AN ANALYSIS OF THE TRENDS AWAY FROM THE TRADITIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN TEXAS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1932-1948

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DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN TEXAS PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS, 1932-1948

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Texas is a solidly Democratic state. Its party affiliation, with but two exceptions, was fixed from the days of the Civil War Reconstruction to the 1930's in presidential elections. Only with the surge of the Populists around the turn of the century and the emotion-packed Hoover-Smith campaign of 1928 was the traditional Democratic Party challenged in recent years. In the late 1930's and the 1940's, however, a trend away from the traditional Democratic Party strength can be seen in presidential elections. In Table 1 the trend is clearly discernible, expressed as a percentage of the total major party vote.¹ It will readily be seen that the opposition vote is not uniformly that of the second major party, the Republican Party. In the election of 1944, a slate of un instructed presidential electors was placed on the general

¹"Since it is this shifting between the Democratic and Republican parties that we are primarily interested in, we may resort to the simple device of showing the votes of one major party as a proportion of the total vote cast . . . for the two major parties combined."

Louis H. Bean, "Tides and Patterns in American Politics," American Political Science Review, XXXVI (August, 1942), 645-646. The same reasoning may logically be used for Texas elections, including the percentages of the sizable third parties of 1944 and 1948.
election ballot, and in 1940 the States' Rights Democrats (also known as the Texas States' Righters and as the "Dixiecrats") offered two "deep South" governors as presidential and vice-presidential candidates. The per cent shift will be seen to be quite small as between 1932 and 1936. Far more significant is the shift by 1940, when the Republicans almost doubled their party strength for Willkie's candidacy; the Democrats also recruited many new voters but proportionately far fewer. With

TABLE 1

VOTE FOR MAJOR PARTIES, EXPRESSED AS PER CENT OF TOTAL MAJOR PARTY VOTE CAST, TEXAS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1932-1948

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Major Third Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1932a</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936b</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940c</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944d</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948e</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Calculated from totals given in Texas Almanac, 1933, p. 293.
c Calculated from totals given in Texas Almanac (unofficial returns of Texas Election Bureau over 99 per cent complete), 1941-1943, p. 369.
d Calculated from totals given in Texas Almanac, 1945-1946, p. 523.
e Calculated from totals given in Texas Almanac, 1949-1950, p. 475, and from firsthand research into Texas Election Bureau files.

the Texas Regulars on the scene in 1944, both of the major parties yielded some votes, with the Republican vote loss
proportionately greater. The voting results in 1948 found the States' Rights Democrats with less than ten per cent of the ballots cast and with a continuation of the trend to the loss of the Democrats and the gain of the Republicans. Thus, the over-all shift of voters away from the traditional Democratic Party to the Republican and third parties is borne out statistically.

The purpose of this paper will be to look into the election returns to find some of the factors which have caused this trend. A study of party convention machinery, of related state races, and of county-by-county election returns should at least roughly indicate what influences and what issues have come to the fore over the sixteen year period. This part of the study will be dealt with chronologically, in Chapters II, III, and IV. A somewhat more extended discussion of the pre-1940 events and of the 1940 campaign will be presented, for a number of reasons. For it was in 1937 that the first revolt of the Southerners, and with them the Texans, took place in Congress. The Dixie revolt and the subsequent attempted "purge" of some southern anti-New Deal Senators were the first steps taken down the path to full-scale disaffection from the New Deal party, concluded in four Southern States with the Dixiecrats' carrying the states in 1948. Texas has not proceeded so far, nor has its voting trend away from the Democrats been unidirectional. But the trend was well-established by 1940.
The "New Deal," and the "Fair Deal" which succeeded it, will be of vital concern to the whole of this paper. These administrations crossed the boundaries from the former concerns of government to engage in new fields of activity: encouragement of labor unions, parity payments to farmers, competition with private utilities companies, subsidization of certain industries, public relief and works programs for the unemployed, and programs aimed at lessening racial discrimination, to name but a few. Many of these new or vastly enlarged New Deal federal programs met with conflict, at first sporadic and later determined and incessant. And this conflict, with those who most objected to invasions of national governmental power into such fields as states' prerogatives and business control, has given the years since 1932 a cohesiveness perhaps unlike any sixteen year period (to 1948) in American political history. In any event, the successive administrations of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman afford a fertile field in which to study any broad trends in Texas presidential politics.

There are many limitations in the use of election statistics which must be recognized. One statistics authority notes that

even so discrete a phenomenon as a vote "aye" or "no" really indicates a variable along a scale, so far as the opinion behind the vote is concerned. . . . Moreover, even though the individual vote be a discontinuous datum, the collective vote of a social group or a geographical area, regarded as the unit of attention,
becomes itself a variable—in quantity, in distribution among candidates or between opposing issues, and in other important respects.2

Thus, by way of example, the Texas Regular vote was assuredly made up of those dissatisfied with both major party candidates, of those estranged from the national Democratic policies, of those who saw the states' rights controversy or some other issue as the only principal issue, as well as many others.

Other limitations deal with the subject matter. State and local elections are excluded, except where they can be seen to affect presidential elections materially or demonstrate some particular voting characteristic of the state. A second, geographical, limitation restricts the study primarily to the State of Texas but includes the nation and the Southern States by way of pertinent supplementary information. National convention and election results certainly influence Texas politics. And, too, the national issues throughout the entire Roosevelt-Truman era are of paramount importance to Texans' presidential voting. A part of the Democratic "Solid South," Texas is yet influenced by its former membership in the Confederacy. More important now, Texas presents with the other Southern States an almost united front in presidential politics and in stands upon national issues before the Congress and before the President. A third restriction is likewise necessary. Only such personages as can be closely associated with

the presidential scene will be named, for surely such men as
Vice President John Nance Garner and Speaker of the House Sam
Rayburn have made their presence known and have carried some
of their fellow Texans along with them in their presidential
views.

The list of intangible factors is long, and the influence
of such factors is not objectively ascertainable. Who can
measure, for instance, the number of voters basing their de-
cisions upon a magnetic radio voice or a mustache? Even such
factors as the weather can affect the turnout at the polls on
election day. One can see that there are sizable limitations
on the measurement of a political trend by the ballots cast
alone.

For this reason, the most authoritative sources have
been consulted as to the issues and other factors on which
the outcomes of each of the five elections under surveillance
hinged. By the frequent use of such general works as that of
V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics, and the articles dealing
with the issues and elections of given years, a far broader
view of the trend may be obtained.

Poll Tax

A few words should be given to the subject of the poll
tax, which Texas and six of her sister southern states charge
as a prerequisite to voting. Because of the inadequacy of
population statistics for four out of the five election years,
there can be no careful use of the number of poll tax receipts
to measure county-by-county nonvoting. Only for the election year of 1940 are the census records adequate. Consequently, the factor of nonpayment of poll taxes and the subsequent non-voting in general elections must be assumed to have occurred at a uniform rate throughout the period covered in the study. Some major findings on this subject have been brought forth by V. O. Key, Jr., in his work on Texas and southern politics. He makes some general observations on this subject of nonpayment of poll taxes which are helpful in understanding some of the voting phenomena of the 254 counties of Texas. He found that the twenty-six counties with the highest percentages of poll taxes paid per population were predominantly rural, each with relatively few Negroes in its population, not many foreign-born whites, and only a small population. On the average, they had a large number of motor vehicles registered in relation to their population, and all of them were west of the 96th meridian, i.e., west of Austin.3

He notes further that

small rural counties develop among their citizens a keener civic interest and perhaps a more integrated political community than do larger political units. Smallness of population may also facilitate tax administration. If ownership of motor vehicles indicates prosperity rather than simply transport necessity in sparsely settled territory, citizens of the 26 counties were relatively well off. The median in number of persons per registered motor vehicle for the 26 counties was 2.95; for all 254 counties, the median was 3.625.4

There is a definite variation between the nonpayment of poll taxes in rural and urban counties, and Key demonstrates this

3Ibid., p. 610. 4Ibid., pp. 610-611.
by the use of the returns from the O'Daniel-Johnson second
primary senatorial contest in 1942. In this election, had
the four big city counties (Harris, Dallas, Bexar, and Tar-
rant) been voting at the state rate of participation, another
one hundred thousand votes would have been cast. This would
have amounted to a ten per cent increase in the total state
vote. \textsuperscript{5} Such characteristics of the rate of poll tax payment
as have been mentioned have probably been relatively stable.
In any event, the rate of voting participation could bias the
county major party percentages considerably.

Identifiable County Groups

There are several blocks of counties in Texas that share
similar characteristics as to race or national origin. Some
of these have shown a high degree of political integration.
Such identifiable county groupings have been frequently used
in political studies dealing with "the German counties," "the
Mexican counties," and "the Negro counties." The use of these
politically integrated groupings of counties should be invalu-
able in analyzing the election returns for the presidential
elections here under surveillance. The counties composing the
three groups require careful definitions, while a fourth, that
of "metropolitan counties," is identifiable easily as the four
counties with substantially the heaviest population in the
state.

\textsuperscript{5}Ibid., p. 511.
No clear-cut definition has as yet been devised for determining which counties comprise the German counties, i.e., those counties with sizable minorities of German descent. An excellent analysis of the German county voting characteristics has been given by S. S. McKay, who notes that

the German population of Texas as a class was traditionally Republican. Colonies of that race had settled most of the ten counties under consideration shown below in Figure 1 before the Civil War, and the people were not interested in slavery, secession, or the Southern Confederacy. 6

Key corroborates this, in saying that the German settlers

were liberals and revolutionists of 1848 who took their American democracy literally. Their coolness toward the Confederacy brought reprisals in some areas, with the result that they were driven into a binding wedlock with Republicanism. 7

Both of these authorities found a definite correlation between the incidence of German settlers and Republicanism throughout the sixteen year period of this study. While McKay's study is more complete, Key's general observation will suffice for the present, as he noted a correlation between the incidence of persons of German descent and high percentages in the votes on prohibition repeal, per cent Republican voting strength in 1936 and 1940, and per cent anti-Roosevelt strength in 1944. 8

The choice of counties to be used for the purposes of this paper must utilize all of the information given in the three


7Key, op. cit., p. 275-276.

8Ibid., p. 276.
Fig. 1--Texas German counties, as calculated from material in Appendix I.
figures shown in Appendix I, as far as the choice can be seen to be realistic. The number should be a conservative one, as individual county investigations to determine the continued validity of the foregoing definitions is beyond the depth of this work. For these reasons, only twelve counties will be noted as the German counties in this paper. None of the more densely populated counties are included, for the reason that the population changes have been such as to alter the population characteristics beyond recognitions. This is not to say that there are not German minorities yet in the larger counties; on the contrary, Bexar and Travis counties, especially, are known to have many persons of German descent, notably in the rural areas. But the same minorities which are engulfed in the flood of new voters moving into the urban counties are yet proportionally sizable in the smaller counties. Figure 1, on page ten, will show the German counties as defined for the uses of this paper.

The "Mexican counties" are much more numerous, stretching from El Paso County on the extreme west to Cameron County on the extreme south, throughout southwest, south, and south central Texas. The best measurement of the incidence of large Mexican minorities and majorities is the census of 1930, when, at the request of the government of Mexico, Mexicans (also Texas-Mexicans or Mexican-Americans) were counted separately. Since 1930, there has been no exact separate count. The history of Mexican participation cannot be dealt with in detail;
however, the accounts of such participation are colorful indeed. Probably the best authority on the subject is O. Douglas Weeks, who wrote in 1930 of the story of the vastly predominant Mexican population of South Texas and of the cattle barons who assumed economic, social, and political control over the poor, unlearned Texas-Mexican people on the ranch lands. A virtual feudalism controlled by both white and Spanish-Indian families grew up, and the benevolent patriarchs protected their people in legal tangles, in times of hardship, and in other types of hardship. Too, they gave political advice, which was readily heeded by the Texas-Mexicans, totally unversed in the tenets of Jacksonian democracy. For a discussion of the Mexican county voting characteristics, see Appendix II.

Figure 2 (on the next page) shows the Mexican counties with over twenty per cent Mexican population, according to the 1930 census figures. Of the fifty-five counties in the group, well over one-third were over fifty per cent Mexican. Thirty-four were over forty per cent. Of all these counties several may well have changed with the population gains that they have experienced. El Paso, Maverick, Webb, Hidalgo, Willacy, and Jim Wells are all counties in which the population has shot up over twenty-four per cent between the census of 1930 and that of 1950. These counties are the most likely ones to have broken away from any group characteristics which the Mexican counties may reveal as the study progresses. There are three major cities, El Paso (El Paso), San Antonio
Fig. 2—Texas Mexican counties, calculated as having more than twenty per cent of the population born in Mexico or of Mexican descent at the Fifteenth Census, 1930.*

(Boxar), and Corpus Christi (Nueces), which may be expected to vote somewhat differently from the rest of the predominantly rural group. The fifty-five counties will be referred to hereafter as the Mexican counties.

The third major grouping of counties is that of the Negro counties of East Texas. The Negro is, according to Key, the focal point of southern politics. He says that the politics of the south

is at times interpreted as a politics of cotton, of a politics of free trade, as a politics of agrarian poverty, or as a politics of planter and plutocrat. Although such interpretations have a superficial validity, in the last analysis the major peculiarities of southern politics, go back to the Negro.\footnote{Ibid., p. 5.}

A further examination of the important position of the Negro in Texas politics may be found in Appendix III.

The information is not far out-of-date on the numbers of Negroes in Texas' counties. While the 1950 census figures are not out, the 1940 figures are yet usable. Two general groups are noted in Figure 3, those counties with over forty per cent Negroes and those with between 20.0 and 39.0 per cent Negroes. It is significant that there are only two very heavily populated counties (Jefferson and Galveston) in all of the fifty-six counties shown. In fact, the westernmost limits of the Negro counties stop just short of McLennan (Waco), Dallas (Dallas), and Travis (Austin); Harris (Houston), although surrounded with counties with over twenty
Fig. 3—Texas Negro counties, calculated as having Negroes as more than twenty per cent of the population at the Sixteenth Census, 1940.

per cent Negroes, is not so designated. Hence, the area contained within the Negro counties may be seen as largely rural. Several other characteristics will be taken up as the area is brought into focus in the various elections.

The four "metropolitan counties" comprise the last of the major county groupings. As mentioned earlier, these will be defined as the four most populous counties, Harris, Dallas, Bexar, and Tarrant. The 1940 census figures will bear out the choice of the four, as may be seen in Table 2. There, it is plain that a sizable break occurs between the first four counties as measured by population and the second four, when the dividing line is set arbitrarily at about one-quarter million inhabitants. The significance of the use of the top four counties may be emphasized by pointing to the 1950 figures on poll taxes paid. Approximately one-fourth of the entire number of poll taxes paid in the state (1,352,848) were in the four

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harris</td>
<td>528,961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas</td>
<td>398,564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bexar</td>
<td>333,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarrant</td>
<td>225,821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>145,329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Paso</td>
<td>151,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travis</td>
<td>111,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McLennan</td>
<td>101,898</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census
metropolitan counties.\textsuperscript{10} It must be kept in mind, however, that in the early 1930's the proportion was considerably less. One other point should be restated and demonstrated. Despite the great numbers of voters, metropolitan county participation is low. In 1940, the four counties averaged 32.1 per cent in the percentage of the population twenty-one to sixty paying poll taxes. The median county of the state averaged 45.0 per cent.\textsuperscript{11}

It will be of interest to note the general characteristics of the four groups in the matter of population. Of course, the last, the metropolitan group, was defined in terms of population. The relation of the other three groups to population density is discussed in Appendix IV. There the Mexican counties will be seen to have six out of fifty-five counties with forty-five or more persons per square mile. Only one German county out of twelve is so categorized, while fourteen Negro counties are included. The variations in the density of population would suggest several factors, as the variation of crop yield per acre, the incidence of certain crops or cattle or oil and so on, or the presence of industrialized areas. As such factors can be seen to have a direct bearing upon the presidential election returns, more attention

\textsuperscript{10}Dallas Morning News, June 25, 1950, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{11}Key, op. cit., p. 612.
will be given to them. One last election factor remains to be discussed.

Presidential Republicans

While one could violently disagree with Key's characterization, there is a degree of accuracy in his saying,

Indigenous to the South is a strange political schizophrenic, the presidential Republican. He votes in Democratic primaries to have a voice in state and local matters, but when the presidential election rolls around he casts a ballot for the Republican presidential nominee. Locally he is a Democrat; nationally, a Republican. Some presidential Republicans are genuine Republicans, who apologetically enter the Democratic primaries to fulfill a civic duty. Others are genuine Democrats who vote Republican nationally, with a touch of pride in their independence and a glance of condescension toward the benighted fellow who supports the Democratic ticket from top to bottom.12

A good case could be made for the argument that many conservative Southerners are being consistent in their own way of thinking, in voting conservative, or Democratic, in state and local elections and conservative, or Republican, in national elections. Certainly, it is true to some degree that there are many immigrant Republicans voting in the Democratic primaries, that they may not "lose" their votes. Many of the immigrant Republicans are gradually assimilated into the Democratic Party. Other newcomers from Republican areas retain their Republicanism and would provide a substantial contingent of voters if the Republican organizations had anything to offer in the way of candidates. The

12 Ibid., p. 278.
immigrant Republican is most numerous in Florida, Arkansas, and Texas.\textsuperscript{13} Now numerous it is impossible to gauge. It is extremely unlikely, however, that the over-all 22.2 per cent shift away from the traditional Democratic Party is explainable by the presence of some thousands of immigrant and other types of presidential Republicans.

Now that the analyzing tools have been discussed, a few permanent factors taken up, and the definitions given for unusual terms, the state is set for looking into each of the five elections in turn. In this manner, the explanation of the over-all trend away from the traditional Democratic party may be found.

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid.
CHAPTER II

ELECTIONS OF 1932 AND 1936

1932

While no attempt will be made to portray all of the
issues and all of the events of significance for this and
succeeding elections, the major issues and events can be
shown reasonably well. Any discussion of the presidential
election of 1932 from the outset must deal with the economic
condition of the nation. Almost certainly, the depression
was foremost in the minds of the voters in the conventions
and at the polls. The list of failing businesses and fore-
closed mortgages on farms and homes gave testimony to their
single-mindedness. Business activity in July, 1932, was at
a new low point; as examples, new car sales were down, steel
output was at fifteen per cent of capacity, freight loadings,
normally high in summer, were declining, and foreign trade
was down from 1931. Cotton was selling at about seven cents
a pound, and wheat, with the Farm Board holding fifty million
bushels for operations in the open market, was to have the
worst season since 1925. Unemployment had increased 1,300,000
in the first six months of 1932, totaling 11,025,000 in June.
President William Green of the American Federation of Labor
was quoted as saying, "No measures taken thus far the summer of 1932 have even scratched the surface of the problem. We must create millions of jobs." One more reference is cited to show how dominant was the economic issue in pre-convention 1932.

When one recalls that between 1920 and 1932 the annual purchasing power of the agricultural community dropped from $16,000,000,000 to $5,000,000,000 it is unnecessary to search further for one of the important factors in the present crisis that has paralyzed virtually every one of our industrial activities and brought poverty and despair to the cities of America.

This same loss was in part attributable to the two Republican tariffs which dried up foreign markets, the Fordney-McCumber act of 1922 and the Hawley-Smoot tariff of 1930. Perhaps this will be enough to portray the economic condition of the country.

Conventions

In Texas the state parties were to endorse, in the Democratic camp, John N. Garner for President and, over on the Republican side, Herbert Hoover for reelection as President. In the Democratic spring state convention, the Garner forces were in the saddle. The state executive committee acceded to


2Bernhard Ostrofenk, "Prosperity Waits upon the Farmer," Current History, XXXVI (November, 1932), 129.

3Ibid., p. 130.
the Garner choice for keynoter and temporary chairman, Congressman Sam Rayburn, even over one of its own members, Charles I. Francis. An undercover movement of Roosevelt delegates was doomed from the start.\footnote{\textit{Dallas Morning News}, May 24, 1932, p. 1.} After the issue was decided, Francis wound up eulogizing Garner, and Amon C. Carter, among others, was advocating harmony in behalf of Garner. An anti-Ferguson man, Clinton C. Brown, was elected permanent chairman of the Ferguson issue, more will be said later.\footnote{\textit{Dallas Morning News}, May 26, 1932, p. 1.} The convention urged Congress to submit to the States a referendum on the Eighteenth Amendment, instructed its delegation to Chicago to vote for John N. Garner until released by him, indorsed full payment of the soldiers' bonus and moved to keep negroes out of the primaries. Militantly dry Senator Morris Sheppard, the author of the Eighteenth Amendment, and ex-Governor Moody, also a dry, were left off the delegation to the national convention. The convention had not been solidly for the repeal referendum proposal, the crucial vote being 353 to 564. Rayburn was made chairman of the national delegation, and he was also national chairman of the Garner-for-President organization. The Democratic platform branded the Republican Administration for unemployment distress, a spirit of discontent and unrest, waste of the nation's money, invasion of the rights of the states, and usurpation of local self-government; it also
hit the national bureaucracy and centralized autocratic power in Washington. It is significant to note that the same charges were to be hurled at the administrations of another party, in subsequent years.

The Republican state convention was to be the most harmonious, if uninspired, in years. The death of Harry Wurzbach, Texas' only Republican Congressman in the 1920's, left the control of the state organization entirely in the hands of R. E. Creager of Brownsville. There the control was to remain for all of the years covered in this study.

That Mr. Creager . . . is in full leadership of Texas Republicans was evidenced in the fullest degree at Monday night's caucus of the Texas delegation, which completed the convention slate of Texas officers and with enthusiasm responded to every known wish of the Brownsville man.

Creager was named chairman of the delegation, he was selected as national committee man and member of the platform committee, and his choice, Mrs. Lena Gay Moore of Brownsville, was selected as national committeewoman with a semblance of opposition. Such an account should suffice to indicate the breadth of the Republican Party leadership in Texas. The state convention endorsed Hoover for a second term, and Creager spokesman gave petitioning Negro committees no encouragement, thus ratifying the "lily white" stand of Texas Republicans made in earlier years. Otherwise, the convention took no strong stands.

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6Ibid.
7Dallas Morning News, June 14, 1932, p. 2.
8Ibid.
The Republican national convention, as has been customary throughout the period under consideration, met in June, approximately a month before the parallel Democratic meeting. While more will be said of the Republicans' stand on the campaign issues, the chief issues in the convention were over the wet-dry issue and the choice of the vice-presidential nominee. By a three-to-two margin, an administration-backed compromise proposal was endorsed, over impassioned pleas for an outright repeal plank. Hoover's renomination was a foregone, if unenthusiastic, conclusion, while that of his vice-president, Charles Curtis, was no such walk-away victory. Reconstruction Finance Corporation president Charles G. Dawes was boomed for the second-place slot, with the support of many delegations including the Texas group. He withdrew from the running, and the permanent chairman of the convention, Representative Snell of New York, was the anti-Curtis choice. Curtis was almost the winner on the first ballot, and the switch of the Pennsylvania delegation made his nomination sure; then, Creager moved to make the choice unanimous.\(^9\) Then the Republicans went home.

The Democratic national convention, on the other hand, was far more bitter and contentious. From the view of the Texas delegation, the Garner candidacy was the key issue in the convention. The choice of the Texans had only recently

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become Speaker of the House of Representatives and had just before the convention come out solidly in favor of the repeal of the prohibition amendment. Garner went into the convention with the third largest number of pledged delegates and plumped for his platform of a make-work program, a balanced budget, a saner basis for industrial finance, collection of war debts, and an expanded international trade.\textsuperscript{10} The Texas delegation, during a stormy caucus, chose Garnerite Maury Hughes as its member on the convention platform committee. The delegation chairman was instructed to vote for Jouett Shouse, the anti-Roosevelt candidate for permanent chairman; he was also told to vote against the abrogation of the two-thirds rule for nominations. The prohibition issue was again raised, but the delegation stuck to the state convention decision, despite Garner's stand.\textsuperscript{11}

The first day of the convention saw three inconclusive votes, with the forces of Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York, Al Smith of the same state, and Garner jockeying for supremacy in the convention. The Tammany (New York) organization and the Texas, Massachusetts, and California delegations were together on the early votes, and it was chiefly these groups which were outvoted 626 to 528 in the selection of the permanent chairman. However, the Roosevelt forces were forced to

\textsuperscript{10}\textit{Dallas Morning News}, June 22, 1932, pp. 1-2.

\textsuperscript{11}\textit{Dallas Morning News}, June 26, 1932, p. 1.
yield in their attempt to throw out the time-honored two-thirds rule. The Texas delegation practically engaged in a fight over the prohibition plank during the convention roll call vote on the issue, with Rayburn advising the delegates to stop their screaming at one another. Carter and Lieutenant-Governor Witt wanted the group to follow their state convention instructions, but the argument that Garner was for repeal prevailed. The delegation voted sixty-seven to sixty-one for the plank favoring repeal and Volstead Act modification; the issue carried in the convention by a vote of 934 to 215. The one remaining large issue was the choice of candidates for the top two national offices. The chief candidates for president were Roosevelt, Smith, and Garner. Although the Texas delegation tried to delay the vote, the first roll call was begun as scheduled, before Texans could line up any more Garner supporters. The first vote found Roosevelt with about sixty per cent of the votes, with two-thirds required for selection; Garner had, principally, the vote of the Texas and California delegations. The stalemate lasted for three ballots, with no candidate getting the two-thirds majority, a deal was made between James Farley, Roosevelt's manager, Sam Rayburn and one other Texas delegate, and some other interested parties, whereby

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the Garner vote would be released and Garner would get the support of the Roosevelt forces for Vice-President. Farley's account of the deal says that no definite commitments were made, merely that Rayburn would see what he could do.\textsuperscript{15} In any event, the deadlock was broken, and Garner was quickly nominated for the second place on the ballot, even though all concerned knew that Garner wanted no part of the vice-presidential nomination.\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{State Issues}

The issue of Fergusonism had been raised again in the summer of 1932, and the national convention results were perhaps dwarfed by "Ma" Ferguson's campaign for governor. "Pa" and "Ma" had been in the governor's chair intermittently for almost twenty years. "Pa" Ferguson had been impeached and convicted in 1917, and the question of his guilt or innocence divided voters into pro- and anti-Ferguson men. Since "Pa" was ineligible to hold office, he offered "Ma" for office and "Two Governors for the Price of One." In 1932, the Fergusons stood as the champions of the wets and the farmers and as the opponents of the rising Ku Klux Klan in the state.\textsuperscript{17} Against this background, a bitter governor's race developed, with

\textsuperscript{15} James A. Farley, "Selling Roosevelt to the Party," \textit{American Magazine}, CXXVI (August, 1938), 112.

\textsuperscript{16} Catledge, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 629.

\textsuperscript{17} Key, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 264-265.
incumbent Governor Ross Sterling running against "Ma" for re-election. In the first primary, "Ma" led Sterling by over a hundred thousand votes but did not have the clear majority required by state law for victory. In the second primary, "Ma", with less than a four thousand majority out of 951,490 votes cast, was returned to the governorship.\textsuperscript{18} The September state convention of the Democrats (often called the "governor's convention") of 1932 was controlled completely by the Fergusons' supporters, and the contest of the election could not be won there by Sterling.\textsuperscript{19} The incumbent, still charging fraud, fought his case with see-saw results through the state courts until the Texas Supreme Court ruled that the issue should be settled by the Legislature and ordered "Ma's" name printed on the ballot as the Democratic nominee.\textsuperscript{20} Whatever the effect might have been on the presidential election, Sterling's next step was certainly influential on the outcome of the governor's race. Declining to comment further, "Gov. R. S. Sterling, who Saturday lost his fight for the Democratic gubernatorial nomination, said Sunday he would not vote for Mrs. M. A. Ferguson, the nominee, in the general election."\textsuperscript{21}

The Republican candidate for governor, normally a loyal Creager follower with little real voter appeal, was a strong

\textsuperscript{18}Texas Almanac, 1933, p. 271.
\textsuperscript{19}Dallas Morning News, September 14, 1932, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{20}Dallas Morning News, October 9, 1932, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{21}Dallas Morning News, October 10, 1932, pp. 1-2.
personage from Creager's camp this time. Orville Bullington, the candidate, openly invited the support of Democratic supporters opposed to the Fergusons; he must have welcomed Ross Sterling's stand. Certainly, he had reason to rejoice even in his defeat in November, for he led other Republican candidates for office and all of the other Republican gubernatorial aspirants of recent times. 22

National Campaign

While state issues involved the governor's pardoning and paroling powers and "Pa's" guilt or innocence, as well as the Klan and prohibition, national issues were of a different type altogether. Roosevelt appealed to the "Forgotten Man" in his speeches, relying on his success with prison reform, systematized labor laws, and liberalized rural taxation in his own state of New York as governor. "Convinced that it was the duty of the state to care for its incapacitated citizens, he . . . advocated unemployment insurance, old age pensions and workmen's compensation." 23 In his acceptance speech he appealed to the laborer, the farmer, and the small investor, offering them leadership out of the depression. 24 In contrast,

Mr. Hoover was not popular with the mass of the American people; Mr. Roosevelt appealed as a heartier, more likable person. The Hoover administration from

22 Dallas Morning News, November 9, 1932, p. 1.

its beginning estranged one important group after another. The President's stand on the bonus and the treatment of the B.E.F. [Bonus Expeditionary Force] alienated the majority of war veterans; labor refused its support to the administration, in part because the Secretary of Labor in the Hoover Cabinet was anathema to labor leaders. Moreover, the administration succeeded in drawing the opposition of both the wets and drys because of its stand on prohibition. . . . On most of these counts, of course, Governor Roosevelt's record was clean.25

Most serious for Hoover was the listlessness of his own party, which had renominated him as a matter of course; campaign funds were meager, and weak speeches were made in his behalf. The chief consideration of voters was devoted to the depression and to those who were responsible for it. Hoover and his associates strove manfully to prove that the Republicans' hands were clean.26 A whispering campaign about "Roosevelt's precarious health" and "Garner's radicalism" was begun, the success of which is impossible to determine. Out of the issue of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway, upon which the two major parties agreed in principle, arose the issue of power and utility regulation, an issue which was to have repercussions beyond election day.27 It is noteworthy that a short-range evaluation of the election echoed an opinion held throughout the campaign that the parties were so similar that the


26Ibid.

outcome of the election was relatively unimportant, whatever
the immediate psychological effect on the country as a whole.28

In the Southern States little apparent interest was ex-
hibited in the national campaign.

In 1932 . . . the support of the southern Democratic
party for Roosevelt was rather perfunctory and routine,
generally lacking in that crusading zeal characteristic
of the campaign elsewhere. Habituated to the tag-
end of national politics, especially through the years
of Republican supremacy, the interest of the southern
Democrats in national party politics was usually nomi-
nal and detached.29

This comment would seem to be accurate as it applies to Texas,
if lopsided presidential election returns provide any fair
indication of a quiet campaign.

Election Results

The total state returns for the presidential and guber-
natorial races will indicate from the outset that the state
and national Democratic tickets ran far differently. The
Ferguson issue very evidently caused the Republican candidate
Bullington to run a good race for governor. However, the Demo-
crats who "scratched," or voted against, "Ma" Ferguson as a
body did not scratch the presidential candidate Roosevelt,
Bullington ran approximately 220,000 votes ahead of the Repub-
lcan national ticket, strongly suggesting the conclusion that

state and national issues did not overlap to any considerable extent. The number of Key's "presidential Republicans" cannot be determined for this one of the five elections, for, unlike

<table>
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<td></td>
<td>Number of Votes</td>
<td>Per Cent of Total Vote</td>
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<td>753,010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>97,598</td>
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^aFrom a manuscript of elections furnished by the Secretary of State, omitting four counties (Callahan, Carson, Hopkins, and Webb) from the official canvass of returns, as cited in E. E. Robinson, The Presidential Vote: 1896-1932, p. 330. ^bTexas Almanac, 1933, p. 238.

the others, the presidential candidate did not run ahead of the Republican candidate for governor.

County-by-County Returns

In analyzing the county-by-county election returns, a number of conclusions can be reached. The most striking feature of the election of 1932 is the large number of counties which closely followed the state trend. Ninety-nine of the 254 counties of Texas returned election results within four per cent of the state average of 83.5 per cent Democratic.
In Figure 4 the location of these ninety-nine counties is shown. The most noticeable feature of the map is the wide dispersion of the counties near the state average. The largest portion of the counties may be seen to be "other counties," or counties not falling in the four defined county groupings which have been set forth. Of the German counties only two, one the German-Mexican county of DeWitt and the other, the German-Negro county of Colorado are near the state average. Only nine of the fifty-six Negro counties (one German-Negro and two Mexican-Negro). About half of the Mexican counties followed the trend, however, counting the three mixed counties. One of the four metropolitan counties, Harris County, went along, perhaps led, the trend, while the other three are conspicuously apart from the average. Two facts are most significant. First, a great many counties, widely dispersed the state, followed closely the state average. Second, the "average" counties were chiefly Mexican and "others" counties, with few German and Negro counties in that category.

With most of the counties in the state having such extremely heavy Democratic majorities, relatively minor factors, as unusual voting participations and small "rock-ribbed" Republican minorities, may appear as over-important in biasing the Democratic percentages in some counties. This is true both for the "average" counties discussed above and for the extreme counties, those in the first and tenth deciles in an array of the two hundred fifty county percentages. A perusal of the next
Fig. 4—Texas counties within four percentage points of the state average of the per cent Democratic vote in presidential election, 1932.**

map, Figure 5, reveals some definite divergence from the "average" counties. Certain geographical concentrations may be seen for both the extremely Democratic counties and the least Democratic counties. In the heavily Democratic counties there are thirty-one counties included, as seven counties had the same per cent Democratic vote as the twenty-fifth ranking county. There appeared to be about four general geographical concentrations. One group, stretching from Briscoe and Hall counties to Andrews and Sterling counties, is in the "other" classification and is directly east of the north-south tier of counties comprising a large part of the average counties. This group falls into none of the four major groupings as defined but is rather a ranching and farming area with small county populations. Presumably, such an area might be a well-integrated political area with a high level of likemindedness in voting and in voting participation. A second major group is more readily classifiable. This block of counties, from Panola and Shelby to San Jacinto and Washington, is in the heart of the "black belt" voting area, the Negro counties. A high percentage of Negroes (over twenty per cent) is present in all save one of the eleven counties in this group. With the Negro voting participation very slight, the white voters were solidly Democratic. Four small counties in the northeastern corner of the state, well-integrated politically and with considerable Negroes, form a third strong Democratic area. The fourth identifiable grouping of counties are the
Fig. 9—Texas counties at furthest extremes from the state average of the percent Democratic vote in the presidential election, 1952."

"Ibid. The army was calculated of the nation."
three Mexican counties of Duval, Starr, and Webb, in the area of Texas most famous for an amenable vote. Among the least Democratic counties are two identifiable blocks of counties. Hidalgo, Cameron, and Willacy counties have strong Republican minorities, with the Republican state machine under R. B. Creager situated there at Brownsville. The fourteen counties in southwest-central Texas apparently have sizable minorities of Republicans; perhaps these are the German-Americans known to live in the area. Only two of the group are German counties, which leads to the observation that the traditionally strong German Republican counties went over in part to the Democratic Party which was forthright in its advocacy of repeal, an issue certainly important to the beer-loving Germans. Bearing this observation out, the German counties voted more strongly than did the rest of the state on the issue of repeal when the option was submitted in the first Democratic primary election in 1932. 50 The rest of the tenth decile counties are so widely dispersed that no general observations are feasible.

Summing up for the counties in 1932, several comments may be made. While twenty-seven of the Mexican counties are among the "average" counties, eleven are in the first decile (the least Democratic), and five are in the tenth decile. Thus, the Mexican counties evince no consistency as a group in this election. The German counties, in the main, are in the

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30 Texas Almanac, 1933, p. 73.
"in-between" group of counties, having less than half their number in the extreme and "average" brackets. Two German counties are in the first decile, two in the "average" group, and one in the tenth decile. The Negro counties, for the most part are in the high percentage bracket, with the Negro counties accounting for almost half of the tenth decile counties. One, heavily populated Smith County, is in the first decile, and nine are among the "average" counties. Two other major geographical comments are in order. The Panhandle counties from the Oklahoma border to the Pecos River are either among the "average" or tenth decile counties. The westernmost of the counties generally run closely with the state average; the eastern half of the Panhandle was strongly Democratic. And a swath of counties in north central Texas from Taylor, Coleman, and Mills counties northward and then eastward to Collin and Fannin counties are to a large extent following the state trend. Finally, the metropolitan counties are mostly in the lower percentage brackets. Harris County is in the state average group, and Dallas County is among the least Democratic counties. The larger counties, in terms of population, kept the state average somewhat below the per cent Democratic vote of most Texas counties; Dallas has a per cent Democratic vote of 30.4 per cent; Bexar, 33.5; Tarrant, 34.1; and Harris, 34.5.

An extraordinary degree of likemindedness of voters was the chief characteristic in 1932. Indicating this agreement among Texas voters, the range, i.e., the difference between
the county percentages of the least and most Democratic counties, is only 33.5 per cent. This finding is more dramatically shown by noticing that the least Democratic county in the state voted 65.5 per cent for Roosevelt! The first decile (the twenty-five most Democratic counties voted Democratic by majorities of between 95.9 and 99.0 per cent. These positional findings should "drive home" the fact that Texans in almost all of the 254 counties were likeminded in their voting and that their likemindedness was strongly Democratic.

Evaluation

Why was there such an overwhelming Democratic victory? Several answers suggest themselves, from the above account of the conventions, the state and national campaigns, and the election returns. Certainly, the issue of the responsibility for the depression had an effect on many Texans. The forthright stand of the Democrats squarely advocating repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment was not without effect, especially in the German counties. The candidacy of John Nance Garner, the first Texan to become one of the top two national officers, aroused a portion of the strong state patriotism felt by many voters. Too, Garner's candidacy was favored by the state political leaders in presidential politics, with full control of the state conventions of the Democratic Party and with the endorsements of Rayburn, Connally, and most of the state "politicos" who took a stand on the race. Even "dry" leaders
like Senator Sheppard and ex-Governor Moody endorsed Garner despite his "wet" stand. The Ferguson-Sterling gubernatorial race caused a lot of split-ticket voting, but the effect was not to aid the candidacy of Herbert Hoover, as amply evidenced by the final returns. Negro voters were few in number in 1932, and neither party offered any appreciable incentives for party participation to them. Racial issues were ignored by the Democrats, save in Roosevelt's appeals to the "forgotten men" of all races; state Democrats, to say the least, did not follow the crusading zeal of their standardbearer in this respect. Texas Republicans offered even less in reaffirming their "lily white" stand of the 1920's. Apparently, the campaign provoked no extensive campaigning in Texas for the presidential and vice-presidential candidates of either party; what campaigning there was resolved itself to the governor's race. The election returns, as discussed at length above, serve to confirm the acceptance of one or several of these issues by the great mass of Texas voters. And the one factor which will not answer to objective study, that of habitual Democratic voting, certainly can be assumed to have swelled the Roosevelt county-by-county majorities.

1933-1936

While it must ever be kept in mind that issues before the nation in the interim between elections are to some extent forgotten by election day, yet far-reaching changes in voters'
minds are wrought during every year. One need only list a few of the accomplishments of the New Deal in its early years to understand why many voters took heart after the depression years of uncertainty and distress. Support of such measures as the bank moratorium, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, the conservation program, the social security program, and non-opposition to the Securities Act, the Securities Exchange Act, the Banking Act, and the Public Utility Holding Company Act was even evinced by the Republican nominee of 1936.\textsuperscript{31} Rumblings of discontent were heard in Southern quarters relative to the New Deal in certain measures. Senator Carter Glass of Virginia denounced the National Recovery Act, and others joined him in opposing the codes of fair competition setting the standards as to wages, hours, and employment conditions.\textsuperscript{32} Roosevelt's scuttling of the World Economic Conference was charged by some Southerners as delaying the revival of foreign trade in post-depression times.\textsuperscript{33} In the matter of cotton,

there are a considerable number of Southern leaders, also, who are highly skeptical of the Administration's

\textsuperscript{31}"In short, he [Landon] has seemed willing to accept all the New Deal laws that have survived the Supreme Court."


\textsuperscript{33}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 14.
program for plowing under cotton, and reimbursing the cotton growers by revenues of a processing tax. The whole concept of plowing under agricultural products, or indeed, or reducing acreage drastically, offends their ideas of common sense, when the world needs the products, and when so many Americans are dependent on their growth.

It is of interest to note that the editor of the periodical containing such dark views of the New Deal in its first year is none other than Roosevelt's irreconcilable political enemy, Alfred E. Smith, defeated by Roosevelt in the 1932 presidential nominating convention.

_Fortune_ editors saw a disaffection in Democratic ranks in the South and in other parts of the nation after the 1934 Congressional elections. After considering other regional political developments, they continued,

_furthermore, the present alignment with its recent if superficial liberalism seems to be costing the Democrats their monopoly in the South. It is not likely that the Solid South will crack in 1936._

However,

_the gains of the Democrats in the Northeast between 1932 and 1934 have been balanced in spite of cotton bonuses by losses in the South. The process may continue._

With more glibness than specificity, the editors critically portray the "political machines" of the several states, saying of Texas that its Democratic "machine" was under "more pedestrian leadership" than other state organizations and conclude

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34 Ibid., p. 15.
that "Vice President Garner and Senators Connally and Sheppard, with a bit of competition from Jesse Jones, ran Texas."36

Despite New Deal critics' claims that the Solid South was more and more becoming dissatisfied with the liberal bent of the national Democratic Party, mass support must have been given the New Deal. In any event, the person considered to be responsible for the program, Roosevelt, was to be given a smashing victory in his reelection try in 1936.

1936

As in 1932, one of the principal issues throughout the campaign of 1936 was the economic condition of the country. The Democrats were to point to the "Republican depression," and the party of Hoover had to defend its role during the last Republican's administration. In the first three years of the New Deal, business operations had been restored to ninety per cent of normal, exceeding the peak of 1929 in some lines. But the depression was not over; over ten million unemployed persons were being supported largely by government relief. And millions of Americans were yet living on or below a bare subsistence level.37 Reactions toward the President had been as numerous and varied as those offering opinions.

Extreme left wingers view him contemptuously as a gay reformer, a country squire, doctoring his patient

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36 Ibid., p. 68.
with bread pills. Alfred E. Smith says he is trying to take the country to Moscow. Norman Thomas says Roosevelt has carried out the Socialist policies--on a stretcher. Recently the Governor of California astonished his fellow-Republicans by declaring that Mr. Roosevelt was a man raised up by God to save the country in its crisis.38

But whatever the opinions, Roosevelt's political machine was "well-oiled." The Gallup Poll directors emphasized this popularity of Roosevelt by saying,

No serious opposition arose to Franklin D. Roosevelt's nomination. As the conclusion of his first term approached, he not only dominated as the convention choice, but 56% of the Democratic voters, when polled, wanted him as a candidate for a third term, even before his nomination for the second time.39

Fully aware of, and apparently sharing in, this confidence in the Democratic President, Texas Democrats met for what was to be a harmonious spring convention in 1936. "Ringing endorsement was given the national administration, with declaration of affirmation in the party's allegiance to and confidence in President Roosevelt." Mentions of both Roosevelt and Garner brought delegates to their feet.40 The convention went on record as declaring the top executives of the nation as true proponents of states' rights, in answer to Roosevelt's opponents.41 Endorsement was given to the Administration farm

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38 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
39 Gallup Political Almanac, 1948, p. 22.
41 Ibid., p. 4.
policy and to price parities, and a favorable resolution was
made and passed for world disarmament agreements.\textsuperscript{42} Garner
was unanimously reelected as national committeeman from Texas
to the Democratic National Executive Committee.\textsuperscript{43} Rayburn
was again made keynote and temporary chairman, assuring full
Administration control of the convention.\textsuperscript{44} And Senator Tom
Connally was chosen as chairman of the delegation to the na-
tional convention, in place of Senator Sheppard, who had
bowed out earlier.\textsuperscript{45} One hitch developed in the national
leaders' plans. "Discarding the wishes of National Demo-
cratic Chairman James A. Farley, the State Democratic conven-
tion instructed the Texas delegation to the national conven-
tion to vote to retain the time-honored rule requiring a two-
thirds majority to nominate President and Vice President."\textsuperscript{46}

Texas Republicans went to the June national convention
pledged to Alfred M. Landon, Governor of Kansas, as their
presidential choice. The Gallup Poll directors found that
public opinion favored three Republican leaders, Landon, Sena-
tor Borah of Idaho, and ex-President Hoover, in that order.
Well over half favored the Kansan by convention time. The
vote of Creager's delegation swelled the first ballot majority
of Landon, totalling 964 votes with eighteen votes being cast

\textsuperscript{42}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{43}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{44}Ibid., p. 7.
\textsuperscript{45}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{46}Ibid., p. 1.
for Borah.\textsuperscript{47} Landon represented a different view from many Republican leaders.

Governor Landon is much nearer the intersection of the two major lines of interest of the party as opposed to the position of "agrarian" Senator William B. Borah and conservative Colonel Frank Knox, publisher of the Chicago Daily News.\textsuperscript{7} Twice elected in years of Democratic landslides, he has made his reputation chiefly by tight-fisted control of State and local finances in Kansas. . . . His past record as a Bull Mooser, his attitude toward the New Deal and his speeches indicate \textsuperscript{48} he is not a reactionary.\textsuperscript{7}

The Republican platform was a far cry from the 1932 pronouncement of the party. The devaluation of the dollar was no longer an issue. The C. O. P. did not admit the presence of an issue over the regulation of security exchanges by the federal government. It even accepted, or acquiesced in, the regulation of the interstate activities of public utilities. Also readily accepted was the program of federal treasury assistance to the needy, "against which Mr. Hoover struggled with all the fervor of his old-fashioned business morality." Some lesser issues were brought up in the convention, with no clear party stand. Senator Borah's fight against the monopolies was vaguely treated in the platform, and other planks dealt with reciprocal trade agreements, foreign policy, civil service reform, and Indian affairs.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{47} Gallup Political Almanac, 1943, pp. 23-23.

\textsuperscript{48} Lindley, op. cit., p. 565.

\textsuperscript{49} Wallace Millis, "Issues in the Political Campaign," Yale Review, XXVI (September, 1936), 7-8.
The Democratic convention in July assembled with a great deal more assurance and optimism than the Republicans had shown. One outgrowth of this related to the northern wing of the Democrats.

The New Deal and the Roosevelt personality so bolstered the confidence of the northern Democratic Party in its ability to win at the polls despite any southern defection that it wrote a Declaration of Independence at the Philadelphia convention of 1936. Boldly denying the efficacy of states' rights, it advocated national solutions to the pressing social and economic problems of the day, social security, housing, soil conservation, maximum hours and minimum wages.50

And, over the strenuous objections of the Southerners, including the Texans, the two-thirds rule was "ramrodded" by Farley and the Administration convention floor leaders.51 The convention was relatively harmonious, and its progress was not unlike the peaceful state convention in Texas. Roosevelt and Garner were, of course, renominated on the first ballot. It is noteworthy, too, that the Texans' leadership was amply rewarded. Representative Sam Rayburn was designated chairman of the speaker's bureau for the 1936 campaign, considered a sure sign (later verified) that he would be next in line for the speakership.52 Thus, Texas Congressmen were to


51 Ibid.

52 Dallas Morning News, July 12, 1936, p. 7.
include in their number two Speakers of the House in a single decade.

Back in Texas, the state primary elections gave the Republicans no promising prospects for success in November. For the seated Governor, popular James Allred, was resoundingly returned to office in the first primary. The U. S. Senate race found Morris Sheppard sweeping to reelection also. No controversies arose as the September state convention of the Democrats followed the Governor and the Roosevelt-Carner ticket.

The state Republicans unloaded a "raff" of criticism in their state convention. They were aiming at "a united effort to rid Texas and the Nation of the common enemy of all which we hold sacred— the Socialistic, Communist, aggregation of self-serving politicians, styling themselves the new deal." Creager's party scored excessive governmental spending and taxing, said that the unemployment problem was one for private employers, promised to restore state and local rights, and took stands on a number of state issues. The state Republicans also formally invited Texas Negroes to return to the party, as was done at the national convention; certain Negro groups were in attendance.

54 Ibid.
Campaign

The conventions of 1936 were, by contrast with that of 1932 and those of subsequent years, relatively colorless and "cut-and-dried." Likewise, the issues of the campaign were not clear, as both major parties campaigned on platforms similar to the New Deal program. In campaign oratory Roosevelt was proclaiming war against want and destitution and economic demoralization and for the survival of democracy, while Colonel Knox, Landon's running mate, passionately put the "choice" to the American people between "the soft and spineless kept citizen of a regimented state" and "the self-respecting and self-reliant men who made America."55 Both parties endorsed, by different means, payments to farmers. Collective bargaining was approved outright by both, and grants-in-aid programs were likewise approved "when needed." The Democrats were for the Social Security Act unqualifiedly, while the Republicans were for it in principle. Balancing the budget was a mutual aim, with the Republicans promising to cut expenditures immediately and the Democrats, as soon as possible.56 The candidates themselves merit some little more comment. Landon, one news commentator wrote, represented "a homesickness for the good old days; a devout hope that we may wake up some morning and realize that it [the depression] was all a bad

55Millis, op. cit., p. 8.
56Ibid., p. 11.
dream." One can hardly agree that "November's election is essentially a choice between the past and the future, between a sentiment and a reality." Landon hit hard, in perhaps his strongest campaign points, at the failure to balance the budget and administrative inefficiency, especially in the handling of relief. The personage of John Garner was yet a colorful vote-getter, as he campaigned loyally for his "Chief," especially in several northern states. He wrote to Farley, saying

after all, the people in this country are going to vote for or against Roosevelt... The personality of the Chief is the principal issue in this campaign, and I don't believe the Republicans or anybody else can change that.

One distinguished author in the field of Southern sociological relations points up the relation of the Roosevelt personality to the South, saying that Roosevelt had succeeded in becoming truly popular with the common people of the South.

He has taught them to demand more out of life in terms of security and freedom from want. He has acquired such prestige that the epithet "nigger lover" simply cannot be applied to him. Even the most conservative Southerner will scarcely dare to come out against him personally in the same way as do Republican conservatives in the North.


58 Lindley, op. cit., p. 565.


60 Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma, p. 464.
In the light of these issues and these personalities, the conclusions of the Fortune editors are probably worthwhile. They believed that, after the crisis of the depression had passed, Southern congressmen and Southern state political machines went along with the New Deal for patronage purposes.

And it was not because of continued faith and loyalty that many Democrats in Congress, after 1934, continued to be submissive to the White House, albeit somewhat unwillingly at times. Quite the contrary. It was because the country had spoken favorably of the New Deal in the 1934 congressional elections. Mr. Roosevelt had demonstrated his power at the polls. The Election Day Loyalty Club of 1936 even [Virginia Senator] Glass, the most courageous standpatter of all, who gave a halfhearted endorsement of Mr. Roosevelt for reelection. . . . It was safe for Al Smith to "take a walk" and make a speech for London.61

Like some others,

Smith was, and is, a has-been in the Democratic party. But to those holding office, the fear of being a has been makes many pragmatists as Election Day nears.62

Election Results

Whatever their motivations, the "Election Day Loyalty Club" included 57.6 per cent of the Texans who cast votes in the general election for president. No appreciable shift had taken place from the Democratic percentage of 1932. The disaffection between 1932 and 1936 was only .9 per cent. In Table 4 the results are shown for the general election. Again,

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61 ibid, "The Democratic Party," Fortune, XX (October, 1939), 75.
62 Ibid.
### TABLE 4

**VOTE CAST FOR MAJOR PARTY CANDIDATES FOR PRESIDENT AND GOVERNOR AND PER CENT OF TOTAL MAJOR PARTY VOTE FOR PRESIDENT, TEXAS GENERAL ELECTION, 1936**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Governor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Votes</td>
<td>Per Cent of Total Vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>734,435</td>
<td>87.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>103,711</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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*Texas Almanac, 1937, p. 72. Two counties, Montague and Upshur, were not officially canvassed due to submission of the returns after the limit set by law.*


State and national returns are dissimilar, but, unlike 1932, the Republican presidential candidate, Landon, ran far ahead of the gubernatorial candidate, San Angelo judge C. O. Harriss. In this election the number of presidential Republicans can be shown. This difference between the voting strength nationally for the Republicans and the state strength is 44,369 votes.

The other race of national interest was the senatorial election, which Morris Sheppard won easily by downing another of Creager's candidates, Brownsville resident Carlos G. Watson. About the same vote was cast in this race as in the race for governor, the vote being 774,975 to 59,491.63

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63 *Texas Almanac, 1937, p. 73. The per cent Democratic vote and the array were calculated by the author.*
County-by-County Returns

County-by-county returns for the presidential elections indicate a not dissimilar result from 1932. Although many different counties are included in the number, the counties within four per cent of the state average, the "average" counties, number one hundred six, just seven above the 1932 number. Again, the dispersion is rather general over the entire state, with the result that the counties not within four per cent of the state average are practically at the extreme high or low deciles of Democratic strength. And again, the largest part of the "average" counties are counties not in the four identifiable groups as defined. Twenty-five of the fifty-five Mexican counties are included, while but thirteen "negro counties" out of fifty-six counties are so included. Only two of the twelve German counties are "average," and, in this election, three of the four metropolitan counties (Harris, Dallas, and Tarrant) in the "average" bracket. Of course, the metropolitan counties to a considerable extent are responsible for the trend of county returns, by virtue of the extra weight carried by their large voting population. Two conclusions present themselves. The large majority of the "average" counties are unclassified counties, with most of the rest being Mexican counties. The German and Negro counties as in 1932, were not conspicuously near the mean county; rather, they are noticeably removed from the state average. The metropolitan counties, except for Bexar County, may be seen to lead the
Fig. 6--Texas counties within four percentage points of the state average of the per cent Democratic vote in the presidential election, 1932.*

*Texas Almanac, 1937, p. 73. The per cent Democratic vote and the array were calculated by the author.
trend. But the chief similarity with 1932 figures is the wide dispersion of the "average" counties and the large number of such counties. Excepting the shift of the metropolitan counties, there is one major shift from the 1932 returns not suggested by the small statewide deviation from the per cent Democratic vote of 1932.

This difference involves the least and most Democratic counties. A changed geographical picture is immediately perceivable in Figure 10 as opposed to the counties in the first and tenth deciles in 1932. The first decile counties are now concentrated to the south and east of the previous counties with the least Democratic strength. The concentration of the most Democratic counties is seen to be in East Texas. In the matter of the least Democratic counties, six counties of the twenty-five in the first decile are German counties, and nine of the other ten in the west-south central Texas group have known German minorities, presumably Republican. These latter counties appear in the 1932 first decile also. Two additional counties, Brooks and Kenedy, appear within the southmost counties considered to be within Creager's bailiwick. Only two counties are not covered in the foregoing broad groupings. One, Lipscomb, like three counties in 1932, might be a first decile county by virtue of some inhabitants more inclined to a Middle Western two-party way of thinking; assuredly, it is in an area farther removed from strong Democratic Texas counties than from the two-party political area of Oklahoma and
Fig. 7—Texas counties at furthest extremes from the state average of the % of total Democratic vote in the presidential election, 1936.
Kansas. The tenth decile counties for 1936 include eighteen East Texas counties, with the remaining seven dispersed over wide areas in central and west Texas. No such tiers of north central and Panhandle counties either in the "average" or extreme brackets in 1932 are observable in this election. Of the Negro counties (over twenty per cent of the population being Negroes), there are fourteen in the tenth decile. Thus, it is plain that there is a significant correlation between high percentages of Negroes, with Negro voting limited by statute and custom, and extremely high Democratic majorities. In the northeasternmost corner of the state, there are three counties in the tenth decile, all small, with high percentages of Negroes, and presumably politically well-integrated. This factor also repeats the 1932 findings. Notable for their absence, along the aforementioned tiers of counties, are the Mexican counties in the far south of Texas.

In summation, several findings stand out. As in 1932, the dispersion of counties following the trend is rather general around the state, with the groups of counties not included in the number of counties more significant than the more positive finding of "average" counties. A substantial number of Mexican counties are included in both the "average" and first decile brackets as before. However, the South Texas counties with some degree of amenability in voting are not in 1936 among the tenth decile counties. This, of course, is not to say that high percentages of the votes were not cast for the
Democratic candidate, but rather that the vote was not so extremely high in this election. The German counties show an even more remarkable shift. Of these twelve counties none are in the tenth decile and but two are in the "average" classification. Six, however, are included in the first decile, indicating that the German counties changed from the heavy support given Roosevelt in 1932. Two counties went Republican in 1936; both were German counties. Evident in the Negro counties was a shift to even stronger Democratic percentages. As noted above, fourteen of the tenth decile counties are Negro counties, and four more are deep East Texas counties, also with sizable Negro populations. None of the least Democratic counties are in the Negro grouping, but several are among the "average" counties. The metropolitan counties, it cannot be overemphasized, showed a definite disaffection of extremely high percentages of Democratic voting to the "average" bracket. The Panhandle and north central counties fall into no extreme brackets such as the figures indicate for 1932; however, a great many of them, as before, are "average" counties.

Evaluation

In the state, taken as a whole, no appreciable disaffection is ascertainable by 1936, away from the traditional Democratic Party. The total number of votes was somewhat less than the 1932 vote in the presidential election, but the Democratic proportion was virtually the same. Again, in most
countries, there was a high degree of liberalism among Texas voters. The range for 1932 was a great deal larger than in 1930, 25.4 per cent, almost double the range of the previous election. But this difference between the extreme counties, even resulting in two Republican counties, is explicable due to the percentage change of a few German counties.

Many reasons appear to account for the high (97.6 per cent) Texas Democratic strength. The issue of the depression having been in part resolved, the blame for its crippling effects probably still was given the Republicans by numbers of Texas voters. The repeat candidacy of Garner gave patriotic Texans another chance to vote for a "favorite son." Throughout the entire progress of the conventions and the campaigns, state political leaders were openly and vocally in full favor of Roosevelt's reelection. A relatively harmonious party, with static given by only the few who styled themselves the "Jeffersonian Democrats" and fought Roosevelt, the Texas Democratic Party went along with the candidates who carried the party banners to victory in 1932. No state issues of any consequence materially influenced the presidential campaign issues in the state. Republicans and Democrats alike appealed

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65 "We have seen in Texas in the years since 1936, when the Jeffersonian Democrats was started as the first anti-New Deal political organization, a campaign of ever-growing intensity against the liberal policies of the New and Fair Deals."
Letter from Stuart Long, State Executive Committeeman, Twenty-first District, May 20, 1930.
to the Negro voters in their conventions, but few Negroes cast votes in Texas. The factor of traditional Democratic voting was, of course, present in an undeterminable degree. But the chief factor in the campaign, aside from the character of Garner's "Chief," was very likely the many-sided issue of the New Deal itself. Issues like the plowing under of cotton, the merit of the W. P. A., and the other New Deal measures were of key interest to many thinking Texas voters. In any event, the Texas decision was emphatic in favor of the New Deal candidates. The Republicans and the Jeffersonian Democrats, in the light of the 1936 returns, had few bright prospects for 1940.

An example of this traditional voting will serve to impress its importance, intangible though it is, upon the reader. "A former editor of the Dallas News" said that "he would vote a yellow dog on the Democratic ticket before he would vote for one of the twelve apostles on the Republican ticket." The editor is quoted as having said, "My father went to the polls in North Carolina when he had to march between two rows of bayonets held by Negro troops [sic], and I have not forgotten it."

CHAPTER III

ELECTION OF 1940

1937-1940

But the Republicans and the Jeffersonian Democrats in Texas were soon to have less cause for weeping and wailing, despite the outcome of the Roosevelt-Landon presidential race.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in 1936, won the greatest victory in modern U. S. politics. And into Washington on his coattails rode the most impressive congressional majorities ever known to either the Democratic or the Republican party. . . . Here should have been the means to a new peak of power. But it was followed, instead, by a steady decline.1

For soon after the new Congress assembled the court reorganization bill came down from the White House. A controversy immediately arose over increasing the membership on the Supreme Court, called for in the bill. This provision had the purpose of "packing" the Court with added justices appointed by the president and would have given the president, so the conservative leaders thought, a "rubber-stamp" judiciary to uphold future New Deal legislation. "Mr. Roosevelt's opposition really came of age in this fight."2 This and other

1 "The Democratic Party," Fortune, XX (October, 1939), 73.
2 Ibid.
issues plagued southern Congressmen.

Until 1937 the dubious southern conservatives could vote for New Deal measures, knowing with a reasonable degree of certainty that a conservatively dominated Supreme Court would hold such measures unconstitutional. With a threat to this safeguard and with the prospect of the passage of an anti-lynching bill brought about in part by the infiltration into the northern branch of the Democratic party large numbers of negroes, the southern wing of the party was badly frightened. Their fears were accentuated by the fact that the traditional two-thirds rule for nominating presidential candidates had been abolished by the Democratic convention of 1936 over the strenuous opposition of southern conservatives.\[3\]

The court bill hearings coincided, too, with a series of CIO-sponsored "sit-down" strikes, abhorrent to the large majority of "anti-labor" Southerners, including Vice President Garner. With all these considerations, and others as well, in mind, Southern Democrats helped defeat the bill.\[4\] The reversal of the president on this bill alone likely would not have caused any general break between Congressional and Administration Democrats. Meantime, however,

the industrial and agricultural reforms introduced by the New Deal were proving increasingly galling to southern conservatives. First of all, though defeated in his Court reform proposal, the President was gaining repeated victories before the Supreme Court itself. The Wagner Act was upheld in 1937 and later a new Agricultural Adjustment Act, enacted in 1938, and the Wages and Hours Law were approved. ... Another source of irritation was the report of one of the President's numerous

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4Ibid.
commissions labelling the South as the nation's number one economic problem. This type of publicity was disturbing to the sectional amour propre of the South and made fair to lay before the world's gaze certain aspects of southern life which its governing class preferred to be settled locally.6

"Old Guard Southerners" were offended earlier by Roosevelt's failure to appoint Senator Joseph T. Robinson to the Supreme Court and his choice of Senator Hugo Black of Alabama, "than whom there was no more militant and courageous southern New Dealer in the Senate."6 Upon the Arkansas Senator's death, Roosevelt entangled himself even more in Congressional politics, in strongly endorsing Alben Barkley over Pat Harrison of Mississippi as Senate floor leader. Barkley won the post by a single vote. "But even sadder, for the New Deal, was the fact that with Robinson's death Vice President Garner became the most powerful man on Capitol Hill."7

The Congressional revolt was well underway, and further "in-fighting" was in the offing. On such measures as housing,

5Ibid., I (August, 1939), 468-469.

6Ibid., I (May, 1939), 149.

7Garner is characterized as a Texas liberal, liberal in economics but not in social attitude. "Garner has the Populist's attitude toward Wall Street and firmly believes in breaking up great concentrations of wealth. He gave his wholehearted support to such measures as the Securities Exchange Act and the utility-holding legislation. But he also has the small-town businessmen's hatred of unions and turned from the President when emphasis switched from economic to labor legislation. Garner opposed the court bill, and this split separated them further. And when he failed to get the President to condemn the 1937 sitdown strikes he joined the opposition for keeps." "The Democratic Party," Fortune, XX (October, 1939), 78.
minimum-wage, and Townsend Plan legislation, "the typical neo-Confederate Southerners" would, in voting "no," despair of the effect of raising the Negro standard-of-living. With representatives like "the pompous Martin Dies of Texas . . . the old prejudices will work overtime to cripple any sort of legislation that might conceivably appeal to--let us say--the United Mine Workers of Pennsylvania [and, by implication, to New Dealers in general]." Two other reversals were in store for Roosevelt before the summer primaries of 1938. Tennessee Valley Authority appropriations for the new Gilbertsville Dam were beaten down in the House in March. Then, the bill calling for the reorganization and reform of the administrative branch was fought by several pressure troops and styled a power grab attempt by ex-President Hoover. The House voted this measure down, after the Senate had passed it.

Then the president decided on a bold move. In his "fireside chat" of June 24, 1938, he announced

his participation in the Democratic primaries. He said he felt that he had every right to speak in those few instances where there might be a clear issue between candidates for a Democratic nomination involving the "definitely liberal declaration of principles set forth in the 1936 Democratic platform," or involving a "clear misuse of my name."

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8 "Mr. Roosevelt's Party," Fortune, XVII (June, 1938), 98.
9 Harold U. Falkner, "Revolt against Roosevelt," Events, III (May, 1938), 357.
From then on he was in the fight openly and with hard blows. 10

No clear decision resulted from the president's attempted "purge" of some of his anti-New Deal political foes. At first, the returns confirmed the president's power in the primaries, as Senator Barkley was returned by a slim majority over the popular Kentucky governor, "Happy" Chandler [who later joined Barkley in the Senate]. The victory of Lister Hill in the Senate race in Alabama and that of Claude Pepper in Florida were held responsible for jarring loose the wages-and-hours bill which had been effectively "pigeonholed" in committee. 11

By and large, however, the president's frontal assault on the Senators who stood in the way of his New Deal program was far from successful. The fall elections showed that, "in state after state, voters have decided to place affairs in the hands of men not of the president's party," in choosing both Republicans and anti-Administration Democrats for service in the new Congress. 12 By way of summary, Fortune editors observed,

With no Robinson to hold them in line any longer, with patronage discontent becoming widespread, with Garner easing over to their side, with their compactness giving them an advantage in the unwieldiness of the big Democratic majorities, the opposition became increasingly powerful. And when the 1938 elections went against the New Deal and gave

10 Raymond Clapper, "Roosevelt Tries the Primaries," Current History, XLIX (October, 1938), 16.
11 Ibid., p. 16.
the Republican opposition more courage, when all but one of the purges failed, this bloc began coalescing with the Republican minority. It became the balance of power on the Hill; the guiding force of the reaction to the New Deal in the last seventy-sixth congressional session and the center of revolt against Roosevelt. 13

But the revolt apparently did not attain broad popular support. An "intensive survey" of nine Southern States by a staff writer of the Baltimore Sun, made after the adjournment of the stormy session of the Congress, showed that all of the Southern States were as pro-Roosevelt as ever. An even broader survey, by Walter Karig of the Newark News, revealed the same findings for the South and the West. 14 As early as 1937, "no less than ten Democratic governors . . . had . . . declared in favor of the third term—and that more than three years before another presidential election." 15 The election in 1940 was to indicate more accurately the political effect of the Congressional revolt and "purge."

As the year 1940 opened, the chief presidential election interest, at least in Texas, was the open candidacy of John N. Garner for president. As early as 1938, Garner was among the presidential aspirants sounding the depths of the party presidential favor. He had declined a third term as a candidate for senator in 1934.

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13 "The Democratic Party," Fortune, XX (October, 1939), 76.


15 Ibid.
for vice-president, and, in the fall of 1939 when Roosevelt's plans were the unknown factor in the race, the Pathfinder poll showed the Texan to be the leading candidate. At that time fellow Texans were polled as favoring their native son quite strongly (seventy-eight per cent). But Garner was not without determined opposition. John L. Lewis called Garner a "whiskey-drinking, poker-playing, evil, old man;" he later qualified these rather strong words by saying he meant them as opposing Garner as a political symbol. New Dealer Maury Maverick of San Antonio said the Texas candidate was too old for the position. Garner, James A. Farley, and Paul V. McNutt all vied for national attention as candidates, as the prospect for a "draft" of Roosevelt dwarfed their efforts.

Conventions

The spring convention of the Texas Democrats was the scene of a great deal of divided and hostile opinions, chiefly concerning two of the candidates for president. Garner leaders were in control of the meeting, with the state executive committee chairman, R. B. Germany of Dallas (also Garner's manager), tried to set up the temporary organization on a

16 Roy V. Peel and George Snowden, "From Four Years of Politics the Candidates Emerge," Public Opinion Quarterly, IV (September, 1940), 453-454.

17 Quoted in Roy V. Peel and George Snowden, "From Four Years of Politics the Candidates Emerge," Public Opinion Quarterly, IV (September, 1940), 454.
viva voce vote. A near-riot resulted, and former Governor Pat Neff finally restored order; the "third termers" were beaten on a roll call by a vote of 1,796 to 217. The convention harmony had been disrupted by "a riotous minority of Rooseveltites whose efforts at control of the convention were squelched, and by an attempt to strike Mayor Maury Maverick's name off the list of delegates." Garnerite Maury Hughes was made permanent chairman, and Sam Rayburn was chosen to head up the Texas national convention delegation. By an agreement reached earlier between Roosevelt and Garner special instructions were given the Texas delegation. "Garner was named as the logical successor to Roosevelt in the resolution of instructions, which also directed the Texas delegation not to use its forty-six votes to join in a movement that ... might be interpreted as one aimed at stopping Roosevelt." On the one other "hot" issue, Chairman Hughes ruled the motion to remove the militantly pro-Roosevelt Maverick as a Democratic elector as having failed, on a close voice vote.

The Texas Republican organization was not so divided, controlled as it was by the single viewpoint of Colonel R. B. Creager. The hand-picked Texas delegation to the national convention agreed on a strong policy of aiding Britain short

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19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., p. 19.
21 Ibid.
of war and, presumably, of going to war if necessary. Creager was named floor manager of the Taft forces, and the visit of Thomas E. Dewey with the Texas delegation was not sufficient to "swing" its support from the more conservative Chican.\textsuperscript{22} The chief candidates, up to the eve of the convention, were Robert A. Taft, Creager's choice, and Dewey, the New York Governor. The relatively unknown candidate, Wendell Willkie, was running fourth on most polls, behind the above two and Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan. The Texans saw the "dark horse" candidate move up to third place and, on the day before the convention, to first place in the public opinion polls.\textsuperscript{23}

The convention choice was being narrowed to Willkie \textit{versus} the field as the platform was being drawn up. In the Republican statement were

\begin{quote}
\textit{A blustering attack on the new deal, a proposal that the constitution be amended to prohibit a third term for any President} \textit{sic} \textit{and a pledge to attack unemployment and depression by encouraging free private enterprise.}\textsuperscript{24}
\end{quote}

The Republicans charged the Roosevelt Administration with extravagance in government expenditures and with unpreparedness in a time of emergency. They advocated preparedness and peace in the matter of foreign policy and went on to develop their

\textsuperscript{22}\textit{Dallas Morning News}, June 27, 1940, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{23}\textit{Peel and Snowden, op. cit.}, p. 459.
\textsuperscript{24}\textit{Dallas Morning News}, June 27, 1940, p. 1.
proposed domestic policies. The Social Security Act was to be extended, and collective bargaining, farm subsidies, and a "scientific" tariff were endorsed. The Republicans would try to restore a "sound" money under Congressional direction. And they would extend the merit system for federal employees and seek equality for all races and creeds.\textsuperscript{25} From such an imposing list of objectives it is not difficult to see that some of these stands would be appealing to many voters, in the nation—and in Texas.

Although Dewey and Taft had major blocs of pledged delegates during the early balloting in the choice of the candidate, Willkie's strength rose rapidly. Dewey released his pledged delegations after the fourth ballot, increasing the roll call vote, the final outcome became clear, and the customary motion for a unanimous vote carried.\textsuperscript{26} Throughout all of the six ballots the Texas delegation clung to Taft and changed only with the unanimity motion.\textsuperscript{27} The nod for the vice-presidential nomination was given to Senator Charles L. McNary of Oregon, with the Texans split over their choice. Creager's choice was McNary, who carried twenty-two of the twenty-six votes; the delegates were uninstructed. At the

\textsuperscript{25}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{26}L. T. Herrill, "Roosevelt Again—or Willkie?" \textit{Events}, VIII (August, 1940), 102.

\textsuperscript{27}\textit{Dallas Morning News}, June 29, 1940, p. 1.
close of the convention, Creager and Mrs. More, also of Brownsville, were again reelected as national committeeman and as national committeewoman.\textsuperscript{28}

When the Democrats assembled in Chicago a month later for their national convention they still had no definite word from the president as to his renomination wishes. The party primaries in several states, chiefly in the Middle West, and several large delegations looked to the "Chief" for continued leadership, in view of the "exigencies of world crisis and party success."\textsuperscript{29} Before the first session opened, the Texas delegation split over the choice of a platform committeeman, especially after the cold reception of Garner's candidacy was realized. A strong minority of the delegation wanted to go along on the Roosevelt "bandwagon."\textsuperscript{30} The uncertain delegates cheered Alben Barkley as he praised the Roosevelt Administration, but it was not until the president's direct message was given that a big demonstration was set off. Roosevelt told the delegates that they were free to choose any candidate and thus put the third term issue directly upon the shoulders of the delegates. The responsibility for breaking the third term tradition was accepted, and Roosevelt was renominated in a tremendous show of force.\textsuperscript{31}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{28}\textit{Dallas Morning News}, June 23, 1940, p. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{29}\textit{Merrill}, op. cit., p. 102.
\item \textsuperscript{30}\textit{Dallas Morning News}, July 15, 1940, p. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{31}\textit{Merrill}, op. cit., p. 104.
\end{itemize}
Fruitless opposition to the Roosevelt draft had its brief innings next day when Vice President John N. Garner, Postmaster General James A. Farley and Maryland's Senator Millard Tydings were put in nomination. . . . The convention's death verdict on those Jeffersonian anti-third term principles was presently thumpingly rendered when it gave Mr. Roosevelt all but 149 of its 1,100 votes.32

Texas' convention votes accounted for forty-six of Garner's sixty-one votes.33

The choice of Henry Wallace was openly distasteful to the Texans and to most southern delegates. The first choice of the Texas Democrats was their delegation chairman himself, Sam Rayburn, with a second choice of Jesse Jones, then Federal Loan Administrator. But Rayburn went along with the president and seconded Wallace's nomination, while Maverick led the outright pro-Wallace minority in the delegation. The Texans cheered McNutt as a possible candidate and "booed" him when he spoke for Wallace. The disgruntled Texans finally went along with the Southern States in voting for John Bankhead of Alabama as a protest candidate. Finally, the Texans agreed to join in the vote to make the nomination unanimous.34

Not only in having Wallace thrust into the vice-presidential candidacy were the southern delegates antagonized. Although with Southerners as temporary and permanent chairman, the Southerners played somewhat the role of the ladies' auxiliary in the Second Chicago Convention.

32 Ibid., p. 105.
33 Dallas Morning News, July 12, 1940, p. 1.
The platform of 1940 was constructed by Senator Wagner of New York who had no personal reason to satisfy the wishes of those Southerners who had so heckled his labor legislation in Congress. The New Dealers were in control; they renominated their men in spite of Jeffersonian tradition; and by proclaiming a program of all-out nationalization, they simply ignored the dead issue of states' rights. Also for the first time in the history of the Party, the Convention so far disregarded southern sensibilities as to pledge equal protection of the laws regardless of race, creed, or color.35

Although this view of the 1940 Democratic platform may well be slanted, the general observation that the South was "snubbed" probably will stand on the issues named. On foreign policy, farm, and relief planks Southerners had reason for no such disagreement with the Democratic platform.

Soon after the national convention delegates went home, they found Texas political fever running high, principally over the governor's race. The results were decisive, as W. Lee O'Daniel was elected over six opponents in the first primary. The significance for the purposes of this paper is that the national issues were not involved in the campaign. Although O'Daniel had been charged with voting for the Republican candidate for president in 1932 and his gubernatorial opponent challenged his party affiliation during the general election campaign of 1938, his party preference was at least nominally Democratic.36 However,


if a man's political principles may be ascertained from the beliefs and practices of the friends he makes and keeps, it seems probable that O'Daniel was already opposed to the Roosevelt administration in 1938 but kept discreetly silent because of the realization that the President polled 37.6 per cent of the Texas vote in the 1938 national election. 37

So far removed from the national scene was the Texas governor's race that O'Daniel was an "out-and-out" isolationist, confining his views strictly to state issues. 38

As the Texas September Democratic meeting convened, one cloud was on the otherwise placid horizon. A minority of the delegates, the size of which could not be determined, were favorable to Willkie's candidacy; their leader was the fiery old Agriculture Commissioner J. E. McDonald who was "openly . . . flirting with the Republicans." 39 Despite this threat, the state executive committee endorsed all of the candidates chosen in the primaries, including McDonald, and praised and asked support for the incumbent governor. 40 The temporary chairman, Hal Collins, who was the choice of O'Daniel for the job, spoke in criticism of the New Deal candidate. He called for an amendment to limit the president's tenure to two terms, scored the "big-city political machines" of the Democrats, and generally criticized the New Deal. A "smashing counter-attack" was given in rebuttal by Elliot Roosevelt, the

37Ibid., p. 4.  
38Ibid., pp. 7-8.  
40Ibid.
president's son and a Tarrant County delegate. The young Roosevelt turned the convention into a "sounding board for President Roosevelt's campaign for re-election to a third term."\footnote{Dallas Morning News, September 11, 1940, p. 1.} And when the governor spoke later to the convention, he confined himself solely to state issues.\footnote{Ibid.} He apparently took cognizance of the president's continued popularity. McDonald was subsequently asked to state his stand on the November presidential election; he was nowhere to be found, and the question remained unanswered.\footnote{Ibid.} Interest was next to center on the national campaign issues, with no serious state schism in view.

**Campaign**

The recounting of campaign issues is at best a selective and only partially adequate process. Several issues, however, stand out. One precaution must be given;

as Mr. Willkie's philosophy of government unfolded it developed that his declarations on specific issues were more in accord than otherwise with those of Mr. Roosevelt. . . . With both candidates preaching the same broad objectives, the political game was to be limited to issues of emphasis and method.\footnote{Y. O. Key, Jr., "Willkie Does the Campaigning," Events, VIII (November, 1940), 340.}

On foreign policy both candidates substantially agreed, and, while Willkie hit the national preparedness program as being late and too costly, Roosevelt was in a position to make

\footnote{Dallas Morning News, September 11, 1940, p. 1.} \footnote{Ibid.} \footnote{Ibid.} \footnote{Y. O. Key, Jr., "Willkie Does the Campaigning," Events, VIII (November, 1940), 340.}
actual foreign policy, having therefore a better political position on the issue. Texans could look at the foreign policy and look at the farm and labor policies of the candidates as well with no clear choice resulting as between the parties. The Republican's stand on agricultural problems was an essentially New Deal stand, calling for changes in the farm credit plan, for a reexamination of the A. A. A., and for more encouragement to cooperatives. In regard to labor, "Mr. Willkie saw eye to eye with Mr. Roosevelt," and he asked further for a high grade conciliation service, a less controversial Secretary of Labor, and expanded state action in the field. As a principal part of his charges, he hit the high number of unemployed persons (9,600,000), even after eight years of the New Deal.

Willkie was emphatically "pro-business;" the regulation of business should be sound and consistent, with a tax program consistent with sufficient incentives for proper reinvestment. Government competition was to be narrowly defined and minimized. Taft had earlier asserted that the chief issue of the campaign was whether local and state action or federal control should provide for business. Before laws were passed pertaining to given industries, those industries should be consulted; while collective bargaining was all right, this process should not ignore the free choices of joining or

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46 Ibid.  
48 Ibid.
refraining from joining the unions. While there is no clear issue in the campaign involving a conflict between business interests and the federal government, there was considerable amount of controversy over this point. The issue of Mr. Willkie's business connections was raised in the campaign, and the Fortune poll of public opinion on the matter indicated that well over half of the American people did not object to his position. About twenty per cent of the people polled were more favorable toward Willkie's candidacy because of this business success.

The effect of two other issues is difficult to assess, but the indications are that they influenced many voters, many


50 Many businessmen undoubtedly preferred the ex-president of Commonwealth and Southern, and some were vehement on the subject in opposing Mr. Roosevelt.

"Were Mr. Roosevelt to be re-elected, almost certainly there would be four years more of the ill-tempered cleavage which has afflicted the country during the recent period, with management of private business almost solidly in rebellion against the government in general and Mr. Roosevelt in particular. It is a question, I think, how long a system set up as is ours, mainly dependent upon the initiative of private enterprise, can survive under a state of bloodless civil war with the government. In instituting reforms much overdue, Mr. Roosevelt has built his monument. But in the process an emotional gulf has developed between him and the businessmen of the country which apparently cannot be bridged at this late date. Bitter feeling on both sides overwheels commonsense give-and-take. It cannot be helpful to the country to perpetuate this situation."

Raymond Clapper, "Third Term for Roosevelt?," Current History, L (August, 1939), 55.

of them, no doubt, Texans. Over the issue of the indispensability of the president a great deal of controversy arose. Those favoring Roosevelt's reelection try pointed to the need for a strong president like Roosevelt to continue and consolidate the gains of his first two terms. Although many would disagree with this analysis, Pennsylvania Senator Joe Guffey said,

Roosevelt's first term which began in 1933, was canceled, vetoed, by the Supreme Court. His second term, which began in 1937, has been hampered by Tories and political ingrates.\(^\text{52}\)

The people, continued Guffey, "are saying that so far there appears to be only one to guarantee the continued enjoyment of the many social, industrial, agricultural, educational and cultural gains that have been made under his administration, and that one is Franklin D. Roosevelt himself."\(^\text{53}\) Willkie hit the "indispensable man" argument hard and often. In a speech at Amarillo, he spoke strongly.

Germany found the indispensable man, Italy found the indispensable man, Russia found the indispensable man, and where is their democracy? If there was ever a time in the history of democracy when we should preserve all of its forms and all of its traditions (here referring to the tradition of two terms only for a president) it is now.\(^\text{54}\)

Roosevelt himself, although campaigning little save in some "nonpolitical" speeches, answered Willkie's implication by saying

\(^{52}\)Joseph F. Guffey, "F. D. R. Must Run Again," Current History, LI (July, 1940), 20.

\(^{53}\)Ibid.

\(^{54}\)Quoted in V. O. Key, Jr., "Willkie Does the Campaigning," Events, VIII (November, 1940), 340.
that no dictator would ever run the gauntlet of a truly free election. It is worthy of note here that Mr. Willkie was the only major presidential candidate to put in an appearance in Texas, certainly influencing some of his hearers in their voting. On the third term issue, which has been mentioned frequently through the pre-1940 discussion, the Roosevelt backers took at least two stands.

Cuffey asked the doubters of Roosevelt's third term strategy, "Can Senators [and Representatives] who have served since the World War convince us that we must get rid of Roosevelt because he has been in the White House since 1933?" Key says, "Democrats, for the most part, were inclined to permit the flow of international events to make the argument for departure from the two-term custom." The Fortune poll, in giving a choice of several statements relative to the third term, found that 51.8 per cent of those polled agreed with the statement, "While it may not be a good idea for a President to serve three terms, there generally should be no rule preventing it at a time of national crisis." Only 29.9 per cent of those polled disagreed with a third term for any reasons. Although Roosevelt was challenging a tradition which might have proved "deep-seated," his candidacy seemed certain to draw support.

55 Ibid., p. 344.  
56 Cuffey, op. cit., p. 20.  
57 V. O. Key, Jr., "Willkie Does the Campaigning," Events, VIII (November, 1940), 344.  
from those who would heed the warning of Abraham Lincoln, "Don't swap horses when crossing the stream." 59

Along with the individual answers to Willkie's charges, Roosevelt asserted his spokesmanship for the rule of the masses against the rule of the elite, as represented by his public utilities holding company-opponent. In addition,

the general tactic of the New Deal speakers was to suggest that Mr. Willkie's promises were incredible. In effect, the line of resistance adopted, in many forms, was to ask, does the farmer, the laborer, the public power advocate, the anti-appeasement man really think that Willkie means what he says? If you believe in his sincerity, do you think that he has the governmental experience to carry out his promises? Do you think that his associates in the Republican party would go along with in the program he advocates?

The task of making all of the "no" answers "stick" was a hard job indeed. 60

Results

But Texas returns indicated that nearly two hundred thousand voters did answer "no." As in 1936, many Texans voted the national Republican ticket and scratched the Republican candidates in the state races. George C. Hopkins, the Republican candidate for governor, received a negligible vote against O'Daniel, as all of the party efforts were exerted in behalf of the national candidates. 61

Presidential Republicans numbered just over one hundred fifty thousand, an extremely

59 Lindsay Rogers, "Willkie vs. Roosevelt!," Current History, LI (August, 1940), 18.

60 V. O. Key, Jr., "Willkie Does the Campaigning," Events, VIII (November, 1940), 345.

61 Dallas Morning News, November 6, 1940, p. 1.
strong indication that some traditional Democrats had voted a split ticket. Again, it is clear that state and national issues nowise conflicted, save in the possible connection that both O'Daniel and the Republicans were to some extent less internationalist than the national Democratic party. Table 5 should serve to bear out the conclusion that little, if any,

<table>
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<th>Party</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Governor</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Votes</td>
<td>Per Cent of Total Vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>905,156</td>
<td>81.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>211,707</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*From officially canvassed returns for 221 counties and from Texas Election Bureau unofficial returns; more than ninety-nine per cent complete, for thirty-three counties, as cited in Texas Almanac, 1941-1942, pp. 309-401.

*bTexas Almanac, 1949-1950, pp. 480-481.

interrelation exists between state and federal issues and, even more definitely, that state and federal party votes are

62McKay notes an especially strong isolationist tendency in the German counties but disclaims any implication of disloyalty on the part of the counties. Cordell Hull's cash-and-carry munitions policy and the issue of the revision of state going along with Willkie, who was at that time not so pronounced an internationalist, and O'Daniel, who was an out-and-out isolationist.

McKay, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
quite dissimilar. How much of the shift away from the traditional Democratic vote was traceable in motivation to voting for Willkie and how much to voting against Roosevelt can never be known. In all probability, the disaffection of many of the erstwhile Democratic voters involved a combination of both of these factors.

County-by-County Returns

Although little could be achieved in looking for the Texas voter's motivation in 1940, there may be some light shed on the election appeals of the two parties by studying the county-by-county returns. As before, the counties within four per cent of the state average, 31.0 per cent, are widely dispersed. But the distinction will be noticed that the number of such counties diminished a great deal as opposed to the 1932 and 1936 returns. Whereas ninety-nine counties so qualified in 1932 and one hundred six did so in 1936, only sixty-six counties are "average" counties in this election. A part of the reason for this small number is that only a limited number of counties showed notable percentage changes and that many of the more heavily Democratic counties with relatively stable voting blocs had been able to qualify as "average" counties when the state average was much higher. Several geographical groupings of the "average" counties may be seen. The Gulf Coast counties from Aransas to Jefferson are included, as are the central and south-central counties which are not classified as German counties. Two other general groupings
Fig. 8—Texas counties within four percentage points of the state average of the per cent Democratic vote in the presidential election, 1940.\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{3}Texas Almanac, 1941-1942, pp. 399-401. The per cent Democratic vote and the array were calculated by the author.
are in the northern Panhandle and in far West Texas. More specifically, the trend counties should be discussed in their relation to the counties used above, defined along the lines of race and nationality. Not a single German county is among the trend counties. Of the twelve Negro counties, out of a total of fifty-six as herein defined, four are on the westernmost fringe of the Negro counties in east-central Texas; the other eight form a double tier of counties along the Gulf Coast. The significant point about the Negro counties is that none of the "deep" East Texas counties with high percentages of Negroes are included among the "average" counties. Fewer Mexican counties (nineteen) followed the trend than in the previous two national elections, and two of the four metropo-
litan counties, Harris and Tarrant, are "average" counties. Many of the unclassified counties following the state trend are isolated in relation to other trend counties. One of the unclassified county groups is a belt of counties from Kimble and Schleicher to Erath and Somervell counties, while the largest number of Panhandle counties as a proportion of all the state average counties forms another bloc of trend coun-
ties.

A considerably different picture is seen in Figure 12 than in Figure 11. The first decile counties for the 1940 election are bunched in two readily identifiable groups; how-
ever, the tenth decile counties are more widely dispersed than in elections previously studied. Eleven of the twelve
Fig. 8-1. Counties at or further removed from the state average of the 44 per cent Democratic vote in the presidential election, 1948.
German counties as defined are among the twenty-five first decile (least Democratic) counties, and six of them are among the seven counties with Republican majorities. The other eight counties in the German county area, all contiguous to the German counties, have sizable minorities of citizens of German descent. Creager's bailiwick, as in the preceding elections, is noticeably in the first decile. One of the counties earlier carried, Brooks, is an "average" county in this election, and another county, Zapata, at least went along with the Republicans to some extent for the first time. One other county is included in this bracket, the inevitable Pan-handle county of Lipscomb, about five hundred miles away from any other first decile county.

Although widely dispersed, two general groups of the tenth decile counties can, broadly speaking, be identified. Fourteen of the twenty-five most Democratic counties are in East Texas, with ten of these being Negro counties. As in the earlier elections, the small northeasternmost counties are represented in the tenth decile. Two of the counties are in the southwest part of Texas; Starr and Duval, the two, are the only Mexican counties out of fifty-five in the tenth decile. The other nine counties in this class come under none of the racial or national definitions and are distributed widely from Crane and Andrews to Baylor and Hall counties.

Several conclusions present themselves. The German counties and the counties adjoining them with many descendants
of German settlers form the bulk of the Republican strength in 1940, along with the Creager counties in South Texas. The trend was but fairly general around the state away from the traditional Democratic party, as the number of counties closely (within four per cent) following the state average dropped over a third since 1936. The biggest proportion of the counties following, or leading, the trend was of two groups. One, the highly industrialized counties along the coast, might have been appealed to by Willkie's known successes in private business operations. The other, the northernmost Panhandle counties, may have been registering some reaction to Willkie's campaigning, conducted solely in that area. In any event, the trend counties may be seen not to be so widely dispersed as formerly. The heavily Democratic counties, as before, include a good many East Texas counties, with varying percentages of Negroes in the population, and several scattered politically integrated farming and ranching counties.

**Evaluation**

Texans saw in 1940 the first important disaffection from the traditional Democratic Party. Both parties gained in total voting strength, and the Democrats outgained the Republicans in new voters by a ratio of about three to two. But the effect of an almost one hundred thousand vote gain was to raise the Republican proportion of the total vote by over seven per cent. An increase of population, much of it from two-party states, may account for a part of this. The foreign policy
stand of the Democrats squarely favoring measures short of war to aid Great Britain and France probably had the effect of sending many isolationists to Willkie's support. Roosevelt's limited campaign and, by contrast, Willkie's fighting campaign likely had some effect on the vote. And the ever-increasing conflict between business interests and the government, deemed their adversary, surely changed some normally Democratic votes to the Republican presidential candidates's column. Some few Texans may have come within John Gunther's appraisal.

Many people, loyal to Jack Garner, were apt to say, "If FDR couldn't get along with as good a Texan as Cactus Jack, there must be something wrong." And Elliot Roosevelt's business activities and also, perhaps, his convention tactics in Texas didn't help to make the family popular. 63

Negroes were a relatively small factor in the election, with their vote total in the general election estimated at about fifty thousand. 64 In this election, despite the wishes of many white Texans, both major parties vied for Negro support. As before, the factor of the traditional voting habit of a large part of the Texas electorate must be left aside. An excellent probability is that many Texans, on the issue of impending war, agreed with their fellow Americans that Mr. Roosevelt might give them more experienced world leadership.

All that can be said with any assurance is that more people favored Roosevelt than Willkie but the polls


64Strong, op. cit., p. 511.
of the American Institute of Public Opinion throw some light on why they favored Roosevelt. About three-fifths of the voters indicated that they believed Roosevelt would do a better job of re-arming the country and about the same proportion expressed a preference for Roosevelt in the event of war.65

Key concludes from this,

If the election actually turned on these issues, the Republicans may take heart. If that is the case, the deduction would be that the New Deal social policies have not irrevocably cemented a majority to the Democratic cause.66

65. O. Key, Jr., "Willkie Does the Campaigning," Events, VIII (November, 1940), 414.

66. Ibid.
CHAPTER IV

ELECTIONS OF 1944 AND 1948

1941-1944

Under the exigencies of World War II men of both parties and men of all factions within the parties rallied under the leadership of the president in matters of war and foreign relations. Northern and Southern Democrats and Republicans alike presented a common front in all major decisions involving American affairs abroad. "Playing politics" was left for domestic issues, and with these Southern Democrats had a "field day." A running battle over American internal matters was waged between the administration forces and frequent Republican-Southern Democrat coalitions in Congress, as well as with the two blocs separately.

As early as 1941, southern Congressmen declared with the American Farm Bureau Federation in demanding that Farm Security Administration activities be curtailed. The broader charge was that the United States was pursuing a policy of land socialization.1 In Texas, a real battle was waged between one of Roosevelt's "fair-haired boys" and the controversial W. Lee

O'Daniel, who in his first vote in the Senate was to vote against the draft act although a world war with the U. S. in it was pending. The feeling was apparent in the state that Johnson was "in" with the Administration, having the blessing of Roosevelt, Secretary of the Interior Alvin Wirtz, a Texan, and many others. O'Daniel hit what he called New Deal "regimentation," "bureaucracies," interference with small business, and excessive spending. Although it was an off-year special election, the opinion seems valid that disagreement with the policies of Roosevelt by many Texans worked to the benefit of O'Daniel. For he carried the state, more especially the German counties with which he shared isolationist views. The victory of O'Daniel was considered a partial rebuff of Roosevelt and his New Deal Administration.

Although the Congress and, presumably, the people were militantly backing the Administration on the war measures, a great deal of criticism arose over wartime civilian controls. O'Daniel, now a Senator, was in the Texas political spotlight once more, running for his first full-time Senate in the summer of 1942. He had voted against extending the draft and had intimated that Roosevelt's administration was weak. His pet bill, an "anti-strike" measure, had been soundly defeated, and he referred to Washington as the "only lunatic asylum run by its own inmates," and to labor leaders as "racketeers." He

daily criticized all civilian controls and promised to rid Texas and the nation of gasoline rationing.\(^3\) Running against a popular and able candidate, ex-Governor Jimmie Allred, in the second primary, O'Daniel carried the state by a fifty-one per cent vote; he carried the German counties by a majority of two to one. Many charges were hurled throughout the state that the German Republicans, voting in the Democratic primaries, had reelected O'Daniel.\(^4\) At any rate, the Roosevelt opposition to the Texas Senator was again snubbed to some extent.

In Congress farm production and price controls were inflammatory issues. Ceilings on crop prices and the Office of Price Administration, the OPA, gave gray hairs to Roosevelt's harried Congressional leaders. The OPA had to be passed by Congress, or the president would have done so by an executive order.\(^5\) The Southern Governors' Conference, the pressure group later to lead the Dixie political revolt, was making early overtures in this direction even in 1942.

The Southern Governors' Conference became less enthusiastic toward the Roosevelt Administration with the rise of new issues, including race relations in wartime and the proposal by American Labor Party Congressman, Vito Marcantonio of New York\(^7\) to abolish the poll tax by act of Congress as a requirement for voting in Congressional and Presidential elections. The coolness was also increased as Talmadge came to

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 15. \(^4\)Ibid., p. 16. 
power in Georgia, Jones in Louisiana, Dixon in Alabama, and O'Daniel in Texas. But congressional opinion of the wartime measures was by no means all negative. Southern leaders did not uniformly go along with the Alabama Farm Federation and other farmers' groups purporting to speak for all the farmers in the region. Southerners were chairmen of the Agriculture Committees of both houses in 1942, and "very large and special aid to southern staples, cotton, tobacco, rice, sugar, and peanuts" came about by congressional action with full presidential approval. And southern support was regularly given in financial measures in wartime. Senators Connally of Texas and Byrd of Virginia were among the leaders in Congress asking for excess profits taxes and similar taxing laws, over considerable southern opposition.

The year 1945 was an off-year politically, with the new Congress elected and the presidential race still distant in the future. But the rebellion of Southern Democrats against the long-exerted control of Roosevelt, with many northern Republican allies, was more active than in previous years. The poll tax issue was shunted aside.


seven Southern States, were overconfident after their easy victory in the House of Representatives three weeks before the 1942 elections. The Republican House leadership, in a bid for Northern Negro votes, had helped get out the vote. But after the elections, when the bill got to the Senate, not a single Republican made a speech for it. The fight was between Democratic leaders and Southern Democrats. When an attempt was made to kill the filibuster by imposing cloture on debate, the Republican leadership voted with the filibusterers against cloture.9

In the new Congress the Southerners effectively took over control. Speaker Rayburn was reelected by a partisan vote with but a nine-vote margin. The Southern Democrats took over the party caucus in the House and placed four more Southerners on the powerful Steering Committee, enabling them to make it "the policy-making body for all House operations."10 In the Senate Senator Barkley was unanimously chosen the Administration leader by the Democratic caucus, but twenty votes were cast against his appointing Senators to fill the vacancies on the Senate Steering Committee. Roosevelt's 1940 campaign manager was subsequently put up for the position of minister to Australia. The Senators requested that he resign as National Chairman and, after he had done so, forced him to withdraw as potential minister when he saw his appointment would not be approved.11 The House Un-American Activities Committee, under

9 Kilpatrick, op. cit., p. 420.


11 Ibid., p. 30.
the chairmanship of Martin Dies of Texas was "one of the greatest thorns in the side of the New Deal," but its extension was approved by 85.5 per cent of the Southern Democrats and 94.6 per cent of the Republicans. 12

But these evidences of a Congressional rebellion do not complete the list.

Two southern Democrats, Representative Smith of Virginia and Senator Tom Connally of Texas, joined their efforts [Smith-Connally Act] with the intent not only of curbing the freedom of unions to strike, but likewise the perhaps chiefly, to prevent the use of union funds for political campaign purposes. President Roosevelt replied with a thumping veto which was promptly overridden, by a cabal of southern conservatives and Republicans. 13

Two weeks after the president's veto was overridden the CIO Political Action Committee, destined to be an incendiary issue in Texas politics from then on, was founded. Its purpose was to defeat every Senator and Representative who voted for the Smith-Connally Act; New Dealer Sidney Hillman's was the most prominent name associated with the movement. 14 Throughout 1943 rumblings of revolt were heard from many southern governors' mansions; "there was an outburst of anti-Roosevelt, pro-third party speech at a meeting of the Southeastern Governors Conference at Tallahassee, Florida, in the late spring of 1943." 15

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12 Vance Johnson, "The Old Deal Democrats," American Mercury, LIX (July, 1944), 52.


14 Peter Molyneaux, The South's Political Flight, pp. 9-10.

15 Johnson, op. cit., p. 56.
But the fire soon was reduced to embers.

While the professionals waxed warm and cool, the Southern man on the street never was intrigued by Governor Jones's Dixie revolt idea. A Gallup poll in midsummer 1943, when third-party agitation was still going strong, revealed that 30 per cent of the voters in the South favored the renomination of President Roosevelt. Samplings of public opinion have indicated continued enthusiasm. 16

The fire was by no means out. On the second anniversary of Pearl Harbor Senator Josiah Bailey of North Carolina in a blistering speech warned again that there was a limit to what the Southerners would take from the national Democratic party. 17 The prospects for victory in the South for the 1944 presidential candidate were not auspicious.

The rebellion over domestic issues went on in 1944 right up to general election day. One of the first issues to plague the Southerners was a provision for a federal war ballot for the convenience of overseas armed forces personnel. Southern leaders like Senators Byrd of Virginia, Eastland of Mississippi, George of Georgia, and McKellar of Tennessee teamed up with the Republican minority on the measure.

Concealing themselves behind a cloak of constitutionality and states' rights, these men joined the Republicans to defeat this measure and to enact a truncated version which left the state in control of the election process. The southern conservatives had no intention of allowing negroes and poor whites to vote without the customary inhibitions. 18

16 Ibid.
The feud continued.

The rift between the Congressional leadership of the Democratic Party and the President was brought to a dramatic climax with the President's veto of a Congressional tax bill which induced Senate majority leader Barkley's resignation. Barkley's position had become well nigh untenable since his task was to try to reconcile the clashing forces. His unanimous reelection was interpreted as a stinging rebuke to the President, and this interpretation was reinforced by the passage of the tax bill over Mr. Roosevelt's veto. The President hastily made an effort to conciliate Senator Barkley, but it is to be noted that Barkley was not included on Roosevelt's 1944 eligible list for the Vice Presidency.19

The Democratic National Executive Committee was not prospering under all of this intra-party strife.

Since the Democratic organization had fallen into a chaotic condition, Democrats began to demand that the national committee be invigorated by new blood. Senator Truman of Missouri took the lead in pressing for a middle-westerner border-state politician, Robert Hannegan of St. Louis. This action proved to be the initial step in the selection of Mr. Roosevelt's successor.20

Along with a rebellious Congress and a divided party organization, the President's Cabinet and the Supreme Court were both to give the anti-Roosevelt forces more fuel for their fires of Democratic insurrection. In the Cabinet, Henry Wallace, after accusing Jesse Jones of nonfeasance of office, was stripped temporarily of his administrative powers in favor of Jones. This change was more than tolerable to the Southerners, who little agreed with Wallace's friendship with organized labor.

19Ibid. 20Ibid., p. 479.
and submerged minorities. They especially disagreed with his militancy toward achieving his ends.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 479-480.} Finally, "the United States Supreme Court, by invalidating in Smith v. Allwright the white primary rule of the Texas state Democratic convention, dealt a stunning, if not immediately mortal, blow to this most significant political custom or practice of the Southern states.\footnote{A series of decisions handed down by the United States Supreme Court, terminating in the decision in Grovey v. Townsend, ruled that "the barring of Negroes from Democratic primaries by party rule was apparently established on firm constitutional grounds, at least in states where the conditions surrounding it were similar to those in Texas, to which the decision applied—that is to say, where, as in Texas, the primary election was financed and administered by the party, even though minutely regulated by law, where the state supreme court has held that either the primary was not a public election or an integral part of the general election system or that the party holding it was a voluntary organization free to determine its own membership, and where the state party convention as the highest authority of the party has laid down the white primary rule." If all of these requirements were met, the white primary rule was valid, by the Grovey Decision. However, in United States v. Classic, decided in 1941, the primary in which candidates for Congress were chosen and where the general election was only the final step in the election process was subject to federal control. The Classic decision paved the way for the Smith v. Allwright determination. C. Douglas Weeks, "The White Primary: 1944-48," American Political Science Review, XLII (June, 1948), 500-502.} This decision was handed down but a single month before the Texas Democratic precinct conventions and about seven weeks before the state convention in May.

Conventions

Anti-Roosevelt Democrats were in full control of the state meeting at Austin. So opposed were they to Roosevelt's
leadership of the party that they resolved that the Texas Democratic electors be left free of moral obligation to support the party nominees if a number of conditions were not met. The May electors would support the nominees only if the two-thirds rule were readopted, the Supreme Court decision on the party participation of Negroes were censured, and the state's right to control its elections were reaffirmed in the national convention. Ex-Governor Dan Moody was elected the temporary chairman of the regular convention, and Roy Sanderford, once a Ferguson supporter, was elected permanent chairman. The first test vote came on the motion to table a substitution motion to replace Moody's name with that of ex-Governor James Allred, the choice for temporary chairman of the Roosevelt forces. Administration supporter Alvin Wirtz's motion to compel the electors to be pledged to the nominees of the party also failed, by a similar margin.

Wirtz then led a bolt of the convention by about two hundred fifty delegates, which met in the other wing of the State Capitol. The bolting convention endorsed Roosevelt for re-election, chose Mrs. Clara Driscoll as the pro-Roosevelt group nominee for national committeewoman (which post she had held since 1932 until her resignation when the regular convention would not support nominees), recited complaints against the state executive committee, and charged that the people's will

had been thwarted by the May convention. Mayor Tom Miller of Austin was made the temporary chairman of the bolting convention, which heard charges that the four biggest counties with delegations of erstwhile Willkie Democrats had taken over the regular organization. Oilman and former State Senator C. F. Richards charged that many of the anti-Roosevelt delegates were "oilmen wanting the price of crude raised 35c a barrel;" he called them "men whose patriotism is gauged in barrels." Both conventions chose slates of delegates to the national convention.24

Action of the Texas [regular] convention fits in a general way with the attitude reported to have been taken by Democrats of Louisiana, Mississippi and South Carolina. Texas evidently has joined this bloc of Southern states in opposing new deal policies and alleged ignoring and mistreatment of Southern Democrats.25

Governor Coke Stevenson, by his own request, was not a delegate at the convention.26 This fact would suggest that state and national issues were not to be intermingled in the presidential campaign of 1944.

There was no such lack of harmony at the Republican state convention. Creager was reelected national committeeman, and Lena Gay More, Creager's choice, was reelected to her post as committeewoman from Texas. The assembled delegates charged, among other things, that the chief executive was encroaching upon the other governmental branches and upon private business.

24Ibid. 25Ibid. 26Ibid.
The convention chose to send an uninstructed delegation to the Chicago national convention.\textsuperscript{27}

Once there, the Texas Republican delegation caucused, and Creager announced the result. About two-thirds of the group chose to vote for Dewey, with the rest wanting Senator John Bricker of Ohio.\textsuperscript{28} The choice of the presidential candidate was almost a foregone conclusion.

Governor Dewey led in American Institute of Public Opinion polls as the Republican voters' Presidential choice throughout 1943 and 1944. Willkie remained in second position until his withdrawal from the race in early April, following his defeat in the Wisconsin Presidential preference primaries. General MacArthur was likewise a serious contender until about the first of May, when he declared that he was not a candidate.\textsuperscript{29}

Dewey's pre-convention campaign paid off well;

at the June convention Dewey was the nearly unanimous choice, and received 1,065 votes and the nomination on the first ballot. One vote was cast for MacArthur.\textsuperscript{30}

Creager's personal choices had been Dewey and Governor Earl Warren of California, who withdrew due to responsibilities in his state. But the Texans were happy with the combination of Dewey and Bricker, as were the vast majority of the delegates assembled, judged by their voting. Creager immediately began to "plump" for Democratic voters in Texas, wooing them with

\textsuperscript{27}\textit{Dallas Morning News}, May 24, 1944, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{28}\textit{Dallas Morning News}, June 27, 1944, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{29}\textit{Gallup Political Almanac}, 1948, p. 25.
\textsuperscript{30}\textit{Ibid}.
the strong states' right plank in the Republican platform, for
which he had in part been responsible. He also reiterated the
national party stand toward Negroes, that the Negroes have a
full right to participate in Republican primaries and conven-
tions.31 A strong bid for Negro support was made by the Re-
publicans, advocating a permanent fair employment practices
commission, an aggressive program to fight armed service se-
gregation, a constitutional amendment to outlaw the poll tax,
and early legislation to do away with lynching.32 Creager
could not very well emphasize this plank to most Texas voters.

To the same convention city went the Texas Democrats,
two full delegations of them. The "Regulars," i.e., the dele-
gates of the regular May convention, made common cause with
other anti-New Dealers in pre-convention meetings. This aim
was "to regain control of the party from the so-called Commu-
nists and labor leader racketeers for the true Democrats, who
seem to come mostly from Texas and other Southern States at
this particular time."33 To add to the confusion, the Regulars
had no agreed candidates until immediately before the opening
of the convention, when Rice Tilley of Fort Worth came up with
the name of Senator Harry F. Byrd of Virginia as the standard-
bearer.34 When the credentials committee ruled that the two

delegations should divide the vote equally and the convention supported the compromise, fifteen of the Regulars bolted the meeting. Among these were Tilley, E. B. Germany of Dallas, Wright Morrow of Houston, and Merritt H. Gibson of Longview.35 Texans seconded the nominations of both Roosevelt (Maury Hughes of Dallas) and Byrd (Dan Moody, Regular delegation chairman). On the first roll call vote, on which Roosevelt was nominated in landslide fashion, Texas rump delegates and one-half of the Regular delegates cast their votes for Roosevelt.36 The proposal of Texas delegates to restore the old two-thirds rule was turned down by a twenty-three to ten vote in the rules committee, and none of the Regular demands (page 99) were met.37 The contest was no less heated for the vice-presidential race. The Regulars and many other southern conservatives must have become all the more incensed when they heard the words of Wallace in seconding Roosevelt's nomination.

The future belongs to those who go down the line unswervingly for the liberal principles of both political democracy and economic democracy regardless of race, color, or religion. In a political, educational, and economic sense there must be no inferior races. The poll tax must go. Equal educational opportunities must come. The future must bring equal wages for equal work regardless of sex or race.38

On the first ballot the Regulars voted with Alabama and Virginia for Speaker Bankhead. The rump Texas Democrats voted

36Ibid.
37Ibid.
38Quoted in Shannon, _op. cit._, X (August, 1948), p. 482.
for Wallace. On the second, both factions finally got to-gether and supported the candidacy of Senator Harry Truman of Missouri, as Truman stampeded the convention.

The Texas Democratic primaries were far more peaceful. The state officers' races did not run into presidential political snags in issues and personalities to any great extent. Coke Stevenson was nominated for his second full term, running nearly 650,000 votes ahead of his nearest rival, with a vote of 606,536 out of 323,460 votes cast in the first primary.

There was no senatorial seat at stake in 1944. But the state elections provided only a brief interlude from the discord and heat of the presidential contest, divided in 1944 as in no previous election in the period covered in this study.

Two opposing views will portray the almost diametrical positions of the extremists in the two battling factions, with the crucial issue the New Deal. The Texas Regulars may be viewed as fighting "the full power and influence of the whole national Democratic administration." "An army of Federal office-holders and employees resident in Texas" and "every sort of pressure that could possibly be brought to bear, including both extravagant promises and dire threats" all militated in opposition to the Regular campaign. However, the campaign

40Ibid.
41Texas Almanac, 1945, p. 513.
42Kolyneaux, op. cit., pp. 31-32.
was anything but one-sided. For example, the "Southern Democratic Club," in fighting the New Dealers, published this type of emotional appeal just before the precinct conventions.

Do you want Texas run by outsiders? Run to suit the labor leader racketeers, the Communists, the CIO Political Action Committee, the Bureaucrats, and the dictator-makers?43

Continuing, the "club" decried the South being "sold out for Harlem votes" under the leadership of the "Roosevelt Caesars." Appealing for the ratification of the May convention results, the "club" asked the voters of Dallas County and of Texas, "Do You love Texas, too?" If so, voters were exhorted to fight "a National Socialistic State."44 Such vitriolic, and oftentimes irrelevant, charges were hurled throughout the summer.

The state executive committee tried to pave the way for an anti-Roosevelt September convention. For one thing, it turned down a proposal put by Robert Calvert of Hillsboro to set up a convention committee on electors, thus assuming the May electors were not clearly the party choices. Governor Coke Stevenson, with a plan to put two slates of electors on the ballot, never had a chance to bring his plan to the attention of the convention, as both factions wanted exclusive possession of the Democratic column on the ballot.

The first battle of the meeting was won by the anti-Roosevelt forces, as the big city delegations, solidly "anti" were

43Paid political advertisement in Dallas Morning News, July 22, 1944, p. 9.
44Ibid.
seated, along with a number of other likeminded county delegations. On the convention floor the first test vote for the control of the organization of the meeting was over the seating of a pro-Roosevelt delegation from Dallas County. The Rooseveltites carried the convention on a roll call vote by twenty-nine votes out of the 1,577 votes cast. State Chairman George Butler’s plan for temporary organization was sent to the scarpile, as Calvert was substituted as temporary chairman by the pro-Roosevelt delegates. The person given the tacit approval for the job by the governor was a former OPA executive, Mark McGee. Not so ignored was Martin Dies, who was cheered and booed at the same time while casting the Jasper County vote against the Administration forces; he was later booed off the platform after attempting to make a speech. Perhaps significantly, too, the two votes of Uvalde County, Garner’s home county, were cast with the ‘anti’s.’ In a most unusual convention the issue had been decided before temporary organization had been perfected; the purpose of this move was clear, to prevent Stevenson’s plan from being brought before the delegates.47

The steamroller then was rolling along. Pro-Roosevelt Harry R. Seay was made the new state chairman. Viva voce votes

47 Ibid.
were used on all issues. All county chairmen who would not pledge themselves to support the nominees were called on to resign, and a similar pledge was to be required of those to attend future conventions. Anti-Roosevelt forces left en masse, seeing "the handwriting on the wall." The anti-Roosevelt delegations from Dallas, El Paso, Harrison, and, next day, Tarrant, counties were unseated and "pro's" substituted. Allred was made permanent chairman by acclamation, and Clara Priscoll was reaffirmed as national committeewoman, as she had been at the May rump convention. Seven of the May "loyal" electors were left on the ballot, but the other Regulars were replaced.\(^48\)

One writer says that the pro-Roosevelt delegates made it only by the skin of their teeth, for on the first crucial ballot which decided control they got only the barest majority, less than 51 per cent of the convention votes. But it was enough. For it enabled them to kick out delegates by the wholesale and then to run things as they pleased. They removed the May convention's Presidential Electors from the Democratic ticket \(\text{[this is partially incorrect]}\), replaced them with faithful Roosevelt candidates, endorsed the Roosevelt administration in glowing terms, and elected a solid Roosevelt State Executive Committee. But they said not one word about the anti-Southern pro-negro program.\(^49\)

But the battle was not over for the September electors, pledged as they were to vote for Roosevelt. Secretary of State Sidney Latham denied the request for the ballot change, announcing that he would certify the May electors.\(^50\) Stevenson left leaders of both factions disgruntled by his middle-of-the-road

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\(^48\) Dallas Morning News, September 14, 1944, p. 1.

\(^49\) Holyneaux, op. cit., pp. 32-33.

\(^50\) Dallas Morning News, September 16, 1944, p. 1.
stand and the unlikelihood of his campaigning for or against either side. Taken to the Texas Supreme Court, the pro-Roosevelt electors were upheld, as no law was on the books pertaining to an elector change and the convention could decide such a party matter. A few hours after the decision was handed down the Regulars, under the permanent chairmanship of Roy Sanderford, chose a full slate of anti-fourth term electors to run as a third party on the November ballot.52

Key looks at it this way,

Actually the southern revolt began in the campaign of 1944. . . . In Texas, where anti-New Deal sentiment arose more from opposition to economic policies than from concern about racial policies as in the rest of the South, the "Texas Regulars," the corporation wing of the party, put a slate of un instructed electors on the ballot." . . . The strategy reflected the fantasy that life might be breathed into the electoral college and that unpledged electors could grasp a balance of power.53

State Issues

So monopolized by the intra-party strife and presidential campaign was the interest of Texas voters that state issues and candidates were practically ignored. Texans knew that the incumbent governor, who had not got "out on a limb" in the political fracas around him, would receive the customary second elective term. Too, there was no senatorial seat involved in 1944.

51 Dallas Morning News, September 17, 1944, p. 1.
Campaign

The regulars' campaign was a sensational and expensive one. John Gunther quotes some of the regulars' literature, "Four more years of those crack-pots and we are done—all finished—Bleanor [Roosevelt] and Sidney [Hillman] will take over and may the good Lord help us!" The influence of Senator O'Daniel was significant in behalf of the Regulars.

He came to Texas for a speaking tour, but was not as cordially received as he had been in his four preceding campaigns. In fact, his rally in Houston ended in a near-riot in which eggs, tomatoes, and other objects were thrown at the speaker. The Senate had revived the W. Lee O'Daniel News and had collected a fund of $100,000 in the so-called "Common Citizens Radio Committee" fund, with twenty-two contributions of over one thousand dollars, mostly from large contributors, to finance the radio and news campaign against the administration.

However,

there was little in common between O'Daniel and the leaders of the Texas Regulars except their opposition to the election of Roosevelt. It is true that the Texas Regulars hoped to profit from the O'Daniel speeches to the Texas voters and hoped to have a large portion of the O'Daniel following vote with them in the election. But it was always evident that the faction led by Dan Moody and C. B. German included mostly independent thinkers and that the O'Daniel movement was entirely separate.

Speaking of the split between the Democrats in Texas, Key says, "The issue of the split is crystal clear; the New Deal.

54 Cited in Gunther, op. cit., p. 344.
56 Ibid., p. 19.
57 W. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics, p. 256.
The issues before the nation as a whole involve the two major parties only. The issue of prime importance again may well have been the New Deal, taken as a body. A cataloguing of the current national problems might reveal the chief points of the candidates in their campaigning. Governmentally "protected" or "regimented" farm crop quotas and parity payments were of dispute, with the Democrats defending the former and the Republicans charging the latter. Wartime controls were managed fairly or unjustly depending upon whether the speaker was of the "in" or the "out" party; the OPA was under special fire by the Dewey backers. Southern voters, including Texans, were continually reminded of the continual attempts of some of the Roosevelt leaders and other liberals to remove the poll tax as a requirement for voting, which the presidential standardbearers both endorsed. Likewise, the Southerners were reminded of attempts by the Democratic Congress to outlaw by federal statute the practice of lynching and of the Democrats' success in providing for a Fair Employment Practices Committee in 1944. The charges of Martin Dies, chairman of the Un-American Activities Committee, that Communists and Fascists were infesting the national government were echoed by Republican orators, who strove manfully to be more "anti-subversive" than their partisan foes. In Texas, the Regulars were opposed both to the Communists, who were supporting Roosevelt, and the Fascists. The endorsement of Roosevelt by the CIO Political Action Committee was hit hard by Dewey and harder by the Texas
Regulars, the claim being that labor leaders were taking upon themselves virtually dictatorial powers and the hope remaining that many union men would not follow their union leaders in voting. John L. Lewis' endorsement of Dewey, like that of Willkie in 1940, was hoped by Republicans to carry the rank-and-file of the membership of the United Mine Workers, as well as of many other unions. While a great many other issues were brought into the campaign, not the least of which were the "depression party of Hoover" and "Roosevelt's age and failing health," one issue was probably paramount.

That issue involved the war. The progress of the war was promising victory in the near future. France and the Lowlands had been liberated, and the United Nations forces were on the offensive on both sides of the world. While the parties were cooperating in the war effort, the "man at the helm" was Roosevelt. Dewey claimed that the president was indeed dispensable, and the Regulars were far more emphatic than that. The two party stands on world peace and a world peace organization were similar; in the light of such problems the Democrats relied on the experience of their candidate, of which the Republican candidate, a state governor, could not have had. The Dewey candidacy had to rely more on his demonstrated ability as an administrator, his controversial use of alleged campaign "half-truths," and the accumulated opposition of the allegedly "anti-business" New Deal.
State Results

In view of such a maze of issues and the prospect of a choice among three major parties, Texas went to the polls in the general election of 1944. Table 6 will reveal that, as

TABLE 6

VOTE CAST FOR MAJOR PARTY CANDIDATES FOR PRESIDENT AND GOVERNOR AND PER CENT OF TOTAL MAJOR PARTY VOTES FOR ELECTION, 1944, TEXAS GENERAL ELECTION, 1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Governor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Votes</td>
<td>Per Cent of Total Vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>281,604</td>
<td>71.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>191,025</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas Regulars</td>
<td>180,239</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Texas Almanac, 1941-1943, p. 620.
b Texas Almanac, 1949-1950, pp. 440-441.

In the case of every preceding election studied, save 1932, the national Democratic ticket ran far behind the corresponding state ticket. The presidential Republicans number over ninety thousand, although the number could be somewhat higher if some of the Texas regular presidential voters, either erstwhile Democrats or Republicans (both major parties lost votes to the new third party), voted for the Republican gubernatorial candidate. The per cent Democratic vote for the state fell off about ten per cent as compared to the 1940 figure. This disaffection was by no means to the Republican party; the greater part of this loss of the traditional Democratic party was to the Regulars.
As partial evidence, the Republican vote was almost stationary as compared to the 1940 returns, while the Texas Regular vote enlisted another 11.8 per cent of the voters from the ranks of the traditional Democratic voters. This is not to say that the Republicans may not have gained some disgruntled Democratic voters who, tired or disdainful of the intraparty strife or convinced by the candidate or platform of the Republicans, went along with Dewey. But not a great many Democrats did so. In point of fact, the Republicans lost about eight thousand votes, chiefly in the German Republican counties, probably due to the influence of Senator O’Daniel. These votes swelled the total of the Regular vote, in all probability.

County-by-County Returns

More light can be shed on the election by a study of the county-by-county returns, all the more significant now with three parties splitting the major party vote of the Texas electorate. Figure 13 gives the counties within four per cent of the state average of per cent Democratic vote, which is 71.5 per cent. The similarity to the figures for 1940 is clear (see Figure 11, page 33). Again the Gulf Coast counties are included, as are many of the far West Texas and northern Panhandle counties. The belt of counties in the "heart of Texas" are again close to the state trend. And again, the two metropolitan counties of Tarrant and Harris are "average" counties. Two important changes are apparent. Fully half of the counties adjoining the German counties, trend counties in 1940, are not
Fig. 10--Texas counties within four percentage points of the state average of the per cent Democratic vote in the presidential election, 1944."

"Texas Almanac, 1945-1946, p. 529. The per cent Democratic vote and the array were calculated by the author."
so in 1944. The new addition of many East Texas counties to the state average group is the chief change in this election. A part of this "deep" East Texas shift of voters away from the traditional Democratic party is in the northeasternmost part of the state, where eight counties now are seen to be following the trend and where no more than two or three counties had formerly done so. The other part, from Houston and Angelina to Liberty and San Jacinto counties, is among the trend counties for the first time. Were these newly "disaffected" counties shifted to in the voting, as well as what part the other counties play in the state trend, an examination of the extreme counties for all three parties is in order.

The dispersion of the least Democratic counties is very much like that of 1940, just as is that of most of the trend counties. As before, the German counties predominate the first decile group. Eleven of the twelve German counties are among the twenty-five least Democratic counties. Nine more German-minority counties in the same south-central part of the state are counted in the first decile. Croager's bloc of counties are seen to be reduced by one more, to three. The one Panhandle county of Lipscomb is present as in every previous election studied. The last county of the twenty-five is Midland, appearing for the first time. Midland is one of the more strongly affected of many counties which, as will be discussed, moved over into the Regular camp. Of course, a number of counties, especially the German county group, also gave considerable support to the new party.
First decile (least) Democratic counties

Second decile (most) Democratic counties

Mr. D-Seven counties at Sunlight extreme from the state average or the 50 seat Democratic vote in the presidential election, 1944.

Mr. D - The per cent Democratic vote on the army were calculated by the writer.
The tenth decile group of counties are more widely dispersed in 1944 than in any of the earlier elections, except perhaps 1932 with its extremely high state average. There is one special similarity with the 1932 parallel figures. A group of counties, from Wall at the north end to Sterling and Coke in the south, are, as in that election twelve years before, among the strongly Democratic counties. Several of these repeated intermittently in the intervening elections in the tenth decile. All of these, along with Hartley and Crane counties, numbering thirteen in all, are among the twenty-seven most (three counties being tied as the twenty-fifth most Democratic county) Democratic counties. For the first time, five South Texas counties are in the tenth decile. Four of them had been strongly Democratic for years, frequently being in the tenth decile. In this election, with little influence reaching the area relative to the new party, their role is one of proportionally higher Democratic strength as compared to the other areas of the state with usually high percentages. Only seven of the fifty-six Negro counties are included in the tenth decile, and these are widely scattered over East Texas. These seven, with one other small county of relatively fewer Negroes, make up but a small part of the tenth decile counties, very much unlike the preceding elections with but two participating major parties.

The same findings as the above will pertain to a large extent, but conversely, to the other two major parties in the election. As for the Republicans, the first decile, the least
Republican counties fall into one minor and two major groups. The minor group includes the amazingly deliverable voting counties of Duval and Starr. It might be added that one of the counties adjoining Starr County, Zapata County, appeared among the twenty-five least Democratic counties in 1940 and among the twenty-five most Democratic counties in 1944, ample evidence that voters' free choices are either quite fickle or quite amenable. One major group in the first decile of Republican counties is almost identical with the eastern Panhandle strong Democratic counties, already discussed. The second group is one never showing strong Republican minorities in their election returns, and it stretches from Navarro to Polk and Montgomery counties. Rockwall and Delta are both small well-integrated counties with many Negroes and, with two other counties isolated from other like counties in West Texas, few Republicans.

The most Republican counties include six counties carried by Dewey, one with a Republican plurality, and one with a tie vote with the Democrats. The entire westernmost and southernmost part of the German counties are in the tenth Republican decile, and were discussed as first decile Democratic counties. Creager's bailiwick does include the four counties of 1940, as measured by Republican percentages. Lipscomb County, by this measurement, is joined by another Panhandle county, Gray, in the tenth decile. However, unlike the elections of 1936 and 1940, the eastern part of the German counties, with the
Fig. 19--Texas counties at furthest extreme from the state average of the 70 per cent Republican vote in the presidential election, 1940.

Note: The per cent Republican vote and the county areas calculated by the author.
one exception of Lee County, are not strong Republican counties in this election. Why they are not may be seen in the study of the Texas Regular strength.

Fifteen of the twenty-five counties with the least Regular strength are among the Mexican counties. This may be emphasized by pointing out that five of the six counties voting less than 1.2 per cent for the Regulars were in the southern-most Mexican county region. One German county, the mixed German-Mexican county of Guadalupe, is in the first decile, as are the two of the "deepest" East Texas Negro counties of San Augustine and Sabine. Three of the four Panhandle counties, all small, show extremely high Democratic percentages, and the fourth, Gray, was sharply divided between the other two parties. And Sterling and Crane counties are "in the same boat" as the three Panhandle counties.

The county groupings in the tenth Texas Regular decile are of some interest. A number of Gulf Coast counties which had been prominent among the trend counties in 1940 are now seen to be, as a group, strongly supporting the Regulars. Harris and Tarrant, again trend counties, may be seen to be such in this election by virtue of their considerable support of the Regular electors. The oil counties of Midland and Lubbock were strong for the new party, and a number of other counties, too scattered for careful judgment, likewise went along. Of these latter, a considerable number are Negro counties, agreeing perhaps with the conservative views of the Regulars on racial
First decile (20.2%)

Second decile (20.1%)

Note: The percentages and the number of votes are approximate and were calculated by the author.
questions. Most significant is the number of German counties now in the tenth decile. One bloc of five counties (Lee, Washington, Austin, Fayette, and Colorado) and two other counties with sizable German minorities, Henard and Mason, had been almost uniformly among the least Democratic counties in the previous elections. But, instead of being strong for the Republicans in this election, these counties delivered a large vote to the Regulars.

In summarization for the county-by-county study, several facts are worth noting. The trend counties are seventy-five in number and dispersed quite similarly with the distribution of 1940, especially in the Panhandle, Far West, and central Texas areas. The most notable change from any of the preceding elections is the large number of "deep" East Texas counties among the trend counties. Here, perhaps attributable to the racial stands of the two major parties and the less radical position of the Regulars on the matter, many East Texans could see their wisest course as leaving the traditional party for the third party. It is likely that these voters in East Texas were quite convinced that they were still voting the straight Democratic ticket and that the national party had left them, on the racial issue, to be the real "traditional" Democrats. At least, no appreciable Republican minorities have appeared in the area, judging by the election returns.
Evaluation

With many East Texas counties following the state trend, some few others remained strongly Democratic, along with the amenable voting areas in the Starr-Duval region. The rest of the high Democratic voting percentages are found in the southeastern Panhandle counties, regularly strong in Democratic majorities. The least Democratic areas are better explained as strong areas of the other two parties. The Republicans, weakest in the eastern Panhandle, the amenable vote counties, and the Negro counties of east-central Texas, carried six counties and are concentrated almost exclusively in the German county area and German-minority area from Bee and Live Oak to Gillespie and Kerr counties. Creager's counties, some others from Dimmit to Val Verde counties in a strip of counties, and the inevitable Lipscomb (along with Gray County) complete the list. The Texas Regulars, polling less than a one per cent vote in some counties, were weakest in the Mexican counties, including the metropolitan county of Bexar. They were strong in the 1940 "average" Gulf Coast counties, in certain of the oil counties, in the two metropolitan counties of Harris and Tarrant, in several scattered East Texas counties with high percentages of Negroes, and in the eastern and northwestern-most German counties.

The total net result of the returns for 1944 suggest a number of conclusions. First, the state definitely continued the trend begun between 1936 and 1940, with almost a ten per
cent shift away from the traditional Democratic party between 1940 and 1944. The shift was not unidirectional; Texas was a three-party state in the 1944 election. No longer was there such a likeminded political outlook on the part of Texans, as but seventy-five counties of the 254 counties were within the four per cent limits defining the state average counties. The Texas Regulars apparently gained votes both from the Democrats and the Republicans, but more from the former than from the latter. On the issues of a militant stand against the New Deal with its alleged "bureaucracy," regimentation," and "socialistic tendencies" and against the stands of both major parties, the Regulars picked up many votes. One of the chief lacks of the Regulars was that of a positive platform, not even having a candidate for whom the Regular electors were to vote. The Republicans, making many of the same charges against the New Deal, with all of its alleged favoritism of the labor unions and its excessive taxes on, and control efforts of both major parties to abolish by federal action the poll tax, lynching, and segregation and to make permanent the wartime fair employment practices commission. A sizable vote, not only in East Texas, undoubtedly hinged on this one issue. Negro voters did not go to the polls in any large numbers, since the Smith decision was handed down three months after the deadline for payment of poll taxes and but three months before the July primary. The total was probably not very much in excess of the 1942 Negro vote, authoritatively estimated at thirty-three thousand
votes. Perhaps the chief lack of the Regulars was that of a positive program; the new party did not even have a candidate up before the voters' choice. The Republicans, with an able administrator actively campaigning for the presidency, made many charges identical or similar to those of the Regulars. They hit the New Deal policies of alleged favoritism to labor leader-dictators, excessive taxing and controlling of private business, and unnecessary civilian controls.

On this latter point, especially in the matter of the OPA, the votes of many women were at stake. It is doubtful that support was given any party by the great majority of the women voters, for, had there been such a mass vote, the results would have been far more one-sided. In the 1944 election, as in no other involved in this study, more women than men voted, due to the absence of the men overseas. On this matter of the voting of armed forces personnel, no clear estimate of how many servicemen voted is available for Texas. The Republicans, while losing some votes to the Texas Regulars, probably picked up a few from some Democrats who had tired of the bitter intra-party strife, as well as some who were appealed to by the platform or candidate of the party. Senator O'Daniel certainly aided the Regulars, but it is likely that the votes he was chiefly responsible for getting were German Republican votes.

In the face of this opposition, the Democrats did not campaign very actively in the state. They had to "soft pedal" Roosevelt's CIO and Communist endorsements, both of which were hit with some effect. Farm issues were not highlighted, nor did the Democrats have to defend foreign policy measures. The voters were encouraged to "vote 'er straight" as usual, and such issues as "Wall Street control" and "Dewey's mustache" were ridiculed.

Along with the question of "who was right" in the intraparty quarrel, one immeasurable factor and two major issues probably ruled the voting choices of most Texans. The factor, as in every presidential election, was the traditional or habitual Democratic vote, reinforced by the Democratic primary pledge to support the nominees. One major issue was the New Deal itself, which, in all of its ramifications, in all probability affected the political thinking of most voters, whether considered as a conflict between business and government, between labor and capital, between high and low taxes, between Negro rights and "white supremacy," or between some other factors. The other issue was the war, fast approaching a successful conclusion. The dynamic leader who had led his people out of the Egypt of depression and now nearly out of that of a world war was probably thought experienced enough to "finish the job" and set up a world peace organization.
The year 1945 was to be devoted almost completely to the winning of the war. A United political front was maintained in all foreign policy decisions, including the measures dealing with the new United Nations. But, while the bipartisan foreign policy was being carried out, domestic disputes proved that the election of 1944 had not resolved the nation's problems of great social and economic import. For even in the spring of 1945 Congress was "racking its brains" over the controversial bill aimed to prohibit employment discrimination.

The principal opposition comes from Southern Democrats and others in Congress, Democrats and Republicans, who believe that the investigatory and punitive powers which the bills would grant the proposed commission are wholly un-American and dangerous to individuals of majorities and minorities alike; that the bill is wholly unworkable and that by accentuating and stressing the differences between the various groups, it would produce more harm than good. Those who seek to lessen discrimination, but who are opposed to the method suggested advocate education rather than compulsion. 60

The reader will be well aware of many Southerners' opinions on the issue as the bill cites three principal groups to be aided by the bill,

... Negroes, Jews and Catholics. Representatives of these groups, together with left-wing members of the Senate and House, are the most active in support of the pending measure. 61


61 Ibid.
Although, as in 1948, all of the issues before Congress and the people cannot even be catalogued, let alone discussed at length, the issues of 1948 need some definite attention. Before his death, President Roosevelt replaced conservative Jesse Jones with his former vice-president as Secretary of Commerce. In reply, the shocked Congress stripped the office of many of its powers.\(^{62}\) The so-called Case Anti-Strike Bill of 1946 was brought up and passed and subsequently vetoed by the president. The veto was sustained by a scant five votes in the House, as Democratic support was convinced almost exclusively to Southern Democrats.\(^{63}\) The Fair Employment Practices program was also blocked in this year by Southern Democrats combined with Republicans, whose actions "were spared . . . because they controlled the press."\(^{64}\)

Back in Texas a summer-long campaign, full of party strife between the "liberals" and the "conservatives," was waged over the Democratic gubernatorial nomination. Homer P. Rainey, "fired" University of Texas president, entered the field of candidates as the only "liberal."

No radical, yet he was portrayed as a threat to all American virtue. In fact, he held conventional New Deal views and did not hesitate to discuss concretely what he felt were the issues of the campaign. He received sympathetic support among CIO members and Negroes, as well as liberals generally.\(^{65}\)


\(^{63}\)Molyneux, op. cit., p. 45.


\(^{65}\)V. C. Key, Jr., Southern Politics, p. 257.
The election issue that was "made to stick" was the charge that Rainey was a man of "super-liberalism."\textsuperscript{66} The leading conservative candidate, Beauford Jester, was "acclaimed by the Texas Regulars" and also by many Roosevelt Democrats "who shied away from the alleged radicalism" of Rainey.\textsuperscript{67} In the campaign, although lost in the maze of political vituperation, was the issue of Rainey's actions at the University, including his stand for academic freedom. The conservative candidate won by a two to one margin in the run-off primary.

In general those counties that turned in the highest anti-Roosevelt vote in 1944 were also strongest for Jester in 1946. Beyond these intensely conservative counties, however, no close correlation exists.\textsuperscript{68}

The campaign was to have some repercussions at the conventions of 1943, where the same general division recurred.

Just before the fall Congressional elections, Truman, now president, was left in a ridiculous light, as James Byrnes, his Secretary of State, and Wallace began "nicking" over the new State Department "get-tough" policy toward Russia.\textsuperscript{69}

Partly on account of the Cabinet dispute,

the congressional election of 1946 suddenly raised some seventy Republican representatives to key positions in control of the House. . . . They proved to be extraordinarily responsive to the pressures of shortsighted business interests. . . . The real estate lobby brought to a standstill pending legislation for slum clearance and public housing. Farmers

\textsuperscript{66}\textit{Ibid.}  \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{67}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{68}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 253.

\textsuperscript{69}\textit{Shannon, op. cit.}, X (August, 1948), p. 487.
and manufacturers crippled the Reciprocal Trade Act. The grain lobby got through legislation greatly reducing facilities for storing grain, with the result that embittered farmers were selling corn far below the government-guaranteed price on election day of 1948.\textsuperscript{70}

With the election of the Eightieth Congress, later to be an issue itself in 1948, came many controversial measures, passed by the Republican majority with help from the Southern Democrats. On two major issues the Southerners teamed up with the majority party. The Southern Democrats helped pass the so-called Taft-Hartley labor law, styled "anti-labor" by union leaders, over the president's veto. And they unsuccessfully voted with the Republicans to override Truman's veto of a Republican-sponsored tax reduction bill.\textsuperscript{71} Some Democrats, chiefly under the leadership of Northern Democratic Senator McGrath, began late in 1947 to attack the Republican Eightieth Congress for its failure to aid veterans, for blocking housing legislation, for its failure to stop inflation (the OPA had been scrapped, with only partial rent ceilings of the wartime controls left in effect), for stopping constructive labor legislation, and for promoting tax cuts for the rich.\textsuperscript{72}

Speaking generally, Key says that by 1948, the New Deal had sharpened issues and had stimulated a closer alliance of the black-belt counties of

\textsuperscript{70} Wilfred E. Binkley, "The Party of Business," \textit{Fortune}, XXXIX (January, 1949), 166.

\textsuperscript{71} Shannon, \textit{op. cit.}, X (August, 1948), p. 438.

\textsuperscript{72} Peel, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 79.
all the South with industry. Both had reason to oppose national Democratic policies. Ostensibly the bases for opposition were different. Fundamentally, however, the black-belt counties shared with industry and finance a conservative viewpoint; it was not the race question alone that drove black-belt leaders into tighter alliance with business reactionaries.\footnote{V. O. Key, Jr., \textit{Southern Politics}, p. 329. The italics are mine.}

But the race issue was raised with its full inflammatory force early in 1943. In the matter of the poll tax, the Supreme Court refused in April "to review a federal circuit court decision invalidating the white primary arrangements of South Carolina, created in 1944 to circumvent the effect of the Allwright decision."\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}} President Truman, acting on the report of his Committee on Civil Rights, recommended to Congress that it pass a number of so-called civil rights bills, to outlaw the poll tax, lynching, and certain types of segregation, including employment discrimination.\footnote{V. O. Key, Jr., \textit{Southern Politics}, pp. 330-331.} Fiery Governor Wright of Mississippi carried his "anti-civil rights"

crusade to the Southern Governors Conference meeting at Wakulla Springs, Florida. He proposed that the conference serve notice on the leaders of the Democratic party that "we no longer will tolerate the repeated campaigns for the enactment" of civil rights legislation and call a "Southern Conference of true Democrats" to meet at Jackson, Mississippi . . . to "formulate plans for activity and adopt a course of action."\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}}

The governors "turned on the slow signal," and a committee was
sent to the national chairman of the party, who turned down their request to drop the civil rights program. This dispute was by no means settled.

Under consideration in the Congress was another measure, one of vital interest to many Texans. This was the bill to give clear title to the state tidelands to the states, an action denied by the Supreme Court to California in a 1947 decision.

Prior to the California decision Congress passed a law quitclaiming all Federal interest in the tidelands, but President Truman vetoed it. Now Congress is considering bill to vest title outright with the States.

Earl Warren, governor of California, testified before the Joint Judiciary Subcommittee in February of 1948 against national ownership; Warren was to be the G. O. P. nominee for vice-president. On the other hand, at least one Texan, Attorney General Tom Clark, spoke for federal ownership. At any rate, the issue of tidelands ownership, involving oil companies, certain state governments, including that of Texas, and the national government, was to be fought out in the conventions and the election of 1948.

The purging of the New Dealers in Congress left Truman standing practically alone within the battered bastion of Democracy. As President and vetoeer of unpopular

77 Ibid.
78 Congressional Digest, XXVII (October, 1943), 229.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid., pp. 278-279.
Republican legislation, he kept his name before the public in 1947. Democratic legislative leaders seemed curiously chastened. Barkley and Pepper seldom spoke on the floor, and the younger Democrats were lethargic.81

But Truman was the only Democrat prominent enough to carry the convention, with so few leaders having achieved much publicity under the "one-man rule" of Roosevelt's successive administrations.

By March 1, 1948, it was clear that Truman would be the candidate. This was what he wanted, the Republicans wanted it, and Wallace and his third party, the Progressives wanted it. The only dissent came from within his own party. The southern governors revolted first, on the civil rights issue. Next came the defection of the northern machine bosses. Next to evince signs of disaffection were the conservative radicals, members of the Roosevelt family and sundry members of the Americans for Democratic Action. The revolt at first was negative, a determination to reject Truman.82

Conventions

Beauford Jester, as nominal leader of the Democrats of Texas, held pronounced views on the Truman candidacy, and his state executive committee agreed with him. The convention, after a test vote of 1,047 to 992 favored State Chairman Calvert's rules of procedure, proceeded down the middle of the road, following neither the Fair Dealers nor the ex-Regulars. For this stand the governor thanked the convention.

The pro- and anti-Truman fight became by and large a progressive-conservative struggle for control of

81 Poel, op. cit., p. 85.  82 Ibid.
the party machinery and the party's presidential electors. The Texas Regulars, 1876 predecessors of the Dixiecrats, were in the forefront of the anti-civil-rights movement. In the Democratic state convention in May the liberal, pro-Truman group was unable to obtain a delegation to the national convention instructed for Truman; on the other hand, the Texas Regulars failed to win approval of a plan for the delegation to walk out if the two-thirds rule were not restored. Governor Jester, who opposed bolting, controlled the convention. 84

Compare this analysis of the convention another authoritative source, relative to the two factions:

The first group was composed of the remnants of the New Deal and in general was loyal to the party, but only lukewarm as regards Mr. Truman, the probable nominee. The second faction was a coalition of anti-New Dealers, violent States Rights men, and others who deeply resented the administration's view on the Tidelands oil issue. Many of the more extreme of this group were ready to bolt if they could find reasonable opportunity to do so. This group, led by Mr. Jester, was successful in nominating Dwight [sic] Morrow as National Committeeman from Texas. The delegates to the National Convention were divided between the two warring factions. 85

The Jester-Calvert choice for temporary chairman was former Speaker of the House Fred Minor, and the compromise permanent chairman was Albert Sidney Johnson. The convention "machine" then rolled along without a "hitch." 86 The platform, one of moderation, called for unalterable opposition to the civil

84 The author, as a delegate to this convention, believes that this first is an accurate account of the results and, more particularly, of the governor's stand.

W. C. Key, Jr., Southern Politics, p. 239.


rights program, a national plank to the effect that the national government would stop "usurping" states' rights, and the restoration of the two-thirds rule. Support of the nominees was also pledged, along with a possibly contradictory resolution that loyalty to one's nation was more important than loyalty to one's party.\textsuperscript{37} The Democrats, thus prepared for the national convention, watched the Republican state and national organizations apprehensively, more especially the latter.

The state Republican convention met with the usual control successfully exerted, i.e., Creager's domination. Some pro-Dewey county delegations, led by State Chairman George Hopkins of Dallas, were not seated, and Creager's choice of Taft was the convention choice.\textsuperscript{38}

The Creager delegates went to the national meeting and helped adopt a long and far-reaching platform and choose the top two G. O. P. candidates. The Republicans were for the full general principle of housing legislation, by implication repudiating the House Republican leadership which had, but a week before, turned down the Taft-Ellender-Wagner housing bill as "socialistic." Endorsement was given a farm price support program, "bona fide farmer-owned" cooperatives, sound rural electrification, strong armed forces, increased veterans'

\textsuperscript{37}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{38}Dallas Morning News, May 25, 1944, p. 1.
benefits and old age benefits, equal pay for equal work for women, and many other relatively noncontroversial planks in the platform. Communism in all its forms was condemned, and a strong civil rights program was advocated. Texas Republican Orville Hillington, a member of the platform committee, successfully kept out of the platform an endorsement of the F. E. P. C. Also, he and Oklahoma Senator F. E. Moore got a state tidelands control plank inserted. Along with these planks, the Eightieth Congress was extolled for reducing taxes, passing a new draft law (for which more Democrats than Republican voted), passing the Taft-Hartley Act, and passing a law allowing soldiers to vote without payment of a poll tax (affecting but two states). The platform was to be tested long before the Republican leadership planned.

A break in the vote of the Pennsylvania delegation in favor of Dewey gave rise to the possibility of a Dewey landslide. Creager assured reporters that the Texas group was definitely for Taft. As for opposition to Creager in a pre-convention caucus, "not a single voice was raised." Lena Gay More was quoted as saying, "that the reason you keep on re-electing me is evidence that you like a woman who doesn't talk too much." Coming from the Creager organization, there is likely more truth in this statement than modesty. In any event, the Texans voted for Taft on the first two ballots and


then joined in waving Dewey's nomination unanimous. The Texas group, which wanted Bricker again, was content with Warren as the vice-presidential nominee, especially because of the governor's stand on the tidelands issue.91

The Texas Democratic delegation to the national convention could only hope for as much success in influencing the platform as the Republican delegation achieved. With Jester as delegation chairman, the group wanted for one thing to help select some candidate other than Truman and for another to get four planks inserted in the national platform. One group of former Texas Regulars, most of them Houston men, demanded "an outright alliance with those Southern States who . . . [were] threatening to walk out on the convention and hold a rival, Dixie convention."92 But "the whole tone of the Jester policy pointed to a willingness to do business with Truman--to vote for his nomination on the first ballot--if Texas . . . [could] salvage anything at all of its platform principles." Wright Morrow, national committeeman-elect, led the first fight in the rules committee for the restoration of the old two-thirds rule. Beaten by a vote of six to twenty-four in committee, the proposal was shouted down on the convention floor.93 Former Governor Dan Moody represented Texas in the attempt by the Southern States to pass several resolutions,

among which was a mild (and unsuccessful) civil rights plank. Moody's specific proposal was a states' rights plank, which was defeated in a roll call vote by a vote of 925 to 309.\textsuperscript{94} Then the Southerners were stunned by the Fair Dealers' strong civil rights plank, also offered as a substitution for the 1944 declaration.

The evolution of the civil-rights plank was clearly the high point of the convention. Originally the hope was to satisfy nobody and offend nobody—a sure-fire prescription for campaign apathy. If the vapory civil-rights plank of 1944 was good enough for Roosevelt, the party leaders reasoned, it should be good enough for the Negroes of the party . . . and for the survivors of the New Deal.\textsuperscript{95}

But the A. D. A. (Americans for Democratic Action) and Truman's positive stand was not to be denied. The roll call vote was 651 to 582, at the conclusion of which (after a short recess) the Mississippi delegation and one-half of the Alabama delegation bolted the convention in protest.\textsuperscript{96} The last request of the Texans, for a plank advocating state ownership of the adjoining tidelands, was defeated in committee and never introduced on the floor.\textsuperscript{97}

The Texas delegation had been repulsed in its every attempt in the matter of resolutions. Then, although the convention choice was clear, the delegation chose to go along.


\textsuperscript{95}Robert Bendiner, "Rout of the Bourbons," \textit{Nation}, CLXVII (July 24, 1948), pp. 92-93.

\textsuperscript{96}\textsuperscript{Tbid.}

with the southern protest candidacy of Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia, after the withdrawal of Ben Laney, governor of Arkansas, as the candidate.98

The president gave the Southerners no comfort, as he appeared personally to accept the nomination given him by all save the "sullen South." He galled them all the more by asking specifically for the strong civil rights legislation. Along with the usual demonstration, "the President's aggressive talk, his peppery manner, and his sensational challenge to the Republicans to act on their platform now in announcing the call of a special session of the Eightieth Congress--all these had an electric effect on delegates and gallery alike."99 The choice of the vice-presidential candidate was a foregone conclusion, after the inspired keynote address of the elderly but eloquent Alben W. Barkley.

The Texans had little over which to rejoice, having been voted down on four resolutions and a presidential candidate. Jester came home to face what he expected to be an easy try for reelection. He was renominated in the first primary but by only about a fifty-four per cent vote. Among a number of state issues, Jester's opposition to Truman apparently was not popular. In the Senate race, Coke Stevenson and Lyndon B. Johnson led the field of eleven candidates and were forced into a run-off primary.100 No such dependence on the national

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98Ibid. 99Fendler, op. cit., p. 85.
100Jackson, op. cit., p. 46.
election was evidenced in this race in the first primary. It was the disputed outcome of the second primary that was of prime importance to the presidential election. Stevenson and Johnson entered the second, or run-off primary, held in August. In a colorful campaign that has seldom been equaled in the history of state, there were approximately one million votes cast and Johnson apparently won with a majority of 87 votes. No one knows, or ever will know for that matter, exactly how many votes each candidate received. For several weeks afterward recounts and recanvassing the 254 counties changed the totals almost daily. Court decisions against recounts were issued. And in one county—Duval—the ballots were burned by the janitor (allegedly through a misunderstanding of instructions from the county clerk). Naturally charges and countercharges were hurled with reckless abandon by both sides. . . .

Stevenson was refused certification as the duly-elected Democratic nominee for senator by a single vote on the state executive committee, meeting immediately before the September convention. His case was lost when the "ultra-conservatives," the "Dixiecrats," were unseated in the organization of the convention; many of his supporters were among the Dixiecrats. "The 2-pronged liberal movement of the Truman Democrats and the "New Dealish" Johnson supporters began as loyalists" booted out the three biggest delegations to the convention—Dallas, Harris and Tarrant." The test vote came over an appeal of the decision of the executive committee chairman that the Harris delegation could not vote in the case of a

101 Ibid.
motion to unseat that delegation; Calvert was upheld by a vote of 1,349 to 734. The "steamroller" was on the move. Wright Morrow, just elected national committeeman, was caught in the rush to unseat the Dixiecrat-dominated Harris County delegation. He was replaced by Byron Skelton, a Temple attorney and a "loyalist." After the crucial test vote, the issue was decided, and both Truman and Johnson, the latter with some scattered "no's", were certified by the party.103

After the withdrawal of Ben Laney from the Dixiecrats' camp, the nomination of the standardbearers took place, and J. Strom Thurmond and Fielding H. Wright, both "deep South" governors, were chosen to represent the Fourth party. Thurmond charged the "accidental President" with deserting every principle of the Democratic Party. The preliminary work had been done at a summer caucus, although the nominations were not to be official until the "national" convention met in the fall. "The Texas element of the States' rights group, composed largely of former Texas Regulars, caucused on plans for county-by-county conventions before the September state convention."104 At the national convention, meeting in Houston, the candidates were formally nominated, and the Dixiecrats hit all of the other three parties for their position on States' rights and civil rights.105 The state convention

103 Ibid.
of the Dixiecrats met in Dallas in September, to meet the legal requirements to get the electors' names printed on the Texas ballot. The official title of the party was to be the "States' Rights party." Several of the Dallas County state convention delegates, unseated at the May convention and soon to have the process repeated, were in attendance at the meeting. 106

In their fall convention the Republicans under Creager again overrode the minority support of the state chairman, George Hopkins. In fact, the Dallas County delegation under the chairmanship of Ralph Currie was seated in place of the former's faction. Hopkins made the Dewey-Warren campaign manager, Creager's Henry Zweifel, admit that he had not even voted for Dewey in 1944. But Zweifel was to succeed him as state chairman. Alvin Lane, "Dallas attorney and follower of Creager," was nominated for governor. 107 A senatorial candidate was nominated, with the provision that he might withdraw in favor of another candidate. At the time, there was still some hope that O'Daniel might take the Republican nomination for senator; so, the "door was left ajar." As it developed, the final candidate was Jack Porter a "Houston oilman and intimate of millionaire H. R. Cullen." Porter was a former Democrat who became a Texas Regular in 1944. 108

Campaign

The part that Porter was to play was a significant one, for Stevenson, embittered over the alleged election fraud and unsuccessful before the state convention and, finally, before the United States Supreme Court, gave an outright endorsement to Porter. With this action the senatorial and the presidential races came to have a direct bearing upon one another.

Many other issues were before the attention of Texas voters. One of the foremost issues was the Eightieth Congress itself, although the argument raised hereon may not have greatly influenced the Texas electorate. The president had challenged the Republican Congress "to make good" on its platform pronouncements, as he called the Congressmen into special session. Republican leaders called the special session a purely political move and the quarrel between Truman and the Congress "not one of failure to enact legislation, but a fundamental difference in governmental philosophy."\(^{109}\) The Republicans countered by bringing up an anti-poll tax measure in the Senate, against which Southern Democrats filibustered until the withdrawal of the bill three days before adjournment. Committees in both houses spent much time in dealing with the sensational Hiss-chambers dispute, involving alleged Communist activity in the Administration. This investigation might have boomeranged for Truman. But the Congress, under pressure, did pass a United Nations loan, modified bank credit and installment

\(^{109}\) "Extra Session Reviewed," Congressional Digest, XXVII (October, 1943), 277.
buying controls, and a housing bill, without the public housing and
slum-clearance features endorsed by both major parties. 110

The Wallace issue was before the Texas voters; Wallace
made at least one trip into the state during the campaign.
No votes are likely to have been cast on the basis of his pre-

sence, however, for the third party candidate was criticized
roundly by the two conservative parties and ignored by the
Democratic party by and large. The issue of labor, raised in
the Case "Anti-Strike Law" and in the Taft-Hartley Act, might
have divided some voters, but the States' Rightsers were most
vocal in labor union criticism. The dispute between the
"loyalists" and "conservatives" in the Texas Democratic Party
was likely not an issue in itself.

Probably three issues stood out in sharp relief in the
campaign of 1948 in Texas. The New Deal was again on trial,
whatever the individual voter's interpretation was of the
broad term. The same epithets were used against the Adminis-
tration as in 1944, with more stress on the alleged imminence
of the "welfare state" and "state socialism." The tidelands
issue had been raised, with both the Dixiecrats and the Repub-
licans favoring state retention of the tidewater oil-producing
areas; the latter party might well have been deemed more capa-
bile of achieving the aim. The race issue, all the more heated
due to the Northern Democratic convention stand and the presi-
dent's recommendations for civil rights legislation, was

110 Ibid.
magnified to undue proportions in Texas. On this issue the Dixiecrats were most articulated, denouncing the pro-Negro stands of both the major parties. Many Negroes, voting for the first time, certainly would have been attracted to the militant Truman stand. While other issues were involved, farm questions, foreign policy matters, and the like, these three seem to stand out as election day neared.

State Results

When the final returns were in, the Truman candidacy carried about as expected in Texas but amazed the nation with a clear victory over the Republican nominee, who had already chosen his Cabinet and been hailed as the new president. For Texas the vote is shown in Table 7. The Republican total for

VOTE CAST FOR MAJOR PARTY CANDIDATES FOR PRESIDENT AND GOVERNOR AND PER CENT OF TOTAL MAJOR PARTY VOTE FOR PRESIDENT, TEXAS GENERAL ELECTION, 1948

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Governor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Votes</td>
<td>Per Cent of Total Vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>315,245</td>
<td>66.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>301,352</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States' Rights Democrats</td>
<td>113,397</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The official totals for president, with complete reports for two hundred four counties, show a much lower vote. (The author has added the unofficial returns for thirty-eight of the forty counties not officially canvassed, the other two being fragmentary, as indicated in the office files of the Texas Election Bureau in Dallas.)


ibid, pp. 480-481.
its gubernatorial candidate was far below that of the presiden-
tial nominee, but the gap was not so large as in previous
elections. The reason is not hard to find. The reader must
take into account

the active campaign of Jack Porter for United States
Senate. He really campaigned—something that few
DOP candidates in Texas attempt. And . . . there
was good campaign material. Coke Stevenson's sup-
porters felt the second primary election had
been stolen from them. . . . Bitter Stevenson men
voted for Porter to spite Johnson, and while doing
so, cast some straight Republican ballots.111

Porter was beaten by a two to one majority by the Democratic
candidate, Lyndon Johnson. But Porter's candidacy ran about
fifty thousand votes ahead of Dewey's:112 It is reasonable
to suppose that Porter picked up a lot of the Dixiecratic
presidential voters along with the Stevenson men. Assuredly,
the Republican candidate for governor, Lane, did not notably
strengthen the ticket; he profited off the vote-getting power
of both Porter and Dewey. Due to the third factor of the
serious senator contender, the number of presidential Republi-
cans is probably not accurate, numbering in this election in
the neighborhood of one hundred thirty thousand. In 1940,
the number was about fifty thousand and in 1944, about ninety
thousand.

111 Letter from Allen Duckworth, political editor of the

112 The vote of Harris County, Porter's home county, ac-
counted for the larger part of this strength above Dewey's
vote.

County-by-County Returns

The 1948 county-by-county returns show several definite divergencies from the parallel earlier data. In the first place, only thirty-seven counties are seen to be within four per cent of the state Democratic average (Figure 14 on page 147). The counties around the German counties are conspicuously absent, as are the far west and Panhandle counties of the state. The Central Texas trend counties of 1940 and 1944 are no longer in evidence, and the Gulf Coast trend counties of 1940 are not so classified in 1948. For the first time near the trend counties is Lipscomb, which, like some of the Big Bend counties, has a stable Republican minority of about one-third of the county votes; in this election, the trend had progressed far enough that only about two Texas voters in every three was voting the majority ticket. There are two big differences between the trend counties of this and previous presidential elections. The number is much smaller; no longer could a county with a relatively stable Republican minority of, say, twenty per cent of the voters be included among the state average counties. The other major distinction between the trend counties of 1948 and those of earlier presidential contests involves the surprising number of "deep" East Texas counties included in the 1948 figures. Sixteen of the thirty-seven trend counties are among the state average counties, fourteen of them having over twenty per cent Negroes in their populations. An appeal to the voters' minds on one
Fig. 14—Texas counties within four percentage points of the state average of the per cent Democratic vote in the presidential election, 1948.43

*Texas Almanac, 1949-1950, pp. 450-451, and personal research by author in records of Texas Election Bureau. The per cent Democratic vote and the array were calculated by the author.*
of the principal problems of the region would preclude the possibility that sheer coincidence was responsible for dividing the vote of the erstwhile strong Democratic counties of the area. Of course, the common problem of all of these counties is that of keeping in reasonable balance the racial relations of the whites and the Negroes. The Dixiecrats in 1948 emphasized this black-belt issue. A study of the returns for the three major parties, as undertaken above dealing with the 1944 election, is apt to be more revealing as regards the overall trend of 1948.

The twenty-six least Democratic counties include nine of the twelve German counties, and four other German-minority counties are so classified. Another group of first decile counties are in the Harris County region, all of them save Harris being Negro counties. Midland County, an oil-rich county, is included, as is one South Texas ranching county, Kenedy. The major noteworthy feature is the presence of three of the four metropolitan counties among those least Democratic counties. The combined vote in these three counties, in a large measure, led the trend away from the Democratic party in 1948, as their vote bulked proportionally larger in the state totals than ever before.

Two groups are identifiable among the most Democratic counties. The South Texas controlled-vote counties of Duval, Jim Hogg, and Starr are three of the only four Mexican counties of the fifty-five so defined. While not a single German
Fig. 18—Texas counties at furthest extremes from the coast. From T. 16 S. to the state line, and U. 17 and 18, residential clusters, 1940.
or Negro county is included among the tenth decile counties, the latter being quite unlike the previous years, nineteen of the counties are located, generally speaking, in the southeastern part of the Panhandle. The counties from Crane and Sterling to Hall and Baylor form a swathe of Democratic Party strength. Other facts will be observable from a study of the election returns for the two parties to which many traditional Democrats defected.

The first decile Republican counties are almost identical with the most Democratic counties. Thus, the relatively low-populated, politically well-integrated farming and ranching counties of the southern and southeastern Panhandle with high Democratic percentages comprise seventeen of the twenty-six least Republican counties. San Saba County, strongly Democratic, and Starr and Duval counties are far from Republican in their politics. The remaining six counties are all in the easternmost part of East Texas. Four of them are along the Louisiana border, in which state the majority of the voters, by choice or by party leaders' coercion, backed the Thurmond-Wright electors. The other two counties, in the northeastern corner of the state, had never been tenth decile Democratic counties although solidly Democratic. As in every election studied, the East Texas counties apparently cared for the Republican cause. A significant difference from the 1944 returns is to be seen. Then, the East Texas counties (Figure 12, page 119) in the first Republican decile were in the east
central part of the state. The issues of the 1948 elections, on the other hand, were such that counties on the eastern border, those with generally higher percentages of Negroes were more prone to oppose the Republicans. Only a single county, Delta, repeated as a first decile county.

The tenth decile counties, twenty-seven in number, are seen in Figure 16 to be in four identifiable groups. Creager's four counties are included, along with the fickle Zapata, alternating between the first and tenth Republican deciles. The German counties and those adjoining German-minority counties again make up the principal part of the tenth decile group. And, very similar to the Texas Regular strength in 1944, the counties around Harris have strong Republican minorities in the 1948 presidential race. Finally, contributing considerably toward the relatively high Republican percentage (24.5 per cent), three of the four Metropolitan counties, with great strides in industrialization and great gains in population, are in the forefront of the Republican voting gains in 1948.

The States' Rights Party, too, has some readily identifiable county groupings of party weakness and strength. In the first decile are chiefly the counties most removed from the presence of the Negro in large numbers, in the Panhandle, far western, and south-eastern areas of Texas. Thirteen of the twenty-five least Dixiecratic counties are in the northernmost part of the state, all in unclassified counties. Eight are Mexican counties, two in the El Paso region and five in
Fig. 17—Texas counties at furthest extremes from the state capital and the seat of state government by percentage vote in the presidential election, 1948.*

*This, and personal research by author in records of Texas...
the far south of Texas. A part of the latter, controlled-vote counties, gave only a negligible vote to the fourth party. The three remaining unclassified counties in the first States' Rightsers decile are scattered, three of them in west-central Texas and one of them, perhaps explicable only on the basis of local observation, is in "deep" East Texas. This county, Shelby, borders on three tenth decile counties and on the Louisiana border as well. The nearest first decile county to it is some three hundred miles away.

But the counties in the same region as Shelby held far different views, relative to the States' Rights Democrats Party. For twenty-two of the Negro counties of East Texas as defined among the twenty-five tenth Dixiecratic decile. And two others, also in "deep" East Texas, Tyler and Hardin counties, have many Negroes in their populations. No metropolitan counties are seen to be in this classification, and, with one exception, no German and Mexican counties may be so categorized. The exception is a mixed county, Guadalupe, defined as a German-Mexican county; a local opinion on the conditions in the county might explain this seeming irregularity. With the Dixiecratic returns so overbalanced in their favor in a single region, the conclusion seems clear that the civil rights stands of the parties gives the key to the voting opinions of a very large minority of the East Texans. Apparently on no other appeal did the Dixiecrats make inroads on the voting choices of the Texas electorate.
Only a very few counties followed the state trend in 1948, suggesting a restatement of the observation. Some few counties, in advance of the trend caused the state average to be in the "middle ground" between these counties leading the trend and the majority of counties with a much smaller disaffection from the traditional Democratic Party. Only thirty-seven counties are to be found within four per cent of the state average, as opposed to one hundred six in 1936 and, even in 1944, to seventy-five. Those counties with relatively stable percentages, included throughout the earlier elections, had been dropped as "average" counties as the state average was made to go considerably lower. The position of the metropolitan counties is the factor of most marked importance in 1948. Whereas before the metropolitan counties were somewhat in advance of the trend, in this election Harris, Dallas, and Bexar counties were far out in front with sizable Republican and some Dixiecratic support. Again, the German counties were in the fore of the Republican strength and among the counties least desirous of Democratic and Dixiecratic candidacies. In the Mexican counties very little support was given the Dixiecrats, some, in the controlled-vote counties, to the Democrats, and considerable, in the German-minority counties, to the Republicans. The Negro counties gave the Republicans little help, the Democrats a great many votes, and the Dixiecrats the bulk of their strength. The southeastern Panhandle counties endorsed the Truman candidacy more than any other area in the
state and gave the least support in Texas to the Dewey-Warren electors. The 1948 figures probably give a fair index to the German Republican minorities, as the counties with such, the Creager counties, the German counties, and the metropolitan counties made up the Republican strongholds in Texas, relatively speaking. The Dixiecrats had support where high percentages of Negroes were to be found and their least number of votes in the areas furthest removed from the Negro race and the race issue.

Evaluation

These county-by-county returns, along with the issues raised in Congress, in the conventions, and in the campaign, suggest many conclusions as regards the election of 1948. The trend, begun chiefly by 1940 and added to in 1944, continued in the election of 1948, away from the traditional Democratic Party and to the minority parties. In this election, as in that of 1944, the trend was bidirectional, to the Republican and to the newly-founded States’ Rights Party. The likemindedness of Texas voters of the 1930’s was gone by 1948. The shift was most apparent in the more populous counties, which unquestionably led the state trend and caused its relative lowness. The county groupings as we have defined them show a marked difference in the voting habits of but two regions. The metropolitan counties have been noted, and the second, the Negro counties, gave a lot of strength to the cause of the
States' Righters. The fourth party in this race, that of the Dixiecrats (the Wallace Progressives having been deemed the third party), did not run as well as the third major party in the last Texas election, the Texas Regulars.

This would suggest that different appeals were used by the two lesser parties. The Dixiecrats based their campaign principally upon two basic issues, that of the pre-Negro "civil rights" program which they attacked and that of the traditional southern stand for states' rights. On the former issue, they opposed all of the other parties in the race; on the latter, they made many of the same charges that the Republicans did, all opposing the "socialistic," "bureaucratic" "welfare state" and "police state," as allegedly advocated by the Fair Deal Administration. As the Dixiecrats presented their views on so few issues, the major disputants on most national issues were the Democrats and the Republicans.

The New Deal, and the Fair Deal which succeeded it, were on trial once more. The Chase "anti-strike" bill and the Taft-Hartley law brought Truman's pro-labor views under fire; Texans were divided on such an issue, with labor union men having good reason to support the president and with many opposed for that very favoritism. In the areas of greatest concentration of union men the results are not conclusive as to their casting a bloc vote. The tidelands issue certainly influenced the votes of many Texans. With the Republicans offering the only major party support of state retention of the tidelands and
with an active blocker of such retention on their ticket, it is not surprising that many counties, either rich in oil or rich indirectly from the profits of the oil industry, should cast many Republican votes. Right along this same line of thinking, the alleged conflict between government and business should nowhere find a greater Republican reaction to government power than in the industrial counties of the state. It is not likely that the issues of housing, veterans' aid, and the NRA influenced any appreciable number of voters, at least as individual issues. More than likely, such issues were considered by voters as part of a larger, more understandable picture of being for or against the New Deal.

Intraparty strife again could have accounted for some defection, and assuredly the factor of traditional voting kept some Democratic voters in the party ranks. The personalities of the candidates were real issues, as many voters chose the "lesser of two evils." Dewey's call for "harmony" and Truman's strong stands on a number of controversial issues must have had some effect.

And the influence of state issues was important. With an active campaign by a former Democrat and Texas Regular for senator, coupled with the support of one of the most popular ex-governors, the Republicans polled votes never reached before. And these votes, cast by traditional Democrats, helped swell the Republican totals, especially as some of them were cast as straight Republican votes. There is no way, of course,
to determine whether the increase of Republican votes is traceable to the state or to the national candidates.

With this and the four preceding national elections discussed at length, the way is cleared for discussing some of the broader trends in Texas presidential politics. The accumulated information as to the issues, the convention disputes, the campaigns, and the final election results should afford a fair basis for taking an overview of this trend away from the traditional Democratic Party.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

Throughout the sixteen years covered in this study Texas has remained solidly Democratic. However, the number of Democratic votes decreased gradually, dropping from 68.6 per cent in 1932 to 66.3 per cent in 1948. Especially in the years after 1936 a definite trend, involving literally hundreds of thousands of votes, set in, to the loss of the traditional Democratic Party and to the gain of the Republican and major third parties.

A number of factors have, throughout the era of the New Deal and the Fair Deal, militated against such a trend. The inertia of the mass of traditional Democratic voters, the number of which is unknown and immeasurable, inhibits any immediate appreciable growth on the part of the present minority parties. Jack Porter, the most recent significant Republican candidate for U. S. Senator, throws more light on this matter by estimating that the Democratic primary pledge, interpreted by the courts as binding morally only, induces two hundred thousand voters to remain Democratic in every general election. He noted, too, that many Republicans, coming into the state from other areas, frequently vote Democratic in order to "make
their votes count" in local and county elections where Republican candidates seldom run.\(^1\) Ellis Arnall, relatively "liberal" ex-governor of Georgia, in predicting a Democratic victory in 1948, notes three factors enhancing continued Democratic success in the South.

Habit is one of these; the Democratic Party has been the Southern party all their lives. Selfishness is another; the South has known no prosperity since the War Between the States, except under the Wilson and Roosevelt-Truman administrations.\(^2\)

Stuart Long, member of the state executive committee of the Democratic Party, seconds Arnall's second observation in saying that the "fear of the Hoover Depression and its far-reaching consequences was undoubtedly a factor in persuading many nominal Democrats to remain in the fold in 1944 and 1948, more especially in 1940."\(^3\) It is extremely likely that this same observation is proportionally more applicable to the elections nearer in point of time to the Great Depression. Arnall's third point is that "political cowardice" would keep in the party many of those Southerners who feared the reaction against party bolters.\(^4\) The same reaction might well have been feared in most of the "courthouse gangs" in Texas during the movements of the Willkie Democrats, the Regulars, and the Dixiecrats.

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\(^3\) Letter from Stuart Long, May 26, 1950.

\(^4\) Arnall, op. cit., pp. 36-37.
Three groups of Texans have been especially benefited by the New and Fair Deals throughout the sixteen years. Farmers, despite the rumblings of some major farm organizations as to "land socialization," have had good reason to cling to the Roosevelt-Truman administrations. Even in 1948, farmers could see the Republican Congress-induced low wheat prices. With special aid from the Democrats for a number of Southern staples, it is not likely that any great dissatisfaction from the Democratic Party occurred in the rural areas. "The Southern Representatives have assiduously voted for all legislation involving aid to farm tenants, rural rehabilitation, rural electrification, agricultural resettlement, domestic allotments, farm mortgages, crop loans, etc."\(^5\) The labor unions have been treated fairly throughout the sixteen years, with the possible exception of the Republican-sponsored Taft-Hartley law. With about four hundred thousand union men in Texas, it would be surprising if they did not vote against the "anti-union" parties in the presidential elections, i. e., the Regulars, the Dixiecrats, and the Republicans. Along the Gulf Coast, heavily unionized areas send Congressmen to Washington who must vote against their Democratic fellow-Congressmen on such measures as the Case "anti-strike" law of 1946.\(^6\) Such a factor severely limits Democratic defection in some areas of


\(^6\)David Botter, "Labor Looks at Texas," *Southwest Review*, XXXI (Spring, 1946), 112-113.
the state. A third group, virtually out of the election picture in the 1930's and having one party (the Republicans) in a "lily-white" status, has come into its own in recent years. The Negroes, given the right to participate in the Democratic primaries in 1944 for the first time, have voted in increasing numbers since that time. No more than thirty-three thousand voted in 1942; estimates range all the way from one to two hundred thousand Negro voters in the election participation of 1948.7

There are many other continued Democratic supporters in addition to those named. "Others, whether formerly Democrats or not—farmers, workers, small business people—the lower middle class, and the "relievers" and petty beneficiaries of various sorts cling to Roosevelt and presumably now to Truman for obvious reasons."8 Others responded to Roosevelt's personal magnetism of real leadership. Some wanted to be on "the winning side."9 This could account for some of the Dewey supporters in the 1948 election, as it seemed "certain" that Truman could not win, judging from the polls, newspapers, and magazines.

Many thinking people, better educated or more highly trained in political observation and with some understanding of the trends of society as well as a concern for the general welfare, recognize, while by no

7 V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics, pp. 522-523.
9 Ibid.
means agreeing with all that Roosevelt has stood for, that much of what he has advocated and accomplished has been in line with what other progressive democracies have undertaken. . . . Social and economic problems do not solve themselves; government everywhere else has been compelled to take a hand, has been forced to regulate, to control, to regiment, and even to socialize concerns formerly considered private in their nature. Perhaps many of the New Deal attempts in this direction have been crude and ill-advised, they argue, but where else can Americans turn for a competing or superior program designed to supply the need? Certainly not to the Republicans. . . . In this group are to be found many of the older independent voters who used to help shift elections and also many of the younger voters whose memories of the era of rugged individualism are somewhat hazy.10

Along with those voters in the above groups who have real personal interests at stake, Weeks sees the former independent voter and the young voters, the latter for the first time being organized now by the Republican Party in Texas, as supporting the New Deal. Perhaps it is in these two groups that some of the disaffection is most notable. There is no objective means of quantitatively measuring the voting trends of such groups.

Against all these forces a number of political factors are at work. The factor of business opposition to the New and Fair Deals is in the forefront of those responsible for the Democratic disaffection. Austin attorney Edward Clark includes four factors pertaining to the control of the federal government over private business in his estimate of nine issues most causing the state trend. He includes the "reckless spending and, consequently, high taxes, which have been applied against

10Ibid., p. 122.
business in a punitive manner," the "tidelands steal on part of Federal government," "subsidies," and "efforts to socialize electric power industry, medicine, banks, housing, etc." Such an indictment of federal control over business, if representative of most businessmen, indicates a very real and tangible opposition element to the traditional Democrats, still supporting that party of government-controlled business. There are those who say that business is "unquestionably the dominant" element of the Republican Party. If such is the case, and many facts bear out the conclusion, the businessmen of Texas have no obstacle save traditional voting to keep them from promoting their own interests with the "business party." The Eightieth Congress, favoring the real estate, grain, and other lobbies, including many "shortsighted business interests," lends some verification to the business control of the Republican Party. When the Republican platform came out of committee, it included a state-ownership-of-tidelands plank; the oil industry of Texas would certainly have profited by such a law in the event of a 1948 Republican victory. Texas votes for the Republican Party must have come in by the thousands on this one issue. More generally, however,

11 Letter from Edward Clark, Austin attorney and prominent lobbyist, May 10, 1950.

12 Hinkley, op. cit., p. 98.

13 Ibid., p. 106.
the need for those national policies which will encourage business—notably lower taxes and some reasonable degree of protection for American living standards.\(^\text{14}\)

A partisan conservative view of the increased activity of the government under the New and Fair Deals is that of Joe Martin, Speaker of the U. S. House of Representatives in the Eightieth Congress.

Another factor contributing toward the disaffection of Texas voters from their traditional party is the vast centralization of government in Washington during the last sixteen years. The federal bureaucracy tends to reach out in all directions for more and more power over the States and counties. Home rule in the local community tends to disappear as more and more decisions are made in Washington. Washington fixes the cotton acreage on every Texas farm, Washington has seized title to the vast Texas tidelands; Washington has stretched its strong arm to take control of Texas' great natural gas industry. This tendency to bring all the affairs of the people within the jurisdiction of Washington bureaus frustrates the enterprise of the people, and requires virtually every business to wait the decision of Washington before making plans for expansion and development.\(^\text{15}\)

But too strict attention to the desires of business is not the wish of many Texans; although the following account is also partisan in the favor of the "liberals," there will be those voters, perhaps traditional Democrats, who will agree.

When Roosevelt took over in 1933, the banks, the insurance companies, oil industry, and every other of "Big Business" were trembling with abject fear, on the very brink of chaos. . . . They were screaming for subsidies—for themselves—and convinced if Roosevelt saved them, he had "saved the country." . . . But when he started in to subsidize the farmer and help the laboring classes, and

\(^{14}\text{Letter from Joseph W. Martin, Republican House Minority Leader, April 18, 1950.}\)

\(^{15}\text{Ibid.}\)
save the home owners, they began to "view with alarm."

... The Republicans had been giving the National
wealth to Big Business for seventy years, and the idea
of the Democrats giving it back to the people filled
their souls with righteous indignation.

The special privilege groups are determined to
save free enterprise and rugged individualism—for
the common herd—but they want bigger and better
special privileges for themselves.¹⁶

Too much consideration cannot be given to this conflict between
business and government, for prominent businessmen have been
in the forefront—and in the background with financial aid—
of the attempts of the Republicans and Texas Regulars to carry
the state. Issues like the OPA, excess profits levies, and
pro-labor governmental policies are anathema to a large number
of Texas businessmen. There is nothing sinister implied in
the intentions of businessmen to bring about a change in the
state's presidential politics. Rather, there is every indica-
tion that economic and social cleavage charged by many serious-
minded citizens as the dubious contribution of Roosevelt is
causing a whole new realignment of the political forces in
Texas.

This realignment has become quite apparent, especially
since the division in the Democratic party between the Willkie
Democrats and the Roosevelt Democrats. In every convention of
the Democratic Party since that time there have been two oppos-
ing factions. In 1944, it was the anti-New Dealers, the Texas

¹⁶Letter from Paul B. Holcomb, onetime Populist and foe
of the sulphur interests in Texas and presently editor of the
Regulars versus fourth termers. In 1946, it was the conservative Jester forces opposing the Rainey "liferais." In 1948, two disputes involved the Dixiecrats and the Truman men, on the one hand, and the Stevenson and Johnson contingents on the other. One earlier dispute dealt with in the sixteen-year period, that of the Ferguson and the anti-Ferguson men, was of a type not to affect materially the presidential politics of the state. As a matter of fact, only in 1948 did the influence of state candidacies and state convention disputes clearly reveal itself in the presidential election returns.

While the political stands of several occupational groups in the Texas electorate have been considered and the one general liberal-conservative dispute has been mentioned, there remains to be discussed some of the more specific causes of the trend. One of the best accounts of these reasons is that of Rice Tilley; however, a very similar and equally worthwhile partisan account is given by Roy Sanderford, permanent chairman of the Texas Regulars in 1944. The vote-drawing power of the Texas Regulars, and that of the Dixiecrats and the Republicans as well, rests to a considerable degree on the agreement or the disagreement of voters with the charges against the Roosevelt-Truman administrations given below.

Franklin Roosevelt was first elected on a platform which embodied true principles of democracy as we understood the same from the writings of Thomas Jefferson. Mr. Roosevelt unfortunately surrounded himself with friends and so-called "brain trusters" who turned out to be most impractical. . . . Outstanding examples of these men were Harry Hopkins
and Harold Ickes. Quite a few of them were so dissatisfied with the American way of life that they thought communism or socialism was what this country needed. They duped Mr. Roosevelt . . . Mr. Roosevelt, when he was thwarted by Congress or the courts, set out to destroy them or at least to render them impotent. For illustration, he tried to pack the court so he could get control, and he threatened or purged members of Congress who would not go along with him. When he got control of the Supreme Court by appointing a majority of the members of the court, he saw to it that the Constitution instead of being changed by the people, was changed just as effectively by interpretation.

Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Truman were advocates of the proposition enunciated by Harry Hopkins to-wit: "Spend and spend, elect and elect." Mr. Roosevelt . . . ignored the precedents set by every other President, such as the holding of office only two terms.

The people of the South . . . are beginning to realize . . . that we are spending and gradually voting ourselves into a welfare state. Although Mr. Truman does not believe in the welfare state, he wants the support . . . of the labor unions . . . .

In Texas he promises us those things he thinks we want, and then after he leaves the state tries to force down our throats F. E. P. C., the confiscation of our Tidelands and to force our courts to write their decisions according to the dictates of the Supreme Court of the United States, which is nationally notorious for its lack of legal talent, dignity and respect. 17

The most striking thing about this whole broadside attack on the New Deal-Fair Deal era is the similarity in the platforms and stands of the opposition parties, their different columns on the general election ballot notwithstanding. In every underlined issue above, Roosevelt or Truman, or both, has been attacked by all three of the minority parties. On one issue alone has there been disagreement in this wholesale attack, that of the Negro question. At this juncture it is

17Letter from Rice Tilley, Fort Worth attorney and prominent figure in Texas Regular Movement, June 8, 1930. The italics are mine.
well worth noting that the Texas Regular leadership, almost without exception, went over to the two minority parties in 1948. Merrit H. Gibson, a prominent figure in the state and national convention in 1944, became in 1948 the national campaign manager for the Dixiecrat candidates, Thurmond and Wright. And the two leading contenders for control of the Republican Party in Texas after Cruzen's dictatorial rule is over, Jack Porter and Henry Zeifel, are both former Democrats and Texas Regulars in 1944. And these forces of the minority parties have other means of undermining the voting strength of the Democratic Party, which so far has not seen the need of active campaigning to overcome the rising opposition.

This trend is no accident, but the result of a well-planned propaganda scheme by the Republican party to take advantage of our uninformed electorate, to misinform and mislead them in order to break into the so-called Solid Democratic South. Our large newspapers, among our many monopolies, are among the largest and most powerful, and they are largely owned and controlled by Republican capital.18

Again, the sinister implications are perhaps put too strongly, but state newspapers, with but a few exceptions, have been endorsing the Republican nominees for president and vice-president in the last several elections.

A part of the disaffection is explainable by the fact that many new citizens have come in from two-party states. Don Cuill estimates that sixty per cent of all newcomers to the state in the last twenty years have been from two-party

18Letter from Don A. Lewis, member of the Texas House of Representatives, June 9, 1950.
But the Republican party organization itself, as presently constituted, is not the party to which the majority of Texans will go.

The Republican political organization as such doesn't give a damn for building up the party in Texas. The majority of the little band that "runs" the phoney conventions of the GOP in Texas wants to get on the inside of any movement that may nominate a winning Republican candidate for president so they can lap up some patronage gravy.20

Nothing seems so patently clear in studying recent Texas presidential politics as that voters are given the choice of voting for or against the Democratic nominee. On a national level, from the platform of Alf Landon to the platform of Thomas E. Dewey, the Republican Party has said, apparently, "We can do it [the New Deal program] better, more cheaply, and with less bureaucrats." While all of the major parties in Texas have made extensive use of scare words appealing to the emotions of the voters, the minority party has most successfully used them. Many of the disaffected Democrats may have left the party due to the "communists" and "socialists" they have been convinced are helping direct national policies.

The issue of the Negro is perhaps the most inflammatory in Texas politics. Generally speaking, only the Regulars and the Dixiecrats have gained many votes for their anti-Negro

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19Letter from Ben Guill, member of the U. S. House of Representatives from the Eighteenth District of Texas, May 19, 1950.

stands. Both major parties, appealing to the balance-of-power Negro voter in the crucial Northern and border states, have antagonized a great many Texas voters by their strong pro-Negro platform planks, especially in the years since 1940. The Democratic Party has been most emphatic in favor of the civil rights proposals which have been before the Congress for a number of years as a "political football." So emphatic has President Truman become that he succeeded in alienating the vast majority of the "deep" South politicians, and the "deep" East Texans are included.

The steady needling of the South and its traditions by a New Deal Supreme Court in decisions affecting segregation in education and transportation are irksome to old line Southerners, but with only thirteen or fourteen per cent of the total Democratic vote coming from the South, it is hardly to be expected that National Democratic nominees will be more heedful of those than of the much larger proportions in the great industrial states.21

That the issue of the Negro alone is not enough to carry elections in Texas is clear. Only with a great deal more of aggravation or with the addition of other major appeals will any minority party attain more votes than did the Dixiecrats in 1948. There the appeal was to the "hate-Negro" voters, and less than ten per cent of the electorate answered with their votes. This is not to say that the issue of the Negro does not affect many Texans. But rather, an appeal on the

race issue alone has not been too important in state presidential politics.

Finally, the county-by-county returns reveal some vitally important characteristics, both of the counties relatively stable in their politics and of those leading the state trend. The German counties, as seen clearly in every election since 1936 (the unqualified "wet" stand of the Democrats presumably appealing to them in 1932), have been the least Democratic counties in the state. A hard core of Republican strength, the voting is just as traditionally Republican as the voting is traditionally Democratic in most Texas counties. In the light of several of the elections, the old objective measurements of the German counties appear outdated. A definition by the voting practices would include counties adjacent to the German counties, especially to the west, which share very similar voting habits. The Mexican counties, on the whole, show no outstanding voting characteristics. Single areas within the whole Mexican county regions, show some remarkable voting characteristics. In the far south, the Republican state political machine, with its headquarters in Brownsville, controls a large and stable minority of the votes. Directly to the northwest of these first Democratic decile counties are some of the most intensely Democratic voting counties in the state. These are the counties which, from all reports and from regularly "lopsided" election returns, are boss-ridden counties with a high level of vote amenability. Others of the Mexican counties,
to the immediate west of the German counties, are frequently among the half dozen Republican-majority counties. Actually, it is probable that the vote of the Republicans is cast by the German minorities rather than most of the Mexicans in the counties. The Negro counties have consistently been among the most Democratic of counties, retaining to a large extent, apparently, that opposition to the party of Reconstruction. As the Negro issue became more incendiary due to pressure from the two major national parties, the Congress, and the Supreme Court, the Negro counties gave a lot of support to the splinter parties which were more disposed to be of the White East Texans' views on the racial issue. Thus, many of the Negro counties went along with the Regulars, and the preponderance of the strength of the Dixicrats was given from the general area north and east of San Antonio. The least support for this latter party was from the areas furthest removed from the presence of the Negro in large numbers. The Negro counties, almost uniformly, have small, even minute, percentages of Republicans. Only in the more industrialized areas of the Negro counties has there been any sizable upswing of Republican strength. The trend in the Negro counties, then, is one to the third parties; very likely, in the absence of such third parties, the voters would not turn to the Republican counties. The lest of the classified county groups is that of the metropolitan counties. A significant shift has occurred in these counties. Only in Tarrant has the per cent
Democratic vote remained high. In Harris, Dallas, and Tarrant counties the decline of the per cent Democratic vote has led the state. The additional trend of the population to the urban areas makes this decline all the more significant; the vote of the four counties approximately doubled during the years covered in the study.

Among the unclassified counties, two brief comments are in order. The southeastern counties in the Panhandle have remained the most consistently Democratic counties in the state. Counties to the north and west of these, usually among the "average" counties, have led the trend either with the Republican or the Regular party. These counties were among the least affected counties as far as the Dixiecrat vote is concerned.

While no predictions are made in this study, the basis for such predictions should be available from the entirety of this work. Certainly it is true that Texas has been, in the sixteen years between 1932 and 1948, and is now a one-party state. The party, however, is multifactional. The Texas Regulars and the States' Rights Democrats were but dissident minorities of the traditional Democratic Party. But the trend, if continued, whether to a rising Republican Party or to some third party of broad and permanent appeal, could in the near future change that one-party status of Texas.
APPENDIX I

Figures 1, 2, and 3 will indicate three different measurements of the German counties. In the first, the 1880 census data are used to indicate the counties where German-born settlers were most numerous. The year 1890 was selected because of its proximity both to the times of the German immigration and to the time since when relatively few immigrants have entered the area. At once, the reader will note the presence of four populous counties, Harris (Houston), Galveston (Galveston), Bexar (San Antonio), and Travis (Austin). These four counties cannot be assumed to have retained their population characteristics, due to tremendous population gains. For the most part, however, the gains and losses in the other counties have been fairly small, and the counties shown are reasonably apt to serve as a valid definition of German counties. Figure 2 does not yield a very good index to the incidence of the German population strength. Yet certain similarities may be seen with 1890 figures. Assuredly, the great majority of the German immigrants were affiliated with the several branches of the Lutheran Church, but a great many Austrians, Bohemians, and other Central European people were likewise Lutherans. The counties of Mill, Leon, and Williamson, and
Fig. 1—Texas German counties, calculated as having over ten per cent of the population born in Germany at the Eleventh Census, 1890.

perhaps others, might be ruled out as German counties in this manner. It is of some significance that all of the heavily populated counties of Figure 1 except Travis County are not in the number of counties with high percentages of Lutherans. One other bias should be noted in Figure 2; the calculations involve small percentages, and relatively isolated factors might be of undue influence upon the results obtained. Figure 3 gives McKay's choice of the German counties in 1940. For this same year Key used seventeen counties, without naming them, for his definition.  

The twelve to be used for the purposes of this paper will be seen to include the ten used by McKay and two others, Colorado and Victoria. Complications will soon be seen to arise, as Medina County will also be defined as a "Mexican county," and five (Washington, Fayette, Austin, Lee, and Colorado) will be defined as "Negro counties." Four other Mexican counties, with smaller Mexican minorities, also overlap with the German counties; these are Guadalupe, Comal, DeWitt, and Victoria. For all such overlapping counties, special mention will be made on voting characteristics.

1Key, Southern Politics, p. 276.
APPENDIX II

Voting in days before the 1920's took a curious turn, as the Mexican, knowing little about the privileges or duties of sharing in the sovereign will, and desiring only to accede to the wishes of his chief, naturally allowed his hand to be guided in marking ballots for presidential, state, and other candidates. If he was conscious at all of what he was doing, he was aware only of voting for his local boss. Landholders who were interested in politics could easily herd their tenants and laborers on election day and bring them in to the polling places with banners flying.¹

In the 1920's, many changes were taking place, as Corpus Christi (Nueces County) became a deep-sea port, Laredo an international trading center, and the whole valley was beginning to bloom in a rapidly expanding citrus fruit and vegetable area. No longer did the cattle barons monopolize the voting habits of South Texas.² Duval, Kennedy, Starr, and Zapata were, in 1930, "the most distinctly Mexican of all," with heavy Mexican populations and high percentages of the landholding in Mexican hands.³ Many corrupt practices were to be seen in 1930; it is doubtful that, after the Stevenson-Johnson dispute over the actual returns of Duval and Jim Wells counties, some would not say the area is yet

²Ibid., p. 610.
³Ibid., p. 616.
Fig. 2—Texas German counties, calculated as having over 2.9 per cent of the population as members of the Lutheran Church, 1816.*

Fig. 5—Texas German counties, Voelk's Sollation of 1940.
partially corrupt. Undue influence on the Mexican voters, illegal assistance in voting, paying of others' poll taxes, and voting of the alien Mexican were common. "But where all factions alike are not particularly opposed to such practices, they are not likely to be made public issues."4 It was not uncommon for the chief or some of his local henchmen literally to corral the voters several days before the election, keeping them together by providing a barbecue for them, and voting them en bloc at the proper time. While such practices have been rare in recent years, it remains true that "Mexican boxes," particularly in the country, return practically a solid vote for the dominant ticket.5

While this type of political corruption is rapidly on the decline and is markedly less prevalent in southwest and south-central Texas, it is not dead. The Duval County machine, "greased with barbecue sauce," beckoned to voters and invited them to shake friendly politicians' hands and eat friendly Archie Farr's barbecue a block away from the polls.

The voters came in groups in automobiles, most of them seeming to be late models. A taxicab made several trips and there was plenty of evidence that anyone unable to reach the polls could have ready transportation. . . . Election day in Duval took on a holiday mood mingled with a religious observance to decorate graves.6

This account of Duval electioneering was in 1948. The manageability of the vote can be traced readily, in what must be assumed as an exceptional county. Duval gave Coke Stevenson

97.3 per cent of the vote for governor in the first Democratic primary election of 1942 and 99.5 per cent of the votes in the same election two years later. Four years later, the same candidate, running for U. S. Senator in the second Democratic primary, received 0.9 per cent of the vote! Nonvoting is another voting characteristic worth noting. The Texas-Mexicans, lacking as has been seen a culture in which voting is an integral part, are behind many of their fellow citizens in participation. Key notes that

in the first Democratic primary for governor in 1940 there were 36 counties of less than 45,000 population in which 32 per cent or less of the adult white population voted. Twenty-six of them had 30 per cent or more population Mexican-American in 1930. Of the 47 counties with 30 per cent or more Mexican-American population in 1930, 33 appeared in the lowest quartile of 1940 participation among Texas' 254 counties and 43 in the lower half. As was mentioned in the discussion of the German counties, some counties overlap the areas of the other two major groupings along the lines of race and nationality. Thus, Medina is a Mexican-German county, as are Guadalupe, Comal, DeWitt, and Victoria. There are also two Mexican-Negro counties, Wharton and Gonzales.

7Key, op. cit., p. 275.
8Ibid., p. 273.
APPENDIX III

Key believes that the "black belt counties" of the Southern States have been "the hard core of the political South," maintaining white minority rule in the Negro counties by enlisting the aid of other counties for mutual action.\textsuperscript{1} In urging this belief, he notes the extraordinary achievement of a relatively small minority—the whites of the areas of heavy Negro population—which persuaded the entire South that in the Civil War it should fight to protect slave property. Later, with allies from conservatives generally, substantially the same group put down a radical movement [the Populists] welling up from the sections dominated by the poorer whites. And by the propagation of a doctrine about the status of the Negro, it impressed on an entire region a philosophy agreeable to its necessities and succeeded for many decades in maintaining a regional unity in national politics.\textsuperscript{2}

The party affiliation of the Negro has seen an about-face in recent years. Formerly grateful to the party of emancipation, they voted Republican in the general elections. Now, that appeal has worn off, or, rather, that a new stronger appeal is being directed to them by the national Democratic Party.

In terms of party, the [the Texas Negroes] vote almost solidly Democratic; one has to search long to discover a Republican. Only a few of the older people are still loyal to the Republican party. For

\textsuperscript{1}Key, \textit{Southern Politics}, p. 8. \textsuperscript{2}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 9.
their part, the Republicans have made no gesture since 1920 to attract the Negro vote. They have none of the Negro membership on the state central or congressional district committees that one finds in some Southern states, such as Louisiana. ... One veteran Negro politician informed me that his first form of political activity in the mid-1920's was fighting to emancipate his associates from their Republican "fixation." All Negro leaders take the realistic attitude that there can be no effective participation in Southern politics except through the Democratic party.3

Since for many purposes the Democratic Party is the only effective political organization on a statewide basis, then participation in the Democratic primary elections becomes all the more important. Negroes have had a rocky road to securing their votes in the primaries. While Negroes have long voted in municipal elections, in bond elections, in school board elections, and in special issue elections, they have been kept from the Democratic primaries, with few exceptions until 1944. "In Texas, the white primary, the poll tax, and such extralegal factors as an environment hostile to Negro assertiveness" have been used to keep the Negroes from voting in great numbers.4

This general observation on Negro voting.

Within all states of the South, Negro voting occurs most in the larger cities and least in the rural counties that have high proportions of black population. Further, extremely sharp differences prevail among Negro classes. Teachers, tradesmen, lawyers, businessmen, doctors, and land-owners compose a much larger proportion of Negro voters than of the Negro population. In point of time, Negro


4Ibid., p. 511.
voting has grown quite rapidly since the decision of the Supreme Court, of which much more will be
said in Chapter IV, holding the white primary invalid in April, 1944. 5

5Key, op. cit., p. 519.
APPENDIX IV

Figure 4 deals with the census data on Texas county populations, listing the counties as over ninety persons per square mile, 45.0-39.9 persons per square mile, and less than forty-five persons per square mile. The German counties, twelve in number, have not a single county with over forty-five persons per square mile. The fifty-five Mexican counties include four in the most populous bracket and two in the 45.0-39.9 bracket; thus, approximately one-ninth of the Mexican counties have over forty-five persons per square mile. The Negro counties, on the other hand, include three counties in the first bracket and eleven in the second in their number (56). About one-fourth of the Negro counties are heavily populated, the criterion again being taken as forty-five persons per square mile.
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