of the Right were being written about, and it came to him, as he later put it, that if one did not care about every murdered child indiscriminately, one did not really care about children being murdered at all. Very well. But nothing we finally know about the countries of the Third World (only in part the object of the Solzhenitsyn charge) warrants the conclusion that they will be concerned only for wrongdoing that directly affects *them*. Ethnic solidarity is not the automatic enemy of civil liberties. It has been the foundation of many. If there are any who can blow off the roof of any such prison—then all credit to them. If you can be against the wrongful imprisonment of a person anywhere, then you can be against wrongful imprisonment everywhere.

It is in precisely such terms that we can seek common cause with the new nations: granted that they, no more than we, are likely ever wholly to live up to either of our protestations. Yet there exists the strongest possibility of an accommodating relationship at the level of principle—a possibility that does not exist at all with the totalitarian powers as they are now constituted. To contemplate an oppositional role to the Soviet bloc, or the Chinese, in, say, the General Assembly would be self-deceptive. One may negotiate there as between separate political communities, but to participate as in a single community—even in opposition—would simply not be possible. We can, however, have such a relation with most Third World nations. And we can do so while speaking for and in the name of political and civil liberty.

And equality, what of it? Here an act of historical faith is required: what is the record? The record was stated most succinctly by an Israeli socialist who told William F. Buckley, Jr. that those nations which have put liberty ahead of equality have ended up doing better by equality than those with the reverse priority. This is so, and being so, it is something to be shouted to the heavens in the years now upon us. *This is our case.* We *are* of the liberty party, and it might surprise us what energies might be released were we to unfurl those banners.

In the spring of 1973, in his first address as director-designate of the London School of Economics—where Harold Laski once molded the minds of so many future leaders of the "new majority"—Ralf Dahrendorf sounded this theme. The equality party, he said, has had its day. The liberty party's time has come once more. It is a time to be shared with the new nations, and those not so new, shaped from the old European empires, and especially the British—and is the United States not one such?—whose heritage this is also. To have halted the great totalitarian advance only to be undone by the politics of resentment and the economics of envy would be a poor outcome to the promise of a world society. At the level of world affairs we have learned to deal with Communism. Our task is now to learn to deal with socialism. It will not be less difficult a task. It ought to be a profoundly more pleasant one.

INDEPENDENCE AND INTERDEPENDENCE

by Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

For two centuries, American foreign policy has been marked by a cyclical pattern in which decades of involvement have been followed by decades of isolationism. Now, on the two-hundredth anniversary of our independence, although the cycle watchers have us scheduled to turn inward, we find our leaders proclaiming that interdependence has entangled us with other nations.

Have we finally buried George Washington and the isolationist tradition he fathered? Not yet. As the Vietnam debacle punctuated the end of an era of hyper-involvement, public debate and public opinion polls became transfixed, right on cycle, by the shadowy ghost of isolationism. Our foreign policy leaders have turned from the tarnished talisman of "national security" that served them so well in the cold war to the rhetoric of interdependence in order to exorcise Washington's ghost and try to rebuild the public consensus for a foreign policy of involvement. Our thirty-fifth president announced that "the age of interdependence is here." Our thirty-eighth president warns us that "we are all part of one interdependent economic system."

Wrestling with Washington's ghost is not the best way to enter the third century. The slogan "isolationism" both misleads us about our history, and creates a false debate that hinders the making of relevant distinctions among types, degrees, and directions of American involvement with the rest of the world. The choices that confront us as we enter our third century are not between isolationism and interdependence. Both slogans contain a large mixture of myth. We were never all that isolated from the rest of the world and we are not now fully interdependent with the rest of the world. Mexicans, Nicaraguans, Filipinos, and Japanese, among others, must be permitted an ironic smile when they hear about our isolationist history. Isolation was our posture toward the European balance of power, and for a century that posture of independence rested on our tacit military dependence on British naval power. Even in the interwar period of this century, our independence from Europe was a military posture while we tried to influence events through dollar diplomacy.

It is ironic that the end of the Vietnam war stimulated neoisolationist arguments: A strong case can be made that, with only a quarter of our trade and investment involved in the militarily weak, poor countries, American economic welfare and military security depend rather little on what kinds of domestic political regimes rule such countries; exports to less developed countries represent about 1 per cent, and earnings on direct investments in such countries represent about one half of 1 per cent of our gross national product; less developed countries have limited—in some cases, negligible—military importance; except for ideologues, the interests of Americans were poorly served by a foreign policy that involved the Third World as an arena in which to combat communism; Americans do not really know what the best regimes for less developed countries are. Neoisolationist arguments such as these were badly needed a decade ago. Now they are like an innoculation against a disease from which we have largely recovered: helpful against recurring symptoms of the past, but possibly harmful as a prescription for the future.

The Right Bicentennial Medicine

Does this mean that a declaration of interdependence is the right bicentennial medicine for our foreign policy aches and pains? Not if it is left at the rhetorical level. The rhetoric of interdependence risks creating a new myth that will be regarded with cynicism abroad and will make our own policy choices more difficult. Interdependence means

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a situation of reciprocal effects or mutual dependence. The sources of interdependence are both physical—for example, the spread of ocean pollutants or depletion of the earth's protective ozone shield—and social—for example, the economic, political, and perceptual effects that events in the Middle East and the United States have had upon each other. Reciprocal effect, however, is rarely equal on all parties and degrees of dependence are almost always uneven. Such uneven dependence can be a source of power. Where one of two countries is less dependent than the other, it can play upon this fact to manipulate the relationship. We must not let the rhetoric of interdependence blind us to the fact that others sometimes feel that the word "interdepend" is conjugated "I depend; you rule."

"Mexicans, Nicaraguans, Filipinos, and Japanese, among others, must be permitted an ironic smile when they hear about our isolationist history."

Overreliance on the rhetoric of interdependence not only may blind us to the legitimate concerns of other nations, but it can obscure our own choices at home. Rhetoric often makes interdependence sound like a good thing or an inexorable force toward cooperation. In fact, interdependence is neither good nor bad, and is just as easily a source of conflict as of cooperation. In some instances, the best policy response is to try to *diminish* rather than to extend interdependence. Take American energy policy for example. Whatever its many faults, the most trivial is the frequently heard criticism that Project Independence is inconsistent with our declarations of global interdependence. Rather than rhetoric, we need careful analysis of the effects and degree of choice presented by different types of interdependence. Even the physical effects of ecological interdependence, such as pollution, can be amplified or diminished by social and political choices. Rhetoric must not obscure such choices.

It is currently fashionable, in the aftermath of the oil crisis of 1973, to regard raw materials as an important source of power. Even a traditional realist like Hans Morgenthau sees an historically unprecedented divorcement of military power from economic and political power resulting from "the monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic control of raw materials."[1] One frequently encounters political judgments about American dependence supported by references to lists of raw materials that America imports, such as the following:

> Of the thirteen basic industrial raw materials required by a modern economy, the United States was dependent on imports for more than one half of its supplies of four of these in 1950: aluminum, manganese, nickel and tin. By 1970 the list had increased to six, as zinc and chromium were added. Projections indicate that by 1985 the United States will depend on imports for more than one half of its supplies of nine basic raw materials, as iron, lead and tungsten are added. By the end of the century it will be dependent primarily on foreign sources for its supply of each of the thirteen raw materials except phosphate.[2]

Sensitivity and Vulnerability

We are often told that we are too dependent to risk antagonizing the countries that provide these imports. But such arguments rest on confusion about two aspects of interdependence—sensitivity and vulnerability. Sensitivity means liability to costly effects imposed from outside in a given situation—in other words, before any policies are devised to try to change the situation. Vulnerability means continued liability to costly effects imposed from outside, even after efforts have been made to alter or escape the situation. In the 1973 oil crisis, for example,

[1] *Hans J. Morgenthau, "The New Diplomacy of Movement," Encounter, August 1974.*

[2] *Lester Brown, World Without Borders (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 194.*

the rapid rise in domestic prices and long lines at gasoline stations showed that the United States was very *sensitive* to the Arab states' embargo, but the degree of our direct *vulnerability* was limited by the fact that 85 per cent of the energy we consumed was produced at home. Japan, on the other hand, which relied almost entirely on imported energy, was both highly sensitive *and* highly vulnerable to the Arab embargo.

". . . others sometimes feel that the word 'interdepend' is conjugated 'I depend; you rule.' "

In the case of our "dependence" on imported raw materials, the fact, for example, that we import 85 per cent of our bauxite makes the price of aluminum *sensitive* to foreign changes in price or interruptions of supply. We are dependent in the sense that changes abroad can quickly cause costly changes at home. But we are not necessarily dependent in the sense of being vulnerable. Vulnerability is determined by whether we have reasonable alternatives. If we have alternative suppliers of bauxite, or if we could substitute domestic alumina-bearing clay for bauxite at relatively low cost, then we are not very vulnerable. Stockpiles could be held to tide us over the period of transition. The fact that we import a raw material may merely be a sign that it is cheaper abroad rather than an indication of our vulnerability. Of course vulnerability is a matter of degree and varies with the costs and time involved in developing alternatives. This implies hard policy choices about acceptable degrees of dependence and how willing we are to sacrifice the economic benefits of cheaper foreign supplies. That is what the foreign policy of raw material interdependence is about, not some magical transformation of power that supposedly occurred in 1973 or some force beyond our control. And that is why a policy of interdependence needs more analysis, not more rhetoric.

What will be the problems of a policy of interdependence in the third century? Not even our era's astrologers, the futurologists who convert large amounts of gold into paper, can really tell us. But though we cannot peer very far into the third century, we can as we cross the threshold identify certain characteristics and trends which appear deeply rooted enough to be important parameters of foreign policy well into the century. After sketching five such characteristics, I will turn to the critical question of how to organize ourselves to cope with the world we are entering.

1. A New Foreign Policy Agenda

Protection against military threats will remain a major foreign policy problem, but national security can also be endangered by events outside the political-military sphere. A melting of the Arctic ice cap because of a three degree rise in the earth's temperature resulting from industrial growth; a depletion of the earth's ozone layer because of widespread use of refrigerants, fertilizers, or nuclear tests; theft of plutonium by terrorist groups; ill-fated experiments with weather modification; or a prolonged world population explosion could threaten the security of American (and other) people as seriously as many occurrences that could arise in the traditional political-military realm. Even such a traditionalist as Secretary of State Kissinger said in his 1975 speech in Los Angeles:

> Progress in dealing with our traditional agenda is no longer enough. . . . The problems of energy resources, environment, population, the uses of space and the seas, now rank with questions of military security, ideology, and territorial rivalry which have traditionally made up the diplomatic agenda.

Many of the possible threats arising from environmental and resource interdependence may never come about. But the new agenda does not depend upon the dramatic oversimplifications of the Club of Rome. Rather

it rests on the age-old proposition that the proper task of foreign policy is to reduce uncertainty and insure against events that despite a small chance of occurring would have enormous potential costs if they did. For instance, a recent government-sponsored conference of atmospheric scientists could not agree on the extent or immediacy of "threats ranging from a Soviet proposal to reverse the direction of north-flowing rivers to possible depletion of stratospheric ozone by spray-can propellants, fertilizers, nuclear weapons, and high-flying aircraft." Nonetheless, the assembled scientists were in full agreement that "some man-induced changes could occur so soon that it would be dangerous to wait until entirely satisfactory scientific evidence is in hand."[3]

While many of the new agenda items will grow out of interdependencies in which effects are physically transmitted across borders, many effects will also be socially transmitted. The rapid rise in population and likely inability of South Asians to grow enough food to avert a famine may appear as a South Asian problem from which we can isolate ourselves if we consider it in purely physical terms. It is highly likely, however, in an age of modern satellite communications that many Americans will demand a major U.S. policy response after watching people starve on the evening news before sitting down to ample dinners. The new items on the agenda will affect even the staunchest neoisolationist who never sets foot outside our borders and professes to care little about the rest of the world.

2. Blurring Domestic and Foreign Policy

One of the characteristics of the new interdependence issues is that they often cut across the traditional distinction between domestic and foreign policy. During the cold war era, politics was supposed to stop at the water's edge. While this maxim was frequently breached in practice, the basic distinction between domestic and foreign concerns was generally accepted. Many of the new issues do not even appear to be foreign policy concerns at all. Decisions to strip mine coal in Montana, to permit or prohibit the production of freon, or to maintain a free market in grain appear to be purely domestic issues; but they are closely related to three of the examples of new foreign policy issues cited by Kissinger.

Thus it is not surprising that many of

[3] *Walter Sullivan, "World Aid Urged for Environment," The New York Times, November 1, 1975.*



the institutions that handle the new issues on the foreign policy agenda are traditional domestic agencies. Nearly all the major executive departments have little foreign offices of their own. In 1973, for example, of 19,000 Americans abroad on diplomatic missions, only 3,400 were from the State Department[4] and less than half of the government delegates accredited to international conferences came from the State Department. Nor, as the table opposite indicates, have budgetary restrictions changed the trend.

These miniature foreign offices that domestic agencies have developed for dealing with the international aspects of issues with which they are concerned are not merely bureaucratic nuisances. They are needed in the management of interdependence issues that are both domestic and foreign. As the entire government becomes involved in "international" affairs, it becomes more difficult to reserve a separate section of the agenda for the State Department. An analogous situation exists in Congress where much of the "foreign policy" agenda comes under the jurisdiction of domestic committees rather than the Foreign Relations and International Relations committees. Isolation will not be a very meaningful concept for those third century issues that know no water's edge.

[4] *I am indebted to Peter Szanton for this statistic, taken from the State Department's submission to the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy.*

U.S. Transgovernmental Contacts

Accredited Government Delegates to Conferences and Agencies

	1964	1968	1974	1974 as % of 1964
Total government (46 agencies)	2,378	2,137	3,656	154
State Department as percentage of total government	52	48	44	

Overseas Stationing of Civilian Bureaucrats

	1962	1968	1974	1974 as % of 1964
State (including AID, Peace Corps)	10,819	12,573	7,621	70
10 major agencies	1,567	2,410	1,259	80
Agriculture, Treasury, Justice	490	901	833	170

Sources: U.S. State Department, Bureau of International Organization; Raymond Hopkins, "The International Role of Domestic Bureaucracy" (manuscript).





3. Transnational Communications

One of the remarkable changes in the past two decades has been in communications technology. The jet plane has made Asia a day away, rather than several days' journey. Synchronous-orbit satellites have brought the cost of intercontinental communication into the same range as intercity calls. The price of a three minute call from New York to London was once $75; today it is only $5.40.[5]

The extent and rapidity of communications across borders will continue to grow in the third century but, profits and prophets notwithstanding, the world is not about to become a global village. On the contrary, transnational communications will affect different people in different ways here at home, while exposing the enormous disparities in global distribution and development. Even using the most optimistic assessments, there will be an enormous gap between the incomes of Americans and South Asians in the third century. Rather than developing a sense of village-like community, transnational communications will create different patterns of moral consciousness and new moral dilemmas as Americans try to reconcile differing moral claims. It is becoming fashionable to proclaim that equality is to our century what liberty was to the nineteenth century. But the problems of thinking clearly about equality in a world organized into national states (a condition likely to persist long into the third century) are not simple ones. As Robert Tucker has written, "if a large portion of Western liberal elites finds no more difficulty in distinguishing between the United States and Bangladesh than it does between California and Mississippi, it is safe to say that the general public continues to find a great deal of difficulty and that democratic governments will continue to prove responsive to the distinction the public draws between its collective welfare and the welfare of those outside the state."[6]

Nevertheless, it will be increasingly difficult to screen out the poor part of the world and the moral discomfort it creates. Even as some Americans will respond to the ugly television pictures of starving people by turn-

[5] *William H. Read, "The U.S. and International Communication Policymaking," Harvard Program in Information Technologies and Public Policy, Working Paper 75-11.*

[6] *Robert Tucker, "A New International Order?" Commentary, February 1975, pp. 49-50.*



ing off the set, others will respond with moral outrage or act out of a sense of total alienation from our society. Is it unrealistic to imagine a small group of MIT-trained sons and daughters of Indian, Japanese, and American middle-class parents threatening to detonate a crude plutonium bomb in Boston unless American aid to Asia is immediately increased? Rather than the pacific image of a global village, the growth of transnational communication in a world of enormous inequality may merely bring us the Patty Hearst case with a global dimension. And the more we try to isolate ourselves from the problem now, the less leverage we will have over it in the future.

4. Erosion of Hierarchy

As military force has become more costly for large powers to apply, power has become less fungible and the traditional hierarchy of states has been weakened. There is an increased discrepancy between power measured in military resources and power measured in terms of control over the outcome of events. Although American power is great in the first sense, our capacity for control is diminished. The need for leadership remains, but the capacity for hegemony is absent. The risk of a stalemate system, unable to respond flexibly to change, is likely to be further increased by the proliferation of nuclear capabilities.

"... profits and prophets notwithstanding, the world is not about to become a global village."

Power has always been an elusive concept in international affairs, but it has become increasingly slippery as we enter our third century. The traditional view was that military power dominated, and that the states at the top of the hierarchy of military power controlled world affairs. But the nature of the resources that produce power capabilities has become more complex, and the international power hierarchy more difficult to determine. In the era of American independence, when a good infantry was the crucial power resource, European statesmen could calibrate the classical balance of power by counting the populations of conquered and transferred territories. The industrial revolution complicated such calculations, and nuclear weapons, as a power resource too costly to use except in an extreme situation, further weakened the relationship between power measured in military resources and power in the sense of control over the outcome of events. For many of the new interdependence items on the foreign policy agenda, calculating the balance of military power does not predict the pattern of outcome of events. And while uneven dependence can be relevant in such situations, judgment and measurement are still complicated. It is difficult to calculate asymmetries, and where there are many of them, to understand the linkages among them. Moreover, even if we felt fairly comfortable in our assessment, measurable power resources are not automatically translated into effective power over outcomes. Translation is by way of a political bargaining process where relative skill, relative in-

tensity of concern, and relative coherence can belie predictions based on the supposed hierarchy of international power—witness the outcome of the Vietnam war.

This is not to say that military force has become obsolete as we enter our third century. Quite the contrary. Military deterrence is likely to remain a central concern of our foreign policy well into the future. But military force is difficult to apply to many of the new interdependence issues on the agenda, particularly for the major military states. The use of force is made more costly for major states by three conditions: (1) risks of nuclear escalation; (2) uncertain and possible negative effects on the achievement of economic goals; and (3) domestic opinion opposed to the human costs of the use of force. Even those states relatively unaffected by the third condition, such as Communist countries, may feel some constraints from the first two. On the other hand, lesser states involved in regional rivalries and terrorist groups may find it easier to use force than before. The net effect of these contrary changes in the role of force is to reduce hierarchy based on military power.

The erosion of the international hierarchy is sometimes portrayed as a decline of American power—as though the causes lay in our aging process. Admittedly, from the perspective of a policy-maker of the 1950s there has been a decline. But American power in the sense of resources has not declined as dramatically as is often supposed. U.S. military spending was roughly a third of the world total in 1950 and it still is today. Over the same period, the American gross national product has declined from slightly more than a third to slightly more than a quarter of the world total, but the earlier figure is a reflection of the wartime destruction of Europe and Japan, and the current figure still remains twice the size of the Soviet economy, more than three times the size of Japan's economy, and four times the size of West Germany's economy. In terms of power resources, America enters the third century as the most powerful country in the world—a condition likely to persist well into the century.

To understand what is changing, we must distinguish power over others from power over outcomes or over the system as a whole. What we are experiencing as we enter our third century is not so much an erosion of power resources compared to those of other countries (although there has been some), but an erosion of our power to control outcomes in the international system as a whole. The main reason is that the system itself has become more complex. There are more issues, more actors, and less hierarchy. We still have leverage over others, but we have far less leverage over the whole system.

The situation is illustrated by the changes in the international monetary system. Contrary to the prophets of American decline, the weakness of the dollar in the 1960s turned out to be partly an artifact of a particular institutional system. In 1976, the dollar is still the key currency. But the monetary system is far more complex in terms of the important governmental and nongovernmental players involved. As *The Economist* put it, "a simpler way of looking at it is that while America could fix the system it wanted at Bretton Woods in 1944, now it seems able only to block what it does not like." America remains powerful, but without a hegemonic capability. The problem is nicely summed up in the title of Marina Whitman's article in FOREIGN POLICY 20, "Leadership Without Hegemony."

5. *Multilateral Diplomacy*

In such a world, multilateral diplomacy, often through international institutions, grows far more important. This is true not only because hegemonic power has declined, but because much of the agenda is concerned with organizing collective action. The number of international conferences in which the United States officially participated rose from an annual figure of 141 in 1946 to 308 in 1956, 625 in 1966, and 817 in 1975.

Nor are the effects always trivial. On the tenth anniversary of our vehement opposition to tariff preferences for less developed countries at the first U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Congress enacted just such a measure as American law. Similarly, in the process of negotiating in the Law of the Sea Conference, the United States has come to accept the idea of a 200 mile economic zone which it had strongly opposed at the beginning of the negotiations.

". . . it will be increasingly difficult to screen out the poor part of the world and the moral discomfort it creates."

The fact that multilateral diplomacy is becoming more important does not mean that we are about to see a global re-enactment of our Constitutional Convention of 1787. It is highly unlikely that we will be faced with the opportunity (or the danger) of submerging our sovereignty. In fact, analogies drawn from our history are an impediment to understanding the political roles that international organizations play. To envisage international organizations as incipient world governments having supranational authority above states is to focus on a small (and frequently inaccurate) aspect of their political roles. More important is the way they affect the political process—for example, the ways by which agendas are set in world politics. The choice of organizational arena often determines which interdependence issues get priority on the interstate agenda. For example, the massive U.N. conferences on the environment, food, population, and women, with their accompanying nongovernmental tribunes and press attention, were largely exercises in agenda setting.

Moreover, the different jurisdictional scope and differing composition of delegations to different organizations frequently result in quite different distributions of influence and outcomes. The same issue may come out quite differently in GATT than in UNCTAD. Government officials shop among forums as they try to steer issues to arenas more favorable to their preferred outcomes; and they use international organizations as instruments to bring pressure on other governments as well as other departments of their own governments.

Indeed, as more bureaucracies once considered "domestic" become involved in international affairs, they sometimes discover a similarity of interests that is greater across national boundaries than it is with competing bureaus at home. International conferences and organizations provide the physical contact and aura of legitimacy that allow the translation of some of these potential transgovernmental coalitions into actual ones. The more technical the organization, the more likely it is that this process will occur. The political importance of international organization, particularly on interdependence issues, is less in their power *above* states than in their role in coordinating bits and pieces of power *across* states. One obvious example will suffice: the reinforcement various national offices of environmental protection received from the Stockholm Conference of 1972 and the subsequent activities of the U.N. Environment Program.

Organizing for Interdependence

If the preceding projection is correct, Americans will confront a new type of foreign policy agenda consisting of issues which blur the traditional distinction between domestic and foreign policy while posing difficult moral dilemmas. At the same time, our power over outcomes in the international system will diminish and we will have to resort to multilateral diplomacy to organize collective action. If these five characteristics do indeed continue well into our third century, what are their implications for the design and management of a policy of interdependence? Two things at least are clear.

We will need to pay more attention to the interconnection of domestic politics and foreign policy, and we will need to think more imaginatively about the relation of our institutions with international institutions.

One of the most basic questions is, given the erosion of the classical distinction between domestic and international politics, how will we determine the national interest? What will be the basis for judging our foreign policy? Cynics regard the term as meaningless and the question as irrelevant. But so long as the world's peoples define their political identities in relation to national communities—and that seems likely to continue well into our third century—the idea of a national interest is not vacuous.

"We need to think of international organization in terms of the networks that are associated with them, and what kinds of behavior different arenas encourage."

There are clearly differences in the degree to which policies affect each American and how their costs are distributed. Clear threats to military security probably come closest to affecting all of us. Though there may be disagreements about the clarity of the threat and the way it is met, maintaining the central balance in the overall military security system of world politics remains a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for the normal functioning of other processes and thus will continue to be a central component of the national interest.

There are some aspects of economic and social issues that touch nearly all citizens in the aggregate (e.g., inflation and recession) and others that hurt or benefit particular groups. There is a long tradition in foreign policy that such groups try to blur the differences and cloak their concerns with the national interest. Their ability to do so is affected by the general concepts that symbolize consensus—such as it is at any time—on the general orientation of American foreign policy. During the height of the cold war and American leadership in the Atlantic Alliance, domestic economic interests were subordinated. For example, it has been estimated that in 1961, deflationary policies designed to strengthen the balance of payments and the position of the dollar cost the American economy some $45 billion. During the 1960s, key policy positions were filled by financial men. In 1971, the Soviet threat seemed less imminent, and our allies themselves seemed to pose an economic challenge. Thus, policy advisers from manufacturing and domestic political backgrounds defined American interests with less concern for preserving the Bretton Woods monetary system.

The Benefits—and the Costs

The point is not that one or the other of these definitions was necessarily right or wrong, but that as the overriding security symbolism weakens, it will become more difficult to establish an American consensus on priorities. The rhetoric of interdependence is an imperfect substitute because economic interdependence and, sometimes, ecological interdependence, more so than national security issues, tend to affect different groups in different ways. Take, for example, the 1975 debate over grain sales to the Soviet Union. Such sales were said to help détente. In the United States, the sales boosted farmers' (and grain-exporting companies') incomes, but had an inflationary effect on food prices across the nation. Thus, in this case, economic interdependence between the Soviet Union and the United States imposed an uneven pattern of costs and benefits on the American population.

Moreover, in terms of the distinction drawn earlier, it was unclear whether the increased mutual sensitivity was really leading to increased Soviet vulnerability that could provide the United States with a useful foreign policy tool in its relations with the Soviet Union. Indeed, some critics argued that the United States itself could become more

vulnerable because domestic groups with an interest in maintaining the profitable transactions would lobby to maintain the relationship. In situations where one society is more liberal and pluralistic than another, the political vulnerability patterns cannot be determined by simple statistics. Moreover, where the domestic burdens fall unevenly, leaders will find it difficult to obtain the leeway they need to make such subtle calculations and indulge their finely balanced judgments. It is more likely that they will be constrained by the view expressed by AFL-CIO president George Meany at the time of the 1975 Russian grain sales: "Foreign policy is too damned important to be left to the secretary of state!"

Many of the relevant policy decisions in the future will appear to be domestic rather than foreign. We can think of sensitivity interdependence, whether through a market relationship or a flow of goods or people, as a transnational system crossing national boundaries. To affect such a system, governments can intervene at different policy points: domestically, at their own borders; through international organizations at another country's border; or inside the domestic jurisdiction of another country. Different points of policy intervention impose different costs and benefits. Political struggles will arise over who pays the costs of any change. Such leaders as the president or secretary of state will often prefer policies proposing equitable international sharing of costs or even, as a price for retaining international leadership, a disproportionate American share. But leverage will be held by bureaucrats and congressmen whose democratic responsibilities are to a narrower and more immediate range of interests.

This means that foreign policy leaders dealing with these new issues will have to pay even more attention than usual to domestic politics. Foreign policy strategy will have to include a domestic political strategy designed with enough leeway to focus on long-term systemic interests of the United States. Different issues—for example, trade and money—have different political characteristics. Even though they may have the same effect on employment, trade issues tend to involve a broad number of political groups while monetary issues rarely do. Strategies will have to be formulated in terms of such political patterns.

Leaders will have to pay special attention to the way that their international bargaining linkages, threats of retaliation, and choice of international forum affect domestic politics as well as the creation of transnational alliances. They will have to anticipate points of strain. At home, they will have to pay more attention to the groups that bear the heaviest costs of adjustment to change. A good example is the comparative generosity of the adjustment assistance in the 1974 trade legislation designed to stave off the restrictive alternative Burke-Hartke bill, compared to the narrow adjustment assistance provision of the Trade Expansion Act that President Kennedy pressed as part of a grand security design in the early 1960s.

A Greater Congressional Role

While it may be painful to the executive branch, the role of Congress in foreign policy decisions on economic and ecological issues is likely to continue to loom large. While part of the current activism of Congress in foreign policy may be a cyclical reaction against its passive role during the cold war and Vietnam years, a deeper cause lies in the fact that there is a domestic side to the issues described. *The choice confronting the executive branch is not between a large and a small congressional involvement, it is a choice between a cooperative and an antagonistic involvement.* The State Department is going to have to learn to work more closely with Congress and at an earlier stage in the development of issues in order to encourage longer-range perspectives. Otherwise, the congressional agenda will most likely be set by groups with short-term interests.

Too often, plans for coping with interdependence focus almost entirely on the role of the president and the executive. But while it is true that the president is often capable of having a longer and broader perspective than a congressman, we cannot simply assume that presidential interests are the national interest—particularly in regard to interdependence issues that involve long-term planning. Presidential political incentives are also short-term. For example, scientific reports on the impending energy and food crises were submitted to the White House in the mid-1960s, but failed to capture adequate presidential attention.

Focusing attention on problems of long-range national interest will require interaction of the executive, Congress, and private sector institutions. Congress has a vital role to play on these interdependence issues. First, of course, congressional activity helps to legitimize the hard trade-offs involved in many of these issues, and to develop the consensus needed for an effective foreign policy. Second, congressional hearings provide for structured public involvement—an open multiple-advocacy procedure which can facilitate the orderly participation of a broad range of groups including scientists, professionals, and special interest organizations. This public interaction of technical and political interests can amplify the political resonance of certain long-run interdependence issues and thus help to set the president's agenda.[8] Obviously, congressional involvement and politicization is no panacea. It can create as well as cure problems. But the choice in dealing with interdependence issues will not be between politicization or not, but between systematic politicization and the ad hoc politicization we now know all too well.

In order to play a more positive role in policy, Congress will have to pay more attention to improving its own procedures, particularly to accommodate the international effects of domestic legislation. While it is true that "foreigners don't have votes," on many interdependence issues they do have capabilities to respond to American legislation in ways our voters later regret. State's "constituents" may live overseas, but they are not irrelevant to Congress.

Domestic rule making in the United States has often meant rule making for the world. Once those rules are diffused and imitated internationally they become much more difficult to change or control. For example, President Truman's 1945 unilateral declaration of jurisdiction over the continental shelf unlocked a Pandora's box. Similarly, current proposals before Congress for legislation on offshore harbors, coastal zones, and fishery jurisdiction may serve as the basis for international law—good or bad, depending on how it is formulated. To ensure that the international implications of "domestic" legislation are taken into account will require an early and close relationship between the executive and Congress and a reorganization of congressional procedures and committees.

The central consideration in organizing for interdependence is to insure that collectively shared interests prevail over narrowly defined interests, and that both domestic and foreign constituencies are taken into account. This can be exceptionally difficult when the number of groups or agencies affected by policy is very large, and when decisions must be made without interminable delay. Coordination is especially difficult when the issues are not generally perceived as posing foreign policy problems at all. But the solution does not rest in handing such issues to the secretary of state. Effective organization must recognize *both* the foreign and domestic aspects of the issues.

Setting an Example

Our international leadership will be affected by the domestic examples we set, as

[8] *Such a procedure is sketched in greater detail in Robbert O. Keohane and J. S. Nye, "Organizing for Global Environmental and Resource Interdependence," Report to the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, 1975.*

well as by the ability of Americans to work with and understand people from other cultural and political backgrounds. Government officials—well beyond the State Department—will need to understand both the limits of our abilities as a nation to control events and the importance of our efforts as the most powerful state to provide leadership toward solutions from which all parties can gain. It will not be enough for a president or secretary of state to appear briefly and make an appeal to Europeans to agree on energy policy or to offer economic concessions to poor countries if there are not informed supporters in Congress and in other countries who understand the policy and are willing to follow through. Transgovernmental contacts and multilateral diplomacy are part of the process of generating that understanding and support.

This perspective affects the way one reacts to the proliferation of international activities of apparently "domestic" branches of the bureaucracy. If these contacts were an aberration, the solution might be simple. But given the technical complexity of many of the issues involved and the domestic problems that arise, the technical agencies must be intimately involved in the process. Thus, as I mentioned earlier, the miniature foreign offices that have evolved in many United States' domestic agencies are not merely a bureaucratic nuisance, as many career State Department officers have charged.

Policy Coordination

At the same time, it is important to distinguish two types of transgovernmental behavior. Transgovernmental *policy coordination* is activity designed to implement or adapt policy in the absence of detailed higher policy directives. Transgovernmental policy coordination is essential to effective management of complex interdependence issues. There may be very beneficial results when officials from technical agencies of different governments work together to solve joint problems, or when interactions facilitate the exchange of information. In occasional instances, a sense of "collegiality" leads to especially effective problem solving. Sophisticated attitudes toward international cooperation and increased sensitivity to the international aspects of problems may thereby increase in the government.

Since international organizations often provide the arena for policy coordination, officials of operating agencies might develop mutually beneficial relationships with those organizations and their secretariats, as well. The role of central foreign policy organs, such as the State Department, should be to encourage constructive transgovernmental contacts of this type, and to orient the agencies involved toward broader views of world order rather than toward their narrowly defined problems. There should be no attempt to cut off such contacts. (This would be futile even if attempted.) On the contrary, one of the roles of technical assistance programs administered by the Agency for International Development should be to encourage the strengthening of "counterpart" agencies concerned with interdependence issues in foreign governments.

Coalition Building

Transgovernmental coordination, however, can shade into *coalition building*. Transgovernmental coalition building is the construction of coalitions between like-minded agencies in various governments, for policy purposes, against elements of their own governments. Transgovernmental coalitions bear close watch, since they can make American policies incoherent. If separate agencies not only coordinate policies directly with their counterparts but adopt their own independent foreign policies through informal alignments with foreign counterparts, the prospect of achieving a relatively rational American policy as a whole disappears. Close monitoring by the State Department and relevant White House agencies is necessary to keep a check on this; but coordination efforts must be subtle enough to avoid re-

pressing legitimate transgovernmental behavior and thus driving the whole process "underground." Coordination has its own costs, and coherence is not valuable in and of itself. The White House staff should identify in advance those areas where coordination is essential and those where the costs of coordination would probably be greater than the benefits. Whether transgovernmental contacts will have a beneficial or pathological effect will depend on the framework within which they occur.

In short, while transgovernmental contacts can present problems of coherence and control, transgovernmental coordination, carried on by operating agencies with their counterparts abroad, is a permanent and essential aspect of interdependence policy. "Collegia" of experts and officials from a variety of countries form around different issues and their associated international organizations, and can work effectively together. Frequently, delegations to international organizations are composed largely of such people; and the United States would do well to pay more attention to placing more of them in international organizations, as members of secretariats, to facilitate cooperation between the United States and these organizations.

Effectiveness in international organizations is not just a matter of voting or elegant speeches. Indeed, if elegant speechmakers signal their basic disinterest by failing to appear in the corridors, their efforts may be to little avail. One day was neither enough time to build ancient Rome nor to charm the 1975 Rome Food Conference. To be effective in international institutions, we have to take them seriously. This does not mean that we must accept meaningless votes as legislation or accept all current institutions. On the contrary, we need to be more imaginative about creating institutions that do not follow the pseudo-parliamentary model which stresses voting by states and gives a citizen of Gabon one thousand times as much voting power as a citizen of India.

There are several tasks that international organizations perform in world politics. These can be crudely ranked in ascending order of difficulty, as follows: (1) provision of information; (2) formation of general norms; (3) regulation and monitoring of state behavior in accordance with specific norms; and (4) operation of technologies or elaborate monitoring or planning systems.

The current trend in the U.N. system is toward large conferences characterized by bloc confrontation. In general, large conferences have positive value in the first two tasks. Even when we do not like the message, they are sometimes useful messengers. On the other hand, such conferences are poorly suited for organizing or regulating collective action.

States have a variety of concerns and adapt their political behavior to the nature of the arena. For example, Brazil was a leader against U.S. positions at the Stockholm Conference on the environment, the Law of the Sea Conference, and the Bucharest Conference on population. In bilateral dealings on these issues, however, the Brazilians have adopted more conciliatory positions.

We need to think of international organization in terms of the networks that are associated with them, and what kinds of behavior different arenas encourage. We need to consider ways in which nongovernmental and quasi-governmental institutions, such as the Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Vienna, can complement and supplement intergovernmental institutions. Rather than being overly concerned about the existence of competing and overlapping institutions, we should think in terms of the flexibility of networks that such overlap allows.

In short, international institutions are one but not the only point of policy intervention in transnational systems of interdependence. Effective policy will have to be based on a combination of instruments. Organizing internationally for interdependence issues does not mean disposing of policy is-

sues by turning them over to international institutions. Leadership will not come *from* such institutions, but such institutions will play an important role in international leadership.

Some Conclusions

Can we finally bury George Washington? Is isolationism totally irrelevant? Not if it is taken in small doses. One of the obstacles to thinking clearly about a policy of interdependence is to ignore the range of choice that we face. One of the fashionable bicentennial themes portrays America as a declining empire such as Britain was a century ago.[9] The two situations, however, are quite different. Britain in 1876 was no longer the largest economy in the world (the United States had already surpassed her), while, as we saw earlier, the American economy today is equal to the next three largest economies in the world combined. Even more important, America is less dependent in the sense of vulnerability than Britain was at the end of its era of leadership. Whereas exports were 25 per cent and repatriated profits on foreign investment were 8 per cent of Britain's gross national product in 1914, the comparable figures for America today are 7 per cent and approximately 1 per cent. The American problem may be that we have too much, not too little, freedom of choice in the short run. We may not exercise sufficient leadership now to affect problems that will increasingly concern us in the future.

Indeed, if taken separately, one can imagine independence strategies that the United States could follow in regard to most of the particular issues of economic and ecological interdependence. If we are concerned about other countries' refusals (or inability) to sell us energy or materials, we can restrict total imports to a level we could live without if we had to: diversify sources of imports; build up stockpiles and design contingency plans for rationing supplies to lessen the impact of sudden deprivation; and invest heavily in technologies to produce new sources and substitutes. Given time, technology can change the seemingly inexorable dependence supposedly implied by figures about known reserves.

Any statement about resources is also an implicit statement about technology. For example, copper ore is being mined today that would have been discarded as waste half a century ago. The technology for mining seabed nodules, a vast new source of minerals, has only recently been developed. America eats up a large share of current world resources, but it also creates the technology that generates new resources.

Those who base arguments against neo-isolationism on the finiteness of the earth's resources—either on raw material inputs or on the supposed limits of the earth's ability to tolerate pollutants or heat outputs—do a disservice by focusing on the wrong aspects of the problem. They simply challenge those who believe in technology to show how technological changes can relax some of the supposedly inexorable limits to independence that arise from environmental interdependence. Heat generated by energy consumption can be diminished by more energy-efficient technologies. If manmade heat nonetheless threatens to melt the polar ice caps, technological fixers will argue that they can develop ways to alter the earth's albedo so that we absorb less solar heat. The problem is not finite resources causing interdependence; it is our social and governmental ability to respond in time and in common with others. Will the right technology be available in time? Will we know enough about its possible adverse effects to be sure that we do not create technological Frankenstein monsters? Will we be able to work with others to ensure that they do not inadvertently do so?

Thus, to cast the issue of interdependence in terms of whether independence will still be technically possible in the third century is to focus attention on the wrong

[9] *Norman Macrae, "America's Third Century: A Survey,"* The Economist, *October 25, 1975.*

questions. The important question is not whether independence will be technologically feasible, but what such independence will cost, and whether we can organize ourselves to minimize such costs. Taken separately, each Project Independence that neoisolationists might propose to reduce our vulnerability to interdependence might be tolerable in terms of costs. But when we add up the list, it will represent a heavy burden on the American people. We can, however, avoid many of these costs by an earlier and larger role in world affairs. Moreover, if the environmental alarmists are even partly correct, the burden will grow heavier as our third century unfolds. And the costs must not be conceived in narrow economic terms. An "independence" solution to the social interdependence transmitted by transnational communications or transnational terrorism that involved censorship of television programs or restriction of civil liberties would be an ironic and tragic means of preserving the independence declared in 1776.

On the other hand, to declare on the two-hundredth anniversary of our independence that the third century will be an era of interdependence is true but trivial. Interdependence does not provide clear guidelines for a new foreign policy. There is still a "necessity for choice." Interdependence just makes the choices harder. The choices will be about how to organize ourselves so that both the "domestic and foreign" aspects of interdependence issues receive their share of attention.

Difficult choices will also have to be made about how to exercise leadership without the capability for hegemony. British hegemony over the world's oceans and monetary system in the last century rested on the twin pillars of restraining domestic interests and applying preponderant power (including an occasional touch of force) abroad. American leaders will encounter the same need to set a good domestic example, but will find the application of power more difficult. We will have to learn both how to live with interdependence and how to use it for leadership. Our lesser degree of vulnerability than other countries and our occasional ability to credibly threaten to opt out can be a source of strength and leadership if carefully used. That is about all that will remain of George Washington's legacy in our third century. Just as a pinch of salt in the hands of an able chef is often essential to a successful dish, so an occasional small dose of American independence may be an essential ingredient of leadership for interdependence. But if we swallow too much of the neoisolationists' offerings now, our children will be choking well before the end of the third century.