IDEOGRAPHS, FRAGMENTS, CLUSTERS, AND STRATEGIC ABSENCES: AN IDEOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF <COLLATERAL DAMAGE>

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This study examined the ideograph of <collateral damage> through an analysis of the Bush Administration’s rhetoric as well as visual photographs of Iraqi civilian deaths. The project argues that the psycho-dynamic rhetoric of the Bush Administration during a time of visual censorship lead to the dehumanization of Iraqi civilian deaths during the War in Iraq. The method consisted of a textual analysis of the Bush Administration’s rhetoric and continued with a content analysis of news media’s photographs. The author argues that critics gain a deeper understanding of the disappearing dead phenomenon of Iraqi civilians by examining ideographic fragments of psycho-dynamic rhetoric.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapters</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Rhetoric of Collateral Damage</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thesis Statement and Research Questions</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method and Review of Literature</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preview of Chapters</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. &lt;COLLATERAL DAMAGE&gt; FRAGMENTS IN THE RHETORIC OF &quot;NEW WARFARE&quot;</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Method of Ideographic Criticism</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Historical Genealogy of &lt;Collateral Damage&gt;</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Emergent Rhetoric of New Warfare</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. DISAPPEARING THE DEAD: IRAQI CITIZENS AS &lt;COLLATERAL DAMAGE&gt;</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush Administration Uses of &lt;Collateral Damage&gt;</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battlefield of Public Information</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. VISUAL REPRESENTATIONS OF &lt;COLLATERAL DAMAGE&gt;</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media’s Effects on War</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. THE FORCE OF FANTASY IN NARRATING &lt;COLLATERAL DAMAGE&gt;</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tracking Imagination and Fantasy through Rhetorical Criticism</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Fantasy of Haditha &lt;Collateral Damage&gt;</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. CONCLUSION</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Summaries</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

“Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain” is a phrase made popular by the 1939 movie *The Wizard of Oz*. However, the phrase could be adapted to describe the current plight of Iraqi civilian deaths as: pay no attention to the dead bodies overseas. This project argues that this quote from *The Wizard of Oz* aptly reflects the Bush Administration’s rhetorical stance regarding the “collateral damage” of civilian deaths in Iraq, flatly asserted by General Tommy Franks when he insisted, “We don’t do body counts” during a speech to the National Rifle Association Banquet in March 2006. This sentiment is echoed through the Bush administration’s ongoing insistence that a body count does not exist and, even if one did exist, they would not distribute it to the public. The claim of a non-existent body count is paradoxical, because human loss was offered as a central rationale for invading Iraq despite international cautions to depose Hussein. A rhetorical double-bind thus lies in using a body count to justify military intervention, yet simultaneously turning a blind eye to civilian deaths that directly result from US military action. This paradox of rhetorically counting when convenient is amply illustrated by the events of the Haditha massacres in 2005.

The events of 19 November 2005 have changed the lives of countless Iraqi civilians and raise grave concern with how the U.S. Military strategically qualifies civilian casualties in Iraq. On the morning of 19 November 2005, U. S. Marine T. J. Terrazas of Kilo Company was killed in a roadside bomb. In the aftermath, Terrazas’ unit raided a number of homes resulting in deaths. The reports filed by the Kilo Company Marines as well as the Iraqi eye witness accounts of that morning all confirm this detail. Yet, the Marines’ shifting account of the aftermath of the roadside bombing and those of eye witnesses are very different. In fact, after several separate
investigations, the Pentagon’s official narrative of the events that came to be known as the “Haditha massacres” has changed at least three times.

On 20 November 2005, the Marines first issued a statement from Camp Blue Diamond reporting that Terazzas and fifteen Iraqi civilians were killed by a roadside bomb the previous day (McGirk, 2006). The report also claimed that after the roadside blast a group of insurgents exchanged fire with the remaining Marines, yet no insurgent deaths were reported within this official account. In January 2006, *Time* magazine acquired video footage made on the day following the incident by a journalist named Taher Thabet al-Hadithi (Asser, 2008). *BBC News* reports that without Taher’s video, “the tragedy of Haditha may have been left at that-- just another statistic of ‘war-torn’ Iraq-- a place too dangerous to be reported properly by journalists, where openness is not the interests of political and military circles, and the sheer scale of deaths numbs the senses” (Asser, p. 1). The video showed, “bodies of women and children, still in their nightclothes…apparently shot in their own homes; interior walls and ceiling peppered with bullet holes; bloodstains of the floor” (Asser, p. 2). Since witnesses claimed the Marines’ rampage was unprovoked because there were no insurgents in the area, *Time* magazine presented the military with a copy of the video.

The military opened another investigation into the Haditha event and interviewed twenty-eight people including Marines, victims’ family members, and local doctors. The U.S. Military’s account of the events in Haditha changed after this investigation; they reported “contrary to the military’s initial report, the fifteen civilians killed on November 19 died at the hands of the Marines, not the insurgents” (McGirk, 2006, p. 1). After this second version of events was released, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service initiated a criminal investigation “to determine whether the troops broke the laws of war by deliberately targeting civilians” (McGirk,
Lieutenant Colonel Michelle Martin-Hing, a spokeswoman for the Multi-National Force-Iraq, maintained that blame “lies squarely with the insurgents” whose aggressive actions “placed noncombatants in the line of fire as the Marines responded to defend themselves” (McGirk, p.1). The Iraqi eye witness accounts in contrasts, painted a grim picture of potential war crimes committed by American soldiers on a murderous rampage of blind revenge.

As a result of military investigations, three of the Marines were charged in the events of Haditha and two others were reprimanded. However, by the end of the formal investigations and military trials, all charges were dropped. None of the Kilo Company Marines involved in the Haditha incident were convicted of any wrongdoing, nor would any of the military superiors, who were accused of a systematic cover-up. Haditha local Waleed Mohammed observed that such results were not unexpected by Iraqis cynical of American military justice. Mohammed noted of his fellow Iraqis, “They are waiting for the sentence – although they are convinced that the sentence will be like one for someone who killed a dog in the United States, because the Iraqis have become like dogs in the eyes of Americans” (Knickmeyer, 2006, p. 4).

The *Time* magazine exposé presses scholars to interrogate the role of language in the Haditha Massacre. *Time* explicitly questions the continually blurred definitional line between war crimes and collateral damage. The Military is, indeed, acutely aware of the language used to frame fatal incidents in Iraq. However, while the Military frames the events of Haditha as inadvertent collateral damage, the Iraqi citizens frame the events as murderous war crimes. Language is a primary means that the Military utilizes to control media representations of their actions, and they are trained in their strategic use of language as accurately as in their use of weapons.

When *Time* magazine reporter Tim McGirk emailed Colonel Jeffrey R. Chessani to
request comment upon the events of Haditha for his story, the Colonel amassed his top executive officers to help him frame “talking point” responses to McGirk’s questions, which were inadvertently forwarded to the reporter and eventually featured in a separate article (Zielbauer, 2007). The tone and tenor of the article situate the media in an adversarial role to the Military by warning Military officials against the spin of media portrayals. In response to McGirk’s inquiry regarding whether any officers were present on the scene that morning, the memo from Chessani prompted his surrogates, “By asking if there was an officer on the scene the reporter may be trying to identify a point of blame for lack of judgment. If there was an officer involved, then he may be able to have his My Lai massacre pinned on that officer’s shoulder” (Zielbauer, 2007, p. 1). Chessani’s fiercely polemical memo continues by asserting that American reporters would try to “spin the news as Iraq’s My Lai massacre. Since there was not an officer involved, this attempt will not go very far” (Zielbauer, p. 1). Colonel Chessani further warns that the military must be on guard against reporters who unfavorably “spin the story to sound like incidents from well-known war movies, like Platoon” (Zielbauer, p. 1). Significantly, the reporters investigating the incident are portrayed not as fact-finders, but as staunch adversaries in a PR “spin” campaign for the hearts and minds of American audiences and perceptions.

The Chessani “talking points memo” is ostensibly composed to assist officers in answering questions from the American media, yet it also highlights the military’s efforts to downplay and diffuse any accusations of potential war crimes committed by U. S. soldiers by strategically controlling the narrative used to frame and identify the situation. This memo is thus an extension of the previously-discussed paradox that exists in the reporting of body counts in Iraq since eye-witnessed “war crimes” are, for the US Military, recognizable instead as blameless or justifiably provoked “collateral damage.”
The Rhetoric of Collateral Damage

The work of Kenneth Burke and Dan Hahn are integral to understanding the theoretical implications of language as a framing mechanism. The idea of framing is illustrated in the Haditha examples by the different accounts provided by the military versus the eye witnesses. The military understands the events as a roadside bombing followed by gunfire with insurgents where civilians were killed as inadvertent if justified deaths, yet the eye witness accounts understand the events of Haditha as a bloody massacre and a rampage. Dan Hahn (2005) explains the power of definition. He argues that political power lies within naming or labeling people or situations, and also within the act of defining a word or an action. Hahn notes “the power of language and the centrality of that power in the political milieu must be neither overlooked nor underemphasized…One of the major ways in which language accomplishes these various feats is through definitions… or naming” (Hahn, p. 53).

The military exuded power over eyewitness accounts by narratively identifying the cause of death as insurgent gunfire, and not to Marines. Hahn argues that the government rarely presents definitions, but rather “names” or labels situations, people, or events. Hahn claims that when rhetors “define” a term, they open themselves to the act of debate and rational deliberation. However, when a rhetor “names” by invoking an affective term or label that brands particular meanings and preferred understandings, they instead are closing off the ability to question the preferred meanings and ideological connotations of a strategic terminology. The consequences of such rhetorical acts for “naming” are quite apparent in the punishments avoided by those Kilo Company Marines directly responsible for the Haditha massacre. Rather than facing severe punishment for irresponsible murders or war crimes, the Marines were acquitted of charges,
since the regrettable incident of “collateral damage” was instead the fault of instigating insurgents and the tragic “fog of war.”

Haditha is just one vivid example of the persistent disconnect that exists in the euphemistic language used by the military to report Iraqi civilian deaths and the media’s reporting of Iraqi civilian deaths. Nonetheless, numerous reports by war critics argue that the death toll in Iraq is a matter of grave importance and worrisome concern for the U. S. mission:

In Iraq, as with other conflicts, civilians bear the consequences of warfare. In the Vietnam War, 3 million civilians died; the Democratic Republic of the Congo, conflict has been responsible for 3.8 million deaths; and an estimated 200,000 people have died in Darfur over the past 31 months. We estimate that almost 655,000 people- 2.5 % of the population in the study area-- have died in Iraq. Although such death rates might be common in time of war, the combination of long duration and tens of millions of people affected has made this the deadliest international conflict of the 21st century, and should be of grave concern to everyone” (Al-Rubeyi, 2006, p 1). John Pilger wrote, “The scale of death caused by British and U.S. governments may well have surpassed that the Rwanda genocide, making it the biggest single act of mass murder of the late 20th century and the 21st century. (iraqbodycount.org, p. 3)

The difference between murderous “genocide” and inadvertent “collateral damage” is but a choice of words, albeit a crucial and important choice with real political consequences.

One website that confronts this issue of civilian deaths is iraqbodycount.org. According to their mission statement:

Iraq Body Count is an ongoing human security project which maintains and updates the world’s largest database of violent civilian deaths since the 2003 invasion. The count encompasses non-combatants killed by military or paramilitary action and the breakdown in civil security following the invasion.” (from www.iraqbodycount.org)

The nonprofit organization gathers data from media sources who document daily civilian casualties as well as official Iraqi sources, such as; Iraq’s Health Ministry, local police, and regional morgues. The reports are then internally cross-checked to ensure that an incident and the corresponding deaths are only recorded once in the database. The organization began compiling the current database at the beginning of the Iraqi war in 2003, and has continued to
compile each month until the present. The database in split into two categories, incidents and individuals, to assist with the interpretation of the numbers reported. Under the date 5 February 2008, for example, the incidents column gives the following reports: four bodies found dead shot in Baghdad, Eight Awakening Council members by suicide bomber near Al-Taji, Five Awakening Council members by suicide bomber Zeraa Degla-Karama road near Fallujah, bodies of fifty-five men found in mass grave near Samarra, Sunni imam and preacher shot dead in central Samarra, woman killed by roadside bomb in Tuz Khurmato. Of these 67 reported deaths, however, only two individuals are conclusively identified for the same date under the individual column: Essam Fleih Hassani and Isam Falyih Hasani. All of these fatal incidents were reported in several media outlets, yet the documented individual deaths offer a more precise and thus conservative account. However, the administration still clings to the position that no official body count of civilian casualties exists, thus calling into question the prima facie validity of any “ unofficial” or “ unauthorized” attempt to document the war dead.

If truth is indeed the first casualty of war, then accountability is a close second. The language of reporting utilized in the United States has largely followed the framing language provided to those reporters by the Bush administration. Numerous media reporters and critics have retroactively admitted that news coverage largely echoed and unreflectively reinforced the Bush administration’s desired narrative, despite evidence of flawed or nonexistent evidence. The Bush administration, Pentagon, and Iraq’s military command have been asked repeatedly about the death toll in Iraq only to be told that “we don’t do body counts.” General Franks is only one example of the systematic dismissal and avoidance of accountability for Iraqi civilian casualties in the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Another example of this systematic dismissal occurred when President Bush was
questioned about *The Lancet* Study of 2006; his response remains indicative of the systematically dismissive stance assumed through language. Researchers from *The Lancet*, a medical journal based in Britain, conducted a 2006 study to update their 2004 findings concerning the estimated number of Iraqi civilian casualties that have resulted from the U.S. invasion and occupation (Al-Rubeyi, 2006). The estimated death toll of civilians in Iraq was 100,000 between March of 2003 and September 2004. Researchers utilized a national cross-section cluster sample method to gather data, a standard method used by social scientists and the United Nations to conduct death estimates for wars such as Kosovo and Afghanistan. Researchers surveyed Iraqi households asking families to list the individuals they knew had died since the American invasion. The report’s final analysis was based on 1,849 households and 12,801 individual participants. Based on this remarkably high sample population, researchers concluded that by July 2006 there had been 654,965 “excess Iraqi deaths as a consequence of the war” (*Lancet*, 2006, p. 1).

When published, *The Lancet* study received little main-stream media attention until a reporter pressed President Bush during a press conference to comment on the shocking figures. “We are unsure of their research methods,” was President Bush’s curtly dismissive reply. The research methods being dismissed without any rationale or explanation, however, are curiously the same research methods commonly used by the United Nations and widely utilized in the social sciences without controversy or methodological dispute. When pressed to provide some further explanation, Bush blithely responded: “It must be deeply satisfying to such people to have what public attention is available for such matters focused on disputes between the differing, and all wholly inadequate, studies that have, somehow, managed to get undertaken” (Iraq Body Count). Such dismissals without reasons or evidence not a new tactic of the Bush
Administration, but are nonetheless brazen in their attempt to sidestep, ignore, and avoid any discussion of Iraqi civilian deaths and possible war crimes by American forces.

Burke (1989) provides insight into the dismissive nature of Bush’s comments when discussing language as “terministic screens” for interpretations of people and events. He argues that humans are, “symbol using, symbol-making, and symbol misusing animal” (Burke, p. 70). Burke uses this definition to set up his explanation of language as symbolic action. That is to say, humans use symbols, and by our use or misuse of symbols, we create language that informs and transforms into action. The language surrounding Iraqi civilians is rhetorically significant because of its inherent action of denial and dismissal of substantive foreign policy concerns by naming or labeling. The curt responses of the President and the slogans of the nation’s top General are important as they perpetuate a perception of unconcern or non-importance regarding Iraqi civilian deaths, thus deflecting any and all attempts at questioning, deliberation, and accountability. The dismissive language frames the situation and leads the audience toward a posture of ambivalence to the human suffering and the consequential “blood costs” of military actions and policies.

Thesis Statement and Research Question

An inherent rhetorical problem exists within the language used to frame and name the death and civilian casualties within a controversial war zone such as Iraq. It is vital to examine incongruities, and how language is used along with active censorship of the visual representations of war dead to shape American perceptions of Iraqi civilian deaths. In this study I argue that the Bush administration’s evasive rhetoric of “collateral damage” is a crucial complementary ideographic cluster in a <Clash of Civilizations> (Cloud, 2004) that narratively
frames our understanding of the Bush administration’s so-called Global War on Terror (GWOT), as well as the death and suffering of Iraqi civilians that directly results from American military occupation. This study begins by examining the evolution of ideographic theory in rhetorical criticism, using a historical genealogy of “collateral damage” within war rhetoric to understand ideographs as discursive constellations of complementary ideographic clusters and fragments. After first considering the rhetorical theory and the effects of ideographs upon official discourses, this study explores how systematic censorship of visual representation of Iraqi civilian deaths colludes in further framing and inherently limiting understandings of the blood costs and consequences of American foreign policy. Finally, this project considers the psycho-rhetorical dynamics of fantasy by building upon Burke’s notion of terministic screens and the Lacanian theory of Slavoj Žižek as applied in rhetorical scholarship, in order to provide a theoretical rationale for considering the psychodynamic rhetorical functions of these emergent trends within ideographic analyses of American war rhetoric.

Method and Review of Literature

Burke is utilized as a foundational theorist in this project due to his theoretical concerns with his understanding of language as symbolic action. The debates over the significance of Iraqi civilian deaths are rooted in both the language and in visual representations -- or a lack thereof -- used to contextualize war deaths. Burke is directly invoked by McGee (1980) in his formulation for the concept of ideographs within language. For Burke (1989), language invoked is itself an incipient action, understood as “a term for the kind of behavior possible to a typically symbol-using animal (such as man) in contrast with the extrasymbolic or nonsymbolic operations of nature” (Burke, p. 53). Burke identifies language use as a “species of action” and not merely
an “instrument of definition” (Burke p. 53). For Burke, language causes people to “act” in ways consistent with discursive depictions. Burke argues that “even if any given terminology is a reflection of reality, by its very nature as a terminology it must be a selection of reality; and to this extent it must also function as a deflection of reality” (Burke, 1969, p. 45). The “we don’t do body counts” bluster of General Franks, and President Bush’s unsupported dismissal of *The Lancet* study of Iraqi civilian deaths, are representative anecdotes of the systematic dismissal of deliberation over the scope and justifiability of civilian deaths and casualties. The President did not petition a new study with proven research methods. He did not suggest that the audience consider any other information that might discount The Lancet report. He merely dismissed the findings. Bush’s symbolic action of dismissal reflects a systematic ambivalence, deflecting uncertainty and doubt, whereby he does not have to prove or disprove anything. This dismissal directly affects the idea slogans or word choices can cause people to act (McGee, 1980).

Burke (1989) defines human as “the symbol-using (symbol making, symbol-misusing) animal inventor of the negative (or moralized by the negative) separated from his natural condition by instruments of his own making goaded by the spirit of hierarchy (or moved by the sense of order) and rotten with perfection” (Burke p. 70). Burke argues that ideology is like a “spirit” that inhabits the “body” and makes that body hop around in ways that it otherwise would not act. If a different spirit/ideology inhabits the body it behaves differently. McGee, who like Burke is a Marxist materialist, insists that ideology exists in the material consequences and effects of language choice and usage. Both McGee and Burke subscribe to Marx’s formulation of ideology as “false consciousness,” and language for them is a material consequence of ideology, just as action is a consequence of language. Ideology is not something that we can see, feel, touch, smell, or even taste because it is the cumulative consequence of language and
practices. If scholars explain “equality,” it is not possible for “equality” to “walk up your drive way” for all to see, experience, shake hands, or even converse. Consequently, to explain the political effects of ideology, McGee examines the recurring sites of struggle over meanings within language. The introduction of the ideograph directly connects both rhetoric and ideology (Parry-Giles, 1995). The ideograph has proven a useful methodological tool for scholars (Condit & Lucaites, 1993; Lucaites & Charland, 1989; Lucaites & Condit, 1990; Martin, 1983; McGee 1978, 1980, 1987; Olsen, 1994; Parry-Giles, 1995). McGee (1980) defines an ideograph as, “historically and culturally grounded commonplace rhetorical terms that sum up and invoke identification with key social commitments” (McGee, p. 3). An ideograph, he suggests, is a specific terministic synecdoche that emerges as a one-term summation for an ideology or political worldview. Public mind, public opinion, and public philosophy are situated within specific ideographs as expressions of collective fantasies, and ideographs are specific rhetorical manifestations and discursive struggles of their historically-contested meanings that determine whether or not individuals participate in the narrativizing “myth” which animates an ideology (McGee, 1980, p. 2). Ideographs are thus both signs and symptoms of ideological commitments.

The Ideograph

McGee (1980) begins to unpack the ideograph by examining the rhetorical functions of myth. Myth is utilized in the creation of the idea of the collective as a narrative and narrativizing identity. Any “collective identity” for McGee is in fact a fiction, a rhetorical construction used to invoke action using historically-charged terms that can have several different meanings (i.e. what it means to be an <American> or a <patriot>), and these polysemic “ideographs” are only intelligible in how they are strategically invoked for specific rhetorical purposes in particular
historical contexts (McGee, 1987). These discursive uses accumulate and sometimes contradict over time, yet a group will nonetheless “share” a vague common understanding. However, in a collective, the myth is already believed within Marxist understandings to perpetuate a “false consciousness” of fictions. Therefore the myth in the collective allows the collective to achieve cohesion and consistency only because it can “suspend belief” through the use of poetic devises (McGee, 1982). If a myth that narratively represents group consciousness and identity can be said to exist at all, the narrativizing myths that animate ideologies present themselves through language use. “Human beings are ‘conditioned,’ not directly to belief and behavior,” McGee explains, “but to a vocabulary of concepts that function as guides, warrants, reasons or excuses for behavior and belief” (McGee, 1980, p. 6). Therefore, the recurring use of specific terms can encapsulate an entire constellation of a conceptual vocabulary, which is precisely how ideographs accumulate and negotiate multiple meanings that come together to operate as an ideology’s “common sense.”

This study understands ideographs as comprised of “ideographic fragments,” a constellation of vocabularies and related concepts that cluster around the mythic understandings or fantasies that animate an ideological worldview. The recurring use of specific contested terms such as <liberty> or <law> or <equality> have deep-rooted meanings that provide articulations dependant upon particular political philosophies and historically-specific ideological commitments. McGee (1980) argues that, “ideology in practice is a political language, persevered in rhetorical documents, with the capacity to dictate decisions and control public belief and behavior” (p. 5). Rhetorical critics can understand a dominant ideology with the Burkean understandings of language as symbolic action. The ideograph is thus a means for examining ideology because symbols and language move people to action, and those actions
have a direct impact on people and their perceptions of warranted behavior. The language of the dominant ideology is expressed through slogans, and the vocabulary of slogans can be further explored by examining phenomena such as the President Bush’s dismissal of *The Lancet* study through the lens of the complementary ideographic fragments for *<collateral damage>*.

Condit (1987) builds upon the notion of the ideograph by considering the concepts of characterizations and narratives. Characterizations are defined as, “labels attached to agents, acts, agencies, or purposes in the public vocabulary, and integrate cultural connotations and denotations while ascribing a typical and pervasive nature to the entity described” (Condit & Lucaites, 1990, p. 7). In other words, individuals use names and categories to ascribe others and thus situate both themselves as well as the other into the idea of a collective (i.e. deploying political labels such as “liberal” or “conservative”). Narratives on the other hand are, “storied forms of public discourse that extend the network of a community’s public vocabulary by structuring the particular relationships between and among various characterizations” (Condit & Lucaites, 1990, p. 8-9). Narratives illustrate the connections between ideographs and the community (i.e., what kind of liberal or conservative one identifies them self as).

Parry-Giles (1995) combines the concept of the ideograph with previous research concerning the public to formulate the argument that ideographs, “only function to justify or validate collective policy by virtue of their operation in public texts” (p. 183). Parry-Giles reiterates the idea that the ideograph illustrates an action by his use of the word “operation” in his definition.

Cloud (2004) defines the ideograph as, “the link between rhetoric and ideology, vehicles through which ideologies or unconsciously shared idea systems that organize consent to a particular social system become rhetorically effective” (p. 288). In this study, Cloud’s framing
of the ideograph is utilized by examining the notion of <clash of civilizations> and how this ideograph frames the media portrayal of Afghan women. Cloud’s move to use the ideograph to seek out an understanding of a people is a vital move in ideographic research. Previous research sought to explain the effects of <equality> (Condit & Lucaites, 1990), but in this case the ideograph is used to illuminate an ideology’s projection onto a people. Cloud’s approach invokes a discussion of the collective, as well as an ideographic approach to that collective. Thus ideographs both reflect and create collective understandings as well as group identity. Any “us” therefore narratively requires that a “them” exist who is “not-us” or Other.

Cloud’s (2004) analysis is vital to this project because it demonstrates that any ideograph attempts to name, classify, and orient itself toward some “Other.” Cloud’s use of the ideograph to illustrate how the other is easily categorized and portrayed is new in the consideration of ideographic methodology. Cloud’s analysis provides a foundation for the current project because it provides a platform of research upon which to expand the relationships between “complementary ideographic fragments” as they are articulated to contested meanings and competing ideographs, thereby making this project a viable extension of Cloud’s work. More specifically, this project will argue that <collateral damage> is a terministic cluster for an entire constellation of conceptual vocabularies that together function to label and name Iraqi “others” without nuanced distinctions between civilians, militia, insurgents, Al Qaeda, terrorists, or innocent bystanders. In short, no “collateral damage” of innocent civilians can exist when no meaningful distinction between civilians and potential insurgents, terrorists, or enemy combatants exists.

Cloud’s (2004) work with the ideograph is leads to a consideration of visual effects. McGee’s (1980) definition of the ideograph has been manifested through language, but Cloud
opens up the possibility of a visual ideograph. This project adheres to McGee’s definition of the ideograph through language use, but also considers the visual representation of media effects in chapter 3. Therefore, the current project bridges McGee’s concept of the ideograph centered in language and political discourse with Cloud’s ideographic analysis of visual rhetorics, which can either reinforce or challenge specific invocations of an ideograph.

<Collateral Damage> Defined

According to the USA Intelligence Targeting Guide (1998), “collateral damage” is the “unintentional damage or incidental damage affecting facilities, equipment or personnel occurring as a result of military actions directed against targeted enemy forces or facilities” (p. 179). The guide also states that collateral damage can occur to friendly, neutral, or enemy targets. The responsibility of assessing collateral damage is reliant upon the ranking officer. If for any reason that officer does not assess the damage, the responsibility is delegated to the next person up in the chain of command until such duties are fulfilled. According to this report on collateral damage, an assessment of damage must be made at some point in the chain of command. If the military is not assessing the damage in Iraq, then they are seemingly in violation the Targeting Guide. Consequently, the duty climbs the chain of command until it is fulfilled, which ultimately would assign this responsibility directly to the Commander in Chief. In actual practice, such damage assessment is based upon vague and imprecise estimates when it is not more routinely avoided or ignored.

Aviation Week & Space Technology (Little Bang, 2007) has produced an article that addresses the need for a new way to conduct missile missions for the United States using a low collateral damage bomb (LCDB), a new form of technology that purportedly lowers the chance
of inadvertent casualties in strategic bombing campaigns. This new bomb is a response to an “urgent need” from U. S. Central Command (Little Bang, 2007, p.1). The development of this new weapon confirms that collateral damage is indeed, despite other dismissals, an urgent problem and concern that the U.S. Armed Services takes seriously. According to the article, the development of this weapon did not begin until 2006, while tests of the bomb only began the following summer. The bomb’s development and testing coincides with the “surge” escalation of U.S. troops by President Bush to secure the streets of Baghdad. The concern for civilian deaths is numbed by the anesthetizing label ‘low collateral damage bombs,’ which nevertheless suggests that theses “smart” bombs will hurt or kill or maim as few civilians as possible. In reality, the “smart” LCDB munitions are largely untested, unproven, and undocumented weapons.

LCDB munitions are clearly named and labeled to continue deflecting concern over wartime deaths of innocent civilians; such strategic language is intended to provide a sense of relief or reassurance for the American public. Peters (1992) examines the two terms “collateral” and “damage” by providing a detailed historic etymology of the two terms. Collateral is defined, “adj 1) situated or running side by side; parallel; 2) Coinciding in tendency or effect; concomitant; accompanying, 3) Serving to support or corroborate: collateral evidence, 4) Of secondary nature or subordinate” (p. vii). Damage is defined as “n 1) Impairment of the usefulness or value of a person or property; loss, harm” (p. vii). An inherent meaning is at work when one describes any phenomena of war as collateral damage, a meaning defined by damage or loss. If collateral is defined by something that “runs alongside” something else, she suggests that it is a secondary phenomena in regards to a main event. The other things that coincide with collateral damage are the unintended deaths of the other. By using the phrase <collateral
damage> one is already speaking into action the act of unintentional or accidental “loss” or “harm.” The loss of civilian life is an inevitable “parallel” to wartime activities, a reality that is always present but, in this case, is never counted or accounted. The word “collateral” is used as the subject representative. By definition it is the descriptor for the subject “damage.” By using “collateral,” the subject is automatically moved into a situation that is of, “secondary nature or subordinate” to the “damage.” No action is required with regard to collateral damage because the damage described by this term is already of non-importance.

Although the term “collateral damage” has been in previous wars and conflicts, such as Vietnam, Peters (1992) claims that the term “collateral damage” was popularized in America during the time of the Gulf War. She argues that the emergence of these words were not meant to cause Americans to “think about their meanings,” but were invoked “precisely because we weren’t” (Peters, p. vii). Collateral is a word that is often used to describe war time conditions at home and abroad, and through the use of this word the imagination is discouraged from viewing the loss of life as a war time effect. During the first Persian Gulf War, Americans were able to deflect the meaning of death and dying civilians by using the notion of collateral damage to rally behind the idea of war. The deflection of this reality was possible because of the technological advances in military bombs, as well as the war’s coverage.

The rhetoric of the “smart bomb” was thus pivotal in the deflection of human responsibility for wartime death (Peters, 1992). These bombs were designed to detonate with an unimaginably high level of precision accuracy. In fact, a prominent rationale to quell the fear of human loss in both the Persian Gulf War as well as Operation Iraqi Freedom was the limited number of American casualties made possible by “smart bomb.” The increased use of this military technology for mass bombing, however, reduces American casualties even as it
exponentially increases civilian casualties and property damage. This “trade off” between American casualties and the opposing side’s civilian casualties is rarely examined, nor is such reflection encouraged. The “smart bombs” provide a new rhetorical frame for viewing and thinking about war; these new technologies also make camera footage from guided missiles available for media coverage to selectively “prove” the military’s untested and undocumented claims. Americans no longer need to draw upon previous conceptions of wars, such as World War I or II, not to mention the televised horrors of Vietnam, because those war tactics and atrocities are now in the seemingly distant past. To conceptualize contemporary warfare according to the previous conceptions would have cast a spotlight on civilian casualties as well as American military casualties. However, the rhetoric of the “smart bomb” dismisses those concerns, and provides a new sanitizing frame for considering war. The American public has a new conception of war as a technological process, and this carefully managed and mediated “Nintendo warfare” no longer closely contemplates the increasing deaths of innocent civilians as a wartime consequence of mass bombings. Within this emerging militarized terminology of mediated warfare, people become mere “things.” Therefore, contemporary conceptions of collateral damage evoke interesting networks of meanings shared by both rhetorically strategic language and new technologies of televisual literacy and language.

Preview of Chapters

This project builds upon the two strands of ideograph research represented by the works of McGee (1980) and Cloud (2004). McGee’s concept of the ideograph is a one-word synecdoche for an entire ideology, embedded as specific words or terms systematically invoked within texts across time for ideological purposes.
Chapter 2 follows McGee’s argument that when rhetorical scholars examine the language used to depict a contentious rhetorical situation, key terms can illuminate the driving ideology that animates beliefs and behaviors. This concept is built upon Burke’s theory of language as symbolic action, wherein “terministic screens” strategically select and deflect desired meanings for ideological consequences. Cloud (2004) building upon McGee’s seminal works expands the ideograph into a new realm, considering the ideograph as not only a phenomenon within language but also relevant to visual representations that support or challenge narratives of a dominant ideology. This project seeks to bridge these two conceptualizations of the ideograph. Adhering McGee’s insistence that ideographs should be particularly attentive to historical evolution and diachronic usage, chapter 2 first reviews the relevant scholarly literature of ideographic rhetorical criticism and also offer a genealogical trace of “collateral damage” as a military and popular term. The second chapter strictly considers the language used, and by doing so will build upon McGee’s conception of an ideograph as encapsulating a vocabulary of an ideology’s constellating terms.

Chapter 3 provides a close textual analysis of the Bush administration’s rhetoric of Iraqi civilian deaths and the mainstream U.S. media outlets, exploring how they similarly invoke the ideographic fragments and terministic constellations of <collateral damage> while avoiding or dismissing any overt discussion of civilian casualties and body counts. Chapter 4 utilizes content analysis to contrast the visual representations of Iraqi civilian deaths by comparing US news media with International news media sources. The goal for this chapter is to determine whether any synchronic differences exist between the reporting of Iraqi civilian deaths in US media versus international outlets, (thereby providing for conceptualizations of the ideograph as either perpetuated or challenged via tacit visual rhetoric). Chapter 5 utilizes a psychoanalytic notion of
fantasy (Gunn, 2003, 2004; Gunn & Treat, 2005) to explain the repression and misdirection of <collateral damage> within the popular imaginary concerning Iraqi civilian deaths. This portion of the project bridges the concepts of rhetorical fantasy with Burke’s Freudian-influenced concept of “terministic screens” as a selective means for negotiating identification/division of self/other within a narrative frame. The concluding chapter considers implications for ideographic rhetorical criticism and directions for future research. The ultimate goal of this project is to provide a bridge between McGee’s conception of the ideograph as centered within language and political discourse, and Cloud’s suggestive insistence that the ideograph must now also account for mass-mediated visual representations, by considering the psychoanalytic functions and collective motives which animate a communal ideological myth or shared rhetorical fantasy.
CHAPTER 2

<COLLATERAL DAMAGE> FRAGMENTS IN THE RHETORIC OF “NEW WAREFARE”

Collateral damage is conceptually linked and intimately tied to technological developments in warfare and weapons of mass destruction, especially since the World War II era. It is critical to understand how the early pioneers of strategic warfare and strategic bombing conceptualized the loss of civilian casualties. The new military technologies are engineered through history to protect our forces, and strive to lessen the number of potential casualties suffered by the United States military and by our allies. However, these technological advances are inaccurately celebrated and promoted under the guise of protecting all civilians during wartime. The concept of strategic military bombardment supports using weapons of mass destruction often rationalizes large-scale civilian casualties as a deterrent to war, justifiable losses to prevent military casualties, or the inevitable consequence of the “fog of war.”

This chapter (1) reviews relevant scholarly literature that theorizes and applies the ideograph to ideological rhetorical criticism, (2) traces a historical genealogy of "collateral damage" from the emergence of strategic bombing in World War I to the Gulf Wars, and (3) identifies the emergent rhetoric of "New Warfare" for strategic influence and perception-management campaigns related to conceptual invocations of “collateral damage” in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Bush Administration's Global War on Terror.

The Method of Ideographic Criticism

This section examines the ideograph as a method as well as tracks the analytic uses and evolutionary development of ideographic criticism within rhetorical scholarship. The analysis begins with a consideration of the seminal work on ideographs (McGee, 1980) and follows a
chronological trajectory that covers both the ideograph’s textual functions as well as its visual functions.

McGee (1980) outlines two different approaches to ideological criticism; 1) symbolist, represented by Burke; and 2) materialist, represented by Marxist critics. McGee argues that previous work on ideology has struggled between defining ideology as “myth” or “ideology”; he contends there is “no error in either position” because “fundamentally, materialist and symbolists pursue two different studies” and the error occurs when an individual considers “myth” and “ideology” as “contraries” (McGee, p. 2-3). McGee’s utilizes Marxism as a foundation, yet argues that “previous persuasion” is a powerful determining factor for an individual’s behavior (McGee, p. 5). McGee expands the arguments made by Marxists that call for attention to the ruling elite, yet he combines the concept of false consciousness with Burke’s symbolist approach to language. Therefore, McGee argues that “humans beings are conditioned not directly to belief and behavior, but to a vocabulary of concepts that function as guides, warrants, reasons, or excuses for behavior and belief” (McGee, p. 6). The vocabulary of belief is McGee’s intersection of Marxist thought with a Burkean consideration of language. McGee introduces the concept of the ideograph as a vehicle of uniting the two previous methods in an effort to explain why individuals act differently in a collective than when they are alone.

McGee (1980) claims that “the important fact about ideographs is that they exist in real discourse” and “function clearly and evidently as agents of political consciousness” (McGee, p. 7). McGee warns that ideographs are not terms that can be “invented by observers” but are “part of the real lives of the people whose motives they articulate” (McGee, p. 7). A critic cannot invent an ideograph by claiming that any term or slogan is an ideograph. Rather ideographs are defined by their function, or what they do as opposed to their mere existence in discourse.
Ideographs constitute a structure of “public motive” (McGee, p. 5) and are terms used to impart value (McGee & Martin, 1983).

McGee (1980) agrees that Marx might have “overestimated” the power of the ruling elite, yet that does not in turn mean that the existence of a “dominant ideology” cannot be experienced by individuals (McGee, p. 15). McGee also acknowledges that the symbolists’ work has come close to illuminating dominant ideologies but the symbolist researchers are too “bothered by poetic metaphor” and do not “conceive their work as description of a mass consciousness” (McGee, p. 15). The ideograph works to bridge the search for dominant ideologies through the work of symbolists’ language analysis. McGee defines the ideograph in his conclusion as an ordinary language term found in political discourse. It is a high-order abstraction representing collective commitment to a particular but equivocal and ill-defined normative goal. It warrants the use of power, excuses behavior and belief which might otherwise be perceived as eccentric or antisocial, and guides behavior and belief into channels easily recognized by a community as acceptable or laudable. Ideographs such as ‘slavery’ and ‘tyranny,’ however, may guide behavior and belief negatively by branding unacceptable behavior…Ideographs are culture-bound, though some terms are used in different signification across cultures. (McGee, p. 15)

Three key elements exist in the definition that highlights the use of ideographic method for this particular project. The first is McGee’s situation of the ideograph within political discourse. The primary text for chapter 3 is an in-depth analysis of the political discourse of the Bush administration’s rhetoric concerning Iraqi civilians. The obvious political nature of the text lends itself well with McGee’s methodological approach. The second element is an ideograph’s ability to “warrant the use of power, excuses behavior and belief which might otherwise be perceived as eccentric or antisocial” (McGee, p. 15). This quote is precisely what is argued in chapters 3 and 4. The ideograph of <collateral damage> has, in effect, excused behaviors and beliefs that would be considered eccentric or antisocial during times of peace, but are excused during times of war as a result of the functioning ideograph. The third element of consideration
is culture. The ideograph is “culture-bound,” yet it still lends itself to an analysis of terms that are used differently “across cultures.” Culture is important to this particular project because this ideographic analysis focuses on the consideration of Iraqi civilians, who clearly belong to a different culture than that of American culture. The definition allows for the exploration of culture-bound terms, but acknowledges their implications within “signification across cultures.” That is not to say that ideographs span cultural barriers, but they do allow researchers to consider a cultural frame when examining how the ideograph functions in society. In the next section I consider how the method of the ideograph has been applied through the work of other scholars.

Ideographic Fragments

McGee (1980) calls for a laborious methodological approach when considering ideographic critique. First, a critic must consider how an ideograph has functioned throughout its history. Therefore, the critic must conduct a diachronic analysis also referred to as “vertical” structures to ensure that a comprehensive analysis of the ideograph’s historical implications is clear (McGee, 1980; Condit & Lucaites, 1993). McGee, Corbin, and Klinger (2003) argue for a clear distinction between a historical analysis, which works from a single point in history forward and a genealogy which works from the author’s historical point backwards through time to consider the history of the term. McGee, Corbin, and Klinger advocate a genealogical approach to research when considering the historical implications of a term or an ideograph. Synchronic analysis or “horizontal” structures constitute the second half of the ideographic method (McGee, 1980, p. 11; Condit & Lucaites, 1993). Synchronic analysis illustrates how the ideograph functions with other ideographs. Synchronic analysis’ primary goal is to examine the interactive functions of the ideograph with other terms that orbit around the main functions of the
ideograph. Synchronic analysis is the foundational work that supports “fragments” that a critic pieces together to form a complete text for analysis.

The concept of ideographic fragment is built upon a post-modern understanding of text as it relates to context. McGee (2004) argued that the text folds into the context that surrounds it yielding a situation in which differentiating the two is no longer possible due to the post-modern condition. Therefore McGee argues that there is no longer a complete text, but textual fragments that are joined together by the critic to build a text. In this post-modern condition there is no one complete texts, but several fragments that are compiled together to provide a complete picture of ideology. This thesis builds upon McGee arguments of fragments by positioning that fragments of ideology can be traced throughout a genealogy to construct a cleared understanding of a specific text. The project will build upon different snapshots of media analysis such as newspaper articles, personal interviews, and historical research to piece together the fragments that comprise the ideograph of <collateral damage>. One source will not provide a clear understanding of this ideograph, but by combining McGee’s original work on the ideograph with his later writings concerning texts, context, and fragmentation the critic gains a deeper understanding within a snapshot of ideology.

McGee (2004) argued that public address studies shifted its focus during the mid-sixties from the discussion of public address to a discussion of methodology, thus leading to a “limited ability to deal effectively with new cultural conditions that seem to require different strategies for managing relationship between a text and its context” (p. 274). McGee further explains that the intent of his essay is to argue that the fragmentation of American culture has lead to a role reversal between a critic and the audience. The audience, critic and reader’s primary responsibility in the fragmented culture is text construction while the primary responsibility of
the speaker and writer’s is interpretation (p. 274). The role reversal between writer/speaker and critic/audience is coupled with a new understanding of “rhetoric” as a “master term” thus de-centering “criticism” as a “master term” (p. 274).

“Criticism” is a master term in the previous way of understanding rhetoric before the fragmentation of society. Criticism’s understanding of rhetoric presumes that rhetoric “…is a form or genre of discourse presented for study as are novels, plays of poems” (p. 274). McGee (2004) argues that within this understanding the choice of “text” is “unproblematic” (p. 274) and provides an example of Martin Luther King’s “I Have A Dream” speech as being an example of text. Through the lens of criticism the speech would be an easy choice for a text, and close textual analysis would be implored to strictly adhere to the speech itself as a text.

However McGee argues that the consideration of “text” is a direct contrast when “rhetoric” is implored as the master term. McGee (2004) argues that rhetors “make discourses form scraps and pieces of evidence” (p. 274). Thus “critical rhetoric does not begin with a finished text in need of interpretation; rather, that texts are understood to be larger than apparently finished discourse that presents itself as transparent” (p. 274). Texts are thus compromised from “fragments” that constitute a compilation of scraps of discourse and do not point to a finished product but a fluid understanding. MLK’s “I Have A Dream” speech is understand as a text that is “in between elided parts that make them whole” (p. 274). This means that the understanding of the speech is bound within a consideration of the text before, during, and after the speech was given. The speech’s central claims under the “criticism” umbrella as an “arrangement of facts, allusions, and stylized expressions” while the speech’s central claims under the “rhetoric” umbrella as a consideration of “fragment” would consider the speech as
“only a featured part of an arrangement that includes all facts, events, texts, and stylized expressions deemed useful in explaining its influence and exposing its meaning” (p. 275).

McGee (2004) provides Henry Kissinger’s article of *Foreign Affairs* as another example of a fragment of discourse. Kissinger’s article outlined and discussed the United States foreign policy with the Middle East in roughly 8,000 words. McGee notes that whenever an academic or researcher finds this article, and gleans the “point” of the article or the “bottom line” of Kissinger’s argument the researcher is utilizing a fragment of discourse (p. 275). The fragments are then utilized to represent the entire text and are thus “nominalistic” or “semiotic”; “the fragment is a sign that consists of a signifier (the whole discourse it represents) and a signified (the meaning we are urged to see in the whole discourse)” (p. 275). This means that the entirety of Kissinger’s essay is understood through a “clustered” compilation of other discursive fragments (p. 275).

McGee (2004) clearly argues in this essay that he feels that a “radical” shift has occurred in the American culture, thus forcing the issue of understanding a text through fragments (p. 279). McGee argues that if this radical shift had not occurred, then his essay would simply be considered as an alternative way to conduct textual analysis, but the radical shift compels his essay to make the argument that the “new condition makes it necessary to insist on the concept of ‘fragment’ and to suggest that alternatives embrace error” (p. 279). The mode of how we got to the “radical” shift in the “human condition” is not as important to McGee as is how the change has effected the ability to analyze a text; though McGee does give a reluctant nod to the “post modern” (p. 281). McGee argues that the important factor in the new human condition is finding a place to begin analysis. He argues that “nothing in our new environment is complete enough, finished enough, to analyze-and the fragments that present themselves to us do not stand still
long enough to analyze” (p. 281). Thus the critic is left with a glimpse of “yesterday’s new, a
puzzle that solved itself by disappearing” (p. 281).

<Collateral damage> is comprised of several fragments of discourse throughout history. However, it is interesting to consider early in the project that the term <collateral damage> disappears or is used sparingly to describe conflicts and war post-Vietnam. The disappearing phenomenon is explained through the metaphoric use of a “black hole.” Scientist cannot see a black hole at first glance when they look across the night sky. The black hole’s presence is detected by the movement and action of other surrounding stars that move and “cluster” around the black hole. Thus the behavior of other stars in relation to the black hole indicates its very existence. I will argue that despite the absence of <collateral damage> in the Bush Administration’s rhetoric the behavior of surroundings terms such as <body count> and insurgents indicates its existence. This behavior means that <collateral damage> continues to have an effect on the rhetoric used even though it is not always implored, and the term’s existence can be articulated and teased out through the behavior of terms that “cluster” and circulated around it.

Textual Ideographs

Railsback (1984) conducted a diachronic analysis of arguments made by oppositional sides of the abortion issue in America. The author’s work derived from her doctoral dissertation for which McGee served as a committee member, has a strong ideographic influence. Railsback provides a chronological assessment of the controversy surrounding abortion by providing a detailed description of public arguments on abortion. The study begins with a summary of arguments made prior to the 1960s, which provides a backdrop of historical analysis. The bulk
of the analysis consists of detailed accounts of public arguments from the early sixties to the late seventies. Railsback argues that her work demonstrates a “viable method for rhetorical analyses” (Railsback, p. 419). She also argues for the value of diachronic analysis as opposed to synchronic analysis. She provides analysis of both sides of the abortion controversy. Finally the author argues that the analysis follows “specific units of discourse” as opposed to Burke’s idea of a pattern in discourse. This article is a primary example of the implications of ideographic studies.

Charland (1987) uses ideographic analysis to examine the constitutive rhetoric of the peuple Québécois. Charland argues that rhetorical critics open consider “social identity” as a “product of discourse” and therefore is “beyond the realm of persuasion” (Charland, p. 133). Charland advocates that the role of identity is in a bind because “persuasive discourse requires a subject-as-audience who is already constituted with an identity within an ideology” (Charland, p. 134). Charland extends a theory of “constitutive rhetoric” that investigates the rhetorical bind of identity through an analysis of the peuple Québécois. The peuple Québécois attempted to use documents that would allow the creation of their own sovereign state of Quebec. Charland builds upon McGee’s notion of “the people” and Althusser’s discussions of interpellation as the foundation of his investigation into the peuple Québécois. Charland argues that the peuple Québécois used the narrative of the White Paper document to justify their arguments for sovereign power. This narrative included a historical justification for the peuple Québécois which provided a foundation of justification for their argument. Based on his analysis Charland posits that “audiences do not exist outside of rhetoric, merely addressed by it, but live inside rhetoric” (Charland, p. 147).

Delgado (1995) builds upon Charland’s theory of “constitutive rhetoric” by examining
documents of the Chicano movement; El Plan Espiritual de Aztlán and El Plan de Santa Barbara. Delgado argues that these two documents can best be understood through ideographic analysis. These documents also portrayed “appropriate frame” of “political ideology” that served to constitute the people’s “subject position” with the larger Chicano movement (Delgado, p. 446). Delgado argues that ideographs functioning within political discourse provide a frame for examining the “interpellating and situating consumers of public discourse” (Delgado, p. 447). Delgado focuses on the cultural dimensions and extensions of the ideograph as a methodological approach to ideology. Delgado also sought to extend the notion of “structured silences” initially argued by McGee (1987).

Another example of textual ideographs is Lucaites and Condit’s (1990) examination of <equality>. Lucaites and Condit (1990) explore the use of the ideograph of <equality> to highlight how Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcom X utilized the idea of <equality> as a slogan in their call to activism. Lucaites and Condit provide two definitions for the critic to consider when approaching their text. The first is “culturetypal” (Lucaites, & Condit, p. 6), which is defined as “rhetors who successfully rearrange and revivify the culturally established public vocabulary to produce social” (Lucaites, & Condit, p. 8). The authors categorize King’s rhetoric as “culturetypal.” The second approach is that of “counter-cultural” (Lucaites, & Condit, p. 4) which they define as “rhetors who introduce new-and thus culturally unauthorized-characterizations and narratives to the public vocabulary and who challenge existing characterizations and narratives” (Lucaites, & Condit, p. 8). Much like McGee, the two authors urge that the importance of these two distinctions is highlighted when they merge. The authors argue that to understand the ideograph of <equality> both of these rhetorical approaches must be considered.
Next, I examine Moore’s (1996) analysis of cigarettes and their ideographic function. Moore argues that the concept of “cigarette” is determined by two competing “synecdoches” (Moore, p. 47). Therefore the social construction of the term cigarette is based on “representational ideographs” that are based on narrative and the scientific community. The author examines the rhetoric surrounding the narrative social reality and compares that with the scientific community’s rhetoric based on the harmful effects of cigarette smoke. The author claims that the concept of cigarette is ultimately claimed by the two competing narratives. Thus Moore extends previous ideographic research of controversies, such as Railsback (1984), by including the work of Lyotard.

Cloud (1998) provides a continuation of the previous ideographic studies with an introduction to the idea of multiple ideographs working simultaneously in discourse. The author argues that the ideograph of <family values> is vital in understanding political discourse during the 1992 Presidential campaign. The analysis begins with a speech given by then Vice-President Dan Quayle that outlined the absence of family values with the Black community in Los Angeles during the riots. Cloud argues that the ideograph served to “scapegoat Black men and poor Americans for social problems” (Cloud, p. 387). The article illustrates how both Republicans and Democrats used the ideograph of <family values> to describe and other members of an already marginalized community. This example of an ideograph also functions similarly to Charland (1987) because it illustrates how ideographs constitute people of a particular community or culture. Cloud utilizes a synchronic analysis during her study to illustrate how the ideographs of <family>, <opportunity> and <responsibility> interact and orbit the larger ideograph of <family values>. This move in scholarship sets a foundation for the current project
to consider multiple ideographs in chapter 3 and how the ideograph of <body counts> orbits the ideograph of <collateral damage>.

Visual Ideographs

Lucaites (1997) extends the notion of the ideograph into the realm of visual rhetoric. Lucaites explores the political discourse of documentary photojournalism in the 1930s. The author argues that a “unified” understanding of a “coherent public” is illustrated through a “visually objectified ‘the people’” than a “fragmentation of the ‘thing’ itself” (Lucaites, p. 269). Lucaites’ text is the documentary photographs of Let Us Now Praise Famous Men which illustrates how visual images can become “representative anecdotes.” Lucaites uses the text of photojournalism to extrapolate the “tensions that exist between individualism and collectivism.” This article illustrates the connections between visual images and their role in constituting a people and because of that argument proves to be vital for the photographic considerations of chapter 4.

Edwards and Winkler (1997) argue that previous research on the iconic image of the flag raising at Iwo Jima neglected to consider the rhetorical function of the photograph. Therefore the authors advocate for a rhetorical consideration of editorial cartoons as visual representative texts. The authors also argue for “a concept of representative form” (Edwards & Winkler, p. 289). The authors focus not on the historical implications of the photograph, but how the visual depictions of editorial cartoons relate to the present. The authors claim that McGee’s (1980) work did not present a clear rationale for considering only language as a form of ideograph and excluding visual depictions. However, the authors claim that the iconic image of Iwo Jima, along with the different editorial cartoons function as visual ideographs because they meet all
requirements of ideographic criticism despite falling short of the language requirement. The notion that iconic photography can reflect social knowledge and be considered an example of ideographic studies is supported in later work (Lucaites & Hariman, 2001).

The final example of visual ideographs is found in Cloud’s (2004) examination of the '<clash of civilizations>'. Cloud examines a grouping of photographs circulated through *Time* magazine’s online website. Cloud argues for both a verbal and a visual representation of the ideograph '<clash of civilizations>'. This argument is unique in the fact that Cloud brings together the two methodological approaches of verbal or textual analysis and visual ideographic analysis. She also focuses on how the ideographic functions in a representative way to classify the enemy other during wartime. The argument for both a textual understanding of '<collateral damage>' occurs in chapter 3 and the second visual component is argued in chapter 4. This thesis extend the work of Cloud’s notion of an ideograph which functions both verbally and visually as a representative format during wartime.

The above analysis documents the foundational work of the ideograph from McGee (1980) as well as subsequent work from other scholars to support McGee’s seminal work. In the next section I consider the genealogy of '<collateral damage>' as the first methodological requirement of diachronic analysis.

**A Historical Genealogy of <Collateral Damage>**

McGee (1980) argues that the historical mapping of an ideograph is essential to determining the presence of an ideograph. In other words, the historical conception of the slogan or wording of an ideograph is central to understanding how the ideograph has been constructed, manipulated, and instituted over time. Cloud (1998) supports a historical emphasis in her
critique of <family values>. Cloud (1998) emphasizes that “ideologies emerge from historical events and therefore are evident only in historical view” (p. 392). Condit and Lucaites, (1993) argue that ideographs represent the “full range of history of its usages for a particular rhetorical culture” (p. xiii). Therefore, it is an essential to trace a historical genealogy of <collateral damage> and its use from World War I through the current War with Iraq by concentrating on major events (i.e., World War I, World War II, the firebombing of Tokyo, Vietnam, and the rise of technology in the Gulf War to present). Genealogy research is best explored through the military frame of strategic bombing because this frame provides an examination that explains the formation of bombing ideologies that directly affect the invocation of <collateral damage>. It is critical to understand how the early pioneer of strategic warfare and strategic bombing conceptualized warfare as it relates to the loss of civilian casualties. New technologies have been engineered through history to protect our forces and to lessen the number of potential casualties suffered by the United States and our allies. However, the technological advances are not developed under the guise of protecting all civilians during wartime.

The difficulty of definitions and discussing strategic bombardment historically is illustrated by Holley who notes, “One is struck by the absence of standard or stable terminology. In each new resurgence of interest..., those involved seem to have coined virtually a whole new vocabulary.” (Cooling, 1990, p. 544-545).

Historically strategic bombing has been characterized by three objectives: “one aimed at the devastation and destruction of industrial and population centers on a vast scale; another aimed at assisting surface forces; and a third form involved the systematic attack on selected targets considered critical to the enemy’s war-making potential” (MacIssac, 1990, p. 1).

Greenfield (1963) addressed the need for definition
The term requires definition because it is inexact. It carries a charge of aspiration, if not of boastfulness. It implies that the kind of air offensive to which it refers is the only kind of offensive that is truly strategic. What the term, as used in World War II, actually meant was massive and systematic bombing of the enemy’s war economy and the enemy’s population’s will to resist….The term “strategic” bombing was used to designate this unprecedented kind of warfare because no other acceptable term for it was available. (p. 88)

**World War I**

Strategic bombing was first practiced in World War I, when a German bomber dropped bombs on Paris. The event of dropping bombs accurately over a target revolutionized the way countries viewed their respective air defenses. By 1915, London had suffered fifty-two air raids that killed or injured 3,000 people (Boot, 2006). However the Royal Flying Corps, which the U.S. Air Force is modeled after, dropped several bombs on German cities as well which resulted in over 1,900 dead or wounded people. Boot reports that these losses were, “alarming enough at the time…[yet] the damage caused by these raids was, in retrospect, minimal” (270). However in the years between World War I and World War II the idea of strategic bombing would become a central focus in military armament.

Air Marshal Hugh “Boom” Trenchard, Commander in the Royal Air Force, Brigadier General Billy Mitchell, United States Army, and General Guilio Douhet, Commander of Italy’s first aviation units, were central in the advancement of strategic bombing (Boot, 2006). These three men felt that the ability to attack a city from the air would create such a surge of fear in any opposing country that the opposing government would buckle because of the catastrophic nature of these airborne attacks. The military men believed that, “any future war would be over in a matter of days, and thus targeting civilians, far from being inhumane, would actually lessen the
horrors of war” (Boot, p. 271). J. F. C. Fuller, a highly regarded military tactics operator, argued that a country facing air attacks

will be swept away by an avalanche of terror. Then will the enemy dictate his terms, which will be grasped at like a straw by the drowning man. Thus may a war be won in forty-eight hours and the losses of the winning side may be actually nil!” (Boot, p. 271)

This ideology illustrates that the concern for the other country involved and its civilians is almost non-existent. It would be incorrect to say that the military planners did not consider the enemy’s civilian population. They considered the population a bargaining tool, an instrument to make warfare catastrophic and fearful. Humans become strategic means of warfare. The men believed that threatening human and civilian targets would ultimately make war less harmful because of the impending fear. Fuller’s statement highlights the conviction that losses of the winning side would be minimal and, therefore, this “strategic” warfare was not only tactical, but acceptable. This type of mentality demonstrates that the enemy’s civilian population affect warfare development, yet that effect is not one of concern due to loss, but one of tactics. This point in military history is important because, as Boot argues, it foreshadows what is to come in military strategy. This point is significant because, at its very inception, strategic bombing is connected to civilian casualties. This connection will be fostered in military planning throughout the wars and conflicts in which the United States is involved, and serves as the basis for future military policy. The tactical connection of casualties is a strategy later becomes the ideology that governs war waging as it relates to collateral damage, and loss of civilian life.

The Fourth Geneva Convention revolutionized the way that civilians were categorized during times of war or conflict. Previously in history civilians were marked as strategic components of war time. The literature has illustrated how civilians were perceived during times of war as potential targets as well as innocent by-standers in need of protection. The Fourth
Geneva Convention outlined war time civilians as people in need of protection, and provided detailed descriptions of how to handle civilians. Thus the Geneva Convention provided a unifying way of seeing civilians during war time for all of the nations that signed the Convention, thereby binding those nations within the use of a new civilian language. The new language of seeing civilians not as potential targets or dehumanized strategic pawns but as innocents who by law must be protected changed the conceptualization of civilians from a definition dictated by the military to a definition regulated by the laws of the Convention.

The ideology of government control through bombing was central in the British Air Force. In the years between wars, the British Air Force worked as a policing unit over countries such as Somaliland, Iraq, and Afghanistan (Boot, 2006). Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin stated, “The only defense is an offense, which means you have got to kill more women and children quicker than the enemy if you want to save yourselves” (Boot, p. 271). Baldwin’s state insists that effectiveness is based upon the number of civilians a country can kill, and rule by fear. This tactic of warfare began in the 1930’s, but remnants of its impact remain. While the Royal Air Force continued on its path of civilian destruction, strategic bombing took another turn in the United States.

The United States did not feel that civilian targeting was the best concept of air warfare. Boot (2006) reports that in 1936 a flood took out a plant in Pittsburgh that was the sole manufacturer of a small part that controlled plane propulsion, and slowed the production of planes for several months. This incident led many officials to question the effectiveness of bombing strategic targets such as factories or distribution centers. The United States would follow along this path of strategic targeting, but would not oppose Britain’s civilian targeting efforts.
During World War II the Royal Air Force continued bombing civilian targets. Under the command of Air Marshall Arthur “Bert” Harris, the Royal Air Force switched its focus from “precision to area bombing” (Boot, 2006, p. 274). The Royal Air Force was intent on, “delivering a crushing load of explosives and incendiaries against urban centers” with the goal of “the elimination of German industrial cities” (Boot, p. 275). On July 27, 1943, a Royal Air Force raid killed at least 60,000 people. The Untied States participated in bombing raids with the Royal Air Force. In fact, the countries engaged in a combined strategy. During the day the United States would conduct “strategic” and “pinpoint” missions that kept with their ideology of structural damage, and the Royal Air Force conducted raids at night with blanket and “area” bombing. Boot argues, however that the United States shift to area bombing would, “move in the same direction, if more slowly and with even less candor” (Boot, p. 275).

Air raids were found to be highly effective in keeping Hitler on the defensive. Hitler spent many of his resources trying to develop weapons that would exact revenge for the destruction of his cities (Boot, 2006). These ventures failed, however, and he ultimately lost the war, due in part to the air campaigns against him. However, another loss contradicted prewar predictions, the loss of allied forces. The United States lost 29,000 bombers and Britain lost 47,000. Although strategic air raids crippled Hitler’s goals, they also resulted in a significant loss in allied bombers. These losses did not affect United States strategy. A new leader emerged during this time period that would forge a new chapter in Strategic Air Command, and in the United States Air Force that would change the face of warfare and intended targeting of civilian populations.
Firebombing of Tokyo

Curtis LeMay enjoyed a rise to fame during World War II as a fighter pilot. He was responsible for many strategic efforts during the war, and developed a flying pattern that was used throughout the war. In July of 1944, LeMay was transferred to the bombardment unit in the Pacific, and his accomplishments in the Pacific lead to an appointment as chief of staff of the Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific. On March 9, 1945, LeMay led an attack on Tokyo that would once again cement the strategy of civilian bombing targets.

LeMay ordered planes to fly at night at low altitudes of 5,000-8,000 feet and to drop a new form of weaponry onto Tokyo: napalm. LeMay had worked closely with a Harvard chemist Louis Fieser who engineered the mixture of four different chemicals to create napalm (Boot, 2006). The air raid on March 9, 1945, was the first time that napalm had been used in an aerial attack. LeMay was struggling to regain a good reputation for air defenses in the Pacific due to the previous record of missing aerial targets, so he needed this daring air strike to work to restore the air defense reputation. The first planes dropped bombs in the shape of an “X” to direct the second wave of attack planes to targets of heavily populated areas. The plans succeeded; over 16.7 square acres were destroyed, over 83,000 people were killed, and over 40,000 were injured. General Thomas Power described the night as, “the single greatest disaster incurred by any enemy in military history….There were more casualties than in any other military action in the history of the world” (Boot, p. 291). Power had circled above the bombers to take photos documenting the raid. He later recalled the event

I watched block after block go up in flames until the holocaust had spread into a seething, swirling ocean of fire, engulfing the city below for miles in every direction. True, there is no room for emotions in war. But the destruction I witnessed that night over Tokyo was so overwhelming that it left a tremendous and lasting impression with me. (Arynhyrm, 1965, p. 11)
The conditions during the raid were unimaginable. Documented accounts state the some civilians were burned alive or suffered asphyxiation, while others sought refuge in the river only to be boiled or scorched because the fires had heated the river to boiling temperatures (Boot, 2006). LeMay apparently was not bothered by the civilian loss. He later stated, “if it hadn’t been for that river [the Sumida] curving through the metropolitan area, a lot more of the city would have gone” (LeMay, 1965, p. 369-370). A soldier ordered to return after a raid to document the destruction could not do his job that night. He stated, “The condition was so terrible, I could not well describe it. After a raid I was supposed to investigate, but I didn’t go [on March 10] because I did not like to see the terrible sights” (Coox, 1990, p. 321). It took twenty-five days to clear the piles of dead bodies out of the city (Coox. 1990). After the raid General Arnold messaged the following to LeMay, “Congratulations. This mission shows your crews have got the guys for anything” (LeMay, 1965, p. 353).

General Amano’s response to the claim that the continued air attacks were inhuman:

Although an effort was made to direct [secondary urban] attacks toward targets the destruction of which would do damage to industrial production, the preponderant purpose appears to have been to secure the heaviest possible moral and shock effect by widespread attack upon Japanese civilian population. To this end, the practice was adopted, in July, of broadcasting in advance the names of towns marked for destruction. Certain of the cities attacked had virtually no industrial importance. Others were significant only as transportation centers. (Coox, 1990, p. 348)

With this statement, the General attempts to justify the continued urban air attacks by stating that they warned the civilians before bombings were to occur, which prepared civilians for the eventually bombing of their villages. The General’s statement exhibits an overwhelming lack of concern for civilian casualties. He even acknowledges that some of the cities that were bombed had no industrial relevance. Other cities were only bombed for transportation reasons, which fits within the realm of targets within the industrial complex, and therefore acceptable by
military standards. However a USSBS analyst returns once again to the argument that civilian targets were seen as a strategic attack that would bring about so much fear that the enemy would forfeit

The vulnerability of the Japanese to air attacks was never a primary consideration of basic Allied strategy. The theater Air Command, however, while selecting urban targets primarily on the basis of their economic value, anticipated that, apart from the economic results of those raids, the impact of mass bombing on the people would seriously undermine the enemy’s ability to continue the war.” (LeMay, 1965, p. 380)

LeMay also harkens the notion of civilians target as a strategic move when he discusses the atom bomb, “if a nuclear weapon shortened the war by only a week, probably it saved more lives than were taken by that single glare of heat and radiation” (Coox, 1990, p. 363). Coox claims that this context affected the Japanese by cementing the idea that, “military expediency, and not moral issues, was the deciding factor” (Coox, p. 363).

The strategic bombing campaign with strategic civilian targets continued in four more Japanese cities including: Osaka, Nagoya, and Kobe. LeMay’s new tactics proved to be pivotal in changing the concept of war. Lieutenant Colonel Morgan who later became a critic of the attacks wrote, “It amounted to nothing less than the beginning of the end of war”” (Boot, 2006, p. 291).

Years later LeMay was questioned concerning so many civilian casualties. His answer demonstrates that the idea of civilian loss is once again governed by strategy and tactics, whereby the Japanese civilian population is reduced to non-human entities and strategic pawns. LeMay’s response illustrates that loss during the war is calculated in terms of the loss of American soldiers, and not loss of the enemy’s civilian population. Therefore, any consideration of loss during the war is based on an American definition, and American casualties; and the loss of the enemy’s civilians is reduced to strategic measurement. LeMay’s response follows:
Contrary to suppositions and cartoons and editorials of our enemies, I do not beam and gloat where human casualties are concerned. No matter how you slice it, you’re going to kill an awful lot of civilians. Thousands and thousands. But, if you don’t destroy the Japanese industry, we’re going to have to invade Japan. And how many Americans will be killed in an invasion of Japan? Five hundred thousand seems to be the lowest estimate. Some say a million. Do you want to kill Japanese, or would you rather have Americans killed? (LeMay, 1965, p.352-353)

The dehumanization of the Japanese population extended to the Japanese soldiers as well. Japanese pilots were not considered a threat before the Pearl Harbor attacks. In fact many American military officials compared the Japanese to animals, or used racialized language when describing Japanese airmen (Coox, 1990). LeMay was asked in an interview what he thought of the Japanese airmen, and he responded:

Well, first of all I certainly wasn’t an expert on [them]. Prior to the war we had practically a non-existent intelligence system. So I personally consider that I knew nothing about the Japanese except that they were pretty tough fighters and that they did consider a defeated enemy even worse than a dog, and treated them as such. I had respect for them as an enemy, but not much respect for them as a people. (Coox, 1990, p. 258)

LeMay’s response shows that the Japanese airmen were seen as soldiers, or a means to an end, but not as a people deserving respect. This attitude towards the Japanese people and airmen is illustrated by the air raid campaigns of Tokyo.

The new aerial tactics would once again change how war was conceptualized. Significantly although technology has advanced, the conception of civilian casualties has remained the same. It is vital to consider the through line of enemy conceptualization because it provides a point of similarity across the decades of wars and conflicts.

The world engaged in an arms race after the mushroom clouds of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As commander of SAC, LeMay controlled the country’s largest supply of nuclear weapons (Boot, 2006). Technological developments provided scientists with the means to make the atomic bomb in smaller sizes. A general advancement was to make all bombs smaller and
weapons were combined together to make them more deadly. Missiles were tipped with small atomic bombs, artillery shells had atomic capabilities, and the Air Force even tried to make planes fly using atomic energy. However, Britain and the U.S. both realized that the nuclear bomb was too harmful to be used as a mere weapon. Boot argues that the atomic build-up kept the world’s attention diverted from the real danger of technology (Boot, 2006). During the time of the atomic militarization, Americans were developing technologies that would lead to the microchip and personal computers.

President Truman’s decision to drop the A-bombs sparked a debate that continues to the present day. Yet the atomic bombs did not mark a radical break with the past. They merely represented the natural culmination of the strategic bombing campaign begun in 1944. It would not have mattered much to the average Japanese whether she was killed by atomic bombs or napalm bombs. Indeed March 9-10 firebombing of Tokyo caused more death and destruction than the atomic raid on Nagasaki. The difference, of course, was that it had taken 334 B-29s to destroy central Tokyo. Only three were needed over Hiroshima and Nagasaki: the bomber, a chase plane, and a weather plane. (Boot, p. 293)

This quote highlights the essential turn in technological warfare when human loss is considered as we seek to lessen the impact for us, and is used as a strategic tactic when the impact is high for the other. Technology has allowed the United States to protect our own troops and military personnel while simultaneously allowing us to disregard human loss of the enemy. The bombing of Tokyo caused more destruction it is not considered a highlight of military advancement because of the greater risk to our own personnel. Instead, Hiroshima and Nagasaki are exemplars of advancement precisely because of the reduced risk involved for American forces. Less risk allows the military categorize loss by different terms and measurements. Technology, therefore, serves as a way for deflecting enemy. Technology continued to shape the concept of strategic bombardment in the next military era, Vietnam.
The Vietnam era was fraught with debate concerning strategic bombardment. Following President Kennedy’s assassination, Lyndon B. Johnson assumed the Presidency about the United States. Johnson was tentative of the idea of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam conflict because he did not want to include the nation in another conflict that resembled Korea. Johnson also considered the potential involvement of the USSR and China; did not want to launch an offensive against North Vietnam that would inevitably involve the Soviets or the People’s Republic of China. To ensure a strategic involvement, Johnson assumed the role of commander in the selection of strategic bombing sites. Despite encouragement from his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Johnson remained tentative about bombing sites as well as the number of sites that were considered as targets. Robert McNamara supported a foreign policy that became known as assured-destruction.

On September 18, 1967, McNamara gave a speech that outlined the first-strike policies of the United States as a response to the potential nuclear war with the Soviet Union. McNamara outlined the policies that would govern the United States’ response strategies to any considerable threat. McNamara (1967) claims that the United States’ primary goal is, “to deter nuclear attack upon the United States or its allies” and he outlines that plan as

maintaining a highly reliable ability to inflict unacceptable damage upon any single aggressor or combination of aggressors at any time during the course of a strategic nuclear exchange, even after absorbing a surprise first strike. This can be defined as our assured-destruction capability. (McNamara, pg. 1)

Assured destruction is a policy that remains consistent with the previous interpretation of civilian loss as a tactical strategy. The goal of assured-destruction is to establish a defense initiative for any possible aggression against the United States or its allies. Assured-destruction’s central focus is fear. The fear that the United States would be able to severely
main its enemy that the enemy would think twice before challenging any of its cities. This policy closely resembles tactics and logic that dictated the earlier policies of strategic bombardment. The assured-destruction policy calculates potential civilian loss as a measurement of success. The policy threatens to level societies and make it impossible for the enemy to ever recover. In fact McNamara (1967) acknowledges the United States would “absorb” the effects on our cities, without compromising our ability to retalate.

When calculating the force required, we must be conservative in all our estimates of both a potential aggressor's capabilities and his intentions. Security depends upon assuming a worst plausible case, and having the ability to cope with it. In that eventuality we must be able to absorb the total weight of nuclear attack on our country — on our retaliatory forces, on our command and control apparatus, on our industrial capacity, on our cities, and on our population — and still be capable of damaging the aggressor to the point that his society would be simply no longer viable in twentieth-century terms. That is what deterrence of nuclear aggression means. It means the certainty of suicide to the aggressor, not merely to his military forces, but to his society as a whole. [emphasis added] (p. 2)

Johnson felt uncomfortable and limited by McNamara’s concept of assured-destruction, so his defense team developed operation Rolling Thunder. Rolling Thunder would be a slow escalation of bombing targets and air raids throughout Vietnam. Johnson made it clear that he wanted the public to feel that bombing Vietnam was the last resort. Johnson planned to continue a path of diplomacy while the bombing campaign slowly increased. If diplomacy failed, more bombing targets would be added to the list of engagement. Rolling Thunder allowed the Johnson presidency to appear diplomatic, while increasing air raids over North Vietnam.

The Johnson Administration did not anticipate that the North Vietnamese forces would be so adept at handling air attacks. The North Vietnamese forces used the largest arsenal of anti-aircraft capabilities that the United States had ever faced in battle (Hone, 1990). The technological advances of Vietnamese radios, anti-aircraft weapons, tracking devices, and radar equipment forced the United States to develop more technically-proficient weaponry. These
developments slowed the impact of Rolling Thunder, and Johnson was pressured once again by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as McNamara to increase bombing targets. President Johnson did not increase the number of bombing targets within Rolling Thunder, and by January 31, 1968, the administration gave up on the operation (Hone, p. 504). Later that year McNamara was asked to resign his post as Secretary of Defense, and the Johnson administration announced that it would halt all missions of the Rolling Thunder Operation. The strategic air offense suffered a slight loss of credibility during the Johnson Presidency. Rolling Thunder had not produced the level of success that the United States had experienced during World War II, but advances in technology at the end of the war would propel the United States in a new direction driven by technology.

Strategic bombing had proved fruitful in World War II and in the Korean conflict, but those tactics failed in Vietnam because it was a different type of war. Vietnam was fought by guerillas on the ground, which caused aerial attacks to occur with more difficulty. Strategic bombing developed during World War II, but the weapons were not extremely accurate. After World War II the country faced an atomic build-up of weapons, and some strategists discounted the need for precision warfare because the atomic bomb had changed the way war was conceptualized (Boot, 2006). However, in Vietnam the United States faced a guerilla war and not a war of atomic weapons. The Vietnamese military had the largest arsenal of anti-aircraft weapons, supplied by the USSR, which American troops had ever faced. American planes were shot down in record numbers, but President Johnson was leery of “collateral damage” so area bombing raids were not allowed (Boot, p. 326). American troops found some success in jamming the radio signals to anti-aircraft weaponry, but the radio-jamming did not prove to be
the technological advance that the Air Force needed to defeat enemies in the North. In 1964, a new technology emerged that would redefine the implementation of strategic bombardment.

Air Force Colonel Joe Davis, Jr. was the first person to test a laser-guided bomb (Boot, 2006). Colonel Davis saw a laser demonstration in the laboratories of Eglin Air Force Base, and contracted Texas Instruments to create the first laser-guided bomb, called Paveways. Boot recounts the most successful deployment of Paveways in Vietnam. The United States had been trying to detonate the Thanh Hoa Bridge in North Vietnam since 1965. Thanh Hoa Bridge was the main entrance for supplies into North Vietnam from China, and it was one of the most strategic bombing sites for the United States throughout the conflict. However, eight hundred and seventy-one bombers and jets had flown missions over the Thanh Hoa Bridge and all had failed; eleven aircraft had been lost in the attempt to blow up the bridge. In 1972, fourteen jets armed with Paveway bombs took out the Thanh Hoa Bridge. Boot recalls, “Just 14 jets managed to do what the previous 871 had not-- send the span crashing into the Red River” (Boot, p. 327). The devastation of the Thanh Hoa Bridge occurred late in the Vietnam conflict, but the technology that began with the Paveway “smart bomb” would propel the United States in the direction of the “smart bomb.”

The change in bombing technology paralleled a change in foreign defense policy. James Schlesinger adopted a new foreign policy as President Nixon’s second Secretary of Defense in May 1973. Schlesinger was placed as head of the Limited Nuclear Options project.

Limited nuclear options are US targeting plans for missile, or possibly bomber, attacks on specific targets. They range from single shot across the bows demonstration strikes, through smaller or larger counter-force measures and attacks on other military targets to, presumably, restricted intimidatory attack on one or two US cities. The idea is to have a whole range of carefully prepared responses to any form of Soviet nuclear use. (Robertson, 1987, p. 181)
This policy is a departure from the mass destruction policies such as assured-destruction. The Limited Nuclear Options policy was announced in 1974, as the central point Schlesinger’s Doctrine which was popularized during the Carter Administration. He claimed that Massive Destruction was too limiting in its scope, and that the United States would need more than one response option if a nuclear attack occurred (Robertson, 1987). President Carter continued operating under the Schlesinger Doctrine and, as a result the Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) was born.

SIOP began in the late 1950s and highlighted a “shift in emphasis rather than actual policy changes” (Robertson, 1987, p. 182). Robertson argues that as a result of Carter’s initial planning and Reagan’s military funding increases the USA now probably does, or shortly will have, the weapons, specifically the MX ICBM and Trident II SLBM, capable of destroying hard targets with minimum collateral damage, which is the principal requirement for the counter-force option. (Robertson, p. 182)

The Schlesinger Doctrine, as well as the implementation of SIOP, points to a move away from massive destruction of the enemy towards a consideration of collateral damage involved in bombing campaigns.

The first year that the Paveway bomb was deployed in Vietnam was also the first year the U.S. military officially defined “collateral damage.” Collateral Damage was initially defined in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT, 1972). SALT resulted from engaged conversation with the Soviet Union, which had as its goals the “enhancement of national security, strategic stability, and détente through dialogue and agreements with the Soviet Union” (SALT, p. 1). SALT ONE defined collateral damage “the damage surrounding human and non-human resources, either military or non-military, as the result of action or strikes directed specifically against enemy forces or military facilities” (SALT, p. 6).
Although the Vietnam War is historically considered a loss, the technological gains during the Vietnam Era are evident today. The technological advantage of the “smart bomb” proved to be another turning point in the conceptualization of war in the United States. Technology continued to develop in the years between the end of the Vietnam War and the beginning of the Persian Gulf War, and as the “smart bomb” increased in precision it was increasingly praised by the military. The “smart bomb” became known as a “precision” weapon that had the potential to limit civilian casualties. <Collateral damage> had already been defined by the military in SALT I, but the new bombing techniques stirred the debate over civilian casualties.

Robertston (1987) defined <collateral damage> as “simply damage, or casualties, which are caused by an attack over and above the destruction intended or required.” He noted that the concept “has become an important concept in strategic theory because of the desire in some nuclear targeting scenarios to minimize civilian casualties” (p. 70). The U.S. Air Force defines collateral damage as “the damage to surrounding resources, either military or non-military, as a result of actions or strikes specifically against enemy forces or military facilities” (Robertson, 1987 p. 70).

Peters (1992) examines the two terms “collateral” and “damage” by providing a historic etymology of the two terms. Collateral is defined, “adj 1) situated or running side by side; parallel; 2) Coinciding in tendency or effect; concomitant; accompanying, 3) Serving to support or corroborate: collateral evidence, 4) Of secondary nature or subordinate” (p. vii). Damage is defined as, “n 1) Impairment of the usefulness or value of a person or property; loss, harm” (p. vii). When one describes any phenomena of war as collateral damage, it is characterized by damage or loss. If collateral is something that “runs alongside of something else, then it is a
secondary phenomena in regards to a main event. The other elements that constitute collateral
damage are the unintended deaths of the other. By using the phrase <collateral damage> one is
already speaking into action the act of unintentional or accidental “loss” or “harm.” The loss of
civilian life is an inevitable “parallel” to wartime activities, a reality that is always present but, in
this case, is never counted or accounted. The word “collateral” is used as the subject
representative. By definition it is the descriptor for the subject of “damage.” By using
“collateral,” the subject is automatically moved into a situation of, “secondary nature or
subordinate” to the “damage.” No agent needs to assume responsibility for <collateral damage>
because whatever damage has been described by this term is already relegated to a status of non-
importance.

Desert Storm, the bombing against Iraq during the Gulf War, began January 17, 1991
with an air attack. Iraq was heavily equipped with anti-aircraft weaponry and surface-to-air
missiles. American troops attacked at night to achieve the best chance of hitting key munitions
targets within Iraq. Objective Oklahoma and Objective Nebraska were two key air defense
targets for the United States. “Alpha alpha” was the code word used in the mission to alert
commanders at base that the plan had worked, and that no U.S. troops had been lost (Boot, 2006,
p. 319). The missions succeeded and were followed by several other attacks on Iraq. The United
States introduced a new weapon during the initial attacks against Iraq.

The cruise missile was first introduced during the initial bombing campaigns in Iraq.
These missiles called Tomoahawks were launched from naval ships in the Persian Gulf and the
Red Sea (Boot, 2006). Sklar (1992) argues the ironic nature of giving weapons a human name
while the intended victims of the weapons remained nameless.

In the oft-parroted euphemistic language of the Pentagon, weaponry is described more
humanly than people. U.S. missiles are “smart” and have names like Tomahawk Cruise
and Patriot. An SDI program riding Patriot missile is called G-PALS, for Global Protection Against Limited Strikes. G-PALS relies on missile-bombarding satellites called “Brilliant Pebbles.” (Skalr, p. 9)

The Stratofortress bombers, which were utilized during World War II, were also commissioned during the initial bombings of Baghdad. The Stratofortress bombers were responsible for air-launching cruise missiles, and were refueled seven times in flight making their 14,000 mile mission the “longest bombing mission in history” (Boot, 2006, p. 321). The U.S. lost only one plane during the first night of the war with Iraq (Boot, 2006). Former Chief of Staff General Michael Dugan described the night as, “the most awesome and well coordinated mass raid in the history of air power” (Boot, p. 321).

The Gulf War promised to be a war like none the world had ever seen. The U.S. strategy relied on technological advantages. “Smart bombs” which had been deployed during the last years of Vietnam, became the central weaponry in the Gulf War. The administration promised “surgical accuracy” and low collateral damage to Iraqi civilians. Sklar (1992) reports that “Military briefers thrilled their audience with Top Gun videos of supposedly civilian-friendly “smart bombs” whizzing through the doors and down airvents” (Sklar, p. 10). The news also marveled at the “smart bomb.” On January 20, NBC’s Tom Aspell marveled over Tomahawk missiles that were “accurate to within a few feet,” right after reporting that a missile had “hit a hotel employees compound” (Sklar, p. 10). At the time the technology used in the war was obscuring the death of innocent civilians.

The critique of the “smart bomb” continued on the fringes of media and academic work. “The only thing surgical about the U.S. bombing was the surgery used to save the wounded. ‘Surgical’ should not be accepted as a euphemistic term for bombing strikes, whatever their accuracy or inaccuracy” (Sklar, 1992, p. 16). The rhetoric of “smart bombs” seemed to lull the
average American into a catatonic state. In February 18, 1991, *The Nation* magazine ran a report about the effects of the “smart bombs.” The magazine criticized the use of precision weapons by arguing

Nothing in the traditional roles of war has survived the introduction of strategic air power, which by intention makes civilians the object of violence. The concept of ‘collateral damage’ is a monstrous sophistry--in Anglo-Saxon criminal law, a man who throws a hand grenade into a crowd is rightly presumed to have intended the death of everyone he killed, not merely the individual he may have been aiming at. (Cockburn, 1991)

The *Washington Post* criticized the rhetoric of the smart bomb in July 1991. The post featured an article that stated, “The worst civilian suffering, senior officials say, has resulted not from bombs that went astray but from precision-guiding weapons that hit exactly where they were aimed—electrical plants, oil refineries, and transportation networks. Each of these targets was acknowledged during the war, but all the purposes and consequences of their destruction were not divulged.” The war began in January of 1991, and the critique of the rhetoric of the smart bomb and civilian loss is clear by July 1991.

The first Gulf War lasted six months. In retrospect Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, claimed that the war, “reaffirmed America’s faith in its armed forces, and in some small measure, Desert Storm also helped to reaffirm American’s faith in itself, in American products, in American performance, in American purpose and dedication” (Sklar, 1992, p. 4). When Cheney was questioned about the targeting of civilian populations he stated “every Iraqi target was perfectly legitimate. If I had to do it over again, I would do exactly the same thing” (Sklar, p. 10). Eleven years later in 2003, Cheney would hold true to his claim as the second Iraq War began.
The Emergent Rhetoric of “New Warfare”

The rhetoric of the “smart bomb” was pivotal in the deflection of human responsibility (Peters, 1992). These bombs were designed to detonate with an unimaginably high level of accuracy. In fact, a prominent rationale to quell the fear of human loss in both the Persian Gulf War as well as Operation Iraqi Freedom was the limited number of American casualties made possible by the “smart bomb.” The use of this technology reduces American casualties even as it exponentially increases civilian casualties and property damage. This “trade off” between American casualties and civilian casualties from the opposing side is rarely examined. The “smart bombs” provided a new rhetorical frame for viewing and thinking about war, but also new technologies that make camera footage from guided missiles available for media coverage. Americans no longer needed to draw on previous conceptions of wars such as World War I or II, not to mention the televised horrors of Vietnam, because those war tactics were now in the distant past. To conceptualize war according to the previous wars would have cast a spotlight on civilian casualties as well as American military casualties. However, the “smart bomb” dismissed those concerns, and provided a new sanitizing frame for considering war.

Contemporary conceptions of collateral damage therefore evoke interesting networks of meanings shared by both rhetorically strategic language and new technologies of televisual language.

Although the term “collateral damage” has been used in previous wars and conflicts, such as Vietnam, Peters (1992) argues that the term “collateral damage” was popularized in America during the time of the Gulf War. She claims that these words were not meant to cause Americans to “think about their meanings,” but were invoked to keep us from thinking about those meanings. Collateral is a word that is often used to describe war time conditions at home
and abroad, and it is through the use of this word that the imagination is discouraged from viewing the loss of life as a war time effect. During the first Persian Gulf War, Americans were able to deflect the meaning of death and dying civilians to instead rally behind the idea of war. The deflection of this reality was possible because of the technological advances in military bombs, as well as the war’s coverage.

A report released by the Associated Press on March 5, 2003, claimed that precision weapons would mean fewer civilian casualties in the second Iraq War than the Persian Gulf wars. In a speech to workers at a Boeing manufacturing plant in April of 2003, Bush argued:

We've applied the new powers of technology... to strike an enemy force with speed and incredible precision. By a combination of creative strategies and advanced technologies, we are redefining war on our terms. In this new era of warfare, we can target a regime, not a nation. (Bush, 2003)

With these words the President is building a rhetoric of new warfare that relies upon the accuracy of the U.S. weaponry. Before the war in Iraq began the Defense Department released a memo that described their stance on the role of technology in the war with Iraq:

Technology has improved exponentially since the 1991 Persian Gulf War to liberate Kuwait from Iraq's grasp. A senior CENTCOM official says ‘the ability to be that [much] more precise, intuitively tells me that there should be fewer casualties. The precision capability that now exists allows us to keep civilian casualties to a lower number than we've ever seen in the past. (Porth, 2003, p. 3)

The commanders of the Armed Forces also used a technology frame to discuss Iraq. The leader of the Navy effort in Iraq, Admiral Timothy Keating said that the war with Iraq would be, “unlike any we have seen in the history of warfare,” and supported his argument by discussing weapons as possessing, “breathtaking precision, almost eye-watering speed, persistence, agility, and lethality” (Porth, 2003, p. 3). General Franks, who was one of the first commanders to speak out against the existence of a body count, told the Federal News Service, “I think you have seen
time and time and time again military targets fall while the civilian infrastructure remains in place. And it's the same with civilian lives” (Porth, 2003, p. 3).

The rhetoric of new warfare was not limited to the Bush Administration and the military. The media also perpetuated the rhetoric of new warfare through headlines used during the lead up to war with Iraq.

Headlines extolled Operation Iraqi Freedom as exemplifying a “new way of war” (Copley News Service, 03/20/03), a “new art of war” (Daily Standard, 04/03/03), or a “new style of war” (Baltimore Sun, 04/13/03) in which “precision bombing” (NYT, 02/02/03), “precision weapons” (Baltimore Sun, 02/24/03), “pinpoint targeting” (Financial Times, 06/16/03), and “pinpoint attack” (London Times, 09/23/02) would “hit hard, hit fast, and protect civilians” (Baltimore Sun, 02/24/03). This makes it possible to wage war while “sparing civilians, buildings, and even the enemy” (op-ed, NYT, 03/30/03) or “sparing the country and its people” (Minneapolis Star Tribune, 04/27/03). Once again, “advanced weaponry” and “a more mobile force have shown their worth” (Baltimore Sun, 04/13/03). Headlines echoed General Tommy Franks description of the war as “unlike any in history” (NYT, 03/23/03; Associated Press, 03/22/03) or “like no other” (NYT, 04/10/03). With this “pivotal war” (Defense & Foreign Affairs' Strategic Policy, 05/03), “war enters a new age” (Minneapolis Star Tribune, 04/27/03) in which “advances shorten war and save lives” (Omaha World Herald, 05/18/03). (Conetta, 2004, p, 18)

The technology frame that has been created by the rhetoric of warfare is essential in understanding the war with Iraq. According to this rhetoric argues that the casualties suffered by both countries will be low. However, as discussed with regard to previous conflicts, the civilian population has been affected. However the technological frame of war is accepted as truth by many media outlets as indicated in the headlines that were featured in the months before the war in Iraq. Precision guided weaponry has revolutionized the way that Americans both military and civilian conceptualize war.

Seabrook (2006) explains the role of space in fighting terrorists in Iraq. The report illustrates how space satellites contribute to weapon guidance systems. Space technology “has given our forces unprecedented leverage in fighting anti-coalition forces and combating improvised explosive devices” (p. 1). Seabrook highlights the role of technology in space, and
the advantage that technology provides for allied forces. Technology is praised as an advantage of allied troops over insurgent efforts that fight with weaker ammunitions and weaponry.

Another area of technological advancement is bomb construction. Butler (2006) pointed towards the development of new weapons by the Air Force and the Navy. The new weapons would have two goals: 1) lessen bomb yield so that the bombs could be used in heavily populated areas; 2) develop capabilities to destroy enemies on the go. Butler (2006) published a story a year later that reported the Air Force testing of small-diameter bombs. The first sentence of the report claims that the Air Force is “confident” that the new weapon will produce only “target amounts of collateral damage,” which would be needed to “kill insurgents without risking harm to nearby populations” (Butler, p. 28). However, this new weapon only limits the amount of damage with 100 feet of the bomb impact point (Butler, 2007). Everdeen (2006) confirmed that the new small-diameter bomb was “ready for war on terror” (p. 1). Everdeen reports that the bomb “combines the accuracy and reduced collateral damage” (p. 1). The evolution of discourse surrounding the small-diameter and low collateral damage bombs supports the link between technological rhetoric of warfare and collateral damage. The second bomb that supported the technological frame of war was the Low collateral damage bomb.

The low collateral damage bomb (LCDB) is a form of new technology that would lower the change of collateral damage in bombing campaigns. The article states that this new bomb was a response to an “urgent need” for new weaponry in Iraq from the U. S. Central Command (Little Bang, 2007, p.1). According to the article, the development of this weapon did not begin until 2006, while tests of the bomb only began in the summer of 2007. The bomb’s development and testing coincides with the escalation of troops by the President to secure the streets of Baghdad. Analysis of the “urgent need” for the bomb suggests that the bomb was created to
continue the deflection of death in war for the American public, because it provides a sense of relief. The concern for civilian deaths is numbed by anesthetizing language of Low collateral damage bombs, a label suggesting these are “smart” bombs that have hurt as few civilians as possible.

Conetta (2004) researched the arguments surrounding precision weapons as well as collateral damage. Conetta highlights the fact that there is no research that supports weapon accuracy. The military calculates the distance of a weapon to their target, as well as the how accurate that weapon is in hitting its target. However, the data to supports American military claims of the arguments that precision guided weapons reduce collateral damage is non-existent.

According to the USA Intelligence Targeting Guide (1998), <collateral damage> is defined as, the “unintentional damage or incidental damage affecting facilities, equipment or personnel occurring as a result of military actions directed against targeted enemy forces or facilities” (p. 179). The guide goes on to state that <collateral damage> can occur to friendly, neutral, or enemy targets. The responsibility of assessing <collateral damage> falls upon the ranking officer. If for any reason that officer does not assess the damage, the responsibility is delegated to the next person up the chain of command until such duties are fulfilled. According to this report on <collateral damage> there has to be an assessment of damage must be conducted at some point in the chain of command. If the military is not assessing the damage in Iraq, then they are seemingly in violation the Targeting Guide. Consequently the duty would climb the chain of command until it is fulfilled, which would lead this responsibility directly to the Commander in Chief.

Conetta (2004) argues that although the military provides information regarding weapon accuracy and care of delivery, “neither the precision of US weapons nor the care with which they
are delivered can tell us how many people will be killed in wars by these weapons” (p. 20). Conetta supports his claim with the argument that the information provided by the military is about reported targets and weapon accuracy and does not reflect the impact on intended targets.

At best, this measures the relationship between aim points and impact points as determined in controlled tests, not on the battlefield. Also, there is an obvious difference between hitting one’s intended target and not causing unintended casualties or damage in the process. (Conetta, p. 20)

According to Conetta, the military claims that the weapons reduce collateral damage, but no empirical data support their claim. The lack of empirical data forces researchers to consider individual cases of collateral damage in Iraq.

Marc Garlasco was one of the Pentagon’s leading air strike analysts in 2003. Garlasco left work as a Pentagon analyst and became a researcher for Human Rights Watch so that he could examine the effectiveness of the air strikes that he oversaw during his work at the Pentagon. Garlasco recalls an incident in 2004 when a Predator drone assassinated Lt. General Ali Hassan al-Majid in Basra shortly after the fall of Baghdad. Garlasco said, “We cheered when the bomb went hit” however after visiting the site of the explosion Garlasco had a different reaction. “When I stood in the crater and I was talking to survivors it wasn’t so cool anymore” (p. 1). Garlasco interviewed witnesses that had never seen al-Majid in the area of the bombing, and he met one witness that lost seven family members in the attack (Case, 2008). Garlasco changed his mind regarding the precision of air strike attacks after visiting Basra.

This chapter has tracked the genealogy of <collateral damage> through a military weaponry frame beginning in World War I continuing through the current War in Iraq. The genealogy provides a look at the historical conception of weapons in relation to projected civilian casualties. It is clear that <collateral damage>, though not defined until the 1970s, has played a pivotal role in the inception of weapons as well as their deployment. It is vital to consider
weapon and technological advancements to understand more clearly the implications of foreign policy and presidential choices on how the weapons are utilized in war. The military claims that weapons that were designed the end of Vietnam War minimize civilian deaths, yet they have not tested these claims empirically in battlefield situations. Consequently, the military continues to claim that the weapons fulfill their purpose of minimal <collateral damage>. This tension invites rhetorical analysis, because a tension exists between the rhetoric of the military and the administration concerning <collateral damage> and the consequences of bombing campaigns on civilian populations. The next chapter addresses this rhetorical tension by comparing the rhetoric of the Bush Administration and its supporters’ use of <collateral damage> with the rhetoric of the oppositional critics’ use of <collateral damage>. The chapter will consider the textual uses of <collateral damage> as well as visual depictions of <collateral damage> to illustrate the rhetorical tension that exists between the Bush Administration’s narrative and fantasy construction as compared with its critics. The analysis will use a case-study approach to examine the Haditha Massacre as an example of textual and visual ideographic clustering of <collateral damage>. 
CHAPTER 3

DISAPPEARING THE DEAD: IRAQI CIVILIANS AS <COLLATERAL DAMAGE>

This chapter provides a textual analysis of <collateral damage> that follows the definitions provided in the previous chapter. First, the chapter focuses on how <collateral damage> has been used to describe Iraqi civilian deaths, and how that rhetorical word choice has framed Iraqi civilian deaths. Next the chapter considers the complementary ideographic cluster of <body counts> to illustrate how different terms cluster around <collateral damage> to provide support for further investigation into the rhetoric surrounding civilian death. The chapter utilizes a case-study approach to consider civilian casualties in the Haditha massacre as <collateral damage>. The Haditha massacre and the discourse the Marines utilized to frame civilian casualties provides a clear framework to further analyze the war of information. The Haditha massacre illustrates the importance of language in framing news that reports events in the War in Iraq.

This chapter closely imitates Cloud’s (1998) in her analysis of <family values> campaign rhetoric during the 1992 Presidential election. Cloud’s analysis begins with a speech given by Vice President Dan Quayle, in which he addressed his perceptions of the L.A. riots. Quayle argued that the riots were a consequence of poor <family values>, and used the television show Murphy Brown as an indication of the low consideration of <family values> in America. Cloud’s analysis followed the campaign rhetoric of the two main political parties from the time of Quayle’s speech until the election to establish how each used <family values> in their campaign strategies to persuade the American people.

Cloud’s article provides a strong foundation for this chapter for several reasons. First, the article is an analysis of presidential candidates and their supporters’ rhetoric concerning a two
term ideograph. The current chapter also analyzes presidential rhetoric. Cloud illustrates how each campaign utilizes the ideograph in unique ways as well as similar uses by both campaigns. The current analysis also examines two opposing notions of ‘collateral damage’. The first portion of the analysis focuses on President Bush and supporters in his administration use ‘collateral damage’; the second portion will compared how critics of the Bush Administration who often outline a different rhetorical function of the ideograph use ‘collateral damage’. Finally, Cloud’s analysis involves a people who in the margins of society, the inhabitants pf poverty-stricken neighborhoods in Los Angeles. She argues that Quayle’s use of ‘family values’ further dehumanizes the people who suffered during the riots. The current chapter will demonstrate that the Bush Administration’s rhetoric has lead to the further dehumanization of Iraqi civilians by describing their deaths as ‘collateral damage’ through language and visual representations.

Bush Administration Uses of ‘Collateral Damage’

The previous chapter provided a detailed history of the term ‘collateral damage’ and showed how the terms function and showed how the military has used the term historically. The next step for ideographic analysis is to analyze the text to identify opposing usages of ‘collateral damage’. The analysis begins with an examination of the Bush Administration’s rhetoric surrounding ‘collateral damage’. In early 2003, the President and members of his administration worked to explain the impending War in Iraq. The Bush Administration worked to dispel beliefs that the war would cause high numbers of civilian casualties for Iraq. Representatives of the administration spoke with the press and, at times, were asked about the risk of casualties. In the following section I analyze quotes from the President as well as
members of his cabinet that illuminate the administration’s stance on civilian casualties as <collateral damage>.

<Collateral damage> is not a new phrase used only with regard to the current war with Iraq. The previous chapter illustrates how the military as well as other officials have used and morphed <collateral damage> during war to diffuse the importance of civilian casualties. In 1993, a cruise missile or a bomb struck the Al Rasheed Hotel near Baghdad. James Blackwell, who was the CNN Military Analyst at the time said that the attack very likely cause, “collateral damage” (Holliman & Reynolds, 1993). In the Toronto Star, Diebel (1993) cited a Pentagon official who summed up the accidental bombing of the Al Rasheed Hotel. “Over-all, certainly from a bomb damage assessment standpoint we would have to characterize it as a very successful and excellent attack with the desired results-- with minimum to no collateral damage” (Diebel, p. A2). The U.S. continued to claim that the attack was unintentional and the same Pentagon spokesperson argued that “the Rasheed Hotel was not a target” (Diebel, p. A2). The hotel was not a target, but the Pentagon still characterized the bombing exercise as an “excellent attack” with “minimal collateral damage.”

Two years earlier The Washington Times featured an article discussing Saddam’s use of propaganda during the Persian Gulf War, that included an interview with Marlin Fitzwater, Press Secretary at the time, Fitzwater stated, “There’s no question that there has been collateral damage, but we don’t think it’s been very extensive” (Murray, 1991). Later in the interview, Fitzwater spun the reporter’s line of questioning by arguing that Saddam’s propaganda must be working.

Well, I think if you look at the transcripts of the last two or three briefings in this room, you’ll find that about 60 percent of the questions went to the issue of civilian damage. That would indicate to me that he’s having some success…clearly one of his major
objectives...to show that the United States is attacking civilians and not the military, and that is not the case. (Murray, p. Al)

In this instance Fitzwater is indicating Saddam’s focus on civilian casualties or collateral damage is an act of propaganda, and by entertaining so many questions about “civilian damage” the reporters are examples of the effectiveness of his propaganda. By questioning officials according to Fitwater, the American media is becoming a victim of and supporting Saddam’s propaganda campaign.

Constable (1991) of The Boston Globe also featured an article that focused on collateral damage. Specifically he focused on the language of the war, and how the language used was, “an effort to keep the war antiseptic” (p. 8). David Paletz, an expert on political communication from Duke University who were interviewed for the article, claimed that Secretary of Defense Cheney and Pete Williams, a Pentagon spokesman, sounded more like “doctors, who use words like procedure when they mean they’re really going to cut you up” (Constable, p. 9). Paletz said that the use of surgical and technical language is a way of, “distancing themselves from the reality of what they’re doing” (Constable, p. 9). The previous chapter illustrated how the language used to describe the weapons employed during the current War in Iraq mimic almost verbatim the language used during the early 1990s to describe the Persian Gulf War.

Helana Cobban (1991), a scholar for the Foundation for Middle East Peace in Washington, wrote an op-ed that focused on the use of collateral damage. Cobban argues that the targets at the beginning of the war were “ill-chosen” (p. 19). The military targeted power plants, which the public was told fueled Saddam’s ability to make weapons. However, Cobban points out that many of the targets were used for civilian industries such as electricity or water purification. Cobban also claims that the “collateral damage” was so great that there is no way to quantify the damage” she also notes that “there are still no good numbers for Iraq’s civilian
casualties” (Cobban, p. 19). That the date on this article could be changed and the article would be fit for publication is a variety of news sources to describe the current War in Iraq.

Finally, Diane White an article on “gulfspeak.” The article focused on the words that emerged during the Persian Gulf War. <Collateral damage> is the fourth term defined by White. White (1991) defines <collateral damage> as “a bloodless phrase used to describe the destruction wreaked on civilians or civilian property near military targets that’s getting attention” (p. 57). The article highlights a number of terms that have been used to describe military efforts as well as consequences of the war. Although <collateral damage> is highlighted as a new term specific to the Persian Gulf War, the term was officially defined twenty years prior. I argue that the use of <collateral damage> by the military and the first Bush Administration’s spokespersons brought the term back to the public’s consciousness.

Attacks on Iraq were carried out after the end of the Persian Gulf War. U.S. and United Nations troops continued to initiate bombing campaigns over Iraq to ensure that the U.N. sanctions, a result of the Persian Gulf War, were being upheld. In 1999, Operation Desert Fox was initiated to slow Iraq’s ballistic weapons program. An M2 Presswire report claimed that the 30,000 U.S. troops, 600 sorties (bombings campaigns) cause “more damage than defense officials first thought” (Strikes damaged, 1999, p. 1). The Defense Department faced scrutiny over the attacks of Operation Desert Fox, because initial reports out of Iraq claimed a mass loss of civilian lives during the operation. Army General Hugh Shelton responded:

We all know the Iraqis like to exaggerate and falsify the collateral damage. They have not shown any significant collateral damage at this point. There have been very few reporters of civilian casualties and none that have been demonstrated by the Iraqis. (Strikes damaged, 199, p. 2).

Shelton places responsibility for proving <collateral damage> on the Iraqis. He also insinuates
that the Iraqis have a history of lying about the loss of civilian lives and about <collateral damage>.

The analysis of stories from the Persian Gulf War will serve as a foundation for demonstrating a clear trajectory between how <collateral damage> has been used in the original conflict and in the current War in Iraq. Several of the same tactics are used during the current War in Iraq were utilized during the Persian Gulf War. A further analysis of <collateral damage> beginning in 2003 will provide a deeper insight into the Bush Administration’s views on impending <collateral damage> as well as those of critics who oppose <collateral damage>.

The *Regulatory Intelligence Data* claimed that the U.S. military will go “to great lengths to limit civilian deaths and to minimize damage” (U.S. military, 2002, p. 2). The story quoted Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld during his press conference on March 5, 2002, “If force becomes necessary, it is clear that coalition forces would take great care to avoid civilian casualties” (p. 2). The Administration began the War in Iraq by creating a frame of concern for the Iraqi civilian. President Bush who was also quoted in this article, claimed “The lives and freedom of the Iraqi people matter little to Saddam Huessein, but they matter greatly to us.” Although the Bush Administration initiated the War in Iraq with a narrative of liberation and concern for the Iraqi people, however as the war progressed the Bush Administration moved away from discussion of innocent Iraqi civilians. Instead, they began either to avoid discussion of civilian deaths or to describe death in a more sterile way. The following stories that illustrate the expressions for the Iraqi people that the Bush Administration used as they initiated their war campaign.

U.S. Army General Franks also discussed steps being taken to limit <collateral damage> to innocent civilians. However, he offered no guarantees that <collateral damage> would be
eliminated even with the technological advancements (Stoullig, 2003). Franks warned that civilian casualties would be higher if Saddam employed “human shields,” as he had done in the Persian Gulf War. Franks continued the narrative of concern for the Iraqi civilian saying, “because we’re Americans, because we’re part of a coalition that treats citizenry like that in Iraq as victims, not as enemies” (Stoullig, 2003, p. 4). Franks also warned reporters that “targets likely to result in non-combatant casualties” will serve as military targets (p. 4). Therefore, targets would be chosen based on likelihood that the target would produce <collateral damage>. Franks concluded by reiterating that the main cause of potential civilian deaths in the impending War in Iraq was Saddam’s propensity for using innocent civilians as “human shields.”

In a subsequent interview, President Bush provided a statement about <collateral damage> to “assuage public concern over civilian casualties” (Sewall, 2003, p. 8). Bush stated that, “America will do its utmost to spare innocent lives” (Sewall, p. 8) in the same article Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, “attributed the lack of information about civilian deaths to the fact that the United States couldn’t always verify what had happened on the ground. When U.S. troops occupy Iraq they will have that opportunity” (Sewall, p. 8). Rumsfeld suggests that the U.S. troops would have better information in Iraq and that civilian casualties would not be comparable to casualties in the War with Afghanistan. President promises at the outset of the war to “spare innocent lives” thereby framing Iraqi civilians as innocent people.

President Bush spoke of the plight of the Iraqi citizens during his weekly radio address on April 5, 2003. This address served to further his narrative of the evil Saddam regime, and the “stark contrast” of the U.S. troops’ treatment of Iraqi civilians.

The citizens of Iraq are coming to know what kind of people we have sent to liberate them. American forces and our allies are treating innocent civilians with kindness and showing proper respect to the soldiers who surrender. The people of Iraq have my pledge: Our fighting forces will press on until their oppressors are gone and their whole
country is free. And by defending our own security, we are ridding the people of Iraq from one of the cruelest regimes on earth.” (Bush, 2003)

The President frames Iraqi citizens as innocent civilians in his radio address. This follows the narrative or fantasy that the War in Iraq is justified because we are protecting innocent civilians. This rhetoric exists in stark contrast to the implications of <collateral damage>. Although the President acknowledges the innocence of the Iraqi citizen, his future actions and rhetoric serve to dehumanize them.

Ranade (2003) argued, “The Americans will, in fact, go to great lengths to avoid damage to civilian lives and property; even to the point of needlessly placing American lives at risk” (Ranade, p. 1). Ranade argues that America will not risk their own troops out of a deep concern for Iraqis, but because <collateral damage> will “hinder the U.S. more than it hurts Saddam” (p. 1). This is one of the first news stories to run that addressed the importance that <collateral damage> plays in the War in Iraq. A low level of <collateral damage> is helpful to the American cause in the War in Iraq. The Iraqis would be less likely to support a change of regime lead by the U.S. if the U.S. in turn was responsible for a high level of <collateral damage>.

On May 1, 2003, aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln, President Bush (2003) addressed the end of combat missions in Iraq, and how the history of <collateral damage> is no longer a problem for the U.S.

In the image of falling statues, we have witnessed the arrival of a new era. For a hundred years of war, culminating in the nuclear age, military technology was designed and deployed to inflict casualties on an ever-growing scale. In defeating Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, Allied forces destroyed entire cities, while enemy leaders who started the conflict were safe until the final days. Military power was used to end a regime by breaking a nation.

The President’s historical renderings of warfare are accurate. The previous chapter provides evidence that past wars have resulted in extensive <collateral damage>. Entire cities were
firebombed, and thousands upon thousands of civilian lives were lost in each of the previous
great wars. The President, however, does not mention bombing campaigns in which the U.S.
served as the primary bombers. Instead he frames Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan as the
enemies of old warfare technologies. This rhetoric sets up the U.S. as victors in the moral fight
concerning civilian casualties. Only evil empires utilize weapons that would harm civilians. The
revolution of technology has ushered in a new era in which technology will limit the threats of
<collateral damage>.

Today, we have the greater power to free a nation by breaking a dangerous and
aggressive regime. With new tactics and precision weapons, we can achieve military
objectives without directing violence against civilians. No device of man can remove the
tragedy of war; yet it is a great moral advance when the guilty have far more fear from
war that the innocent. (Bush, 2003)

The President heralds the new advancements in technology as a way to avoid <collateral
damage> in the form of civilian casualties by specifically mentioning “precision weapons.” The
President’s rhetoric sets up an expectation that <collateral damage> will remain low throughout
the war, and that technology will save the day. The President’s rhetoric in the Mission
Accomplished speech projects an end to the war, and a technological and sterile approach to any
impending harm to Iraqi civilians. By referring to Iraqis as “innocent” he reinforces the rhetoric
utilized before the war began.

During the era before the war as well as in this speech, <collateral damage> was used by
the President as a term to describe a controllable situation. The military had designed new
weapons to control <collateral damage> that were discussed in the previous chapter, and the
Bush Administration continued to assure the American public, the Iraqi citizens, and the world
that they would be able to control any <collateral damage> inflicted during Iraq. The Bush
Administration framed the Iraqi civilians as “innocents” or “victims” of the evil Saddam regime,
and the military and the Administration were going to control <collateral damage> and liberate the Iraqis. However, as the war continued Iraqis the Administration’s use of <collateral damage> became practically non-existent. In searches of Lexis-Nexus the term decreases in use from the Bush Administration, and returns later in the coverage of the War in Iraq from the mouths of critics. However, the Bush Administration begins to use another term to describe Iraqi <collateral damage> and that is <body counts>.

Cloud’s (1998) article on <family values> was previously discussed to illustrate similarities, both methodologically and theoretically, with this chapter. Another vital argument that Cloud proposes in her <family values> article is the idea of ideographic clustering or complementary ideographs. Cloud argues that <responsibility>, <family>, and <opportunity> cluster around one another to support <family values>. Cloud argues that in certain instances it is easier to understand the main ideograph of <family values> by noting what terms cluster near or around the main ideograph. Cloud states, “<Responsibility> serves as an ideographic complement to <family>…suggesting that <family> be understood as the site of personal <responsibility> for caretaking” (Cloud, p. 404-405). Cloud is using specific ideographic clustering to explain a comment made by Bill Clinton at the Democratic National Convention. She uses key terms of <responsibility> and <family> to illustrate arguments about the larger ideograph of <family values>. Cloud illustrates a methodology that combines a Burkean cluster approach with McGee’s notion of ideographic criticism.

In the case of <collateral damage> additional terms function similarly to support the central ideograph of <collateral damage>. I argue that <body counts> is an ideograph that complements <collateral damage>. A <body count> is inherent in the discussion of <collateral damage> based on the very definition of <collateral damage> which includes the “unintentional
loss of life.” The previous section showed how the Bush Administration pledged their concern for <collateral damage> and their plan for limiting <collateral damage> in Iraq. So the critic can know that the Bush Administration has thought about and planned for <collateral damage> which by definition includes civilian death. Therefore, in theory, the Bush Administration should be concerned with a <body count> of civilians to ensure that they had kept their pledge to protect civilian lives. However, the Bush Administration begins to conceal and deflect Iraqi deaths by shifting their use of <collateral damage> to a new frame where they describe Iraqi civilians not as “innocent victims” of Saddam’s brutal regime, but as an unknowable figure based on a <body count> that the U.S. does not calculate.

Media reports concerning the <body count> or death toll in Iraq began almost as soon as the war began. Gordon (2003) provided evidence that the Bush Administration’s pre-bombed Iraq before war was declared. Gordon’s identified several rationales the Administration used to justify the pre-war attacks. The story alludes to <body count> that must be performed and approved before specific targets are attacked. Gordon (2003) states,

Air war commanders were required to obtain approval of Defense Secretary Donald L. Rumsfeld if any planned airstrike was thought likely to result in deaths of more than 30 civilians. More than 50 such strikes were proposed, and all of them were approved. (p. 6)

This above information confirms the Bush Administration’s concern for <body count> in its conduct of the Iraq War. Military targets were accessed based on anticipated <collateral damage>, which in this instances translates as a <body count> that played a specific role in determining where air strikes occurred. Benjamin (2007) interviewed Marc Garlasco, the Pentagon’s chief targeting analyst at the beginning of the war. Garlasco confirmed that the “magic number was 30” and that “if you hit 30 as the anticipated number of civilians killed, the airstrike had to go to Rumsfeld or Bush personally to sign off” (p 2). Garlasco’s statements
demonstrate that a <body count> existed, and that <collateral damage> is linked to that <body count>.

Benjamin (2007) argues that based on the “magic number 30” revelations, <collateral damage> is seen as legal by the Administration, “as long as the deaths are the result of a strike at a legitimate military target” (p. 5). Colonel Gary Crowder, deputy commander in charge of Combined Air Operations Center in Qatar, told Benjamin that the Administration had a “higher tolerance for civilian casualties during the first phase of the war” and so “when the targets packages were finalized we had about 300 targets that were considered high CD or high collateral damage, meaning over 30” (Benjamin, p. 2). According to these figures the <collateral damage> estimates were at least 3,000 civilian deaths in January 2003, approved missions alone. Crowder claimed, however, that the Air Force “played with bomb angle” and reduced the number from 30 to “about 25.” As a result, these sorties did not require approval (Benjamin, p. 2). Only two bombing targets were not approved, the Al-Rasheed Hotel and Saddam’s Ministry of Information.

The magic number 30 no longer operates as it did when Garlasco was in the Pentagon. Benjamin (2007) reports that <collateral damage> and civilian casualties remain “key factors” in selecting air strike targets, however, the process is conducted by high level officials behind closed doors. The identity of these officials is unknown to the public. Crowder suggests that the higher the proposed <collateral damage>, the higher the authority must be of the person who signs off on the targets. The collateral damage described in this article addresses civilian casualties due to air strikes; Benjamin argues that a chain of command is adhered to for assessing collateral damage before an attack, and subsequent official requirements for attacks to take place. However, another type of engagement with Iraqis that result in collateral damage ground attacks.
In the next section I consider the postmortem categorization of civilian deaths in the Haditha massacre, and how these rhetorical categorizations illuminate the larger battle of the war of information.

Battlefield of Public Information

The government has been concerned with public representations of war have been a concern of the government since Vietnam (Conetta, 2004). Vietnam is described as the first “television war,” but Conetta argues that the widespread use of the Internet, which now reaches over 500 million people worldwide, has proven to be a pivotal factor in the public’s perception of the War in Iraq. This access to information has lead to a strict control over media’s role in reporting incidents of war. The engagements of U.S. forces in Somalia as well as the end of the Persian Gulf War have been attributed to a phenomenon known as the “CNN effect,” which emphasizes the media’s affect on the public’s perception of war (Conetta, p. 4). The rhetoric describing the media is similar to the rhetoric that is used to describe war. During an interview with the Council of Foreign Relations in February 2006, Rumsfeld described news surrounding the War in Iraq as information warfare. Rumsfeld (2006) also criticized the media for what he described as an “explosion of critical press stories” that too harshly critiqued the Administration’s decisions during war time (p. 7).

We are fighting a battle where the survival of our free way of life is at stake and the center of gravity of that struggle is not simply on the battlefield overseas; it’s a test of wills, and it will be won or lost with our publics, and with the publics of other nations. We’ll need to do all we can to attract supporters to our efforts and to correct the lies that are being told which so damage our country, and which are repeated and repeated and repeated. (as cited in Goodman & Goodman, 2006, p. 126)

Rumsfeld uses war rhetoric to describe a war of information. Rumsfeld’s battlefield rhetoric presumes a struggle over the media coverage that will ultimately lead to victory or defeat of the
“us vs. them” mentality through the media’s coverage of the War in Iraq. Battle formations have been drawn, and the office of Information Operations is one of the Bush Administration’s weapons in the war of information. “IO (Information Operations) practitioners must recognize that much of the information war will be waged in the public media, necessitating…PA (public affairs) participation (Pounder, 2000, p. 3). Pounder illustrates the importance of the public media, and illustrates why the Bush Administration was so concerned in policing the message that the public received during the War in Iraq. Pounder situates the public media as the arena for the war of information, and claims the war was to be fought between the Bush Administration’s policing of media news and critics of the Administration’s version of incidents in Iraq. Further examination of this rhetorical tension of reporting is necessary to illuminate the differences that occur between rhetoric perpetuated by the Bush Administration and the military and journalist who criticize the Administration’s version of incidents in Iraq. In the next section I consider an incident in Haditha to highlight how textual discourses morph over time to provide changing narrative fantasies surrounding incidents of collateral damage in Iraq.

Haditha: Massacre or Incident?

The attack of a U.S. Marine’s convoy on November 19, 2005, was described in chapter one. However, an in depth analysis of news media coverage illustrates the differences in the reporting of the story surrounding the event, and media coverage that has continued throughout the trials of the Marines involved.

The Marines initially reported Terrazas and fifteen civilians were killed in the same IED blast. The first report from Camp Blue Diamond also claimed that the after the explosion the Marines were fired upon by “gunmen…with small-arms fire” and this exchange killed eight
“insurgents” (McGirk, 2006, p. 1). The events in Haditha on November 15, 2005, were reported like many stories of death in Iraq. The events were described by the military documentation, and no additional inquiry into the events of Haditha occurred until January of 2006.

Dr. Wahid, the director of the local hospital in Haditha, reported that the autopsied corpses from the 19 November 2005 incident did not match the initial description of the Marines (McGirk, 2006). The Marines claimed that the civilians were killed by the same blast that killed Terrazas, but the medical review proved otherwise. Dr. Wahid said, “it was obvious to us that there were no organs slashed by shrapnel. The bullet wounds were very apparent. Most of the victims were shot in the chest and the head—from close range” (McGirk, 2006, p. 2). The doctor’s report contradicts the Marine’s claims that the civilians were killed by the same bomb that killed Terrazas, and provides evidence that something else happened that day in November. Despite the medical reports, the Marines stood by their initial report that the civilians were killed by a roadside bomb. The Marine’s initial report did not change until they were approached by Time magazine with the video shot by the Iraqi journalism student.

At this point, the Marines initiated a full investigation of the events of Haditha. The investigator interviewed several witnesses and doctors in the morgue that were responsible for medical reports following the incident. The investigator found that the Iraqi victims were not killed by the same roadside bomb that killed Terrazas, but by the Marines. However, the investigator described the civilians as “collateral damage” (McGirk, 2006, p. 2) that resulted in the firefight between the Marines and the “gunmen” or “insurgents” that had fired upon the Marines. The civilians were initially categorized as victims of the same roadside bomb that had killed Terrazas, but after the investigation they were redefined into a separate category of “collateral damage” or an unintended consequence of the firefight between the Marines and the
“insurgents.” The second report illustrates the tension in the rhetoric used by the Marines and the rhetoric used by critics of their story. After this investigation the Marines concluded that 24 civilians were killed instead of the 15 civilians in their initial reporting. The timing of the increased body count is suspect. The Marines account of Haditha only listed 15 victims. When the investigator defined the victims as “collateral damage,” the body count increased. The rhetoric seems to indicate that an increase in the body count is acceptable as long as the victims were the result of unintentional harm, and not due to any fault of the Marines.

The punishment of a two-star general and two colonels following the Haditha massacre also raise concern over the varying textual representations surrounding Haditha. Zielbauer (2007c) reports that the officials were formally reprimanded by the Marine Corps for “failure to thoroughly investigate why a group of enlisted men killed twenty-four Iraqis, including several women and children, in Haditha nearly two years ago” (p. 1). Lt. General Mattis reported that the three officials’ “actions, or inactions, demonstrated lack of due diligence on the part of senior commanders and staff” (Zielbauer, p. 1). An official reprimand of commanding officials is “almost always confidential,” and Zielbauer claimed that the announcement of the censures “reflects the enormous interest military leaders have in shaping the public perception that wrongdoing in Iraq, even by senior commanders, will be punished” (p. 1). The charges were announced during Staff Sgt. Frank Wuterich’s hearing, who at the time was the last enlisted person to face murder charges for actions in Haditha. The timing of the announcement of charges is a rhetorical decision by the military to utilize the previously discussed war of information. The Marines capitalized on the opportunity provided by the Wuterich hearings to catapult new information regarding the Marine’s official stance on punishment for “wrongdoings” in Iraq. The peculiar announcement of censures magnifies the tension over the
rhetoric used to describe military conduct within incidents of suspected wrongdoing. This rhetorical move allows the Marines to dictate the discourse, and ensure the public that officials involved in wrongdoing will be punished. The war of information is set to occur in public discourse, and this announcement is an apt example of the military’s manipulation of the discourse surrounding wrongdoing in Iraq. The timing of the announcement signifies a rhetorical move on the military’s part, but the charges that were leveled against the general and two colonels do not support the Marine’s initial account of the massacre at Haditha.

General Huck reportedly learned of the civilian deaths in Haditha the morning that they occurred, and his formal reprimand resulted from his failure to ensure that his field commanders properly investigated “how and why infantrymen killed so many noncombatants” (Zielbauer, 2007c, p. 1). The censures official reprimand General Huck for failure to investigate why “infantrymen” killed civilians, and the General reportedly knew about the civilian deaths on the morning they occurred, but the initial report released by the Marines stated that the civilians died by the same roadside bomb that killed Terrazas. The discourse of the censure of General Huck implies that the General knew about the civilian deaths caused by infantrymen, and did not ensure that his field commanders properly investigated the events. The incongruities of the charges could mean only one of two things; either the Marines initial report was intentionally falsified and the Marines were aware that the civilian deaths were caused by infantrymen and not a roadside bomb or two that the reprimand issued to General Huck was an act of propaganda perpetuated by the military to control the war of information. Colonel Stephen W. Davis was also censured for “knowing about the civilian deaths but not seeking a detailed explanation from his battalion commander” (Zeilbauer, p. 1). Colonel Sokoloski, General Huck’s chief of staff, was censured for his failure to inform General Huck that a reporter from Time magazine was
investigating the Massacre in Haditha. The military has operated within Rumsfeld’s outlined rhetoric regarding the “war of information.” In this instance the Marines controlled the timing of censure announcements, and publicized these announcements to ensure that public opinion would molded according to their public proclamations that wrongdoings will be punished. The Marines sought to make an example of General Huck, Colonel Davis, and Colonel Sokoloski’s responses to the massacre at Haditha, yet the discourse used to describe the charges against the three officials illustrates the extent to which the Marines have gone to control the discourse surrounding the massacre at Haditha.

The language used in a military hearing regarding Haditha and civilian casualties is another interesting intersection of textual discourse that illuminates the battle over the language used to describe the Haditha incident. Paul von Zielbauer (2007a) claimed that the hearings were a “rare public window” into the “debate” about how the Marines are fighting in Iraq (p. 13). Zielbauer reports that several officers testified that civilian deaths were “unfortunate but justifiable if they occurred during combat” (p. 15). Major McCann was the lawyer who led investigations of this specific military hearing the purpose of which was to find out why proper investigations into the death of the civilians at Haditha had not been carried out. Several witnesses testified that civilian deaths that resulted from “combat action need not be investigated (Zielbauer, p. 15). Major McCann was perplexed by the witnesses’ testimony and tried to find the authority that lead the witnesses to believe that civilian deaths due to combat action needed no investigation. Colonel Keith Anderson provided an answer to Major McCann’s question with the response “There is no authority. I think it’s just a mind-set” (Zielbauer, p. 15). Major Carroll J. Connolly was a lawyer for the Marines under the command of Colonel Stephen Davis who was also being investigated for failure to properly investigate the civilian deaths at Haditha.
Major Connolly said he saw no reason to investigate Colonel Davis’ investigative inaction because the civilians at Haditha were a result from combat. Major McCann asked what authority Major Connolly based his decision upon, and he responded that he could not think of any authority that would support his decision. Zielbauer (2007a) reports that Major Connolly was granted full immunity for testifying in the military hearing. The language the witnesses used during the military hearings greater rhetorical incongruities about the civilian deaths in Haditha. The witnesses testified that inquires into the civilian deaths that result from combat are not grounds for further investigation. If the civilians killed in the massacres at Haditha are categorized as collateral damage then no grounds exists to further investigate these deaths. The language used to categorize the civilians is important because the investigations into civilian deaths hinge upon how the civilians were killed. If the Marines are able to control the categorization of the Haditha civilians as collateral damage, then in their eyes, there is no further need to investigate their deaths. Therefore, no Marines can be brought up on formal charges, and no one in the military would face possible charges of war crimes because no further investigation is necessary. The testimony of witnesses under immunity exemplifies the extreme turf war for the control of discourse. Rumsfeld had already set the war of information frame of reference that the Marines utilized when they discussed civilian deaths at Haditha. The Marines know that controlling the war of information also means controlling any possible consequences that they would face for their actions at Haditha.

The Chessani “Talking-Points” Memo

The final text for examination is a memo written by Lt. Col Jeffrey Chessani in response to an email sent by Time magazine reporter Tim McGirk. The memo addresses each question
posed by McGirk, and carefully outlines the suspected intention behind his questions as well as how these questions should be answered or avoided by military personnel. When McGirk asked if an officer was present, the memo insinuates that McGirk is trying to “have his My Lai pinned on that officer’s shoulders” (Zielbauer, 2007b, p. 1). This comment harkens back to the Vietnam War and accusations of war crimes committed by Marines. The memo argues that reporters attempt to spin incidents such as Haditha so that the incidents of the Iraq War can be compared to incidents in the Vietnam War. Chessani warns in the memo that Marines should be aware of the media’s practice of comparing Iraq and Vietnam. “One common tactic used by reporters is to spin a story in such a way that it is easily recognized and remembered by the general population through its association with an event that the general population is familiar with or can relate to” (Zielbauer, p. 1). Col Chessani’s memo also warns that journalists will try to “spin the story to sound like incidents from well-known war movies, like Platoon” (Zielbauer, p. 1). The *Platoon* example furthers his argument that the media will spin a story such as Haditha to sound like something out of a war movie from the Vietnam era. By implication, the Marines must be extremely careful not to invoke memories that associate Vietnam’s collateral damage with Haditha’s collateral damage. The third question McGirk posed in his email asked about the number of marines involved in the “killings” [at Haditha]. Chessani stated:

First off, we don’t know what you’re talking about when you say ‘killing.’ One of our squads reinforced by a squad of Iraqi Army soldier were engaged by an enemy initiated ambush on the 19th that killed one American marine and seriously injured two others. We will not justify that question with a response. Theme: Legitimate engagement: we will not acknowledge this reporter’s attempt to stain the engagement with the misnomer of ‘killings.’ (Zielbauer, 2007b, p. 2)

Chessani’s intent is clear in this statement. His response shows that he and the Marine Corps are acutely aware of the language used by reporters, as well as the language they will or will not engage during interviews regarding Haditha. Through this memo Chessani provides a clear
understanding of the measures taken by the Marines to control the war of information.

McGirk’s final two questions draw the most explicit remarks from Chessani pertaining to the war of information and how the Marines’ discourse must be carefully guarded to ensure a certain public perception. The fourth question in the email asks about ongoing investigations into the civilian deaths, and whether any Marines have been brought up on formal charges. Chessani responded,

No, the engagement was bona fide combat action….By asking this question, McGirk is assuming the engagement was LOAC [Law of Armed Conflict] violation and that by asking about investigations, he may spur a reaction from the command that will initiate an investigation. (Zielbauer, 2007b, p. 2)

Lt. Col. Chessani’s response implies violation of LOAC, which could mean possibly mean that the Marines involved in the Haditha incident could face charges of war crimes. The answer to the fourth question is a careful construction of discourse to evade possible consequences. This is an apparent rhetorical strategy utilized by Col Chessani is an attempt to ensure that neither his discourse nor the discourses of any other Marine can be used against them in any further investigations. This rhetorical move is similar to those in the military hearings where officials sought to control the rules of investigation into civilian deaths associated with combat action. In both cases the Marines involved are acutely aware of the rhetorical choices they are making when discussing Haditha to ensure that they can to control the severity of consequences in case of further possible charges.

The final question that McGirk poses in his email inquires whether any marines were still “serving” in Haditha. Chessani’s response is the most clear-cut example of discourse control in the entire memo. Chessani’s responded,

Yes we are still fighting terrorists of Al Qaeda in Iraq in Haditha. (Fighting terrorists associated with Al Qaeda is stronger language than ‘serving.’ The American people will side more with someone actively fighting a terrorist organization that is tied to 9/11 than
with someone who is idly ‘serving’ like in a way one ‘serves’ casserole. It’s semantics, but in reporting and journalism, words spin the story). (Zielbauer, 2007b, p. 2)

In this response Chessani’s clear intent is that the Marines must maintain control of the war on information. By claiming that the Marines are fighting Al Qaeda terrorists in Iraq, and that the specific fight in question lead to the death of civilians in Haditha, he is confident that the American people will more readily side with the Marine Corps. This connection is explicit in Chessani’s statement. The Marines are once again controlling the discourse by preparing their answers to journalists in a rhetorically slanted manner that will allow the Marines to connect the civilian deaths of Haditha to the fight against Al Qaeda terrorists. It is clear by the reports filed concerning the massacre at Haditha that the civilian deaths were not the result of Al Qaeda terrorists. However, if the Marines can effectively spin their rhetoric, they can maintain control of the war of information. By controlling over the war of information they can ensure that civilian deaths or collateral damage is categorized in a way that situates the Marine Corps with the power to dictate the consequences of their actions. If Marines control the war of information, which provides them the ability to control the categorization of civilian deaths as collateral damage due to combat action, they can excuse their own actions and avoid investigation. The Chessani talking points memo is a rare look into the inner-workings of the Marine’s strategic language campaign in the war of information.

Conclusion

This chapter examined the formation of the complementary ideograph <collateral damage> by tracing the terms usage through the Bush Administration’s rhetoric leading up to the war in Iraq. The Bush Administration’s language initially framed the Iraqi civilian as an innocent victim of the Saddam regime, and positioned the United States as liberators for
oppressed Iraqis. However, when reports began to surface that Iraqi civilians were dying en masse as a direct result of U.S.-led combat operations, the Administration quickly began using other terms that clustered around <collateral damage>, which included the ideograph <body count>. The Bush Administration was adamant that body counts did not exist for civilian casualties in Iraq, this claim allowed the Administration to control the war of information regarding how many Iraqi civilians were dying due to actions taken by U.S. military forces in Iraq. However, the notion that body counts did not exist was disproven by the interview with Garlasco in which he discussed the “magic number” of 30 intended civilians. Garlasco and Crowder’s interviews laid the foundation for a closer examination of discourse that surrounded collateral damage in Iraq. The discourse surrounding the Haditha massacre peels away the layers of rhetoric to reveal the intentional policing of textual discourses utilized by the Marines in an effort to police possible consequences of civilian deaths by using language to categorize the Haditha civilian deaths as collateral damage. The textual analysis of <collateral damage> via “body counts” and “casualties” surrounding the Haditha incident provides evidence that a rhetorical struggle is occurring over textual representations of events in the War in Iraq. This analysis begs the question of possible incongruities within the textual representations of civilian deaths as compared to visual representations of collateral damage. The next chapter will focus on a comparison of United States media sources and International media sources to ascertain the incongruities between the two sources.
CHAPTER 4

VISUAL REPRESENTATIONS OF <COLLATERAL DAMAGE>

Jon Bowersox, is a professor and vice chair of surgery at the University of Cincinnati, and worked in Baghdad during the War in Iraq from 2005 to 2006. Bowersox (2006) he called for the U.S. to “halt the war over body counts” (Bowersox, p. 21A). Bowersox by lambasting The Lancet study and claimed that The Lancet “had taken an anti-war stand on Iraq even before 2003” (p. 21A). Bowersox used Iraqi Body Count, which is also a British anti-war group that tracks civilian deaths, as support against The Lancet study. Bowersox claimed that <body counts> ranged from “educated guesses to pure fiction—tragic statistics twisted to serve the agendas of whoever is spinning the numbers” (p. 21A). The memories of Vietnam <body counts> plagued the author, and he was “heartened” when Rumsfeld announced that there would be no <body count> would be conducted during the war in Iraq. Midway through the article Bowersox’s tone changed, and he began to explain how his time in Baghdad forced him to reconsider <body counts>. Bowersox (2006) suggests

one visit to the Baghdad morgue is all it takes to see that Iraq has a major collateral damage problem…you also see it as families watch a TV screen trying to identify missing relatives from a never-ending loop of postmortem photographs…all it takes is one visit to a Baghdad hospital, where Iraqis injured in the day’s bombings lie in pools of blood waiting to be treated by doctors who are working without the resources needed for even basic casualty care. (Bowersox, p. 21A)

Bowersox’s experience in Baghdad opened his eyes to the importance of <body counts> and their role <collateral damage>. He states that “one visit” reveals a “major collateral damage problem.” <Collateral damage> is a problem within the confines of Iraqi hospitals but, as in the case of Jon Bowersox, it is arguably impossible to understand the full extent of <collateral damage> without seeing the catastrophe for oneself. Bowersox had the textual information he needed to reach the same conclusions regarding <collateral damage> and his stance on <body
counts> from the news stories analyzed in the previous chapter. However, he is insistent in his story that an individual cannot fully understand the extent of the <collateral damage> in Iraq until they have physically seen the damage. This chapter focuses on the available depictions of Iraqi civilian deaths in U.S. media sources versus International media sources. Content analysis is used to analyze images and to provide a quantified argument that significant differences of media coverage exist between U.S. media sources and International media sources. The chapter begins by examining the research on the effects of media on war and, specifically, the effects of photographs during times of war.

Media’s Effects on War

Agenda-setting is a theory in mass communication that seeks to explain media’s effects on public opinion. Agenda-setting argues that the views of the public are consequences of media’s privileged information (McCombs et. al, 1997). The public forms their ideas regarding current issue based on what they see on television or read in newspapers. The topics of news discussed are already highlighted by what the media deems worthy of coverage. News media can set the agenda based on the idea of inter-media agenda-setting (Song, 2007). Reese and Danielian (1989) discovered, for example, that other medias began to cover news of the drug war after the New York Times covered these issues. Prominent news outlets deem a topic worthy of coverage, and other news outlets follow suit.

Gamson and Modigliani (1987) defined framing as, “a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them” (p. 143). Another definition of framing situates it as, “persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers
routinely organize discourse” (Gitlin, 1980, p. 7). Judith Butler (2006) questions our ability to hear. She argues that our ability to hear and in turn to know is guided by frames. These frames are not created by us, but by those who are in power. Burke (1984) also refers to the use of rhetorical frames. Burke argues that frames “gauge and configure historical and political situations for audiences” (Parry-Giles, 1995, p. 184). Butler situates her definitions of frames as follows,

"The point I would like to underscore here is that a frame for understanding violence emerges in tandem with the experience, and that the frame works to both preclude certain kinds of questions, certain kind of historical inquires, and to function as a moral justification for retaliation. Its seems crucial to attend to this frame, since it decides, in a forceful way, what we can hear, whether a view will be taken as explanation or as exoneration, whether we can hear the difference, and abide by it. (Butler, 2006, p. 4-5)"

Song (2007) used the idea of framing to examine how the mainstream news media and Internet news media covered a story of kidnapping in South Korea. She argued that, “studies reveal that mainstream serve as an institution of social control by imposing frames that marginalize causes or movements that challenge the values of main stream society” (p. 8). In this study I attempt to show the use of frames and their repercussions by examining internet news coverage of photographs depicting the Iraq war in United States online news media and International online new media.

**Role of Photographs in the News**

Evidence of the photographs’ impact on the war can be traced to Vietnam. After Vietnam U.S. leaders were unsure of the representations of war and war causalities in the media. Dauber (2001) refers to this phenomenon as, “fear of ‘casualty shyness’ that causalities will erode public support for military operations” (p. 655). Domke, Spat, and Perlmutter (2002) argue that the photographs of war casualties are underrepresented. They claim that, “systematic
investigations of the actual influence of visual images are rare” and “claims about the persuasive power of visual images far outstrip actual evidence of such influence” (p. 196). Gibson and Zillmann (2000) also argue for photographic representations during war time. They state that there has been “little examination of the effects [of photographs] on the issue perception” (p. 355). In a recent article Perlmutter (2005) extends the argument for photographs as a representation of foreign affairs. He also warns future leadership that images will become “iconic” of the times.

Zelizer (2004) argued that photographs are among the most powerful images produced in war. Hariman and Lucaites (2003) argue that visual images are processed in the brain faster than text. They further claim that a war photograph, “freezes an action in time” (p. 40). Cloud (2004) agrees that images have an emotional aspect by arguing that “images posses the capacity for visceral emotional appeal,” and that the emotional appeal brought on by a photograph “does not always enable rational, conscious processing” (p. 290). This process increases the emotional response of visual images as compared with textual representations of news stories. Paivio (1986) states that, “affective reactions would ordinarily occur more quickly to pictures than to words because the former have more direct access to affect-mediating images” (p. 79). Gibson and Zillman (2000) argue that, “images in the news can stir emotions and foster public outcry like no other means of expression” (p. 358). They also issue a call for more research to be conducted in photographic images of the war.

People are drawn to the photographs and headlines of newspapers rather than text. Barnhurst (1994) postulates that people look at the pictures in newspapers and magazines and scan the headlines. These readers privilege the visual images and short amount of text over the
full textual articles. Mendelson and Thorson (2004) argue that the main entry point for newspapers is the visual image.

Sontag (1973) claims that “something we hear about, but doubt, seems proven when we’re shown a photograph (p. 17). David Flemming (1996) asserts that “the pictorial has no negative. With words, on the other hand, there is always the possibility of negation” (p. 15). People do not doubt when they see a picture, but are more suspect of textual representations of the news media. In assessing the believability of photographs with text found in print and those without, Kepplinger (1991) found that images without text were believed more than images with text. These scholars illustrate the rhetorical tension between textual and visual representations.

Cloud (2004) claims that pictures have an integral role in signifying an ideograph. Cloud argues that the <clash of civilizations> is an apparent ideograph that is supported by the depictions of Afghani women in *Time* magazine. Cloud argues that,

In time of war, images of enemy Others, represented as helpless and savage, are foils for images of the national self. This binary construction strengthens national identification, entailing rigid disidentification with the scapegoating of the Other (and a rhetorical and potentially actual ‘kill’). (p. 290)

She means that depictions of an enemy Other serve to solidify the national identity because “we” are not “them.” The depictions of enemy Others are important to consider because of their role in the U.S. own national identity, and Cloud claims they could potentially be utilized to scapegoat both rhetorical kills and actual kills. Therefore researchers must further investigate the pictorial depictions of Iraqi civilians during the War in Iraq to investigate how they are depicted and the possible effects those depictions have on the U.S. public.

Based on the previous research it is imperative to evaluate photographs taken of the conflict in Iraq and their influence on individuals’ attitudes of the war efforts.
RQ1: Does the type of image (photograph) portrayed differ in U.S. media and international media?

RQ 2: Is the content of a photograph different in U.S. media and international media?

RQ 3: Do representations of individuals differ in U.S. media and international media?

Method

The dataset included 75 photographic images of the conflict in Iraq. My aim was to consider what differences, if any, existed between American media portrayals and International media’s representations of the conflict. Therefore, online news station sites were scanned for images. Papacharissi (2002) argues that the Internet expedites the flow of information as well as encourages the public to participate in political discourse. Hill and Hughes (1997) found that five to ten percent of messages sent through the Internet contained a political message. Song (2007) researched the potential between news representations concerning a conflict in South Korea. She postulated that this area of comparison has been under-represented in news media research. These scholars provide a solid argument for Internet related searches for photographs.

Images were selected at random in terms of their content. To acquire the most options the most popular civilian search engine Google was utilized to perform photographic searches. The search term, “Iraqi deaths” was used consistent in each time research was gathered. The search term was selected to catch possible photographic depictions of Iraqi civilian casualties that would include <collateral damage>. In this manner “Iraqi deaths” serves as a cluster term that orbit <collateral damage> that allows me the capabilities for search results. The images collected were restricted to the Iraq war. No images of other terrorist actions, or war in any other
country were considered for this project. The data set is only comprised of images taken in Iraq, or as a direct result of the war there.

The publishing body of the photograph was the second criteria for choosing photographs. One of the primary goals was for the dataset to be as indiscriminate as possible in representation of U.S. media outlets and International media outlets. International media outlets were defined as any legitimate news outlet that was located outside the borders of the United States of America. Countries who we consider as allied forces in this war were considered as International news sources because those countries are outside the U.S. borders. Images from these countries were coded as International media. Examples of U.S. media sources considered include, www.whitehouse.gov, www.msn.com, www.cnn.com, www.yahoo.com, www.nytimes.com, www.washingtonpost.com, while examples of International media sources considered include, www.aljazeera.net, www.bbc.co.uk, www.iraqbodycount.org, www.commondreams.org

Two coders were used in this study. Coders were trained on photographs that depicted the Iraq war, but were not included in the dataset. Using photographs of the Iraq war provided the greatest amount of reliable training, because they exposed the coders to the types of images and individuals that they would be coding for the study. The dataset was distributed after extensive training and practice coding. The full dataset was given to each coder, and each coder completed the coding of each image and each individual represented. This method allowed the coders to adjust to the images of war time as well as code on individuals from Iraq.

Photographs were coded in two separate units of analysis (see appendix for complete codebook). The first unit of analysis was of the photograph itself. The image section of the code book addressed coding the type of image and a series of yes or no questions. Type of image had
six categories: Mourning, which included images of individuals crying; Protests, which included any standard protests image such as sign carrying or picketing a location or person of power; Daily Life, which included images of chores or activities that occur during a daily routine such as washing dishes, cleaning house, or walking to work; Active Combat, which included photos in which soldiers were present or individuals with guns in a combat position; Structural Devastation, which included images of bombed buildings, cars, homes, tank devastation, car bombs, or any damage cause to a structure during an apparent bombing strike; Detained, which included images of any individuals who were currently in detention such as prison cells as well as individuals who were handcuffed both with and without their heads covered. Each of these categories was utilized to classify the image as a whole. If there were individuals were present in the photograph, they were considered to determine type of image, but they were not coded by these questions. Images were further categorized based on the presence or absence of objects found in the photograph. The following five questions were considered as the second portion of the image coding.

1. Does the image include dead bodies?
2. Does the image include burning buildings?
3. Does the image include blown up equipment?
4. Does the image include weapons of any kind? (guns, knives, tanks, helicopters, etc.)
5. Does the image include a coffin?

Coders simply indicated yes or no. These two portions of the coding sheet comprised the image coding portion of the code sheet.

The second unit of analysis for coding was the individual person in each photograph. Four different sections were utilized to attain this information. The first section was sex of the
individual in which the coders identified if the individual was female; male; mass of people with potential for either sex; or unable to determine.

The second section for individual coding was generational group. The age of the individuals in the photographs were determined by six different categories: Child/Adolescents, which included individuals up to 17 years. Young Adults included individuals from 18-39 years of age. Middle-aged Adults, which included individuals who were estimated between 40-59 years of age. Young-old Adults, which included individuals between the ages of 60-74 years of age. Old-old Adults, which included individuals who were 75 years of age or older. Unable to determine was utilized for individuals for whom it was impossible to gauge their age. This category was specifically for implied dead bodies. Implied dead bodies included images were a body was believed to be underneath a cloth or drape, or when a coffin was present in the image. All other individuals were assigned to an age category based on a best estimate. If an individual potentially overlapped between two age groups the coders were instructed to code them in the younger age group.

The third section used to code individuals was physical health. Dead/Mortally injured which included individuals who were dead or who would die within a matter of hours due to injuries. Very Ill/Sick, which included individuals who were injured and could possibly die from these injuries. The distinction between the two categories lies in the immanent death of the first group as opposed to a chance of survival from injuries in the second group. Unhealthy was designated for individuals who were perceived to have a chronic illness or health problems due to external forces. These individuals’ health concerns were not directly a consequence of the war. Neutral/Can’t tell was used to designate individuals where it was impossible to discern the health status of the individuals. Healthy was used to describe people who were not injured and
who were involved in any action that would lead the coder to believe that they were healthy 
enough to move around and engage in activity. The category Very Healthy included individuals 
who were perceived to be physically fit. Soldiers and people who had to maintain a high level of 
physical fitness, for example, were assigned to this category. Individuals in this category were 
shown running or engaging in actions that would lead the coder to believe that they must be 
extremely fit to achieve the task that they were attempting to perform.

The final section used to code individuals was their perceived role in the war. Collateral 
Damage was used to code images of structural damage as well as loss of life. Collateral is 
declared, “adj 1) situated or running side by side; parallel 2) Coinciding in tendency or effect; 
concomitant; accompanying, 3) Serving to support or corroborate: collateral evidence, 4) Of 
secondary nature or subordinate” (p. vii). Damage is defined as, “n 1) Impairment of the 
usefulness or value of a person or property; loss, harm” (Peters, p. vii). Insurgents were defined 
as an outsider who is coming in to engage in the war. This category would not have included 
Iraqi citizens or US/UK soldiers. Anyone who was not one of those people was categorized 
under this section. The category US/UK soldiers included individuals who were discernable as 
military forces for either the United State the United Kingdom. The category Iraqi 
Soldier/Police included any individuals who were considered part of a peace keeping force in 
Iraq and who were not US/UK soldiers. The category Iraqi Citizens was used to code any 
individual who was not defined by any of the previous categories, but was of Iraqi descent. The 
final category, Other, included any individual who could not be coded by any of the terms 
published above. This category included American politicians that were found in the US media’s 
representation of the war.
Inter-coder reliability was calculated using Scott’s Pi for each of the categories coded. The coders reached acceptable levels of reliability for all categories related to type of image of individual (mourning = 1.0; protest = 1.0; daily life = 1.0; active combat = .89; structural devastation = .96; detained = 1.0), type of image in media (dead bodies =1.0; burning buildings = 1.0; blown up equipment = .97; weapons = .98; coffin = 1.0), and media type by characters (sex = .89; generational group = .86; perceived health = .90; role in war = .94).

Results

A series of chi square analyses were conducted to test the research questions. RQ1 examined the type of image and media outlet. Cross tabulations of type of image and media type showed no significant difference, $\chi^2 (5) = 7.549$, $p = .183$; (see Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Image and Media Type</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>International</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N (% within media)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mourning</td>
<td>9 (22.5%)</td>
<td>14 (40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest</td>
<td>2 (5%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Life</td>
<td>10 (25%)</td>
<td>11 (31.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Combat</td>
<td>9 (22.5%)</td>
<td>5 (14.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Damage</td>
<td>10 (25%)</td>
<td>4 (11.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detained</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RQ2 addressed the content of each image. Cross-tabulations were run for five different image contents (dead bodies, burning buildings, blown up equipment, presence of weapons, and presence of coffins) and portrayal in each media outlet (see Table 2).

### Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Image in Media</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>International</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N (% within media)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dead Bodies- Yes</td>
<td>4 (10%)</td>
<td>12 (34.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>36 (90%)</td>
<td>23 (65.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burning Building-Yes</td>
<td>5 (12.5%)</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>35 (87.5%)</td>
<td>34 (97.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blown Up Equipment- Yes</td>
<td>8 (20%)</td>
<td>3 (8.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>32 (80%)</td>
<td>32 (91.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons- Yes</td>
<td>19 (47.5%)</td>
<td>6 (17.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>21 (52.5%)</td>
<td>29 (82.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffin- Yes</td>
<td>2 (5%)</td>
<td>3 (8.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>38 (95%)</td>
<td>32 (91.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Two of the five image contents (weapons and dead bodies) were found to be significant. There was a significant difference between U.S. news media and International news media in their coverage of weapons, $\chi^2 (1) = 7.741, p = .005$. U.S. and International news had 33% ($n = 25$) total photographs that contained a weapon. Out of 25 photographs containing weapons 76% ($n = 19$) were found in the U.S. media as compared to 24% ($n = 6$) in International media. There was a significant difference between U.S. news media and International news media in the images that contained a dead body, $\chi^2 (1) = 6.560, p = .010$. Of the 16 photographs containing dead bodies 25% ($n = 4$) were found in US media versus 75% ($n = 12$) found in International media. Only 20% of all images contained dead bodies. There was no significant difference between news media outlets and their representation of burning buildings, $\chi^2 (1) = 2.358, p = .125$. There was no significance found between either of the news media outlets and blown up equipment, $\chi^2 (1) = 1.948, p = .163$. There was no significant difference between news media outlets and their representation of coffins in images, $\chi^2 (1) = .383, p = .536$.

RQ3 examined the portrayal of individuals in the two different media categories. Cross-tabulations were run using four categories (sex, generational group, perceived health, and role in war; see Table 3). Sex of the individual and media outlet was not significant, $\chi^2 (4) = 1.142, p = .888$. There was a significance difference found in the relationship between media type and role in war, $\chi^2 (5) = 16.469, p = .005$). Almost 32% ($n = 10$) of individuals in the US media were identified as Iraqi civilians, while 59.4% ($n = 38$) where identified as Iraqi civilians in International media. Also, 21.9% ($n = 7$) of individuals were described as other in the US media while 1.6% ($n = 1$) were described as other in International media.
Table 3

Media Type by Characters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US</th>
<th>International</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4 (12.5%)</td>
<td>9 (14.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>20 (62.5%)</td>
<td>41 (64.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass</td>
<td>1 (3.1%)</td>
<td>3 (4.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unable</td>
<td>7 (21.9%)</td>
<td>10 (15.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Generational Group</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child</td>
<td>1 (3.1%)</td>
<td>12 (18.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Adult</td>
<td>12 (37.5%)</td>
<td>30 (46.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-Age</td>
<td>8 (25%)</td>
<td>10 (15.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young-Old</td>
<td>2 (6.3%)</td>
<td>5 (7.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unable</td>
<td>9 (28.1%)</td>
<td>7 (10.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dead/Mortally Injured</td>
<td>6 (18.8%)</td>
<td>10 (15.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Ill/ Sick</td>
<td>2 (6.3%)</td>
<td>4 (6.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can’t Tell</td>
<td>10 (31.3%)</td>
<td>28 (43.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthy</td>
<td>11 (34.4%)</td>
<td>19 (29.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Healthy</td>
<td>3 (9.4%)</td>
<td>3 (4.7%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(table continues)*
Table 3 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role In War</th>
<th>N (% within media) US</th>
<th>International</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collateral Damage</td>
<td>9 (28.1%)</td>
<td>13 (20.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgent</td>
<td>1 (3.1%)</td>
<td>2 (3.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US/UK. Soldier</td>
<td>4 (12.5%)</td>
<td>10 (15.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Soldier</td>
<td>1 (3.1%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Citizen</td>
<td>10 (31.3%)</td>
<td>38 (59.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7 (21.9%)</td>
<td>1 (1.6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Discussion

There were two major findings in this study. First, in RQ2 it was found that there was a significant difference within the news outlets for the presence of weapons and dead bodies. Second, in RQ3 there was a significance difference in the role of war depicted between the news outlets. These findings can be understood within the framework of agenda setting. First I consider the findings of RQ2.

The U.S. news media showed a vast difference in their representations of weapons and dead bodies as compared to International news media sources. Weapons were shown almost three times more in U.S. news media than the International news media outlets. As previously discussed, media frames highlight what is seen. The U.S. news media has framed weapons as an important element for the public to see. Cloud (2004) argues that photographs use a “number of
other persuasive strategies (framing, selection, editing, use of light, or arrangement of subject)” (Cloud, p. 289). However, these persuasive strategies are often overlooked because of “the appearance of having captured reality” (p. 289). There is a shift to a technological way of viewing war in our country (Jacobson & Jang, 2002), which supports the trajectory established in chapter 2 with regards to the rhetoric of new warfare. When we view the war through the lens of weapons, it diminishes the human aspect of the war (Peters, 1995). This fantasy shields us from the reality of war, in that war actually causes human loss. This finding further establishes the U.S.’s view of war time depictions as technological instead of humanistic.

Frames, similar to psychoanalytic notions of fantasy both reveal and conceal. I discussed the war in terms of a technological entity that serves to highlight the use of weapons, but the direct effect of this highlighting is the loss of human life as a consequence of war. U.S. media outlets showed only 10% \( (n = 4) \) photographs that contained a dead body out of 16 total images. The International media had 34.3% \( (n = 12) \) photographs that contained dead bodies. That percentage is almost a 3 to 1 ratio of depictions. The U.S.’s lack of representation of the Other in war times is astounding. The U.S. established a strict policy restricting the discourse of the Other post 9/11. After 9/11 the discourse concerning the terrorist was that of you are either “for us or against us” (Butler, 2006). This dichotomy limited the discourse that happened after 9/11. This limitation is present in the discussion of the Iraq War and of its consequences. American citizens are unable to see the dead bodies overseas because they are unable to rationalize their existence within the functioning dichotomy of an “us vs. them” mentality. American citizens label our enemies in War as being against us, so the mere questioning of their role or contribution to the conflict is in itself an anti-American act. A method of limiting this discourse is presented by the media. The U.S. media limits the number of visual images that portray dead
bodies, and thus limits the discourse that would seek to question the death of the Other. The implications of the “us vs. them” mentality is discussed in the next chapter, which focuses on the psycho-rhetorical functions of fantasy, and how fantasies both deflect reality and how that deflection serves as a coping mechanism for individuals. However, another implication of quantifiable absences of dead bodies is the censoring of images concerning the coverage of the Iraq War.

In the previous chapter, I analyzed the Haditha massacre as a case-study of textual incongruities, however Haditha also serves a text of analysis for visual ideographs as well. Staff Sgt. Laughner testified that he took photos of the massacre in Haditha hours after the roadside bomb killed Terrazas, but was ordered by Lt. Andrew Grayson to delete the photos. Staff Sgt. Laughner testified that he felt he had done something wrong by deleting the photos, but was unaware that storing the photos on his laptop computer was also in violation of military law. Staff Sgt. Laughner’s testimony also included an omission of lying to five different investigators to cover up the existence of the photographs, because he already knew that he had deleted them and that he had obstructed justice. The testimony of Staff Sgt. Laughner is an interesting intersection of textual and visual incongruities. A Marine ordered Sgt. Laughner to delete evidence of the Haditha massacre and, by doing so, the Sgt. risked obstruction of justice charges to aid in the massacre coverage. Despite the reports of evidence tampering and obstruction of justice, the only Marine that still faces charges in relation to the Haditha massacre is Staff Sgt. Frank Wuterich. All other charges leveled against marines in relation to Haditha have been dropped.

The most recent example of visual censorship occurred in July 2008, to a war photographer known as Zoriah. Zoriah was an embedded journalist for the Army, and switched
to a Marine company located in the Anbar Province. On Zoriah’s first day with his new Marine patrol, the troop received a dispatch about a bombing in nearby Sadr City. Zoriah reported to Goodman (2008) that the marines immediately dressed in their military clothes and began running to the bombing site. A city council meeting had been targeted by terrorist’s bombs. Zoriah recounts that as he was running to the bombing cite he saw a human ear on the side of the road, and he realized that the destruction of the scene he was about to see would be graphic. Once on scene, Zoriah began snapping photographs of the horrific conditions. He shot pictures of dead Iraqis as well as two dead marines. The military states that picture depicting “identifiable” military personnel are not allowed to be published. Zoriah claims that he was extremely careful to ensure that identifiable dog tags, name plates, facial features, or tattoos were present in any of the photographs so that no one would be able to identify the marines in the pictures. Zoriah was allowed to photograph the scene for roughly ten minutes until he was escorted to a Humvee, reportedly for his protection.

A few hours after he returned to base, a marine approached Zoriah and asked him to delete his camera as well as his camera’s memory card, but he refused and was no longer encouraged to delete the items. The military has a policy of waiting twenty-four hours before pictures are published of a bombing to ensure that the families are properly notified before photographs are posted on the news. Zoriah confirmed the next day that the families of the two deceased marines had been notified; nevertheless waited three additional days before posting the pictures of the Sadr City bombing to his blog. Zoriah claims that he even asked fellow marines if there were any identifying marks or features that could possibly upset the families of the marines involved. Zoriah posted the pictures on the evening of June 30, 2008, and he reports that several hours later he was contacted by high level officials of the Public Affairs Office and
was told that he was in violation of his signed embedded journalist contract and must therefore, remove the blog and its entirety immediately. Zoriah argued that the contract had no stipulations concerning the photos that he took because there were no identifying features of the photos, and he had waited the allotted twenty-four hour time constraint before posting. Eventually, the Marines escorted Zoriah away from his Marine troop and airlifted him to the Green Zone in Baghdad. He was subsequently sent back to the United States. Zoriah has been stripped of his credentials with the Marines, who are pursuing Zoriah's full disbandment from military action which would include all branches of the military in any conflict involving the United States. Zoriah’s case is one of the strongest cases for censorship of war time photographs in the Iraq War. Clearly the military is pursuing any journalist who portrays an incident often than how the military dictates. This censorship is not unlike the textual coercive practices that were illuminated in the previous chapter with the Marines categorization of civilian deaths. In this case, instead of categorizing the ways in which we talk about civilian death, the Marines are controlling American citizens’ very ability to see civilian death as a result of bombings that resulted in collateral damage.

RQ 3 dealt with the portrayal of individuals in photographs. None of the categories except for role in war were significant. Common sense would posit that the U.S. media might have stereotyped the Iraqi civilians that were present. Perhaps news media only covered the Iraqi in a positive light, and tried to sell the public the claims that the war was progressing well. The findings proved something much more significant, an absence of Iraqi representation. Iraqi civilians were not stereotyped, they were not present. International media contained 59.4% \((n = 38)\) of images of Iraqi civilians while only 31.3 % \((n = 10)\) of images were represented in the U.S. news media. This problem is significant because, through absence, the American media
dehumanize Iraqi citizens and, by doing so, American citizens will never understand what is happening in the war.

The *Boston Globe* featured a cover story that depicted the death of an Iraqi civilian by a stray bullet. The picture, which ran on the front page in 2003, was the first image of a dead body printed by the newspaper. It is interesting to note that Nelson, Globe deputy director of photography, refused to permit any further photos that showed, “identifiable faces” (Strupp, 2003, p. 2). In this instance the paper found it acceptable to run a photo of an Iraqi casualty, but no more photos ran in the Globe that humanized the victim by showing their faces. In this instance, Nelson dehumanizes the subject by removing the victims’ faces. This exclusion is yet another method for the dehumanization of the Iraqi civilians.

Levinas (1998) argues that to be human is to see yourself in the person who may be threatening to your very existence. Levinas was concerned with saving face. To avoid the face of another is to dehumanize the other. “Do not deface me”; “Allow me, my otherness without violation, shame or indifference.” (p. 12). These quotes from Levinas illustrate his idea of face, and how face functioned. This idea is very similar to Butler’s (2006) notion of the ability to see. If we cannot see the face of Iraqis, American citizens feel as though they are further away from the war (Beadoin, 2005). Butler (2006) says that the idea of human can be defined, “based upon their exclusion” (p. 33). She also states that there is a method of examining this non-human who continually interferes. Butler states, “If violence is done against those who are unreal, then, from the perspective of violence, it fails to injure or negate those lives since those lives are already negated” (Butler, p. 33). She continues to say, “They cannot be mourned because they are always already lost or rather, never “were,” and they must be killed, since they seem to live on, stubbornly, in this state of deadness” (p. 33). The analysis of these images provides a strong
foundation for what is represented and what is repressed in American media, but the analysis of
the piety or appropriateness of the photographs is not a matter of quantifiable metrics but is
illuminated by reproduction and iconography.

Piety

The analysis of media images’ representation of Iraqi deaths accounts for what pictures
are present and absent, but the quantitative number alone does not explain the reaction to
pictures. For instance, the quantity of photographs absent or present does not explain why
pictures of dead Iraqi civilians are considered grotesque while photos of Sadaam Hussein’s sons
dead and blown up are celebrated. Burke (1984) argues that piety plays a role in determining
appropriateness and provides a foundation for analyzing competing pieties. Rosteck and Leff
(1989) argue that Burke extends piety to “encompass any impulse toward order and system.
Piety thus functions to sustain the coherence of a perspective, but it now attaches itself to all
levels of human experience, to the mundane as well as the divine. Moreover, while the function
of piety remains constant, in substance pieties are diverse, since their content shifts in accordance
with changing perspectives” (p. 327-328). That is to say, that piety is often a meaning or
understanding that can change over time and across circumstances (e.g. the appropriateness of
showing dead Americans versus dead enemies). Thus differing groups of people or differing
perspectives on a situation will view it with differing levels of piety and appropriateness, and
therefore project their own views of piety onto the situation. The argument of piety is central to
understanding why photographs of dead Iraqi civilians are viewed by some as in appropriate,
while others argue that they are necessary for the public to see so that they might grasp the full
understanding of the situation in Iraq.
The quantitative numbers of this chapter are evidence of competing notions of piety and appropriateness. Rosteck and Leff (1989) explain that there can be “competing perspective” or a “rival version of piety” and that within this “zone of competition pieties struggle to organize matter at the expense of rival perspectives” (p. 328, 330). The authors argue that when a version of piety is rejected it points to an “adherence to a new and equally systematic principle of order” (p. 328). Thus the numerical data in this chapter point towards a newly developed “systematic principle of order” which supports the militaristic fantasy of the war in Iraq.

The military argues that pictures of Iraqi civilians are grotesque and critics who advocate for their inclusion in the news media are morbid. This is the militaristic fantasy operating to control the new order of piety. The Zoriah case is a prime example of the use of piety to combat the possibility of framing the death of the Marines as anything other than the military’s definition. The military claimed that showing the boots of soldiers was inappropriate, and that those photos would upset family members. Thus by using the argument of piety, the military successfully removed an embedded journalist from a combat zone. The removal of the journalist is an example of competing pieties at work within the same situation, and in this case the military’s version of piety won while Zoriah’s version of piety was rejected. Therefore this situation points to the new order of piety instituted by the military that condones censorship and combats evidence contrary to their version of events.

Burke (1984) explains that piety refers “both to a certain kind of product- an orientation, a frame, or way of organizing things-and to a certain kind of process- a process by which we generate orientations, frames and ways of organizing things” (p. 76). Thus pieties organize the thoughts, perceptions, and reactions of individuals to given situations and these reactions shape the way in which individuals constitute appropriateness. Pieties function to help individuals
make sense of the world around them, and thus provide a frame for viewing. Rosteck and Leff argue that pieties become “stable frames of reference which direct human perception and determine our judgments about what is proper in a given circumstance” (p. 329). When the militaristic piety is over represented in the media, and any critique of their piety is under represented, then the way in which individuals build perceptions of appropriateness is skewed. Individuals rely on their conceptualizations of piety to lend order to the world around them, and thus are reliant on the dominant worldview through which they view circumstances around them, and in this instance the number of dead Iraqi civilians. Rosteck and Leff even argue that pieties are “created by human makers as they interact with their fellows and with the world” (p. 329). The numerical data in this chapter argues that the human makers of pieties in the U.S. have framed the deaths of Iraqi civilians in a disproportionate manner as compared with their interactions with International media sources thus creating a frame of grotesque nature when viewing photographs of Iraqi civilian deaths. Therefore, the frame or piety of the circumstance is viewed differently by individuals in the U.S. versus individuals in the International community. The militaristic framing has labeled the photographs of dead Iraqi civilians as inappropriate and therefore outside of our frame of reference.

The argument of frames circles back to the original question of why some photographs of death in Iraq have been celebrated while others are censored. Burke’s answer to this phenomena lies within perspective by incongruity, “a lens that focuses or refocuses our encounters with the world in a way consistent with our interests” (p. 141). The militaristic version of piety argues that photographs of Iraqi civilians are grotesque or morbidly inappropriate disrespectful, thus photographs are censored, and individuals will refocus the manner in which they interact and encounter the world in order to remain consistent with the militaristic version of piety. Burkean
piety explains why celebration and reproduction of photographs of Sadaam’s dead sons is appropriate and pious while photographs of dead Iraqi civilians are censored as inappropriate. The focus shifts when individuals are presented photographs of dead Iraqis because such disturbing photographs our self-righteous American piety as liberators and champions of democratic values. Therefore images of slaughtered civilians are censored, repressed, and the focus shifts away from the photographs that disrupt the pro-war fantasy.

The argument for the role of pieties in perpetuating hegemonic worldviews, as well as the notion of the perspective by incongruity offer a unique glimpse into the phenomena of photographic representation of war. Understanding photographic representations as sites of struggle over preferred and oppositional readings illuminates the notion that there are differing worldviews, narratives, and fantasies that are competing to become the dominant frame for viewing the war in Iraq as well as the treatment of Iraqi civilians. This chapter provides a strong foundation for continuing to investigate the flashpoint contradictory frames for viewing Iraqi civilians. A further investigation into this struggle over the narrative frame leads to a consideration of competing ideological fantasies and psycho-dynamic rhetoric, and how differing fantasies interact with each other to establish an overall narrative of the war in Iraq. The next chapter argues that fantasies help individuals cope with the horrors of war, thus the absence of visual representations of Iraqi deaths serves to deflect reality as well as provide a vehicle for coping. The absence of visual Iraqi deaths invites a further analysis of the disappearing or “void” phenomenon surrounding these deaths. The next chapter provides a detailed explanation of fantasy functions in rhetorical studies that argues for a psycho-analytic explanation for the quantifiable absence of Iraqi civilian deaths.
CHAPTER 5
THE FORCE OF FANTASY IN NARRATING <COLLATERAL DAMAGE>

In this chapter I argue that scholars can better understand the concept of ideographic fragments through the psychodynamic rhetorical lens of fantasy. Ideographs are a snapshot of ideology, yet those snapshots of ideology inherently seek to offer a cohesive account that negotiates competing narrative fantasies. In one account <collateral damage> is the unfortunate, if inevitable, result of combat operations and the “fog of war”; a persistent counter-narrative holds that limited <collateral damage> should be systematically and strategically accountable for excluding war crimes, atrocities, ethnic cleansing, and other intentional, if murderous, human error within the horrific calculus of war. Ideographs as a rhetorical method or critical approach requires both a diachronic analysis, which considers the history of an ideograph’s use, as well as a synchronic analysis, which considers how the ideograph functions with other ideographs or vocabularies of terms that cluster around the ideograph. An ideographic analyst must consider the breadth of ideological history and the depth of distinct invocations to conduct a proper analysis (Condit & Lucaites, 1993). Synchronic analysis is a mode to uncover competing fantasies because it must account for other terms that are existent within and around ideographic functioning. Ideographic analysis inherently lends itself to the consideration of dueling fantasies that are reified through narrative. Therefore, the illumination of fantasy is inherent when paired with ideographic analysis.

Ideographs are a small puzzle piece of ideology, an entire worldview that structures beliefs and behaviors within a larger narrative spectrum. A psychodynamic understanding of fantasy allows the critic to consider how that ideographic puzzle piece fits into the larger fantasy narrative, legitimating narrative understandings of people and events while simultaneously
rejecting or marginalizing others. Because psychoanalytic understandings of “phantasy” emphasize such narrativizing choices as strategic acts of selection and deflection, if not outright repression, rhetorical fantasy is essential for understanding how ideographs and their terministic constellations of ideographic fragments act together as puzzle pieces fitting into the larger cohesive functions of ideology. Just as puzzle cannot be understood completely with key pieces missing, nor can a single puzzle piece adequately produce a whole picture, neither can isolated ideographs singularly expose the entirety of a narrativizing network of words and meanings that fill in holes of missing meaning. The ideograph’s relation to fantasy functions, as understood here, as a footprint or photo snapshot of a dynamic and ever-changing rhetorical process of adaptation, response, pre-emption, and narrative fidelity to changing factual realities. Therefore, rhetorical critics might gain a deeper insight into the full spectrum of ideology through a deeper understanding of a single ideographic event within a larger narrative function, while an exploration into the constellating terministic vocabulary and fragments of an ideograph may yield a broader understanding of the full spectrum of an ideology’s narrative and imaginative appeal.

These two strands of the ideograph, the diachronic and synchronic, thereby work together to provide an in-depth consideration of the narrative appeal of an ideology’s justificatory scene, characters, actions, and motives. Ultimately, ideology tells a convincing story of collective motives and actions that leads to often self-serving, self-aggrandizing, and self-deluding “zombie trouble” (Gunn & Treat, 2005). Because identities and ideologies wish to believe the best of themselves, it is often the case that liberties are taken and narrative fictions are perpetuated to preserve a noble Ego of Self, whether individual or collective, thus leading to repression, displacement, and misdirection of the otherwise discomforting desires, drives, and self-
rationalizing fantasies that animate our stated motives and actual behaviors. <Collateral damage> is one of these self-comforting but other-demonizing fantasies, inviting us to believe that the war-time deaths of innocents is a concern adequately mitigated by strategy, technology, and the best of intentions. As has been demonstrated thus far, such narrative comfort is at best illusory and, at worst a deceptively naïve fiction ruthlessly promoted to endure the horrors of war.

It is therefore necessary to outline the ways in which fantasy and ideology have been considered and discussed in the field of rhetoric to gain a deeper understanding of the oft-ignored fantasy functions of rhetoric. The following section will consider Gunn’s (2003) work on refiguring fantasy in which he conducted a genealogical look into the invocation of the “imagination” followed by a consideration of Gunn’s (2004) work on refitting fantasy into psychoanalysis and fantasy’s implications for rhetorical studies. The section will continue with an exploration of ideological critics through the work of Gunn and Treat (2005), who utilize the rhetorical homology of zombies to theorize ideology. The three articles track a recent trend in rhetorical studies that advocates the centrality of the unconscious for ideological criticism. The articles will provide a framework to illustrate fantasy’s intimate relationship with ideology and, hence, ideographic criticism.

Tracking Imagination and Fantasy through Rhetorical Criticism

Gunn (2003) charts a genealogical history of the function of imagination in rhetorical studies, and the subsequent logocentrism of fantasy. Gunn begins his analysis with definitional situating of imagination in the tradition of rhetorical studies as a “psychoanalytic understanding of the collective unconscious” (p. 41). This definition situates the understanding of the
imagination in rhetorical studies through the lens of the unconscious, which is a shift of understanding the collective public from Marx and Neo-Marxist scholars, who situate the understanding of the collective public in the conscious mind. Gunn indicates an opening for rhetorical consideration of the unconscious that would build upon the work of Freud, Burke, and Lacan to highlight a different avenue for rhetorical studies.

Gunn (2003) continues with a consideration of the rhetorical agent. He states that his primary goal is “to outline a disciplinary genealogy of anxiety concerning the rhetorical agent within the psychoanalytic idiom or paradigm of the imaginary” (p. 41). Gunn claims that the anxiety over rhetorical agency illustrates the communication studies’ discipline reluctance to let go of the Cartesian ego as an “autonomous, humanist subject who claims mastery over the material world in conscious thought in favor of a more contingent and fragmented understanding of individual subjectivity, community and world)” (p. 41-42). Gunn also calls for a new move toward an understanding of subjectivity. Ultimately, Gunn argues that the consideration of imagination’s genealogy through rhetorical studies could manage the tensions that exist between “self-centered rhetorical agency” and the “decentered, posthumanist subject” (p. 42).

Gunn begins his analysis of the genealogy of imagination in the field of rhetorical studies. He outlines major moves by scholars beginning with Lacan’s understanding of the imago and the theory of the looking glass and Althusser’s arguments that imagination leads to a new level of “complete autonomy” (p. 44). Gunn outlines three of Althusser’s critiques of Lacan. First, Althusser argues that Lacan is developing a theory of ideology that Marx did not have, because people on the top and bottom of society could be articulated by ideology. Second, Althusser argues that Lacan’s notion of imagination implicates a collective unconscious, and thus that “ideology articulates the subject (p. 45). His argument is that ideology uses the
imaginary to reinforce subjects. The third and final of Althusser’s critique of Lacan is concerned with rhetoric as the suasive movement of images and discourse center of analysis; “fostering the illusion that one’s social rank in life is natural and ‘freely’ chosen” Rhetoric therefore is a tool to “demystify discourse” where freedom is concerned. (p. 45).

Gunn (2003) then moves his argument to the Italian thinker Vicco, who is the first scholar to consider “rhetoric of imaginative invention” (p. 46). Vicco expands the notion of sensus communis by claiming that it “expands to mean a collective consciousness structured by language” (p. 46). Vicco’s claim is vital to communication studies because of his situation of collective consciousness and structured language; his claim provides a foundation for twentieth century vigor around literary criticism.

Literary criticism was the vehicle of popularization for Burke, who built upon the Freudian conceptualization of the unconscious mind. Burke argued that the idea of persuasion in language and identification was the “central concept of rhetoric” (Gunn, 2003, p. 46). Gunn argues that Burke was one of the first scholars to return to Vicco’s original claim that fused the concepts of a collective conscious through language. Leff (1983) also championed a return to sensus communis by stressing “social knowledge” and the “individual” (Gunn, 2003, p. 47). Leff argues that “Metaphorical communication depends on social knowledge and the intersubjective connections that exist within a speech community” (p. 47).

The next major move in rhetorical studies is the “ideological turn” championed by Bormann (1982) with the use of fantasy theme analysis. Bormann builds upon the work of Bales who posited that groups dream much like individuals dream therefore groups’ dream or fantasies needed to be considered. Consequently, Bormann’s theory focuses on “group or collective fantasies” (Bormann, p. 48). Bormann defined fantasy as “intersubjectively created stories
featuring characters, scenes, and plots that are used by members of a group to make sense of a common experience” (p. 48). According to Bormann fantasies have three basic types; 1) character themes, 2) action themes and 3) setting themes, a connection can be drawn through these themes to relate to community consciousness. Bormann (1982) states, “Sharing fantasies is closely connected with the motivation, and is an important means for people to create their social realities.” (p. 49)

The ultimate finding of symbolic convergence theory is “the collective imaginary as the principal and primary locus of suassive movement” (Bormann, p. 49). Individuals chain fantasies together, but are not the origin of fantasies, which means that collective consciousness and not the individual is the locus of fantasy. Gunn (2003) argues that Bormann’s definition of fantasy is “striking because it implies that rhetoric occurs within a field of a collective consciousness that is not reducible to any individual” (p. 49). Fantasy and ideological criticism, then, fell to the work of McGee (1980) work on the ideograph, and his work (1999) on the discussion of the “people” as rhetorical discourse.

McGee (1980) argued that ideological criticism had followed two tracks of practice in the realm of culture studies and communication studies: 1) symbolism and 2) materialist. The two methods of analysis claim that a “trick of consciousness” occurs when a message is presented or (re)presented to an audience. Scholars who follow symbolist notions of rhetoric claim that the evidence of “trick” is illuminated in the realm of public conscious, because individuals think as individuals (McGee, 1980). Therefore, when an individual seeks to follow rules or regulations, that individual has abandoned individual thought, and is putting on the thought of the “mass.” The action of thinking like the masses is not a trait specific to an individual, so this action signifies interference from a power source.
The source of power for Marxist critique is the “elite” or ruling class. The ruling class acts upon the working class through “tricks” that enable the elite to remain in power and dictate the “means of production.” The method of the “trick” for Marxists scholars is a “lie” (McGee, 1980, p. 2). Marxists argue that a system of belief is operating that reifies existing power structures in society. The structured system must continually perpetuate “lies” generated from the “elite” to the “proletariat” to keep the structured system in operation. Therefore, the system self perpetuates beliefs and interpretations to reify its existence (McGee, 1980).

Burkean analysis of the “trick” is concerned less with the structural factors at play, and more with the “motive” behind the “trick” (McGee, 1980). Burke sought to analyze the dramatistic natures of language and consciousness. Burke argued that the mode for understanding public consciousness was most productive through an examination of the “motive” behind those in power. Burke is attributed with the creation of “dramatism,” a method that considers five elements (including motive) that are used to analyze rhetorical situations such as public consciousness.

McGee’s (1980) argues that there is no need to laud one of these approaches over the other; rather, a new understanding of both approaches is called for in research. Therefore, McGee proposes that an “ideograph” can be utilized to bring together the two differing approaches to define the behavior of the public. However, critics of the ideograph have claimed that the ideograph was not a strong proponent for ideological criticism because it provided only a snapshot of ideology. Isolated incidents of ideographs did not provide a strong enough methodological vehicle for McGee’s critics. Instead critics claimed that a vehicle for examining the entire narrative of ideology was needed. In later works McGee fleshes out this criticism, and supports a consideration of several texts as “fragments” that can be drawn together by a critic for
ideological criticism. The move towards “fragments” lies beneath the service of McGee’s seminal work in 1980 but was fully examined in later works before his death.

Gunn (2004) continues of the exploration of the connections between fantasy, psychoanalysis, and rhetoric. His primary goal in this article is to examine the role of psychoanalysis in human communication. Gunn argues that “The idea of communication derives from a fundamental fantasy structuring the phenomenon of talking to the dead” (p. 2). He begins with an explanation of the show Crossing Over with John Edwards. In this television show, Edwards claims that he can talk to the dead relatives of friends or family of audience members, thus serving as an intermediary source of communication between the dead and the living. Gunn explains that talking to the dead exhibits, “the mediation or reconciliation of Self and Other across a terrible, yawning gap” and that ultimately “communication is the name for those practices that compensate for the fact that we can never be each other” (p. 2-3). Situating communication in this light is a compelling argument for looking at Crossing Over. If communication is used as a method because we can never be someone else, it could also be a method for talking to the dead; for crossing a bridge of understanding that otherwise would not exist. Gunn argues “If the unity of text and autonomy of the subject are illusions, then so is communication as the successful reconciliation of Self and Other” (p. 3).

Gunn (2004) situates the definition of fantasy within the context of Lacan and Žižek’s understanding of fantasy, which “refer to the psychical-rhetorical narratives about Self (the “I”) and Other (a symbolic “not me”) the way desire generates and traverses theses narratives (Gunn, p. 5). Fantasies produce agency that are exterior to one another, and the rhetorical agent is a necessary fantasy. Gunn argues that fantasies’ connections to the symbolic structure is under-
theorized in the field of rhetoric. This argument provides opportunity for additional exploration of the unconscious and ideology.

Gunn and Treat (2005) claim that ideological criticism is facing yet another threat of extinction a point previously argued by McGee (1980) and Charland (1987). The authors outline three reasons that contributed to the beginning of a shift away from ideological criticism; 1) a renewed defense of the classical rhetorical agent; 2) the embrace of hegemony and the “active audience” thesis; and 3) the adoption of Foucauldian modes of criticism (power/knowledge). The author further argues that the “ideological turn in rhetorical studies has been framed as a reinvestment in the political and ethical complexities of criticism, shifting attention away from the processes of subjectification suggested by Burke, McGee, and Charland” (Gunn & Treat, 2005, p. 2). Therefore, they call for a reconsideration of ideological studies that includes a conceptualization of the unconscious as an important factor that influences ideological criticism.

The argument for consideration of the unconscious for ideological criticism hinges on the argument that conscious rationales for beliefs, behaviors, attitudes, and actions are guided by unconscious drives. Therefore, unconscious factors work with fantasy to deflect or misdirect uncomfortable motives and desires.

Fantasy is a screen that helps us cope with trauma and horror, but it can do so in either functional or dysfunctional ways. This evaluation applies to ideological criticism by considering the ways in which ideology serves as a coping mechanism for larger events of wartime, and while simultaneously helping us cope, what other realities are blinded from us and thus disappeared. The tensions between self and other, critique and counter-critique, are ethically and deliberatively productive.
Military Fantasy of Haditha <Collateral Damage>

Both the genealogy of fantasy and the call of rhetorical scholars to consider the role of the unconscious in ideological criticism point to an explanation of the ideograph’s operation in conjunction with fantasy. As previously discussed, this chapter seeks to illuminate the rhetorical functions of ideographs as a specific cite of a larger operating ideological fantasy. A clear demonstration of competing fantasies can be seen in the Chessani talking points memo. The memo illustrates how the Marines control the discourse in the war of information. This control allows the Marines to classify civilian deaths in a way that controls any possible consequences. This memo is a rare backstage pass into the function of the military’s war on public perception, and is a clear representation of how dueling fantasies are controlled when they collide.

*Chessani’s Talking Points*

The memo indicates a clear distinction between the fantasy of media outlets and the fantasy perpetuated by the military. Chessani’s responses portray the media fantasy as one of conspiracy and “spin.” He argues that the media will try to “discredit the U.S. at this time concerning the Iraq war and the current administration’s conduct of the war” (p. 1). Chessani also uses the terms “spin” and “common tactic” to paint a fantasy of the media as twisters of words, and to indicate that journalists will not be honest in reporting the actual events of the war. Chessani also outlines that reporters will try to paint the military in a negative light by invoking the memory of Vietnam through the My Lai massacre, and by invoking popular war movies such as *Platoon*, that cast the military in an unforgiving light.

Chessani warns other military personnel of the trap that the media is planning by comparing Marine officers with Sergeant Barnes who is the “antihero, depicted as a no-
nonsense, war-haggard platoon sergeant who knows how to get things done in the bloody jungles of Vietnam—and it ain’t always pretty” (p. 1). Chessani argues that when McGirk asks about officer presence at the Haditha massacre, he “tries to adapt our situation to this model” in a way that it “simultaneously exposes a ‘war crime cover-up’ and shows the deteriorative (albeit exaggerated) effects of war on U.S. marines” (p. 1). Chessani’s use of the term model is interesting because points to competing patterns, thoughts, or ways of seeing a situation, or a fantasy that operates in contrast with his fantasy for himself and the military. Chessani’s rhetoric also indicates a fantasy deflection of “war crimes” with his own invocation of the term. Chessani’s explicit use of “war crimes” demonstrates that “war crimes” are already on the minds of the Marines; however by displacing the blame on McGirk, Chessani is able to exclude “war crimes” from the fantasy of the Marines by deflecting the idea of war crimes as a claim that reporters are seeking to project on the military.

Chessani also points to the military fantasy when he discusses the use of the term “served.” Chessani argues that by using “serve” McGirk is trying to downplay the mission in Iraq. Chessani reminds military personnel to avoid the term “serve,” as in the idea of “serving a casserole,” and to reify the fantasy of “fighting Al Qaeda terrorist.” By invoking “Al Qaeda” and “terrorist” the military perpetuates the fantasy of justification for going to war with Iraq in the first place. Chessani invokes the memory of 9/11 to project a fantasy of proper military engagement. Chessani states that “the American people will side more with someone actively fighting a terrorist organization that is tied to 9/11 than with someone who is idly ‘serving’” (p. 2). These statements demonstrate that the military is a fantasy producer as well as a perpetuator of the fantasy of war introduced by the Bush Administration. Chessani implores strategic uses of rhetoric to perpetuate the existing fantasy of terror and fear of the attacks of 9/11. The projection
of the 9/11 fantasy connects with Cloud’s (2004) arguments for the ideograph <clash of civilizations> and the consideration of how ideographs function during wartime. The talking points memo is a clear indication of Chessani’s explicit call for fellow Marines to participate in the reification of the military fantasy that is portrayed through the <clash of civilizations>. The talking points memo is a clear example of the military’s attempt to control the fantasy of the war in Iraq by cathecting the war with the events of 9/11.

Haditha Hearings

Another example of the military fantasy occurs in the military hearings on Haditha. The textual implications of the hearings were previously discussed, but the textual implications also serve to highlight a larger fantasy construction of Iraqi civilians. In the testimony during the hearings, the concept of civilians did not exist for the Marines involved in Haditha. The Marines claimed that civilians who die in combat missions are not viable for investigation and do not warrant a cause for any further attention; rather, they are rhetorically dehumanized as collateral damage an unfortunate side effect of war. The categorization of dead bodies in this manner signifies a fantasy for war that does not account for the consideration of civilian death. The Marine fantasy of dehumanization serves to deflect the reality of civilian deaths in the war in Iraq. Operating within the non-existent civilian fantasy allows for control of possible consequences. If civilians do not exist in combat missions and are dehumanized through their categorization as collateral damage, war crimes are impossible because there are no victims of war crimes; only unfortunate by-products of war. Thus what the ideograph <collateral damage> actually does is to deflect the invocation of civilian deaths and reify the militaristic war fantasy.
The argument for the militaristic fantasy of civilian deflection is not a new concept based upon the genealogical arguments outlined in chapter 2. The initial difference between the Royal Air Force and the United States in strategic bombing was targeting civilians. The Royal Air Force initially targeted dense civilian populations as prime bombing targets to strike fear into the hearts of their enemy. The Royal Air Force believed that if their enemy experience intense fear, the enemy would immediately recoil defenses and wars would inevitably be short incursions. However, the United States opted for a structural bombing campaign that would lead to the collapse of a civilian population resulting in the fewest number of civilian casualties. This ideological concern over civilians continues through the rhetoric used by the Bush Administration at the beginning of the War in Iraq. The pivotal rhetorical shift occurs when civilian discourse is dropped and new terms and fantasies are implemented which allow the discourse to disappear. The discourse shifts to a sterile and technological view of warfare and civilian casualties that serves to illuminate a fantasy of deflection. Through this deflection the of innocent civilian casualties disappears and is replaced with the counter fantasy of the absence of civilians, rhetorically labeled <collateral damage>.

These examples provide a unique understanding of the fantasies that operate to construct a larger ideological narrative during times of war. The deeper analysis of the ideograph <collateral damage> illustrated the historical genealogical implications of collateral damage as well as how the term operates when used in conjunction with other operating terms. By analyzing collateral damage the critic is allowed an in-depth look into the material conditions of the term. McGee (1980) was concerned with how terms operate, their function. Burke’s definition of man “as a symbol-using and symbol-used” animal also points to the effects of language on individuals as well as the collective. Each of these scholars was concerned with
what language and terms actually “do.” The analysis of the ideograph conducted in chapter 3 and four allow critics to see what the term collateral damage actually does to the public. However recent scholars have argued that additional ways to understand ideology are needed in rhetorical studies by examining fantasy function as a way to answer a new call in scholarship. The critic’s analysis is made stronger when consideration of an ideographic snapshot of ideology is juxtaposed with the larger ideology constructions that are illuminated by fantasy.

**Headline News**

One final illustration of the competing fantasies at work in the Haditha massacre are the competing headlines used to describe Haditha. *Time* was the first magazine to run a report on the Haditha massacre, and the headline reads “Collateral Damage or Civilian Massacre in Haditha?” (McGirk, 2006). Subsequent articles follow the questioning approach as well; “What Happened at Haditha” (Asser, 2008); “Lawyers on Haditha Panel Peer Into Fog of War” (Zielbauer, 2007); “Rampage at Haditha: Aberrant or Endemic?” (Keefe, 2006). These headlines are, for the most part, neutral in their assertions concerning the events in Haditha and serve an exploratory function. Other headlines provide a more distinct glimpse of the competing fantasies that surround Haditha. The television show *60 Minutes* conducted a investigate report titled “The Killings in Haditha: Charged Marine tells 60 Minutes He’s Sorry Iraqi Civilians were Killed, But Insist he Made the Right Decision” (Efran, & Granastein, 2007); “In Haditha, Memories of a Massacre” (Knickmeyer, 2006); “The Shame of the Kilo Company” (Duffy, 2006); “In Haditha Killings, Details Came Slow” (Ricks, 2006); “Haditha Victim’s Kin Outraged as Marines go Free” (Fadel, 2008); “The Haditha Massacre” (Cohn, 2006); and finally “Lawmaker: Marines deliberately killed Iraqis (Miklaszewski, 2006). These headlines highlight the fantasy that the
Marines were responsible for the “death” and “massacre” in Haditha. This fantasy does not reify the existing military fantasy. The headlines project another ideology that is operating in examining the events of Haditha, a fantasy that illuminates and calls attention to the intentional death of Iraqi civilians. Within this fantasy charges of war crimes would be a possibility, because it acknowledges of a victim. If victims, exist, investigations and charges of war crimes are possibilities. This analysis does not imply that war crime charges are necessary and clearly called for the incident in Haditha; rather the possibility of investigation is a reflection of Iraqi civilians as humanized rhetorical agents. The operating fantasy determines how Iraqis are seen, either as rhetorical agents or as non-existent.

The analysis in this chapter addressed the importance of fantasy within ideographic analysis. Through the review of literature concerning imagination and application of fantasy within psychoanalysis function in rhetoric, it is clear how fantasy functions within existing rhetorical scholarship. This chapter extends previous research concerning the psychoanalytic function of fantasy as well as the call for a consideration of the unconscious in rhetorical studies, by marrying the arguments for ideographic studies through a larger understanding of fantasy. Thus, fantasy functions to illuminate larger conflicting ideologies and terministic screens for viewing incidents such as Haditha, and the ideograph functions as a place of conflict between these competing fantasies which serves to suture the fantasies together. The horizontal and vertical view inherent in the ideograph, spanning both a historical and present time analysis, situates the critic within a specific moment in ideological time, and fantasy serves to explain how that moment in time functions within the larger ideological narrative.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This project has explored how the Bush administration’s strategic use of specific rhetorical terms, and the systematic avoidance of a terministic vocabulary surrounding <collateral damage>, ultimately worked together to deflect and repress civilian deaths in the Iraq War. Specifically, this project sought to explore political discourse and visual images depicted in main stream media (re)presentations of Iraqi civilian deaths to gain a deeper understanding of implied and implicit rhetorical strategies. Thus, the methodological approach of the ideograph analysis was chosen. The two main methodological vehicles of ideographic studies are diachronic and synchronic analysis. Diachronic analysis demands that the researcher conduct a genealogical trace of the ideograph beginning from the current time back to the initial use of the ideograph. Chapter 2’s genealogical approach to <collateral damage> fulfills this methodological requirement originally outlined by McGee (1980).

By identifying <collateral damage> as it has functioned within the broader philosophies and applications for strategic bombing campaigns and the targeting of non-military personnel and facilities, this study has sought to address a substantive theoretical concern with ideographic rhetorical criticism. Critics complain, Cloud clarifies and qualifies, the McGee concedes that ideology within mediated fragmentation and pastiche of postmodern contemporary culture suggests that ideographs today may be fragmentary, intertextual, incomplete, and thus increasingly difficult to identify and trace. The surprising absence of sustained discussion or deliberation of <collateral damage> by the Bush Administration seems to confirm such concerns over the fragmentary invocations of ideographs. To address this problem, and attempt to make a rhetorical phenomenon present this study has examined <collateral damage> as a crucial...
“ideographic fragment” within a vocabulary of terms and constellation of discourses that can be charter through parallel concepts, alternate terminologies, and ideologically-interested euphemisms that circulate and orbit similar sets of meanings, whether preferred or oppositional. Instead, by invoking <body counts> or more rarely “civilian casualties,” terms that strategically implied a morbidly inappropriate curiosity by media and researchers which somehow serves to advance the propagandistic goals of the enemy, the Bush Administration strategically avoided the historical connotations and Vietnam-Era concerns that <collateral damage> might raise for an American public sympathetic and sensitized to innocent civilian deaths directly resulting from sustained military operations. By strategically controlling the terms of debate, as powerfully illustrated within the Chessani “talking points” memo for the Haditha massacres, the Bush Administration and the Pentagon maintain a unified discursive front in advancing their version of the Global War on Terror fantasy within the American media without ever being accountable for defining, supporting, and defending their plans, policies, and metrics of warfare. These same rhetorical goals have long been the goal for sanitized military vocabularies and their euphemisms for war, thus hiding ideological presumptions and political commitments working within terms carefully crafted for portraying strategic military engagements and the inevitable deaths that result.

Chapter Summaries

Tracking the use of collateral damage caused certain claims to surface. The genealogy illustrated how civilian populations have been manipulated throughout the period of modern aerial bombardment. The tracing of <collateral damage> pointed to the larger dominant ideology of civilians as strategic objects used in wartime, which was originally utilized by the
Royal Air Force and then adopted by the United States during Vietnam and the firebombing of Toyko. The conclusion of chapter 2 argues that the warfare technologies does not in fact spare civilians but, on the contrary, serves to dehumanize civilians through the use of sterile language and jargonistic rhetoric. <Collateral damage> and its constellation of terms militarized conceptualization of terministic constellations, the project examined an isolated moment in the total ideological narrative of warfare by focusing on its impact upon the current Global War on Terror and war in Iraq.

Chapter 3 supplements chapter 2 by fulfilling a methodological demand found in McGee’s (1980) original work on the ideograph, synchronic analysis. The goal of synchronic analysis is to illustrate how an ideograph works in conjunction with other operating terms, ideographs, and ideographic fragments or clusters. The rhetoric of the Bush Administration at the beginning of the war in Iraq is different from the later rhetoric invoked by the Bush Administration later in the conflict and the rhetoric used today. The analysis of chapter 2 demonstrated that rhetoric during the beginning of the war utilized <collateral damage> in an effort to paint Iraqi civilians as innocent victims of the cruel regime of Saddam Hussein. The Bush Administration argued that the United States would be able to limit any possible <collateral damage> for Iraqi civilians during the invasion of the country because, unlike Saddam, they cared for the Iraqis and possessed “smart bomb” technology that would mitigate civilian casualties. However, when questions and concerns began to rise in the media, and The Lancet produced their study calculating an Iraqi body count, the Bush Administration’s rhetoric introduced and answered <body count> and contested metrics. The dynamic interaction of these terms illustrates an instance in which <collateral damage> operates with the other ideographic terms <body count> and <civilian casualties>, thus fulfilling the synchronic portion of analysis.
The interaction of these clustered fragments also served to point to another phenomenon of competing fantasies, depicted in the strategic rhetorical shift in descriptive terminologies discussed later in the project.

The next portion of the analysis follows the ideographic work of Cloud (2004), who argues for a combined analysis that considers both the verbal/textual implications of an ideograph as well as the visual manifestations of the ideograph. Therefore, a visual analysis of <collateral damage> within media coverage was conducted through the method of content analysis. Through this method I quantified existing media representations to bolster the argument that United States media representations of Iraqi civilians are significantly different from International media representations of Iraqi civilians, by demonstrators that an absence of Iraqi deaths was statistically significant. The study demonstrated that the presence of weapons and dead bodies was significantly rarer in the U.S. versus international media. The main purpose of this chapter was to provide evidence that the ideograph functioned visually, as well as to provide another example of how the fantasy of Iraqi civilian death is depicted differently in U.S. and International media outlets. The chapter also serves to solidify the claim that Iraqi civilian casualties disappear in the U.S. media does not occur with other International media outlets. Thus, I argue for an approach that combines ideographic analysis with psychoanalytic notions of fantasy to gain a deeper understanding of the unintended psychological consequences that occur with the absence of visual representations of dead Iraqi civilians, fantasy animates the ideographic fragments used, avoided, or displaced.

Chapter 5 illustrates why a psychoanalytic understanding of fantasy is rhetorically necessary when considering ideological criticism and ideographic clusters. In the chapter analysis I, attempt to answer the concern that traditional ideographic criticism of an isolated
textual fragment is too shallow (McGee, 1990), or fans to offer any conclusive analysis, by instead suggesting that the snapshot ideological understanding illuminated by ideographic analysis provides a clearer understanding of the larger fantasy narratives at play. Work on ideographic studies claim the ideologies are competing and mutually animating discourses (e.g. those of NeoConservative war hawks and Liberal war critics), and that when a particular ideology is favored, it offers only a one-sided look at the dominant hegemonic ideology of a particular group or rhetorical community. Fantasy allows critics a reflective glimpse into the battle of competing fantasy narratives each of which is attempting to become the dominant hegemonic ideology. The ideograph provides fantasy critics with an in-depth analysis of the rhetorical strategies and unconscious presumptions that are utilized within the larger ideological competition for mythic supremacy, thus enriching both ideographic criticism and the psychoanalytic understanding of fantasy as misdirection.

Implications for Future Research

The ultimate issue at hand is the fact that rhetoric and words are doing something in the war in Iraq; disappearing the dead. Though the actual number is debatable and impossible to count accurately, hundreds upon thousands of Iraqi civilians have died during the War in Iraq and have been repressed and disappeared. These civilians have been cast aside as a consequence of war and dehumanized through rhetorical strategies. This phenomenon can best be illustrated through Burke’s use of pentadic analysis. <Collateral damage> is an ideograph through which acts are understood not through agents, but through scene (Rountree & Huglen, 2004). The scene is the center for agential choice, and the agents themselves are not in control, nor are they to blame for their actions. Evidence of this pentadic shift are illustrated with the use of “fog of
war,” which allows military officials to claim that they can never be fully aware of who they are shooting or bombing because the tragic “fog of war” makes them unable to distinguish civilians from insurgents. Therefore the previous systematic approach to war which involves distinguishable enemies from comrades is impossible. Thus a cultural dichotomy of “us vs. them” was activated in the Global War on Terror, and thus instituted in the war in Iraq. The “us vs. them” mentality tears down the previous militaristic structure of distinguishable enemies, and institutes a new scene. If a clear distinction cannot be accounted for, then the control of the scenario is determined not by military agents, but by the scene in which those agents are functioning. When a “few bad apples” can be scapegoated for systematic failures and abuse, as was the case when a few subordinate soldiers were persecuted for Abu Ghirab using photos that documented the torture of Iraqi detainees, then the scenic “fog of war” excuses and sanctions the provoked targeting of civilians, as was the case when the Marines responsible for the “Haditha massacres” were not persecuted. Thus the rhetorical agency has shifted from an agent-act ratio to a scene-act understanding of <collateral damage>, which partially explains the systematic evasion of accountability for failure, error, and criminal misconduct.

Repression and Mourning within The State of Exception

The Burkean scene within which contemporary rhetoric finds itself is powerfully explored by Agamben (2005), who similarly suggests significant scenic shifts during times of war and conflict into what he calls a “state of exception.” Agamben argues that a consideration of power struggle is necessary to fully understand the state of exception. Agamben argues that a consideration of power struggle is necessary to fully understand the state of exception. Agamben defines the states of exception as “the state of exception is not a special kind of law (like the law
of war); rather, insofar as it is a suspension of the juridical order itself, it defines law’s threshold or limit concept” (Agamben, p. 4). Agamben continues, “Under the pressure of the paradigm of the state of exception, the entire politico-constitutional life of Western societies began gradually to assume a new form, which has perhaps only today reached its full development” (p. 13). Agamben considers the law’s definition of necessity within the state of exception. First “necessity does not recognize any law” (p. 29). This argument for necessity relates to the status of law during the “fog of war” because the scene does not allow an appropriation of war crimes due to civilian deaths, because they are excluded from the scene during the state of exception. Second “necessity creates its own law” (p. 29), an argument illustrated through the military hearings on Haditha. Recall that when the lawyers asked the marine to identify what authority granted him permission not to investigate civilian deaths at Haditha, he said that he could not think of any. No authority granted him permission to overlook the deaths thus disappearing twenty-four civilian casualties. Rather the Marine invoked “a state of mind”; a state of mind reified during the state of exception. Agamben supports this argument by claiming “not only does necessity ultimately come down to a decision, but that on which it decides is, in truth, something undecidable in fact and law” (p. 30). Agamben continues his discussion of the state of exception in chapter 4 of his book by theorizing the “void.” This argument is central for the current project because <collateral damage> functions at times as a taboo ideograph, a black hole of terms that at times can only be accounted for by examining the terms that cluster in its absence.

To extend his arguments, Agamben provides a brief history of Schmitt and Benjamin’s scholarship situates their work in a basic historical timeline. “The aim of the essay is to ensure that possibility of violence that lies absolutely ‘outside’ and ‘beyond’ the law and that, as such,
could shatter the dialectic between lawmaking violence and law-preserving violence” (Agamben, 2006, p. 53). Benjamin classifies the violence described above as “pure” (p. 53). Benjamin’s ideas of “pure” violence makes the state of exception possible. Schmitt counters by arguing that there “cannot be pure violence” (p. 54). Schmitt says that this violence is “included by its very exclusion” (Agamben, 2006, p. 54). Schmitt argues for the role of the sovereign; “The sovereign violence responds to the pure violence with the figure of power that neither makes nor preserves law, but suspends it” (Agamben, 2006, p. 54). Agamben situates himself between Schmitt and Benjamin. Agamben argues that pure violence is the example of the extreme political object. This is important because through these debates American citizens see that the exception becomes life. The exception becomes how reality operates for the people existing within the exception.

Agamben (2006) theorizes the interplay between the scene defined by the state of exception and individual agent through a discussion of public vs. private law. “Juridical validity is not an originary characteristic of human actions but must be conveyed to them through a power that grants legitimacy” (p. 78). However, Agamben illustrates how the combination of public law and private law in the state of exception functions to create a killing machine, thus illustrating an important instance in which an external factors influences an agent; “But when they tend to coincide in a single person, when the state of exception, in which they are bound blurred together, becomes the rule, then the juridico-political system transforms itself into a killing machine” (p. 86). Thus the scene defined by the state of exception interrelates with the agent to produce a killing machine, and due to this interplay to definition of “us vs. them” becomes even more segregated. The “them” or enemy other in Iraq begins to loose humanistic characteristics and are seen more as enemy other than as another human agent. Thus the
casualties of the killing machine are subjugated by what Agamben argues is bare life or a result of the biopolitics. “Bare life is a product of the biopolitical machine and not something that preexists it, just as law has no court in nature or in the divine mind” (p. 88). The state of exception has further implications in that it polices human responses, because the rule of law has been altered; people function differently in the state of exception. Bare life within the “state of exception” limits our ability to mourn the loss of the other, because the other is reduced to bare life because of biopower. The interplay of agent and agency as defined through a post-humanistic lens of fluidity forces the critic to consider the effect that the enemy other has on the “us” side of the war.

Butler (2005) lays the foundation for an argument in which she claims that if there is no acknowledgement of the death of the other, then there is a hole left in an individual. The interrelated nature of Butler’s arguments continues to define the post-humanistic view of an agent. She defines the relations by arguing “We’re undone by each other. And if we are not, we’re missing something” (p. 23). Thus we are defined and connected to each other. If we cannot “hear” the enemy, then we cannot fully know them, therefore we cannot fully know ourselves. Butler argues that the government/press dehumanized the enemy as Other after the 9/11 attacks. She claims that this dehumanization makes it easier to enact violence on the other, because we do not see them as human, nor can we “hear” them. “Violence against those who are already not quite living, that is, living in a state of suspension between life and death, leaves a mark that is no mark” (p. 22). Butler describes the grieving process as human connectedness

I grieve when “you” die because I have lost a part of “I.” I am defined and connected to you, so when I lose you I have lost part of myself. “I” grieve not for what I know of you but what I do not know and will never know because you are gone. (p. 22)
We cannot see the enemy in this way, because we cannot “hear” their stories, their suffering, our complicity.

Mourning cannot occur if there is no acknowledgement of a victim insists Butler, and therefore American society will be left with an incomplete formulation of themselves as agents, because we fail to acknowledge the death of the enemy other and by doing so ignore the notion of interconnectivity. Butler argues that this inability to mourn is a reflection of the “fear of melancholy” and was signaled when President Bush called for the end of mourning after the 9/11 attacks and ordered the American public back to work and back to shopping (p. 29). This call to end mourning was hasty and did not allow for the consideration of the loss of the other and how the loss of the other affected us. The fear of melancholy points to a definition of human who are worthy of grief and those who are not. Butler argues

But this can be a point of departure for a new understanding if the narcissistic preoccupation of melancholia can be moved into a consideration of the vulnerability of others. Then we might critically evaluate and oppose the conditions under which certain human lives are more vulnerable than others, and thus certain human lives are more grievable than others. (p. 30)

Butler’s arguments focus on the exclusion of Palestinian obituaries from the San Francisco Chronicle. She argues that the conceptualization of all U.S. inflicted war casualties would be impossible, because of their inherent relation to the other.

There are no obituaries for the war causalities that the United States inflicts, and there cannot be. If there were to be an obituary, there would have had to have been a life, a life worth noting, a life worth valuing and preserving, a life that qualifies for recognition. (p. 34)

This argument ties into the disappearance of Iraqi civilians, because their very exclusion points to their status as a non-grievable by-product of war; through their void and absence they are defined as non-human.
Finally, Butler (2005) claims that the grieving process not only identifies the presence and human status of the other, but illustrates a complete understanding of self. Thus the ability to “hear” the other and grieve their loss is central to the understanding of self. Butler explains:

If I understand myself on the model of human, and if the kinds of public grieving that are available to me make clear the norms by which the “human” is constituted for me, then it would seem that I am as much constituted by those I do grieve for as by those whose deaths I disavow, whose nameless and faceless deaths form the melancholic background for my social world, if not my First Worldism. (p. 46)

The consideration of Iraqis as humans, and thus an acknowledgment by grieving their loss, is central to the constitution of the self. The implications to the self are illustrated below through a discussion of consequences for Iraqi war veterans.

The absence of victims in the Iraq War has made life difficult for returning Iraq war veterans. American unwillingness to acknowledge victims problematizes co-constitutive victimization of our own military living and dead. The ability to cope with the horrors of war has been denied to soldiers, because of the lack of mourning. If war crimes such as those possible in Haditha do not exist, it is reasonable to argue that atrocities are rare in Iraq. This is often described as “just a few bad apples” in the military, and often is sold to the public that the military personnel are happy and proud of their work in Iraq. This rhetoric does not allow for proper psychological treatment for soldiers who return home from war without victimization; they are expected to be psychologically stable. If the surge is working and we are making a difference in Iraq, then no soldier should be suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder because he or she did their job with fervor in Iraq. However, the recent book *Collateral Damage* (Hedges, & Al-Arian, 2008) paints a vastly different picture for soldiers who come home from combat in Iraq.
In the book, several soldiers complain of sleep deprivation because the violence they witnessed replays in their dreams. Other soldiers claim that they no longer believe in the mission in Iraq, and feel that they were tricked into fighting for a cause that does not exist. The soldiers also claim that they distrust everyone around them because they are unable to determine who is a civilian or insurgent. The loss of trust in the very nature of humanity lead to the suicide of Colonel Ted Westhusing on June 4, 2005. His suicide note was written to General Joseph Fil and General David Petraeus:

Thanks for telling me it was a good day until I briefed you. -- You are only interested in your career and provide no support to your staff- no msn [mission] support and you don’t care. I cannot support a msn that leads to corruption, human right abuses and liars. I am sullied-- no more. I didn’t volunteer to support corrupt, money grubbing contractors, nor work for commanders only interested in themselves. I came to serve honorably and feel dishonored. I trust no Iraqi. I cannot live this way. All my love to my family, my wife and my precious children. I love and trust you only. Death before dishonored anymore. Trust is essential-- I don’t know who trust anymore. Why serve when you cannot accomplish the mission, when you no longer believe in the cause, when your every effort and breath to succeed meets with lies, lack of support, and selfishness? No more. Reevaluate yourselves cdrs [commanders]. You are not what you think you are and I know it. Life is trust. Trust is no more for me here in Iraq. (as cited in Hedges & Al-Arian, 2008, p. x)

The horrors of Iraq are disappearing along with the dead. The future implications of this disappearance could be disastrous for the United States, because the absence of mourning is defining the U.S. during a time within the state of exception. This defining time is occurring in a suspension of law that reduces victim others to bare life. Žižek (2002) argued that Osama bin Ladan was, in Lacanian terms, the United States “excess” of previous imperialist incursions in the Middle East. After all, the United States provided bin Ladan weapons and military training during the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. The U.S. was responsible for the training and built the facilities that latter served as Al Qaeda training camps. The “excess” that is produced must always be considered in Lacanian terms. Perhaps the haunting “excess” of the
Iraq War will not be future revenge attacks, but a generation of soldiers who are emotionally lacking in self definition because their constitution of the other was formulated during the state of exception. This “excess” would be unlike bin Ladan, because it would not be illustrated by an enemy other, an object of projection, but instead an inward implosion in which we have no one to blame but ourselves.

In this project I have argued that the discourse surrounding <collateral damage> is effectively disappearing the deaths of Iraqi civilian with dire consequences for our American discourses and traumatized soldering citizens. <Collateral damage> is an effective complementary ideographic fragment that is cathected to the larger dominant ideograph of <clash of civilizations> previously established by Cloud (2004). Evidence of <collateral damage> rhetorical functions are illustrated through both the genealogical mapping of its history as well as the visual differences between United States media coverage and that of International media sources. The key finding of this study is the necessity to account for the psycho-rhetorical functions of fantasy. The inclusion of psychoanalytic notions of fantasy in ideological criticism is vital to understanding unconscious functions in this disappearing of the dead. This project argues that fantasy functions suggest unconscious dynamics of misdirection, repression, and projection of disappearing the dead Iraqi civilians. Fantasy is what sutures these ideographs and ideographic fragments which is why fragments can be revealed- and concerned- as it serves the unified and unifying ideological fantasy. The scenic big picture for often times piecemeal metaphors, synecdoche, jargonistic slogans and strategic ambiguities. However, it is important to note that the fantasy functions as a deflection that serves the Bush Administration, and a necessary fantasy screen for the American people. Individuals participate in fantasy constructions as a coping mechanism, because they need a way to deal with the consequences of
war. The public buys into the fantasy of a sterile technologically clean type of warfare precisely because they do not want to consider the consequences. In this manner fantasy deflects, but it also shields us from having to face the real consequences for our actions. Fantasies for wartime are essential for functional or dysfunctional rhetorics of therapeutic, therefore, further analysis of their rhetorical functions is necessary.

This project also suggests implications for cultural studies, because it argues for a deep consideration of human agency as constructed by an other (Lundberg & Gunn, 2005). This analysis functions on how we are made and undone by other humans, and seeks to gain a deeper understanding of our dependency upon other humans. During times of war and conflict, it is easy to forget how the enemy becomes a part of us, just as we become a part of them. However, when the critic understands the ideographic fragments of discourses and visual representations of the other, an extension of understanding the interrelated nature of agency is achieved.
APPENDIX

CODE BOOK: US NEW REPRESENTATION VS. INTERNATIONAL NEWS

REPRESENTATION
Image Coding Sheet

Coder # (this is the number previously given to you by the researcher)

Photograph # (this is the number found at the top of the page of each photo)

Photo Coding Sheet

Type of Image
[ ] 1. Mourning
[ ] 2. Protests
[ ] 3. Daily Life
[ ] 4. Active Combat
[ ] 5. Structural Devastation
[ ] 6. Detained

1. Mourning
These photos and images depict people who are actively mourning. Active mourning would include crying, weeping, screaming, and tearing of clothes. Mourning category should also include pictures of remembrance. Remembrance should include photo memorials, or flowers at a grave, etc.

2. Protest
These photos depict people who are actively protesting a governmental action. This would include carrying a picket sign, protesting with soldiers or governing officials, or shooting weapons into the air.

3. Daily Life
Images in this category should depict actions or events that are connected with the seemingly everyday life of those photographed. This does is not limited to cooking, cleaning, or domestic chores. Searches and/or seizures of property, occupation from US/ UK soldiers, etc., and detentions are all instances of daily life. Daily life also includes life of the injured after they have left the hospital or battlefield. So if there is an injured person at home, they should be coded in this section.

4. Active Combat
Active combat should include pictures of soldiers in action. This would included getting in and out of helicopters or in a convoy. Active combat also includes images that show the aftermath immediately after an attack. For instance, wounded and bandaged persons who are still at the site of attack should be coded in the category of active combat. Injured citizens who are in hospitals should also be coded as active combat. If the wounded are at home or a residence, or if the individual is in another location other than the battlefield or hospital they should not be coded in this section. Those individuals should be coded in daily life.

5. Structural Devastation
This category is meant for pictures of building damage, equipment damage, housing damage, etc. Human loss or injury should not be coded as structural devastation. Only structural damage of actual buildings, military equipment, residential homes, hospitals, churches, etc. should be included in this section.

6. Detained
Images coded in this section should be illustrations of people being detained. Detained would include acts that resemble being arrested. Also any images of men or women on their knees, blindfolded, or with their hand tied behind their backs should be coded in this section. Note that for this project’s purpose only human beings that are alive should be coded in this section. A dead body should not be coded as detained.

Does the image include dead bodies?
[ ] 1. Yes
[ ] 2. No

Does the image include burning buildings?
[ ] 1. Yes
[ ] 2. No

Does the image include blown up equipment?
[ ] 1. Yes
[ ] 2. No

Does the image include weapons of any kind? (guns, knifes, tanks, helicopters, etc.)
[ ] 1. Yes
[ ] 2. No

Does the image include a coffin?
[ ] 1. Yes
[ ] 2. No

If photograph includes person(s) (dead or alive) please proceed to following questions.

Sex
[ ] 1. Female
[ ] 2. Male
[ ] 3. Mass of people with potential for either sex
[ ] 4. Unable to determine

1. Female
Considered female based on observations of the medical community.

2. Male
Considered male based on observations of the medical community.
3. Mass of people with potential for either sex
These images should not be coded as unable to determine. If you can determine that both sexes are present, but not able to code them individually option 4 should be the choice. This would be the case for mass audiences were a determination cannot be adequately made.

4. Unable to determine
Individuals should be coded in this category if it is absolutely impossible to determine their sex. If the person is dead and you cannot tell their sex they should be coded in this category. Also people who are assumed to be inside of a coffin and dead should be coded in this category.

Generational Group
[ ] 1. Child/Adolescents: up to 17 years
[ ] 2. Young Adults: 18-39 years
[ ] 3. Middle-aged Adult: 40-59 years
[ ] 4. Young-old Adult: 60-74 years
[ ] 5. Old-old Adult: 75 and over
[ ] 6. Unable to determine

Physical Health
[ ] 1. Dead/ Mortally Injured
[ ] 2. Very Ill/ Sick
[ ] 3. Unhealthy
[ ] 4. Neutral/ can’t tell (default choice)
[ ] 5. Healthy
[ ] 6. Very Healthy (very active; athletic)

1. Dead/ Mortally Injured
Images of people who are dead or have wounds that will lead to death very quickly should be coded in this section. Images of people who have heavy bandages and have the possibility to pass away in a matter of days, should not be coded in this section. Only those who will die within a few hours, or who are already dead should be coded in this section.

2. Very Ill/ Sick
Images in this section should be individuals who are seriously injured. These individuals could be injured to the point of death in a matter of days. However, if they are not mortally injured, as in immanent death, they should be included in this section. Chronic illness should not be coded in this section.

3. Unhealthy
This category should be used for the people who appear to have chronic illness. If these individuals seem to be unhealthy, but not unhealthy due to injury, should be included in this section.

4. Neutral/ can’t tell
If it is impossible to discern a person’s health status they should be included in this section. These images should have no cues of health. The person might be sitting, or only their face is showing. No discernable health decision can be made.
5. Healthy
These people should have no injuries and no discernable health issues. These qualities can be attributed to people who are in the middle of an action such as walking or running. If the person is standing in the photo or is pushing or holding an object they should be coded in this category. If they exhibit any actions or cues that they are healthy they should be included in this section.

6. Very Healthy
These individuals should represent a fit and active individual. They should either be demonstrating action, or have a physique that would classify them as an active person. Also individuals who must maintain a high level of fitness for the job that they hold, or the action they were doing in the photo should be coded in this section.

Role in War
[ ] 1. Collateral Damage
[ ] 2. Insurgent
[ ] 3. U.S./UK Soldier
[ ] 4. Iraqi Soldier/ Police
[ ] 5. Iraqi Citizen
[ ] 6. Other

1. Collateral Damage
This category should include photos of damaged equipment, buildings, structure, homes, etc as well as dead bodies. This category is operating under the definitions provided by the current administration, and do include structural damage (loss of property) as well as dead or injured people (loss of life).

2. Insurgent
An insurgent is a person who comes into a foreign land from the outside. They are essentially considered an outsider who comes to fight in a conflict. If you feel that the person in the individual cannot be coded as a US/UK Soldier, or an Iraqi they should be coded in this section.

3. US/ UK Solider
These photos should have either a soldier from the United States or the United Kingdom. They can be discerned by fatigues, patches on clothing, or by other means.

4. Iraqi Soldier/ Police
These individuals should appear to be in a type of Iraqi uniform of some sorts. They are perhaps working a check point, or doing some guarding of a location. Individuals in this category should be any peacekeeping force that is not coded as an US or UK soldier.

5. Iraqi Citizen
Individuals who are not coded as collateral damage, individuals who are not coded as insurgents, individuals who are not coded as US/ UK soldiers, and individuals who are not a member Iraqi force or police should be coded in this section. Individuals who are clearly not Iraqi should not
be coded in this category. However, every other individual that is not clearly from the US or UK and is not coded as any of the other categories should be coded in this section.

6. Other
This section should include anyone who does not fall into the previous five categories.

**Additional Information for Coders**

If there is a mass of people in a photo please only code the individuals in the foreground.

Only code images with a face present in the image, unless the individual is dead or covered. So if there are individuals with their backs turned to the camera do not code them as individual characters. They should be considered when coding for the image.

If the individual is dead please code them as such. However, when answering questions of sex, and age please mark unable to determine if they are in a coffin or covered by a cloth.

Dead bodies are the only exception to coding individuals without a discernable face present in the photograph.

If there are no discernable individuals, or if the photograph is structural please only answer questions that require yes or no responses.

The individuals who were implied to be dead underneath a cloth or drape, or in a coffin should be the only individuals that are coded in [6] Unable to determine under the generational group. All other individuals should be placed in the category most appropriate for their age estimate. If an individual is close, please code them in the young age groups as opposed to the older group.
REFERENCES


U.S. military works to avoid civilian deaths, collateral damage. (2002, March 5). Regulatory Intelligence Data.


